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The Politics of the Conquest of the Caucasus, 1855-1864
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
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The study of politics is popular in Russian history; the examination of Russian politics in its regions is not, at least, not yet. The spectrum of interpretations about autocratic politics includes the parading of litanies of imperial arbitrariness and/or manipulation of interest groups against each other, incidents of ministerial incapacity to restrain the autocrat, examples of the inordinate power of favorites, the failure to establish regularizing institutions that would restrain autocrats, and a series of interesting categories including such wonderfully suggestive terms as “free floaters” proposed in Alfred Rieber's important article on the subject. Whether one is wedded to the notion that tsars decided all in the nineteenth century, or advocate some scheme that emphasizes the plurality of conflicting interests at play in decisionmaking, however, the pattern of scholarly production suggests that regional politics has been of secondary importance, and that in any event documentation often is lacking; in short, such approaches are not seen as ideal lines of inquiry. This article seeks to make a contribution to the debate about the politics of autocrats by examining a localized question where documentation is rather complete and where ministerial/bureaucratic lines may be traced fairly closely, in an attempt to shed added light on Russia's leadership in a time of great crisis, specifically the aftermath of the humiliating defeat in the Crimean War and the tension surrounding the preparations and implementation of the Emancipation and other reforms. To be specific as well as anticipatory, it is argued that there are regional questions of great national, indeed international, importance to autocrats, that the Caucasus was so recognized in the post-Crimean War period, and that those involved in the region affected policy decisions in ways that rivaled, as well as displaced, senior officials in the capital.
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- Copyright © 1996 Association for the Study of Nationalities
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1. Rieber, Alfred J., “Bureaucratic Politics in Imperial Russia,” Social Science History 2:4 (Summer 1978), 399-413. S. Frederick Starr, “Tsarist Government: the Imperial Dimension” in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices (New York, 1978), 3-38, is another insightful overview, directed more specifically at the general problem of Russian imperialism. Questions of imperial decision-making have been addressed most notably by Rieber in his The Politics of Autocracy. Letters of Alexander II to Prince A. I. Bariatinskii, 1857-1864 (The Hague, 1966). Older works, even John F. Baddeley's classic The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus (New York, 1908), as an example close to the subject of this study, ignored how and why successive tsars determined their policies in the Caucasus.Google Scholar
Russian colonialism and imperialism have been major topics of historiographical dispute, especially in recent times, but Marc Raeff, writing in 1971, lamented that “[t]he first difficulty confronting a historian who wishes to analyze the evolution of attitudes and policies toward the nationalities in the Empire before the middle of the nineteenth century is the paucity of both historiography and published sources.” Marc Raeff, “Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy Toward the Nationalities” in Edward Allworth, ed., Soviet Nationality Problems (New York, 1971), 23. Soviet historiography was too diverse to characterize briefly, but two points may be noted: rarely did Soviet scholars address questions of decision-making, except in connection with Russia's foreign affairs, and often the Caucasus and Central Asia were paired for analysis. For recent examples, see N. S. Kiniapina, M. M. Bliev, and V. V. Degoev, Kavkaz i Sredniaia Aziia vo vneshnei politike Rossii. Vtoraia polovina XVIII-80-e gody XIX v. (Moscow, 1984), and the same authors, “Sovremennaia burzhuaznaia istoriografiia politiki Rossii na Kavkaze i v Srednei Azii v XIX veke,” Voprosy istorii (1988), No. 4, 37–53.Google Scholar
