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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 20 November 2018
The fate of democracy in Kazakstan may well depend less upon decisions taken in Kazakstan's capital, Almaty (the capital is now Aqmola), than upon what takes place in Kazakstan's far-flung and disparate regions. This should come as no surprise to anyone who appreciates the history and complexities of democratic development. The history of democracy is a history of bottom-up initiative. The democratic institutions that are the most successful and enduring are those that originate from the common and everyday interests and concerns of citizens. Even in historical cases where the political institutions of democracy were adopted consciously and deliberately to break with authoritarian tradition, democracy has been closely associated with local control, self-governance, public participation, and citizen empowerment. The fate of Kazakstan's constitutional order, on the other hand, depends almost exclusively upon decisions taken at the “center” of the new Kazakstan government. The establishment of a constitutional order is a highly conscious and deliberate process. It is also a highly political undertaking. To what extent has the democratic process in Kazakstan corresponded to the process of the establishment of a constitutional order in Kazakstan? To what extent has constitutional development supported limited, accountable government based on popular sovereignty? To what extent can democratic process and constitutional development be expected to mutually reinforce one another in Kazakstan's future? The answers to these questions have great importance for the development of democracy in Kazakstan. They have great importance for the efforts of the international community to encourage democratic development in Kazakstan. These are the key questions of this article.
1. Economic development and democratic development are linked but are by no means synonymous. Democratic reform may be achieved even in circumstances of austerity. Economic development by itself says little about democratic development. The linkages between the two are subtle. According to many economists, Kazakstan's economic prospects are positive but risky. Much depends on the ability of the government to avoid “populist spending policies to address discontent.” Such policies would be likely to “destabilize the economy and breed uncertainty” by pushing up demands for revenue, encouraging rent seeking, and thereby discouraging investment, both national and foreign. See Kazakhstan: The Transition to a Market Economy (Washington: World Bank, 1993), Chapter 3.Google Scholar
2. Major international institutions and foreign governments have given significant encouragement and assistance to Kazakstan in its quest for stability in the post-Soviet international community. Yet virtually all assistance efforts in the area of democracy promotion continue to emphasize conceptions of democracy building which emphasize the dominance of central government. For instance, a recent GAO report on U.S. government funded efforts to promote democracy in Russia describes activities in political party development, civil–military relations, and trade union development. No reference is made to the importance of regional administration, fiscal federalism, or the role of regional actors in influencing the development of democracy. The GAO report on U.S. government assistance to Central Asia has not yet been made public. “Promoting Democracy: Progress Repot on U.S. Democratic Development Assistance to Russia,” Washington, DC, U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO/NSIAD-96–40, February 1996. Democracy assistance efforts focused on the central institutions are likely to contribute to the problem of overdeveloped executive branches rather than to encourage decentralization. This is a commonly encountered problem of the presumption of universal cultural uniformity. Democratizers are often comfortable thinking in terms of the institutions that they know the best, assuming that all kinds of democratic development will result in the same kind of democratic institutions. Investments in democracy, consequently, tend to be investments in specific institutions. In a review of U.S. government democracy programs in Eastern Europe, Thomas Carothers notes that “assistance has been directed to institutions in which there is little impetus to reform.” Thomas Carothers, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington: Carnegie Endowment, 1996), p. 92.Google Scholar
3. The Minsk Declaration (8 December 1991) announced among other things that the “USSR shall henceforth cease to exist.” However, the formal demise of the Soviet Union is usually associated with the “Alma-Ata Declaration” (21 December 1991), which also announced that the “USSR shall henceforth cease to exist.” It was the Alma-Ata Declaration that won international acceptance. For a discussion of the politics of the collapse of the Soviet Union, see Gleason, Gregory, “The Federal Formula and the Collapse of the USSR,” Publius, Vol. 22, Summer 1992, pp. 141–163.Google Scholar
4. For background on Kazakstan, see Fierman, William, Soviet Central Asia: The Failed Transformation (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991); Ingvar Svanberg, “Kazakhs,” in Smith, Graham, ed., The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union (London: Longman, 1990), pp. 199–121; Olcott, Martha Brill, The Kazakhs, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1987); Sagdeev, Roald Z. and Eisenhower, Susan, eds, Central Asia: Conflict, Resolution and Change (Chevy Chase: CPSS Press, 1995).Google Scholar
5. See, for instance, George Soros's argument that the unexpected cost of the end of the Cold War is that it is clear now how “much easier [it is] to mobilize society behind a real or imagined national injury than behind abstract ideas like democracy or open society.” Soros, George, “Toward Open Societies,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 98, Spring 1995, pp. 65–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6. For a discussion of the impact of Soviet institutions, see Amrekulov, Nurlan and Masanov, Nurbulat, Kazakhstan mezhdu proshlym I budushchim (Almaty: Gylym, 1994).Google Scholar
7. CSCE Parliamentary Assembly Press Release (8 March 1994).Google Scholar
8. See Baimakhanov, M. T., Parlament I Zakonodatel'naya Vlast’ Kazakhstana (Almaty: Zheti Zharghy, 1995).Google Scholar
9. Personal communication with Azhar Kusainova.Google Scholar
10. Wheare, K. C., Federal Government (Oxford: Clarendon, 1946), p. 11.Google Scholar
11. Thorburn, Hugh G., “Federalism and Development,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1984, p. 355.Google Scholar
12. See Riker, William, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1964).Google Scholar
13. The powers not delegated to the U.S. by the constitution nor prohibited by it to the states are reserved to these states respectively or to the people.Google Scholar
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