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Between Ambition and Paralysis—Germany's Policy toward Yugoslavia 1991–1993

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 November 2018

Michael Thumann
Michael Thumann*
Affiliation:
Die Zeit, Hamburg, Germany
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Extract

The decay of Yugoslavia since 1990 has put an end to the experiment of a state of Southern Slavs. At the same time it has destroyed the myth of a peaceful and strong Western Europe. The continent that had displayed an impressive performance of cooperation and skillful diplomatic maneuvering during the last years of the Cold War proved to be incapable of coping with the problems in its southeastern backyard. In the beginning of the conflict, the European Community assumed responsibility for negotiating cease-fires and a peace settlement for the embattled Yugoslav states. But all efforts were fruitless. In 1995, it was primarily the interference of the United States that brought about the peace treaty of Dayton for Bosnia-Hercegovina.

Type
Part III: International Reactions to Yugoslavia's Disintegration
Information
Nationalities Papers , Volume 25 , Issue 3: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Inevitable or Avoidable? , September 1997 , pp. 575 - 585
Copyright
Copyright © 1997 Association for the Study of Nationalities 

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References

Notes

1. Despite the significance of this topic for German foreign policy after 1990, only a few articles have been published since: Arthur Heinrich, “Neue deutsche Auβenpolitik, Selbstversuche zwischen Zagreb und Brussel,” Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, No. 12, 1991, pp. 1446–1458; Alexander Mühlen, “Die deutsche Rolle bei der Anerkennung der jugoslawischen Sezessionsstaaten,” Liberal, June 1992, pp. 49–55; John Newhouse, “The Diplomatic Round. Dodging the Problem,” New Yorker, 24 August 1992; Heinz-Jürgen Axt, “Hat Genscher Jugoslawien entzweit? Mythen und Fakten zur Auβenpolitik des vereinten Deutschlands,” Europa-Archiv, No. 12, 1993; Martin Rosefeldt, “Deutschlands und Frankreichs Jugoslawienpolitik im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (1991–1993),” Südosteuropa, Nos 11/12, 1993, pp. 621–654; Hanns W. Maull, “Germany in the Yugoslav Crisis,” Survival, Winter 1995–1996, pp. 99–130.Google Scholar

2. Quoted by The Times, 26 April 1993, p. 64.Google Scholar

3. Walter Manoschek, Serbien ist judenfrei, Militärische Besatzungspolitik und Judenvernichtung in Serbien 1941–42 (München, 1993).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4. Wolfgang J. Mommsen, Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik 1870–1914, Die Aussenpolitik des deutschen Reiches (Berlin, 1993), pp. 263–264.Google Scholar

5. Andrej Mitrović, “Germany's Attitude Toward the Balkans 1912–1914,” in Bela K. Kiraly and Dimitrije Djordjevic, eds, East Central Society and the Balkan Wars (New York, 1987), pp. 295–316, 310.Google Scholar

6. See Mitrovic, p. 313.Google Scholar

7. Financial Times, 5 February 1992, p. 5.Google Scholar

8. Bild-Zeitung, 31 August 1991.Google Scholar

9. Bild-Zeitung, 9 October 1991.Google Scholar

10. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 19 November 1991.Google Scholar

11. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 November 1991. Die Welt contended “that American and British policy toward the Balkans and Yugoslavia was directed backwards,” 14 October 1991 and 17 December 1991.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

12. Die Tageszeitung, 17 December 1991.Google Scholar

13. However, he added, Croatian sovereignty could be accepted only if Zagreb grants cultural and political autonomy to the Serb minority. See: Archiv der Gegenwart, 1 July 1991, p. 35796.Google Scholar

14. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 July 1991.Google Scholar

15. “Deutscher Bundestag”, Stenographischer Bericht (Bonn, 15 October 1992), p. 9635.Google Scholar

16. See Genscher's description of his travel to Yugoslavia in: Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen (Berlin, 1995), p. 939.Google Scholar

17. Deutscher Bundestag, Stenographischer Bericht (Bonn, 19 June 1991), p. 2564.Google Scholar

18. See for example Heinz-Jürgen Axt who calls it “Genscher's turn” (“Wende”), p. 354.Google Scholar

19. Interview with Genscher, Die Zeit, 30 August 1991, p. 5.Google Scholar

20. Die Zeit, 25 June 1993, p. 5.Google Scholar

21. John Newhouse, p. 65.Google Scholar

22. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Erinnerungen, pp. 961–962.Google Scholar

23. Die Zeit, 25 June 1993, p. 5.Google Scholar

24. New York Times, 24 December 1991, p. A3; The Times, 19 December 1991, p. 16; Time, 30 December 1991, p. 13; Newsweek, 6 January 1992, p. 16.Google Scholar

25. Even former German ambassadors asserted that recognition added insult to injury in the Balkan crisis: Horst Grabert, former ambassador to Belgrade, Die Zeit, 2 July 1993, p. 8; and Hans Arnold, “Der Balkan-Krieg und die Vereinten Nationen,” Europa-Archiv, No. 2, 1993, pp. 33–40, 38.Google Scholar

26. In order to justify his policy Genscher emphasises the collective decision of all EU Foreign Ministers in Maastricht. See Erinnerungen, p. 961.Google Scholar

27. Henry Wynaendts, L'engrenage. Chroniques yougoslaves, juillet 1991-aoǔt 1992 (Paris, 1993).Google Scholar

28. Žarko Puhovski, professor of political philosophy at the University of Zagreb, in a conversation with the author on 31 March 1994.Google Scholar

29. Quoted by John Newhouse, p. 66.Google Scholar

30. Hans-Peter Schwarz, “Auβenpolitik ohne Konzept,” Rheinischer Merkur, 1 October 1993, p. 3.Google Scholar

31. On the annual Munich conference on security in February 1993 several Western officials publicly chided Germany for refusing to commit troops to peacekeeeping. See: International Herald Tribune, 8 February 1993, p. 2.Google Scholar

32. See Financial Times, 10 February 1993, p. 12; and Thomas Kielinger/Max Otte, “Germany: The Pressured Power,” Foreign Policy, Summer 1993, pp. 44–62, 53.Google Scholar

33. According to a report of Deutsche Presse Agentur, 24 May 1992.Google Scholar

34. On the EC summit meeting in Copenhagen, 21–22 June 1993.Google Scholar

35. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 15 January 1994.Google Scholar