2. Such was the view of prospects for the conquest by Murav'ev, N. N., current viceroy of the region, Count M. S. Vorontsov, his predecessor, and other military experts on the area. See also Romanovskii, D. I., “General-fel ‘dmarshal kniaz’ A. I. Bariatinskii i Kavkazskaia voina. 1815-1879 gg.,” Russkaia starina 30 (1881), 247-318, and Winfried Baumgart, The Peace of Paris 1856. Studies in War, Diplomacy, and Peacemaking (Santa Barbara, 1981), 111-112, for British determination to follow up the terms of Austria's December 1855 ultimatum to Russia that included discussion of the future control of the Caucasus.Google Scholar
3. Baddeley, See, passim, and Otchet namestnika Kavkazskago i glavnokomanduiushchago Kavkazskoi armiei (1857, 1858, 1859) (Tiflis, 1861), Bariatinskii's self-congratulatory 1859 report to Alexander, which relates the general course of the conquest. Many passages of A. L. Zisserman's three-volume biography, Fel ‘dmarshal kniaz’ Aleksandr Ivanovich Bariatinskii, 1815-1879 (Moscow, 1888-1891) are barely veiled paraphrases of this report.Google Scholar
4. Kolonial'naia politika rossiiskogo tsarizma v Azerbaidzhane v 20–60 gg. XIX v., part 1 (Moscow-Leningrad, 1936), 280.Google Scholar
5. See my essay, “Nicholas I as Reformer: Russian Attempts to Conquer the Caucasus, 1825-1855” in Banac, Ivo et al., eds., Nation and Ideology (Boulder, CO, 1981), 227–263, for general background, and Laurens H. Rhinelander, Jr., “Viceroy Vorontsov's Administration of the Caucasus” in Ronald G. Suny, ed., Transcaucasia. Nationalism and Social Change (Ann Arbor, 1983), 87–108, for a somewhat differing appreciation of Vorontsov's accomplishments.Google Scholar
6. “O plane budushchikh deistvii na Kavkaze,” draft in Miliutin's handwriting. Russkaia gosudarstvennaia biblioteka, Otdel rukopisei, fund 169 [Miliutin, D. A.], box 19.39, 4 sheets. Except where noted otherwise, subsequent archival references are from this fund. Miliutin had submitted a very similar memorandum in August 1854, but it had been ignored.Google Scholar
7. Bobrovskii, P. O., “Imperator Aleksandr II i ego pervye shagi k pokoreniiu Kavkaza (Epizod iz istorii velikoi Kavkazskoi voiny),” Voennyi sbornik 234:4 (April 1897), 203–215.Google Scholar
8. “O sredstvakh k ustraneniiu sushchestvuiushchikh neudobstv v nachal'stvovanii voiskami na Kavkaze,” box 19.8, [May] 1856, 3 sheets, and “O nekotorykh administrativnykh merakh v otnoshenii k pokornym plemenam Kavkaza,” box 19.9, [May] 1856, 4 sheets, both drafts in Miliutin's hand. The latter memorandum is published in full in Zisserman 2:part 2, 26–29, but erroneously attributed as a report of Prince V. A. Dolgorukov, Sukhozanet's predecessor as War Minister. Bariatinskii's memoranda are printed on pages 13–18 and 30–35.Google Scholar
9. Miliutin's memoirs give the best description of the memoranda and of Bariatinskii's successful opposition to Murav'ev's pessimistic views about future Russian action in the Caucasus. Box 9.1, sheets 35–41; the quote is on sheet 48. See also Bobrovskii, 208-210, and Romanovskii, “General-fel'dmarshal,” especially 307–313.Google Scholar
10. “Zapiski Vasiliia Antonovicha Insarskago,” Russkaia starina 84 (August 1895), 25. Further confirmation that the Caucasus was seen solely as an “internal problem” may be extrapolated from the fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs survey of its nineteenth-century activities, Ocherk istorii ministerstva inostrannykh del 1802-1902 (St. Petersburg, 1902), makes no mention of the Caucasus in the reign of Alexander II, though many other regions are mentioned, most notably Russia's expansion into Central Asia.Google Scholar
11. “O nekotorykh, loc. cit. Google Scholar
12. One of the privileges Bariatinskii used most often was to bypass Sukhozanet when purging weak officers (shipping them back to Sukhozanet for reassignment), replacing them, with Alexander's approval and, again, without Sukhozanet's involvement, with men he knew and respected from earlier service in the region.Google Scholar
