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Political and institutional constraints on structural reforms: interpreting the Italian experience

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 January 2016

Sergio Fabbrini
Sergio Fabbrini*
Affiliation:
School of Government, LUISS Guido Carli, Rome, Italy
*
∗Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

During 2011 Italy reached the verge of a financial default because of its huge public debt. Neither the centre-right nor the centre-left governments that alternated in power in the 2000s were able to introduce the reforms necessary for reducing the debt and promoting growth. The impotence of the government became incompatible with the requirements of the country's continued presence in the eurozone. In November 2011, under the pressure of financial markets and eurozone institutions and leaders, the incumbent centre-right government was obliged to resign, and was substituted by a government composed of technocrats and experts, the Monti government. This lasted until December 2012 and was supported in parliament by a cross-partisan coalition; it was able to introduce some of the structural reforms required, because of the threat of default but also because it did not need to seek the electoral support of powerful constituencies. This article advances an interpretation of the Italian crisis of November 2011, identifying the political and institutional structures and the specific political conditions that fostered a policy stalemate in the country in the 2000s and whose persistence makes the continuation of reforms after the February 2013 elections uncertain.

Keywords

Italian democracycorporativismparty fragmentationinefficient administrationweak governmentstructural reforms
Type
Contexts and Debates
Information
Modern Italy , Volume 18 , Issue 4 , November 2013 , pp. 423 - 436
Copyright
Copyright © Association for the study of Modern Italy 

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