Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dzt6s Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T01:19:03.614Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Troppi capi e troppo pochi indiani: la leadership del centro-sinistra

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 January 2016

Gianfranco Pasquino
Gianfranco Pasquino*
Affiliation:
Johns Hopkins University (Bologna Center), Via Belmeloro, 11; 40126 Bologna, Italy. E-mail: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Summary

Since its defeat in the 2001 general election, the Italian centre-left has been unable to come to any agreement on the question of its political leadership, either inside or outside parliament. For various reasons, neither of the defeated candidates—Francesco Rutelli of the Margherita and Piero Fassino, the new secretary of the Democrats of the Left—was able to take on this role. Nor could the centre-left agree on appointing Massimo D'Alema as the alliance's spokesperson in parliament. As a result, the choice regarding the alliance leadership was continually postponed with the excuse: ‘The centre-left has lots of prominent figures. When the time comes we will choose one of them’. For a time, there was popular support in favour of a leadership role for Sergio Cofferati, the former Secretary of the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL). However, the likelihood of this scenario receded with his decision to run as candidate-mayor for Bologna. Subsequently, the return from Brussels of the only centre-left leader to have won a general election, Romano Prodi, seemed to resolve the leadership question. However, Prodi quickly became aware that, while the party oligarchs of the centre-left were prepared to make him leader, they were not willing to yield much power. Prodi therefore suggested the use of electoral primaries to decide the leadership issue. In this way, he hoped to build up sufficient consensus from the Olive Tree/centre-left electorate to allow him to become not only head of the government, but also the real leader of the alliance. To date, however, the problems surrounding the centre-left leadership and the undefined nature of the Olive Tree remain unresolved.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Italy , Volume 10 , Issue 1: Special Issue: Italy under Berlusconi , May 2005 , pp. 95 - 108
Copyright
Copyright © Association for the study of Modern Italy 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Notes

1. On the judiciary, see chapter 4 of Guarnieri, Carlo, Giustizia e politica. I nodi della Seconda Repubblica , Il Mulino, Bologna, 2003. On constitutional reform, the divisions within the centre-left are persistent and run deep. See Bassanini, Franco, (ed.), Costituzione: una riforma sbagliata, Passigli, Florence, 2004 and Pasquino, Gianfranco, ‘Una transizione da spacchettare e ridisegnare’, Il Mulino, 52, 6, 2003, pp. 1030–9. In government, the centre-left could not agree on the best solution to the conflict of interests question, with the result that it was left unresolved. See the eye-witness account in Passigli, Stefano, Democrazia e conflitto d'interessi: Il caso italiano, Ponte Alle Grazie, Florence, 2001.Google Scholar

2. For a detailed and sophisticated analysis of the centre-left in opposition, see Newell, James, ‘The Opposition Role of the Centre-Left Party’, in Blondel, Jean and Segatti, Paolo (eds), Italian Politics: The Second Berlusconi Government , Berghahn, New York and Oxford, 2003, pp. 78–94. For an overview, see the chapters in Tuccari, Francesco (ed.), L'opposizione al governo Berlusconi, Laterza, Rome–Bari, 2004.Google Scholar

3. See Diamanti, Ilvo, ‘Il popolo del centro-sinistra: primarie e listone allargato’, La Repubblica , 18 July 2004.Google Scholar

4. It should be noted that Amato had often criticized the very existence of the Ulivo.Google Scholar

5. On the manner in which Rutelli was selected and his impact on the campaign, see the chapters by Pasquino, Gianfranco and Barisione, Mauro in Pasquino, Gianfranco (ed.), Dall'Ulivo al governo Berlusconi: Le elezioni del 13 maggio 2001 e il sistema politico italiano , Il Mulino, Bologna, 2002.Google Scholar

6. The term ‘correntone’ does not denote any great size, but rather refers to the wide-ranging (and confused) mixture of different positions and personalities it encompasses.Google Scholar

7. Following the centre-left performance in the 2004 European elections and a number of important subnational election victories, Piero Fassino observed that Moretti may have been wrong. However, the real test, of course, will be the 2006 general election.Google Scholar

8. Some intellectuals close to Rifondazione have even spoken of two ‘Rights’: the Right of Berlusconi and that of the technocrats within the Ulivo.Google Scholar

9. Although, in Italy, as in various other countries, there is a long tradition of trade unionists also being involved in political activities and having party affiliations. Indeed, the career path of many a trade union leader has culminated in parliament.Google Scholar

10. Since the 1993 local political reforms, the resignation of a directly elected mayor triggers the dissolution of the municipal chamber and new elections. If Cofferati were to decide to step down from his post in Bologna, it would therefore pose significant risks, for it would not go down well at all with the electorate of the Left, either in Bologna or nationwide.Google Scholar

11. The term ‘girotondisti’ refers to middle-class, grassroots demonstrations against Berlusconi and his government. On many occasions the campaigners encircled politically symbolic institutions, chanting their protest against the new occupation of power. The term derives from a nursery-rhyme game similar to ‘ring a ring of roses’.Google Scholar

12. See Ginsborg, Paul on the ‘reflexive middle classes’, most recently in Italy and its Discontents 1980–2001 , Penguin, London, 2001.Google Scholar

13. For example, the clash between the ‘new’ Cofferati and the ‘old’ D'Alema in a memorable episode of the Rai 3 current affairs programme ‘Ballarò’ in spring 2003.Google Scholar

14. On this point, it is interesting to note that both Fausto Bertinotti and Giuliano Amato (who has taken on the thankless task of programme co-ordinator) have once again brought up the classic myths of the Left: the Programme Office (Ufficio per il Programma) and the Programmatic Convention (Convenzione programmatica).Google Scholar