13. Box 13.2, sheet 61.Google Scholar
14. Letter of 20 March 1857 from Vladimir Petrovich Butkov to Bariatinskii, as quoted in box 13.2, sheet 36.Google Scholar
15. See box 61.26 for Golovnin's letters to Miliutin in this period.Google Scholar
16. , Zisserman, 67. Letter of 15 May 1857.Google Scholar
17. , Rieber, The Politics of Autocracy, 105. Letter dated 20 May 1857. Emphasis in original.Google Scholar
18. , Zisserman, 77. Letter of 4 June 1857.Google Scholar
19. Box 13.2, sheet 61. Zisserman's biography contains a large part of this correspondence, as does Akty, sobrannye Kavkazskoi arkheograficheskoi komissiei, 12 (Tiflis, 1904), but the letters in the latter reference often are edited without acknowledgement.Google Scholar
20. Box 13.2, sheet 66.Google Scholar
21. , Zisserman, 108–109. Letter dated 24 June 1857.Google Scholar
22. The correspondence is extant in the Miliutin archive, and published with minor omissions in Zisserman, 142–169.Google Scholar
23. , Zisserman, 115–116. Letter of 10/22 December 1857.Google Scholar
24. , Rieber, 129. See also Alexander's 28 July 1859 letter to Bariatinskii, 130-131, in which Alexander repeats the possible desirability of a negotiated settlement with Shamil'. The immediate cause of the latter letter was the report of the Russian ambassador in Constantinople that Shamil's agents there had stated that Shamil' was willing to enter into peace negotiations. Both Gorchakov and Sukhozanet also wrote Bariatinskii recommending acceptance of Shamil”s offer. Zisserman, 268-270. Gorchakov's letter emphasized the dangerous political situation in Western Europe and reported that Alexander already had instructed the Russian ambassador in Constantinople to agree to negotiations, with Bariatinskii empowered to work out any settlement, but Bariatinskii opposed any agreement with Shamil', even if he should escape the siege Russian forces had begun at his mountain retreat. See Bariatinskii's letter to Gorchakov, 269-270. Miliutin's memoirs, box 13.3, sheets 52–52 overleaf and 55, suggest that Alexander did not understand how close Bariatinskii was to final victory, thinking it was only another minor expedition with many more needed before final conquest.Google Scholar
25. , Zisserman, 206–210, provides details, including relevant correspondence.Google Scholar
26. Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Russkoi federatsii (GARF, formerly TsGAOR), fund 722 (Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich), index 1, item 91, sheet 109 overleaf. Entry of 22 December 1858.Google Scholar
27. See my article, “Russia's Conquest and Pacification of the Caucasus: Relocation Becomes A Pogrom in the Post-Crimean War Period” in Nationalities Papers, Vol. 23, No. 4 (December 1995), pp. 675–686.Google Scholar
28. For a general assessment of Russian diplomacy related to the Polish question in and around 1863, see Tatishchev, S. S. Imperator Aleksandr II. Ego zhizn' i tsarstvovanie I (St. Petersburg, 1903), especially chapter 17.Google Scholar
29. fact, In, in his memoirs Miliutin quotes a letter from Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich to Bariatinskii, hand carried to the viceroy by Khanykov, N. V., the head of the expedition, that also refers to the mission as an opportunity to use British troubles in India to achieve Russian goals: box 13.2, sheet 133); see also Seymour Becker Russia's Protectorates in Central Asia: Bukhara and Khiva, 1865-1924 (Cambridge, MA, 1968), especially chapter 1. Becker, 14, traces Russian expansion to pre-Petrine times, and in the late 1850s stood “on the threshold” of the region and considered “further Russian advance … inevitable.” The exploits in the Far East of Murav'ev, N. N. (soon to be rewarded in part by the hyphenated “Amurskii”) unaddressed in this article, offer a contemporary parallel example of much that has been presented here. See, for example, Tatishchev, I:275-78, for suggestive details.Google Scholar
30. , GARF, fund 722, inventory 1, item 91, sheet 110 overleaf.Google Scholar