This paper originated from my undergraduate thesis at Wadham College, Oxford University. I must thank Professor Mark Elvin for suggesting the topic, Dr Jane Garnett and Dr Clifford Davies for their superb supervision. Others who have subsequently helped to improve this paper include Professors Michael Barnhart, Samuel Chu, Albert Craig, Joshua Fogel, Marius Jansen, William Kirby, Mark Peattie, Hans van de Ven, Arthur Waldron and my friend John Carroll. I am very grateful for their help.

¹ There is yet to be a scholarly monograph on the War in English. For a brief survey of the field, see S.Chu, ‘China: The Valiant Loser?’, Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Boston, March 1994. In the past ten years there has been a renewed interest in the War in mainland China, with a number of important publications made, notably by Qizhang, Qi, For example, Qi Qizhang, Jaiwu zhanzhengshi (Beijing, 1990).Google Scholar

² The literature is enormous. Some attribute China's problem to the lack of modern weapons caused by China's inability to industrialize. See for instance, Hansheng, Quan, ‘Jiawu zhanzheng yiqian de zhongguo gongyehua yundong’, Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan, vol. 25 no. 1 (1954), esp. pp. 77–8Google Scholar; Others see the lack of military education as the fundamental factor: Smith, R., ‘The Reform of Military Education in Late Ch'ing China, 1842–1895’, Journal of the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, XVIII (1978).Google Scholar Still others study the political problems created by the military modernization and attribute China's failure to these problems: Spector, S., Li Hung-chang and the Huai Army (Seattle, 1964), esp. pp. 205–7.Google Scholar

³ See the article which summarizes many of these factors: Liu, K. C., Smith, R., ‘The Military Challenge: The North-west and the Coast’, Cambridge History of China vol. 11 eds Liu, K. C., Fairbank, J. K. (Cambridge, 1980).Google Scholar

⁴ This shopping-list approach is evident in Chinese scholarship as well. See for instance, Keifu, Sunet al., Jiawu zhongri luzhanshi (Heilongjiang, 1984) esp. pp. 152–4; 180–2; 231–6.Google Scholar

⁵ Basically all the literature on the military reforms in the years before 1894–1895 emphasizes what went wrong. There has been little effort to see whether the reforms brought improvements in the Chinese military establishment: See Liu and Smith, ‘The Military Challenge’, esp. pp. 270–3; Sun, Luzhanshi; Powell, R., The Rise of Chinese Military Power 1895–1912 (Princeton, 1955), esp. pp. 36–50.Google Scholar The exception is surprisingly from a Marxist historian Mingxia, Yu, ‘Jiawu zhanzheng shibai xuangao yangwu yundong “chedi pochan” shuobianxi’, Jiawu zhanzheng jiushi zhounian jinian lunwenji, ed. Qizhang, Qi (Jinan, 1986).Google Scholar He argues that the reforms before 1894 did not fail completely despite China's defeat.

⁶ von Clausewitz, Carl, On War, ed. Rapoport, A. (London, 1982), p. 117.Google Scholar

⁷ Although the French defeat was so crushing, the Germans had taken great risks in their strategy to secure the victory. See Howard, M., War in European History (Oxford, 1976), p. 132.Google Scholar

⁸ See Powell, Military Power, pp. 36–50.Google Scholar

⁹ As will be evident in the following sections, I have chosen to use analysis rather than narrative to answer the questions above. This means that although I will describe certain battles when they serve to explain my argument, I will not be giving a chronological description of how each and every battle was fought. Of course, there were often unique reasons which explained the outcome of each battle, but I do believe that there were sufficient common factors which allow an historian like myself to make generalizations.

¹⁰ Fung, E., ‘The Peace Efforts of Li Hung-chang on the Eve of the Sino-Japanese War (June–July1894)’, Papers on Far Eastern History, 3 (03 1971), pp. 131–6.Google Scholar

¹¹ [Munemitsu, Mutsu], Kenkenroku: A Diplomatic Record of the Sino-Japanese War 1894–1895, edited and translated by Berger, G. (Princeton, 1982), p. 8.Google Scholar

¹² shixuehui, Zhongguo (ed.), Zhongri zhanzheng (Shanghai, 1956)Google Scholar, 2:557–8 (Doc. 994). Hereafter the entry will be abbreviated as ZRZZ.

