^{note (1) in page 52} National Institute Economic Review no. 51, February 1971, page 47.

^{note (2) in page 52} On the basis of the equation shown in the note to chart 1, the 95 per cent confidence interval for the GDP growth of 1.1 per cent for 1971 (as detailed in Chapter II) is a growth of industrial production of 0.13 ± 0.87 per cent.

^{note (1) in page 54} National Institute Economic Review no. 41, May 1967, pages 44-54.

^{note (1) in page 55} Tariffs on cars have been steadily declining since 1966 from 25 1/2 per cent and under the present Kennedy Round agreement will stabilize at 11 per cent on 1 January 1972.

^{note (2) in page 55} E.g., the BAC 1-11, the Trident, the HS748 on the civil side, the Nimrod and others on the military side, and the RR-Spey engines for US-built Phantom aircraft which in 1968 added £54 million (though in 1969 only £11 million) to the industry's export earnings.

^{note (3) in page 55} The value of the incoming traffic connected with the Concorde project alone is estimated to be £20-£25 million in 1970.

^{note (1) in page 56} National Institute Economic Review no. 51, February 1970, page 52.

^{note (2) in page 56} Until about spring 1970, most merchant ship contracts were taken on fixed prices, with penalty clauses for late delivery. Shipyards therefore had to estimate their building costs 3-4 years ahead and they might have underestimated the rate of wage rises.

^{note (1) in page 57} The big increase in the level of the textile output index from 1966 to end-1968 was due to man-made fibres; pro duction of these is classified under textiles and rose from 882 million lb in 1966 to 1,189 million lb in 1968, or 35 per cent in two years.

^{note (1) in page 59} National Institute Economic Review no. 51, February 1970, page 57.

^{note (1) in page 60} Other definitional points to be noted are (a) stoppages involving fewer than ten workers, or lasting less than one day, are excluded except where the aggregate of working days lost exceeds 100, and (b) the statistics are concerned only with disputes connected with terms and conditions of employment, i.e. strikes of a political nature are excluded.

^{note (2) in page 60} For an estimate of the cost of strikes in terms of aggregate industrial output foregone, see above, page 52.

^{note (1) in page 61} The DEP Gazette estimates that the loss of working days might be 350,000, 180,000, 1,250,000, 100,000 and 270,000, respectively.

^{note (1) in page 62} ‘Days lost’ is less meaningful in the car industry than in most. As it is so specialized, quite small strikes can cause shutdowns of production out of all proportion to the size of the original strike. The fact that these shutdowns are often at other establishments means that this effect is not picked up in days lost as published by the DEP Gazette. Therefore, the numbers of stoppages may be a better measure in this case.

^{note (2) in page 62} In 1970 there were only three strikes in vehicles involving more than 50,000 lost days; together these three accounted for 340,000 lost days.

^{note (3) in page 62} In fact, there were over 100 more stoppages in metal manufacture in 1970 than in 1969 (a 40 per cent increase).

^{note (1) in page 63} There is some evidence of a weak but positive correlation between unemployment and strike activity by industry in 1970.