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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 26 March 2020
In the recent atmosphere of gloom over the state of the world economy it is interesting to find that our forecast of the growth of output in OECD countries in 1977 is virtually the same as it was a year ago (at 4–4 1/2 per cent in real terms), while growth in 1976 appears to have been above our expectations (5–52 per cent compared with 4 1/2 per cent). Moreover our forecasts last February were not at the time regarded as particularly pessimistic either in terms of the prospect which they held out or in relation to the expectations of other observers. OECD, for example, had predicted only 4 per cent (on unchanged policies).
(1) OECD, Economic Outlook 20, December 1976, pages 22-3.
(2) Neil A. Stevens and James E. Turley, ‘Economic Pause— Some Perspective and Interpretation’, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis Review, December 1976.
(2) James F. Rayens, ‘Measuring Capacity Utilisation in Manufacturing’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Quarterly Review, Winter 1976.
(1) OECD, op.cit., pages 27-9.
(1) OECD, op.cit., pages 50-2.
(1) This figure is calculated, as are other prices and values in this section unless otherwise indicated, in terms of ‘new’ SDRs (that is a weighted average of currency values, see National Institute Economic Review, no. 69, August 1974, page 45). Table 24 of the Statistical Appendix gives SDR/US dollar rates of exchange.
(1) Claims that prices of OPEC imports have risen faster than general indices of exports of OECD countries indicate could be true if the supplying countries' prices rose more than the average, if prices of the particular commodities imported by OPEC rose unusually rapidly, if exporters charged more to OPEC countries than to other customers for the same commodities, or if shipping costs were rising faster than the price of goods. Reweighting export price indices by share in OPEC imports, whether by country or by a combination of country and commodity, offers little evidence to support the first two possibilities, as the resulting indices are almost identical to the general index of prices of exports of manufactures. Discriminatory pricing, which is impossible to measure, seems quite probable, however, as the speed of the rise in imports, in experience in government purchasing departments, and the rapid growth of income should all have reduced sensitivity to price. The fourth hypothesis is also plausible because of the shipping delays incurred through inadequate port facilities, but such import price data as are available do not indicate a very large effect.