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Proliferation Resistance of Borosilicate Glass as a Host Form for Weapons-Grade Plutonium

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 September 2012

G. S. Cerefice  and
K. W. Wenzel
G. S. Cerefice
Affiliation:
Bldg. NW12–312, 138 Albany St., Cambridge, MA. 02139; [email protected](Primary contact)
K. W. Wenzel
Affiliation:
Department of Nuclear Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Abstract

To examine the proliferation resistance of borosilicate glass, a process to extract and recover a plutonium analog (thorium) from borosilicate glass was developed and examined. The glass matrix examined was a modified standard frit consisting of the ARM-1 frit (with simulated fission products) loaded with 2 wt. % thorium (as an analog for plutonium) and 2 wt. % each of three rare earth elements (Gd, Sm, Eu), which were added for criticality control and to possibly increase the proliferation resistance of the glass matrix. The plutonium analog was extracted from the crushed glass with a nitric acid dissolution process, and subsequently decontaminated using a solvent extraction process. The acid dissolution process was able to extract 88.4 ± 6.8 % of the plutonium surrogate from the glass host form. The bench top solvent extraction process was 30.2 ± 10.9 % efficient in recovering the plutonium analog as a purified product. Overall, this process was able to extract 26.7 ± 9.9 % of the plutonium analog from the glass as a purified product. To quantify the proliferation resistance of borosilicate glass as a host form for weapons-grade plutonium, MCNP was used to determine the compressed critical mass of a plutonium alloy with the same composition as the product of the extraction process. For the average product composition, the compressed critical mass was 4.7 kg of material. On average, one compressed critical mass could be recovered from 613 kg of borosilicate glass (2 wt. % Pu loading).

Type
Research Article
Information
MRS Online Proceedings Library (OPL) , Volume 465: Symposium II – Scienfific Basis for Nuclear Waste Management XX , 1996 , 1237
Copyright
Copyright © Materials Research Society 1997

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References

REFERENCES

[1] National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control. Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. (National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1994) p. 2.Google Scholar
[2] A more complete description of the details of this work is given in Cerefice, Proliferation, Gary S. Resistance of Borosilicate Glass as a Host Form for Weapons-Grade Plutonium. (Masters Thesis, MIT. June 1996)Google Scholar
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