My bangles are broken

my days of shame are gone.

I have one small son, one calf, one field.

A calf to feed, a son to nurture.

but the land, baiji, this half acre of earth

to feed me, to rest my head.

(Malli, a Rajasthani widow I interviewed in 1987)

This paper is woven around two main arguments: One, to ensure effective economic security for widows in India it is necessary to ensure their command over property; and in the context of rural India, the most significant form of property is arable land. Two, we need to see widows not as a category in themselves, but as embodying a stage in most women's life cycle—a stage which is often coterminous with old age. Effective economic security during widowhood would therefore need securing women's property rights prior to the event, not only after it, namely securing their claims as daughters in addition to their claims as widows.

Masjid Manzilgah forms a chapter in a biography of Mohammed Ayub Khuhro on which the author is currently working. Khuhro (1901-80) was an important politician of Sind whose political career spanned over fifty years from 1921 to the end of the ‘seventies. He was a member of the Bombay Legislative Council from 1923 till the severance of the connection between Bombay and Sind in 1935 when the latter province attained autonomy under the Government of India Act of 1935. He was in the forefront of the political struggle for the ‘separation’ of Sind and after 1936 became a front-ranking Muslim League leader who helped organize the party in Sind and put it behind the Pakistan movement. Khuhro was the first Premier of Sind after independence and held that office altogether three times. He came into confrontation with Jinnah over the issue of severing Karachi from Sind and became identified as the protagonist of states' rights (or provincial autonomy) and as a champion of politicians' supremacy in the fight against the domination of the bureaucracy which bedevilled Pakistani politics for nearly half a century of its existence. This fight resulted in his repeated enforced exile from the political field depriving Pakistan of one of its most experienced public men during its formative years.

The relations between James Brooke and the various peoples of northwest Borneo have attracted considerable scholarly attention. Nineteenth-century Iban experiences have been analysed extensively and continue to provide the basis for a healthy industry in historical anthropology. Daniel Chew and Craig Lockard examined the development of the Sarawak Chinese community. Sabihah Osman explored Malay political activity during the Brooke period. In contrast, although Bidayuh were the subject of a detailed anthropological survey in the 1950s, political relations between Bidayuh and Rajah Brooke's regime have been largely ignored by scholars.

Tropical deforestation and the associated economic, ecological, and equity issues have become a matter of general interest and concern for scholars, international conservation and environmental organizations, and local pressure groups. ‘Remote’ outposts like Sarawak (‘Land of the White Rajahs’) have suddenly been thrust into the limelight as conflicts arose between different interest and ethnic groups for allocation of land and rights to utilize forest resources. A review of existing knowledge and data is therefore necessary to set rainforest clearance in Sarawak in a local, national, and international political economy context. This paper looks at the following themes: the historical legacy of ‘commercial’ extraction of forest products; the growth of the timber sector and the development of state forest regulation; and the conflicts of interest for allocation of land and rights to utilize forest resources.

Contemporary critics argued that counter-insurgency in Malaya represented more than the defeat of militant communism. Britain's campaign against the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was seen as resulting from British government collaboration with British capitalists to maintain profits at the expense of the legitimate aspirations of Malayan workers. More recently, it has been argued that the declaration of the emergency in June 1948 was a pre-emptive strike intended to ‘resolve the problem of political control’ and prevent the ‘radical nationalist forces organized around the MCP’ from gaining a nation-wide following. According to this view, government strategy was to ‘manage nationalism’ and ‘control’ decolonization so as to preserve the position of British capital in Malaya. For marxists, the emergency is seen as part of the process of establishing ‘neo-colonialism’. Even for less determinist models, the general complicity between British government and British business in colonial counter-insurgency campaigns is apparently clear. In primary-producing territories like Malaya, the harmony of interests between ‘gentlemanly capitalist’ officials and unofficials (centred on the City of London) ensured that after 1945 ‘coercion tended to be the first resort of policy’. The majority of scholarly output on the emergency has focused on official and guerrilla strategies leaving aside the role of business interests. As a result, the relationship between British business and British government has not been explored in depth. The present article seeks to fill this historiographical gap by reassessing official and commercial interaction in politically disturbed Malaya.

The past twenty years have seen the rapid growth of a new branch of international history, the serious academic study of secret services or ‘intelligence history’ with its attendant specialist conferences and journals. Two main causes for this development can be identified. The first was conceptual, namely the increasing recognition that the study of international history was greatly impoverished by the reluctance of academic historians to address a subject which appeared capable of shedding considerable light upon the conduct of international affairs. Two leading historians underlined this during 1982 in a path-breaking collection of essays on the subject, suggesting that intelligence was the ‘missing dimension’ of most international history. The second development was a more practical one, the introduction of the Thirty Year Rule during the 1970s, bringing with it an avalanche of new documentation, which, within a few years, was recognized as containing a great deal of intelligence material. In the 1980s historians had begun to turn their attention in increasing numbers to the intelligence history of the mid-twentieth century. They were further assisted in their endeavours by the appearance of the first volumes of the official history of British Intelligence in the Second World War.

Our image and knowledge of the Vietnam war come predominantly from American sources, which all stress the unusual character of that war. From the despatch of the first combat units to Vietnam in 1960 to the fall of Saigon and the takeover by the North Vietnamese in 1975, it was America's longest war. American literature from Vietnam depicts the war as being waged not only against the enemy (particularly as it was often difficult to determine who and where the enemy was) but also against the elements — heat, rain, jungle, mosquitoes, leeches, dust and mud. The moral confusion surrounding this war and the disillusionment among the soldiers are well documented and portrayed in numerous films and stories. In examining, therefore, Japanese writing on the Vietnam war, it seemed sensible to concentrate on those aspects which were different, not only in order not to repeat the obvious, but also in the hope of bringing into focus the different perspective on the conflict which this writing offers.