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¹⁴ Minutes of the meeting of the Education Committee of the LNU, 4 Dec. 1923, LNU 5/23; Short List of Books on World History, Historical Association, Leaflet No. 59 (1924).

¹⁵ “Teachers and world peace” (LNU, 1923), LNU 7/3.

¹⁶ Elliott, “The League of Nations Union,” 132.

¹⁷ Wagar, W. Warren, H. G. Wells and the World State (New Haven, 1961), 39Google Scholar; on the popular reception of The Outline (especially in the US), see Ross, William T., H. G. Wells’ World Reborn: The Outline of History and Its Companions (Cranbury, 2002)Google Scholar.

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¹⁹ Minutes of the meeting of the Education Committee of the LNU, 25 Jan. 1924, LNU 5/23.

²⁰ Sylvest, British Liberal Internationalism, 219.

²¹ Gooch, G. P., “The Teaching of History in Relation to World Citizenship,” in Whitehouse, J. Howard and Gooch, G. P., eds., Wider Aspects of Education (Cambridge, 1924), 1–23, at 7Google Scholar.

²² Ibid., 5–7.

²³ Ibid., 2, 7, 17, 21, 22, 23.

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²⁶ Gooch, “Teaching of History,” 1; textbooks on world history shared this emphasis on “unity” and “civilization”; Hearnshaw's, F. J. C. A First Book of World History (London, 1924)Google Scholar conceived of world history as an attempt to “trace a single evolutionary process,” viii; see also F. S. Marvin, “History and the League of Nations,” The Study and Teaching of International Relations (1923), LNU 7/3, 5–7; for Marvin (historian, former school inspector and member of the Historical Sub-committee of the LNU's Education Committee), history was the “story of the unification of mankind” and “nothing less than tracing the stages that have led mankind from the one extremity to the other—from that state of misery and bare existence to our state of comparative ease and power and hope.”

²⁷ Gooch, “Teaching of History,” 1; Gooch, “History as a Training,” 350; G. P. Gooch, “The Unity of Civilisation,” an address delivered at the 12th Annual Conference of the Educational Associations (LNU, 1924), LNU 7/5, 2.

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³¹ Gooch, “History as a Training for Citizenship,” 350.

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³⁹ Gooch, Nationalism.

⁴⁰ Ibid., chap. 7.

⁴¹ Ibid., chap. 6.

⁴² Ibid., 92.

⁴³ Ibid., 92, 95; for the impact of the Russo-Japanese War on the rise of nationalism in the non-West see Aydin, Cemil, The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought (New York, 2007), 71–92CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mishra, Pankaj, From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt against the West and the Remaking of Asia (London, 2012), chap. 3Google Scholar.

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⁴⁶ Sluga, Internationalism, 53, 3, 150.

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⁵³ Partington, Building Cosmopolis, 149.

⁵⁴ Wells, The Outline of History, 499.

⁵⁵ Features proposed included utilization of the world's natural resources for the common good in place of aggressive national imperialisms, and a cultivation of a cosmopolitan subjectivity through universal education and universal world religion. Ibid., 497–501.

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⁶⁰ Although idiosyncratic in his Zionist-influenced conception of nationality, Alfred Zimmern shared the broader universalist narrative on Japanese modernization, reflecting on the Japanese defeat of Russia in 1905 as the “most important historical event which has happened, or is likely to happen, in our lifetime” (even in light of the Great War), and a “demonstration that science and its practical applications are not the appanage of any one race.” See Zimmern, Alfred, The Third British Empire, Being a Course of Lectures Delivered at Columbia University, New York (London, 1926), 82Google Scholar. On Zimmern and nationality see Baji, Tomohito, “Zionist Internationalism? Alfred Zimmern's Post-racial Commonwealth,” Modern Intellectual History 13/3 (2016), 623–51CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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⁶⁵ Stefan Collini has noted the use of the customary imagery of Chinese “stationariness” by Victorian intellectuals including J. S. Mill, in Collini, Stefan, Public Moralists: Political Thought and Intellectual Life in Britain, 1850–1930 (Oxford, 1991), 108, 274Google Scholar.

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⁷⁴ Ibid., lix.

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⁷⁶ Gooch, Nationalism, 97.