¹³ See Fung, E., ‘Peace Efforts’, and the classic study by Xinzhong, Wang, Zhongri jiawu zhanzheng zhi waijiao beijing (Beijing, 1937), pp. 199–230.Google Scholar More recently, there is Qizhang, Qi, Jiawu zhanzheng guoji guanxishi (Beijing, 1994).Google Scholar

¹⁴ This view is apparent in many works. To name but the most recent, Yi, Daiet al., Jiawu zhanzheng yu dongya zhengzhi (Beijing, 1994), p. 105.Google Scholar

¹⁵ For the qingyi officials' push for war, see Oh, B., ‘The Leadership Crisis in China at the Eve of the Sino-Japanese War 1894–1895’, Papers on Far Eastern History, 29 (03 1984), esp. pp. 84–5;Google ScholarChu, S., ‘Chinese Attitudes Toward Japan at the Time of the Sino-Japanese War’, The Chinese and the Japanese ed. Iriye, A. (Princeton, 1980);Google ScholarKwong, L., A Mosaic of the Hundred Days (Cambridge, Mass., 1984), pp. 60–73.Google Scholar

¹⁶ See Qizhang, Qi, Guoji guanxishi, pp. 146–62Google Scholar for Qi's excellent point about how the enemies of Li Hongzhang used the opportunity to discredit him. Qi Qizhang also believes that there were an Emperor's party and a Dowager's party, although the evidence for this, I believe, is very thin. While there was indeed a group of officals who were opposed to Li Hongzhang, I do not think they were united enough for us to call them a party. Furthermore, even though some of these officials were supported by the Emperor, there is little evidence to suggest that the Emperor was trying to wrest power from the Dowager.

¹⁷ ZRZZ 2:623–5 (Doc. 1169).

¹⁸ Qizhang, Qi (ed.), Zhongri zhanzheng (Beijing, 1989 and onwards)Google Scholar [hereafter the whole entry will be abbreviated as QIZRZZ] 1:123–5 (Doc. 109).

¹⁹ See, for instance, QIZRZZ 1:126–9 (Doc. III).

²⁰ Some historians believe that Li wanted to avoid war because Li knew the weaknesses of his military forces. Wang, Beijing, p. 224;Google ScholarShoukong, Li, Li Hongzhang zhuan, 2nd edition (Taipei, 1985) pp. 242–8.Google Scholar But we also know that Li had very confidently told the British ambassador Nicholas O'Conor that he believed he could crush the Japanese. See London, Public Record Office, Foreign Office, class 17, no. 1195 (11 07 1894 dispatch).

²¹ See his memorial after the defeat in Pingrang on 19 Sept. 1894 in ZRZZ 3:111–13 (Doc. 1630).

²² ZRZZ 2:583–5 (Doc. 1083).

²³ The Russian threat was widely felt: see the memorial by the Jilin general Changshun and his associates on 18 August 1894, QIZRZZ 4:36–9 (Doc. 40). The lesson of the Triple Intervention seems to have proven that this fear was not groundless.

²⁴ [Mutsu], Kenkenroku, p. 44.Google Scholar

²⁵ North China Herald, 20 July 1894. The report was written on 16 July.Google Scholar

²⁶ As summarized by the Japan Weekly Mail, 21 July 1894.Google Scholar

²⁷ [Mutsu], Kenkenroku, pp. 14, 44–54.Google Scholar

²⁸ Wang blames Li for his tactical errors in his diplomacy and his over-reliance on arbitration, but this view runs the risk of judging people with hindsight. The development of events was very rapid in those two months, and Li had every right to believe that the negotiations would work. Likewise, although Qi Qizhang also criticizes Li's peace policy, his analysis of the situation actually shows that Li had good reasons to believe that his policy would work. See Wang, Beijing, p. 224; Qi, Guoji guanxishi, pp. 62–118; E. Fung, ‘Peace Efforts’.Google Scholar

²⁹ For the composition of the Grand Council at this time, see Qi, Guoji guanxishi, pp. 146–8.Google Scholar Prince Li was known to be an indecisive person who always tried to please everybody: Xingjian, Fei, Jindai mingren xiaozhuan (repr. Taipei, 1967) for his entry.Google Scholar

³⁰ See ZRZZ 2:625–6 (Doc. 1172).

³¹ ZRZZ 2:602 (Doc. 1125).

³² ZRZZ 2:602 (Doc. 1125).

