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“After the Putsch”: Prospects for Independent Ukraine
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
Extract
There has been considerable speculation as to which of the former Soviet republics could become viable economic entities following the Putsch of August 19-21, 1991, and the resultant dissolution of the USSR. The consensus is that after Russia, Ukraine has the best chances of survival as a European state with a highly developed economy. Yet the picture remains a bleak one. Although Ukraine has advanced industry and has been a major source of grain crops (of winter wheat in particular), a declining standard of living had been forecast by its economic experts for the period 1991-1995, even before the August 24 declaration of independence. The following study will show Ukraine's major advantages and weaknesses, and what sort of prospects lie ahead for an independent Ukraine. As with any statements on the future of the former territories of the Soviet Union, they have to be qualified with the phrase “pending future political developments.” For the most part, the assumption is made that relations between Ukraine and its once and future economic partners will be amicable.
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- Articles
- Information
- Nationalities Papers , Volume 21 , Issue 2: Special Issue - The Ex-Soviet Nationalities Without Gorbachev , Fall 1993 , pp. 35 - 46
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- Copyright © 1993 by the Association for the Study of the Nationalities of the USSR and Eastern Europe, Inc.
References
Notes
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