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43. The state utilized Church as a tool for its social activities. Therefore, Church was allocated a role to increase number of married couples. This was assumed to maintain the basic unit of national life, i.e. family. Along with that, the Orthodox Church carried out health services against alcoholism. The Romanian Orthodox Church was also ready to provide these services in attempt to illustrate a clear evidence of its special relationship with the state. See e.g. George R. Ursul, “From Political Freedom to Religious Independence: The Romanian Orthodox Church, 1877–1925,” in Stephen Fischer-Galati, Radu R. Florescu and George Ursul, eds, Romania Between East and West. Historical Essays in Memory of Constantin C. Giurescu (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1982).Google Scholar

44. That is why Article 82 of the new Romanian Constitution said that His Majesty Carol I's sons would be raised in the Eastern Orthodox Religion. See <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carol_I_of_Romania>..>Google Scholar

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51. Immediately after Ceauşescu came to power, he asserted Romania's equality with the Soviet Union by renaming the Romanian Workers' Party the Romanian Communist Party and the People's Republic of Romania the Romanian Socialist Republic (see Chen, “The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Leninist Legacy,” p. 190). That is why throughout the paper I use Romanian Workers' Party and the Romanian Communist Party interchangeably.Google Scholar

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64. The “muscovites” were those who passed the years of illegality in Moscow. There was a friction between them those who passed the years of illegality in Romanian jails. See Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania , p. 104.Google Scholar

65. The future of Transylvania emerged to be a point of controversy between the Hungarian and Romanian communist leaders at the end of the World War II. However, conceding to the loss of Bessarabia after so many years made it possible for the Romanians to strengthen their claims over Transylvania. See Chen, “The Roots of Illiberal Nationalism in Romania: A Historical Institutionalist Analysis of the Leninist Legacy,” p. 178.Google Scholar

66. One can mention Mátyás Rákosi in Hungary, Ana Pauker in Romania and Rudolf Šlansky in Czechoslovakia.Google Scholar

67. Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceauşescu's Romania , p. 104.Google Scholar

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69. The invasion of Hungary by the Soviet troops in 1956 worked for the benefit of Romania. Khrushchev, in an effort to present that the Soviet Union was not only able to send its troops into certain countries, but also withdraw them from others, indeed withdrew troops from Romania in 1958. Therefore, Romania became the only signatory of the Warsaw Pact to be relieved of Soviet military occupation. See e.g. Pavel Campeanu and Ronald Radzai, “National Fervor in Eastern Europe: The Case of Romania,” Social Research, Vol. 58, No. 4, 1991, pp. 805–829.Google Scholar

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73. Ibid., pp. 6–7.Google Scholar

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76. Ibid., p. 30.Google Scholar

77. Ibid. pp. 33–35.Google Scholar

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79. To give a quick example: the literary critic Eugen Lovinescu was one of the first interwar figures to be restored to the patrimony of authors acceptable to a leftist regime, owing to his spirited opposition to interwar fascism and his adherence to liberal-democratic principles, yet in the 1980s these commendable items in his resume were overlooked in order to revile his welcome of “alien” Western standards (see ibid., p. 110).Google Scholar

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96. Ceauşescu promoted Romanian speakers belonging to different Christian denominations than Orthodox Christianity in minority churches in attempt to change the language of the Church. This is an interesting example of utilizing ethnically Romanian religious minorities for the regime's nationalist purposes. Rudolf Joó and Andrew Ludanyi, The Hungarian Minority's Situation in Ceauşescu's Romania (New York: Columbia University Press East European Monographs, No. CCCLXXIII, 1994).Google Scholar

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114. Ibid., p. 77.Google Scholar

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