³³ Fung, E., ‘Peace Efforts’, p. 139Google Scholar; See also the letter from Li Hongzhang's close associate, Sheng Xuanhuai, to Ye Zhizhao on 28 July, 1894, Xulu, Chen et al. (eds), Jiawu zhongri zhanzheng: Sheng Xuanhuai dangan Part 3 (Shanghai, 1982), p. 56 (Doc. 62).Google Scholar

³⁴ FO 17/1195 (11 July, 1894 dispatch).Google Scholar

³⁵ North China Herald, 22 June, 1894.Google Scholar

³⁶ Reported in North China Herald, 20 July, 1894.Google Scholar

³⁷ Wanhe, Lu, ‘Jaiwu zhanzheng zhong qingzhengfu de midianma shi zenyang beipoyi de’, Lishi jiaoxue (1979 no. 6).Google Scholar

³⁸ O'Conor and the military observer A. E. J. Cavendish subscribed to this view: FO 17/1200 (11 Dec. 1894 dispatch).

³⁹ Akira, Nakatsuka, Nisshin Senso teki Kenkyu (Tokyo, 1968), pp. 229–34; Qi, Jiawu zhanzhengshi, p. 129.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Japan Weekly Mail, 8 September, 1894.Google Scholar

⁴¹ See Muchio, Fujimura, Nisshin Senso (Tokyo, 1973), p. 116.Google Scholar

⁴² See Volpicelli, Z., The China–Japan War, (London, 1896), p. 85Google Scholar for general descriptions of Japanese weapons and Bianxiezu, Zhongguo Junshishi, Zhongguo junshishi (Beijing, 1988), 1:226–34 for Chinese ones.Google Scholar

⁴³ North China Herald, 12 October 1894.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Ibid.; ‘Nisshin Senso Jikki’ translated into the Chinese in ZRZZ 1:236; Volpicelli, War, p. 150; Inouye, J., A Concise History of the War Between Japan and China (Tokyo, 1895), p. 35;Google Scholar See the diary of Risaburo, Hamamoto, Nisshin senso jugun hiroku (Tokyo, 1972), p. 77Google Scholar, 89. According to Hamamoto, the Chinese army even held the upperhand in terms of their weapons in certain engagements. As I will explain later, although Chinese soldiers possessed weapons which were on par with the Japanese, their marksmanship was much inferior.

⁴⁵ This was a problem in China's reforms all along. See Erxun, Zhaoet al., Qingshigao (Beijing, 1927; repr. Beijing, 1977), pp. 4136–8.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ There were rumours that the soldiers in Pingrang were supplied with ammunition which did not fit their guns. See the memorial by Hong Liangpin of the Board of Revenue on 8 October 1894 in QIZRZZ 1:332 (Doc. 346). But this was probably only a small problem, as the heavy firepower generated by the Chinese army during the battle would testify.

⁴⁷ Volpicelli, War, p. 161.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Kennedy, T., The Arms of Kiangnan: Modernization in the Chinese Ordnance Industry, 1860–1895 (Boulder, Colorado, 1978), p. 146.Google Scholar Kennedy believes that had the Chinese arsenals been more productive, China would have performed better in the Sino Japanese War. But even he has to admit that firepower was not the key factor in deciding the outcome of the war.

⁴⁹ Japan Weekly Mail, 29 September 1894.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ FO 17/1197. 17 August, 1894 report by the British Consul at Niuzhang. He was a harsh critice of the Chinese army, but even he realized that the troops at Diaren were well-equipped.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Sun, Luzhanshi, p. 181.Google Scholar

⁵² The lianjun were the Green Standard Armies which had undergone reforms. See Spector, Li, pp. 167–9.Google Scholar Even raw recruits were called to service. See FO 17/1199 (7 November 1894 dispatch). I will explain this distinction between the ‘reformed’ troops and the ‘unreformed’ ones in subsequent sections. But this distinction is an important one, and it is misleading to use the problems of the unreformed armies as proof of the ineffectiveness of the Chinese army as a whole. For a good description of the recruiting process, see the diary of the local magistrate Qingzhang, Xu, ‘Liaoyang fangshou riji’, Jindaishi ziliao (1962: 3).Google Scholar

