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Neoconservatives and Neo-Confucians: East Asian Growth and the Celebration of Tradition

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 September 2020

Jennifer M. Miller
Jennifer M. Miller*
Affiliation:
History Department, Dartmouth College
*
*Corresponding author. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This article explores the influence of East Asia's economic growth on the evolution of American neoconservative thought in the 1970s and 1980s. It traces how prominent neoconservative thinkers—Nathan Glazer, Peter L. Berger, Herman Kahn, Michael Novak, and Lawrence E. Harrison—developed the claim that the region's prosperity stemmed from its alleged Confucian tradition. Drawing in part from East Asian leaders and scholars, they argued that the region's growth demonstrated that tradition had facilitated, rather than hampered, the development of a distinct East Asian capitalist modernity. The article argues that this Confucian thesis helped American neoconservatives articulate their conviction that “natural” social hierarchies, religious commitment, and traditional families were necessary for healthy and free capitalist societies. It then charts how neoconservatives mobilized this interpretation of Confucian East Asia against postcolonial critiques of capitalism, especially dependency theory. East Asia, they claimed, demonstrated that poverty and wealth were determined not by patterns of welfare, structural exploitation, or foreign assistance, but values and culture. The concept of Confucian capitalism, the article shows, was central to neoconservatives’ broad ideological agenda of protecting political, economic, and racial inequality under the guise of values, culture, and tradition.

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Articles
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Modern Intellectual History , Volume 18 , Issue 3 , September 2021 , pp. 806 - 832
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press

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