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SR 97: Post-Closure Safety for a KBS 3 Deep Repository for Spent Nuclear Fuel - Overview -

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2011

Allan Hedin ,
Ulrik Kautsky ,
Lena Morén ,
Jan-Olof Selroos ,
Patrik Sellin ,
Anders Ström  and
Tönis Papp
Allan Hedin
Affiliation:
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, P.O. Box 5864, SE-102 40 Stockholm, Sweden
Ulrik Kautsky
Affiliation:
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, P.O. Box 5864, SE-102 40 Stockholm, Sweden
Lena Morén
Affiliation:
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, P.O. Box 5864, SE-102 40 Stockholm, Sweden
Jan-Olof Selroos
Affiliation:
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, P.O. Box 5864, SE-102 40 Stockholm, Sweden
Patrik Sellin
Affiliation:
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, P.O. Box 5864, SE-102 40 Stockholm, Sweden
Anders Ström
Affiliation:
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, P.O. Box 5864, SE-102 40 Stockholm, Sweden
Tönis Papp
Affiliation:
Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, P.O. Box 5864, SE-102 40 Stockholm, Sweden
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Abstract

In preparation for coming site investigations for siting of a deep repository for spent nuclear fuel, the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, SKB has carried out the long- term safety assessment SR 97, requested by the Swedish Government. The repository is of the KBS-3 type, where the fuel is placed in isolating copper canisters with a high-strength cast iron insert. The canisters are surrounded by bentonite clay in individual deposition holes at a depth of 500 m in granitic bedrock. Geological data are taken from three sites in Sweden to shed light on different conditions in Swedish granitic bedrock.

The future evolution of the repository system is analyzed in the form of five scenarios. The first is a base scenario where the repository is postulated to be built entirely according to specifications and where present-day conditions in the surroundings, including climate, persist. The four other scenarios show the evolution if the repository contains a few initially defective canisters, in the event of climate change, in the event of earthquakes, and in the event of future inadvertent human intrusion.

The principal conclusion of the assessment is that the prospects of building a safe deep repository for spent nuclear fuel in Swedish granitic bedrock are very good. The results of the assessment also serve as a basis for formulating requirements and preferences regarding the bedrock in site investigations, for designing a program for site investigations, for formulating functional requirements on the repository's barriers, and for prioritization of research.

Type
Research Article
Information
MRS Online Proceedings Library (OPL) , Volume 663: Symposium – Scientific Basis for Nuclear Waste management XXIV , 2000 , 739
Copyright
Copyright © Materials Research Society 2001

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References

REFERENCES

1. Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company, SR 97 - Post-closure safety. Main report, Volumes I and II; SKB Technical Report, TR-99-06, SKB, Stockholm, Sweden (1999).Google Scholar
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