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Prelates and Politicians in Bosnia: The Role of Religion in Nationalist Mobilisation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Lenard J. Cohen
Lenard J. Cohen*
Affiliation:
Simon Fraser University, Banbury, Canada
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Extract

The role of historical and cultural influences in recent Balkan warfare has been the subject of considerable debate among commentators both within and outside the former Yugoslavia. For example, some observers, who might be considered members of the primordial hatred school, have emphasized the cyclical role of “ancient enmities” and atavistic impulses in the Balkans. In contrast, another group of analysts, who have subscribed to the paradise lost approach, focus on the long periods during which populations of different languages, religions, and other facets of Balkan ethnic identity, managed to peacefully co-exist. This second perspective downplays historical factors and attributes the violence and savagery of recent years to nationalist leaders who whipped up antagonisms to suit their own political agendas.

Type
Part II: The Politics of Disintegration
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 25 , Issue 3: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Inevitable or Avoidable? , September 1997 , pp. 481 - 499
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

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References

Notes

1. Aleksa Djilas, “Fear Thy Neighbor—The Breakup of Yugoslavia,” in Charles A. Kupchan, ed., Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 1995), p. 87. For an excellent survey concerning the impact of religious factors in historical and recent Balkan ethnic conflicts see, Josip Kumpes, “Religija i etnicki sukobi na prostorima bivse Jugoslavije,” in Ivan Grubisic, ed., Konfesije i rat (Split: Centar za religijska istrazivanja, 1995), pp. 257–280. The same author has also prepared the most comprehensive bibliography on the subject, “Religija, politika, etnicnost: selektivna bibliografija,” Migracije teme, Vol. 10, Nos 3–4, 1994, pp. 251–280.Google Scholar

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28. In January 1994, Kuharic had issued a more direct criticism of Tudjman's policies in Bosnia, and also called for better relations among all nationalities, British Broadcasting Corporation Shortwave Broadcast/EE/1903/C, 24 January 1994.Google Scholar

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31. FBIS-EEU-95-071, 13 April 1995, p. 30.Google Scholar

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33. Independent, 15 June 1992, p. 9.Google Scholar

34. FBIS-EEU-94-178, 14 September 1994, p. 57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

35. Karadzic interview with Paul Mojzes, “Confessions of a Serb Leader,” The Christian Century, 16 August 1995.Google Scholar

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38. Agence France Presse, 23 December 1995.Google Scholar