⁵³ See for instance, Powell, Military Power, pp. 49–50.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ We have a lot of contemporary critiques of this strategy, many of which were made by Chinese court officials. See QIZRZZ 1:301–2 (Doc. 315). See also FO 17/1201 for the comments of a British military analyst who criticized the defensive approach. Many modern-day historians have similarly criticized the Chinese strategy. See Qi, Jiawu zhanzhengshi, pp. 131–2,Google Scholar although Qi in his recent work does acknowledge that an all-out attack was not feasible: Qi, Guoji guanxishi, pp. 140–3.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ See the debate within the Qing court concerning what strategy to adopt in Qi, Guoji guanxishi, pp. 140–6.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Kierman, F. A. Jr, Fairbank, J. K. (eds), Chinese Ways in Warfare (Cambridge, Mass., 1974), esp. pp. 25–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵⁷ biabxiezu, Junshishi, Junshishi 4:378–83;Google ScholarDuqiao, Shi, ‘Shilun Hu Linyi de junshi sixiang’, Zhongguo jindai junshi sixiang he jundui jianshe, eds Xinzhong, Wuet al. (Shanghai, 1990), p. 367.Google Scholar Wu agrees that Hu Linyi was converted to a more defensive approach after he suffered heavy casualties in his attack of Wuhan in 1855.

⁵⁸ For the rise of the docrtine of the offensive, see Kitchen, M., ‘The Traditions of Greman Strategic Thought’, International History Review, 1, 2 (04 1979), pp. 169–72;Google ScholarHoward, M., ‘Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914’, Makers of Modern Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. Paret, P. (Princeton, 1986);Google ScholarGriffith, P., Forward Into Battle, new edition (Novata, Califronia, 1992), pp. 50–75.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See G.Rothenberg, ‘Moltke, Sachliffen, and the Doctrine of Strategic Envelopment’, Makers, ed. Paret.

⁶⁰ Kitchen, ‘Strategic Thought”, p. 169.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Howard, War, p. 105.Google Scholar

⁶² I am not saying that Chinese tactics in each and every individual battle were sound. What I argue is that the defensive strategy was on the whole a well-advised one.

⁶³ For instances, in Pingrang, see Inouye, A Concise History, pp. 32–3.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ The Japanese military itself admitted the risks involved. See Jimapchi, Honda, Nisshin Senso Kokyuroku, translated from the Japanese to the Chinese (1907?, repr., Taipei, 1976), Appendix:21.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Wanhe, Lu, ‘Jiawu Haicheng zhiyi yu riben de junshi maoxianzhuyi’, Jindaishi yanjiu (1982 no. 2), pp. 168–72.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Wei was by far the worst commander in the army. Because his troops looted the Korean villages, the support for the Chinese army in the countryside was undermined. See Keifu, Sunet al., Jiawu zhongri zhanzheng renwuzhuan (Anhui, 1984), pp. 126–8.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Sun, Renwu, pp. 1–7.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 111–14.

⁶⁹ Ibid., pp. 83–6; Zhao, Qing, pp. 12717–19.

⁷⁰ Zhao, Qing, pp. 12730–1.Google Scholar

⁷¹ ZRZZ 2:602 (Doc. 1125).

⁷² Zhao, Qing, pp. 12730–1.Google Scholar

⁷³ Fairbank, J. K. et al. (eds), The I.G. in Peking (Cambridge, Mass., 1975)Google Scholar, No. 938. This letter was written on 5 August 1894. To be sure, there were people who doubted Ye's ability (see Qi, Guoji guanxishi, p. 152)Google Scholar, but many of them were actually the factional rivals of Li Hongzhang. However, no one seemed to be able to question the past credentials of Ye.

⁷⁴ FO 17/1201.

⁷⁵ ZRZZ 4:16 (Doc. 3002).

⁷⁶ FO 17/1200 report to O'Conor.

