^{note (1) page 32} National Institute Economic Review no. 46, November 1968, pages 4-21. The forecast in this Review did not take account of the measures of 22 November, the probable effects of which were indicated in a Press Release issued on 24 November. The relevant part of the text of this Release is reproduced here, on page 85.

^{note (1) page 33} This seems to have been confirmed in the latest official statement on public expenditure, ‘Public Expenditure 1968-69 to 1970-71’ (Cmnd 3936).

^{note (2) page 33} Public sector investment, as defined here, excludes steel.

^{note (3) page 33} And the results of the CBI Inquiry, announced on 21 February, appear also to confirm an expectation of a large rise in capital expenditures.

^{note (1) page 35} Allowing for the anticipatory reduction in importing which will precede removal of the prior deposit scheme.

^{note (1) page 36} The fall in the ‘savings ratio’ shown for the first quarter in table 3 is largely a result of the sudden large drop in real disposable income caused by payment of the special charge on investment incomes.

^{note (1) page 38} We have accordingly excluded from our balance of payments forecast table (table 4), any figures of the long-term capital account, although retaining in the text a discussion of some of the factors likely to influence it.

^{note (1) page 40} Department of Economic Affairs, ‘The Task Ahead’, Economic Assessment to 1972. HMSO.

^{note (2) page 40} Green Paper, page 7, paragraph 18.

^{note (3) page 40} Green Paper, page 8, paragraph 15.

^{note (4) page 40} Green Paper, page 9, paragraph 1.

^{note (1) page 41} Assuming there is no autonomous ‘shake-out’ of unem ployment which has been standing high, in 1967 and 1968, relative to the level of output, employment, and other labour market indicators. (See above, pages 27-29.)

^{note (2) page 41} Green Paper, page 44, paragraph 23.

^{note (3) page 41} Neither of the variants is in fact much discussed in the Green Paper, and in the case of the ‘higher’ variant in particular it is rather difficult to reconcile what appears to be the higher productivity growth assumption which is said to underlie it with the higher growth rate predicted upon it. Cf. Green Paper, paragraphs 22-23, and table 4.3.

^{note (4) page 41} Because of the way the information is set out in the Green Paper, it is not possible to show exports and imports of goods and services in the usual fashion. Growth rates for goods imports and exports are shown, and the balance on services is given separately. There seems no very obvious reason why the Green Paper could not have shown goods and services together in the normal way.

^{note (1) page 42} It is of course true that the Green Paper envisages a ‘higher’ variant, in which faster productivity increases would allow 4 per cent growth; and also that it acknowledges that the situation ‘must be kept under constant review’ (Green Paper, page 43, para. 19.)

^{note (2) page 42} The Green Paper choice represents a clear reversal of the earlier convention of extrapolating into the future the acceleration of the rate of rise in productivity (which was occurring even before the 1967-68 productivity gains).

^{note (3) page 42} The ‘basic case’ implied growth for 1969-1972, given our 1969 forecast, is for an annual rate of rise in the total of private non-dwelling investment of nearly 5 per cent. It seems unlikely that investment in the non-manufacturing industrial and services sector should proceed at much more than about 4 per cent per annum implying a growth in manu facturing investment at rates well over 9 per cent per annum from 1969 to 1972. This would be a considerably higher rate than might be inferred from the Green Paper's assumed 4 per cent annual rate of increase in manufacturing output.

^{note (1) page 44} The Green Paper estimate that defence expenditure overseas will fall by about 30 per cent between 1967 and 1972 seems highly optimistic, particularly as expenditure was virtually unchanged in the first three quarters of 1968 as compared with the corresponding period of 1967. But the surplus on private invisibles, shown as rising from £686 million to £900 million, was already running at an annual rate of £850 million by the two middle quarters of last year. It is unlikely that the effects of devaluation on travel earnings were anything like exhausted in this period. There should also be gains to come on shipping account if expectations about visible trends are fulfilled, and on the same assumptions it should be possible to reduce Bank rate to a more normal level, thereby achieving substantial savings in interest payments on sterling balances.