⁷⁷ Gooch, “History as a Training for Citizenship,” 351.

⁷⁸ Wells, The Outline of History, 450–51.

⁷⁹ Partington, “H. G. Wells and the World State,” 236. Wells's endorsement of tutelage was compatible with his anti-imperialism, the latter being an objection to the competitive acquisition and exploitation of colonies by individual nations. The form of colonial development Wells advocated was one of “empire pooling” in which colonial possessions were to be administered directly by a federal commission (cf. the league's Mandates system) for the benefit of both the colonial inhabitants and the former imperial rulers.

⁸⁰ Gooch, Nationalism, 124.

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⁸⁵ Wells, The Outline of History, 452–3; cf. the racial supremacist underpinnings of the discipline of international relations in the United States outlined in Vitalis, Robert, White World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations (Ithaca, 2015)Google Scholar.

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⁹⁰ Barton, World History, esp. the Afterword.

⁹¹ Ibid., 112.

⁹² Ibid., 121.

⁹³ Ibid., 93–4; 95–102; 121.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 97–8.

⁹⁵ Ibid., 105–6; 111–12; 118.

⁹⁶ Wells was also critical of capitalist exploitation and expressed some enthusiasm for Russia under Lenin and Stalin. But contra Barton, Wells's gradualism precluded him from rejecting a liberal conception of civilization. On Wells's political thought in this respect (and the diversity of socialist thought in Britain) see Partington, John S., “H. G. Wells: A Political Life,” Utopian Studies 19/3 (2008), 517–76Google Scholar; Partington, Building Cosmopolis, 31–43; and my discussion in n. 88 above.

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¹⁰¹ Tetsuo Furuya, “Ajia shugi to sono shūhen” (Asianism and Its Environs), in Furuya, Kindai nihon, 47–102, at 91–2.

¹⁰² e.g. Kenkichi Kodera, “Dai ajiashugi ron” (Treatise on Greater Asianism) (Tokyo, 1916). For an overview of Japanese pan-Asianism see Saaler, Sven, “Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Overcoming the Nation, Creating a Region, Forging an Empire,” in Saaler, Sven and Koschmann, J. Victor, eds., Pan-Asianism in Modern Japanese History: Colonialism, Regionalism and Borders (London, 2007), 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Paradoxically, the effect of this growing Japanese pan-Asianism was to undermine the possibility of a regional solidarity, as the discourse of a “common destiny” was increasingly conflated by Japanese Asianists with a self-appointed Japanese “mission,” and viewed with suspicion in other parts of Asia as a legitimating tool for Japanese expansion.

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¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 198; Nitobe, Inazō et al. , Western Influences in Modern Japan: A Series of Papers on Cultural Relations (Chicago, 1931), 22Google Scholar. For a full discussion of Nitobe's universalism (and its tensions) see Ōta, Yūzō, Taiheiyō no hashi toshite no Nitobe Inazō (Inazō Nitobe as a Bridge across the Pacific) (Tokyo, 1986), 54–60; 67–8Google Scholar.

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¹⁰⁷ Gooch, “Unity of Civilisation,” 7–12.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 16.

¹⁰⁹ Gooch, Nationalism, 92.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 96.

¹¹¹ Gooch, “History as Training,” 352.

¹¹² Burns, C. Delisle, “Modern Theories and Forms of International Organisation,” in Rose, W. and Aveling, F., eds., An Outline of Modern Knowledge (London, 1931), 739–71, at 739, 751Google Scholar.

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¹¹⁵ Murray, Gilbert, “What Liberalism Stands For,” CR 128 (1925), 681–97, at 688Google Scholar.

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¹²⁰ On this debate see Ashworth, “Democratic Socialism and International Thought.”

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¹³⁸ Wells, H. G., “Civilization on Trial,” Foreign Affairs 13/4 (1934), 595–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an overview of the anxieties of the 1930s see Overy, Richard, The Morbid Age: Britain and the Crisis of Civilization, 1919–1939 (London, 2010)Google Scholar.

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¹⁴⁰ Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis; see also Wight, Martin, International Theory: The Three Traditions, ed. Wight, Gabriele and Porter, Brian (London, 1996)Google Scholar.

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