⁷⁷ Cunningham, A., The Chinese Soldier and Other Sketches (London, 1903), pp. 55–6.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Volpicelli, War, p. 150.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See Smith, ‘Military Education’; Smith, R., ‘Foreign Training and China's SelfStrengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864–1873’, Modern Asian Studies, 10, 2 (1976).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁸⁰ Liu, Smith, ‘The Military Challenge’, pp. 266–9.Google Scholar

⁸¹ See Cunningham, Chinese Soldier, pp. 55–78.Google Scholar

⁸² FO 17/1201 Henry Bristow's report to O'Conor.Google Scholar

⁸³ Cunningham, Chinese Soldier, p. 55.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ von Bernhardi, F., Germany and the Next War, translated by Powles, A. L. (London, 1912; 13th impression, 1914), p. 254. This was a very influential book in Europe at that time.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Eastlake, F. W., Yamada, Y. A., Heroic Japan, A History of the War Between China and Japan (London, 1897).Google Scholar Some of these materials were of course mere propaganda, but there is no denying the fact that many Western observers were impressed>

⁸⁶ Volpicelli, War, esp. pp. 160–1.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ ‘Nisshin Senso’ in ZRZZ 1:249–250; Sun, Luzhanshi, p. 213.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Dispatches of O'Conor, Nicholas, London, Public Record Office, Administrative Record Files (ADM), class 125, no. 112 (21 11 1894).Google Scholar

⁸⁹ FO 17/1200, the report from the Consul at Niuzhang.

⁹⁰ Eastlake, Yamada, Heroic Japan.

⁹¹ Holmes, R., Acts of War: The Behaviour of Men in Battle (New York, 1985), pp. 49–50.Google Scholar

⁹² McNeill, W., The Pursuit of Power (Oxford, 1983), p. 131.Google Scholar

⁹³ Ibid., pp. 125–39; 245–6, 254–5; Keegan, J., The Face of Battle (London, 1978), pp. 32–3; A. Cunningham believes that the Chinese could become good soldiers if they were well-drilled: Cunningham, Chinese Soldier, p. 67.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Holmes, Acts, pp. 36–42;Google ScholarKellett, A., Combat Motivation: The Behaviour of Soldiers in Battle (Boston, 1982), pp. 80–1;Google ScholarDinter, E., Hero or Coward: Pressures Facing the Soldier in Battle (Totowa, New Jersey, 1985), p. 75.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Kennedy, M., The Military Side of Japanese Life (London, 1924; repr. Connecticut, 1973), pp. 155–6. For Japanese reforms in military training, seeGoogle ScholarPresseisen, E., Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Arizona, 1965), chps. 4–5.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Volpicelli, War, p. 72ff.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ FO 17/1198.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ ADM 125/112.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ On 22 September 1894, the paper estimated the Chinese army in Pingrang to be as large as 30,000 to 40,000. But when the details of the war were known subsequently, the paper had to admit that the Chinese army was in fact much smaller eg. 29 September 1894.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Volpicelli, War, pp. 72–5.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ ZRZZ 2:584 (Doc. 1071).Google Scholar

¹⁰² Zhao, Qing, p. 3901.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Spector, Li, p. 204, Table 5.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 205–7.

¹⁰⁵ This is the reason why few people actually talked about the mobilization of the whole country's armed forces against Japan. The theory that China could have won the war if the whole country got involved is a myth, because this kind of mobilization was simply not possible.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ China did have numerical superiority in some of these battles: Sun, Luzhanshi, p. 274, but the fighting value of the armies concerned was questionable.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Honda, Nisshin, Appendix:2. There were serious problems of coordination, for instance, in the defense of the Yalu. General Song Qing, presumably the commander-in-chief, was unable to control the many different divisions newly put under his command: Sun, Luzhanshi, pp. 131–2.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ This view is clearly under the influence of modernization theories, and is evident in most of the literature which touches upon the War. Fairbank, J. K., for instance, attributes the defeat primarily to China's political backwardness.Google Scholar See Fairbank, J. K., The Great Chinese Revolution (London, 1988), pp. 118–19;Google ScholarChu, S., ‘The Sino-Japanese War of 1894: A Preliminary Assessment from U.S.A.’, Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, XIV (06 1985), pp. 369–70.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Likewise, although the Germans defeated the French in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1871), no one would consider Germany as more ‘modernized’ politically or culturally, and probably even economically, than the French. See the classic byGoogle ScholarHoward, M., The Franco-Prussian War, (1961; repr. New York, 1990), esp. pp. 1–39; 455–6.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ See Presseisen, Before Aggression, ch. 4.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ For instance, Nie Shicheng's battalion, which was very well-trained, fought very well in the beginning of the war.Google Scholar

¹¹² For China's reforms after 1895, see Fenghan, Liu, Wuweijun (Taipei, 1978).Google Scholar

¹¹³ See the detailed war reports in London, Public Record Office, War Office, class 32, no. 6144–6145.Google Scholar