¹ Jawaharlal Nehru's speech at Delhi, 3 November, 1945 in Gopal, S., editor, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, vol.14, (New Delhi: Orient Longman Limited, 1972), p. 220Google Scholar. Hereinafter cited as SWJN.

² ‘How to Canalize Hatred’, 15 February, 1946 in The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1977), vol. 83, p. 135. Hereinafter cited as CWMG.

³ AICC resolution on ‘Indian National Army’, 23 September, 1945 in Zaidi, A.M., editor, INC: The Glorious Tradition, Texts of the resolutions passed by the INC, the AICC and the CWC, vol. 4, (New Delhi: Indian Institute of Applied Political Research, 1988), pp. 198–199Google Scholar. Hereinafter cited as INC.

⁴ Subhas Chandra Bose (1897–1945) was a left-leaning Bengali Congressman. Bose was elected President in 1938 and 1939, but resigned from the post in April, 1939 following a dispute with Gandhi and the majority of Working Committee members over the direction the nationalist programme should take. Bose departed India in January 1941 to seek assistance from Britain's wartime enemies. Making his way to Southeast Asia in 1943, Bose took control of the Indian National Army (INA), which fought against British forces in eastern India and Burma.

⁵ The Congress Working Committee (CWC) was the executive body of the Indian National Congress. Originally developed as something of a reception committee, under Gandhi's influence the CWC was constitutionally strengthened and reconstituted as a full executive body. The CWC typically met independently of plenary Congress sessions or irregularly-scheduled AICC meetings. Constitutionally, the CWC provided the Congress with consistent, year-round direction of nationalist activities.

⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) was a self-declared socialist who supported Gandhi throughout the period of Gandhi's leadership of the independence movement. He served as Congress President in 1930, 1936, 1937 and 1946. He went on to become the first prime minister of independent India.

⁷ In October 1943, Bose declared a Provisional Government of Free India in Southeast Asia, which was recognized by the Axis powers (the countries that were opposed to the Allies during World War II—mainly Germany, Italy and Japan).

⁸ In addressing the issues surrounding Congress acceptance of Bose's philosophy and nationalist support of the INA, other questions arise, specifically, the greater need for electoral support among Muslims and the purpose behind organizing widespread agitation on behalf of the INA officers held by the British. Further details should also be provided for the relationship between the Red Fort Trial and the Bombay Naval Mutiny in 1946, as well as between Congress agitation and the 1946 Calcutta riots. These events are, however, beyond the scope of this work.

⁹ The Red Fort in Delhi was the residence of Mughal emperors. After the war, the British chose the site for approximately ten trials of INA men for treason. Jawaharlal Nehru proclaimed India's independence from the Red Fort on August 15, 1947. This paper is concerned with the first of these trials.

¹⁰ Ayer, S.A., Unto Him a Witness: The Story of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose in East Asia (Bombay: Thaker & Co. Ltd., 1951), p. xvGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ Among this group of historians are scholars such as Brown, Judith and Low, David A.. In Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985)Google Scholar, Brown maintains that while there was never a clear ‘point of no return’, by 1940 ‘the Indian empire was no longer viable in the long term, though it could be kept going as part of the allied war effort’ (p. 242). Similarly, in Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1917–1947 (London: Heinemann Educational Books, Ltd., 1977), Low writes that Lord Wavell had decided in 1943 to effect the ‘withdrawal from India as soon as the war was over’ (p. 32). Both these works overlook the fact that, despite British offers for limited self-governance, the true authority of the Raj (the British Indian Army) was not due to be fully Indianised until 1952, and that the Red Fort Trials would never have been overseen by a British court-martial if the British had not intended to remain the rulers of India after the war.

¹² As late as May 1946, Viceroy Wavell continued to submit his so-called break-down plans to Whitehall for cabinet approval. See Wavell's comments on the situation in India, 30 May, 1946 in Moon, Penderel, Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal, (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 483–486Google Scholar; hereinafter cited as VJ. Despite the Labour government's urge to depart India, once London decided to hold general elections in India, the cabinet was particularly ‘anxious to avoid anything which might be considered by one side or the other as calculated to influence elections’. See Damodaran, Vinita, Broken Promises: Popular Protest, Indian Nationalism and the Congress Party in Bihar, 1935–1946, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 302Google Scholar. See also the observation that Pethick-Lawrence ‘sat on the fence, a vantage point from which the unsure and inexperienced hope to observe every side of a question’, in Jalal, Ayesha, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the demand for Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 134Google Scholar.

¹³ Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875–1950) was a conservative member of Congress and formally a follower of Gandhi. Patel was the only Congress leader permitted by Gandhi to launch a satyagraha campaign to address the tax burdens on farmers without Gandhi's direct control. He presided over the Congress in 1931 and in 1937 was elected the Chairman of the Parliamentary Sub-Committee. Patel oversaw the post-war elections and held the portfolios of the Home and Information and Broadcasting ministries in the Interim Government.

¹⁴ Fay, Peter Ward, The Forgotten Army: India's Struggle for Independence, 1942–1945 (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1993), pp. 510–515Google Scholar and Gordon, Leonard A., Brothers Against the Raj: Biographies of Indian Nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 547, 550–558Google Scholar.

¹⁵ Ghosh, Kalyan Kumar, The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1969), pp. 208–209Google Scholar, 241, 267.

¹⁶ For instance, forming the basic foundations for Sumit Sarkar's description of the INA and the Bombay Naval Mutiny; see Sarkar, Sumit, Modern India: 1885–1947, (Madras: Macmillan India Limited, 1983), pp. 418–425Google Scholar. Leonard Gordon also links the INA to the naval mutiny, describing the ‘rallies and the impact of the INA on the Indian army, navy and air force’ as ‘one factor influencing the British to quit India’ refer to Brothers Against the Raj (1990), p. 556. Similarly, by emphasizing the Congress leadership's urge to control violence, Vinita Damodaran wrote that ‘mass activity had to be controlled and not allowed to threaten Congress strategy;’ see Broken Promises (1992), p. 307.

¹⁷ Sarkar, Gordon, Damodaran and the overwhelming majority of other historians highlight this theme. B.B. Misra describes Congress opposition to the RIN Mutiny by showing Patel's ‘opposition’ and relating that Patel ‘even condemned the outbreak of mob violence’ in sympathy with the mutiny. Similar to other historians, Misra surmises that Congress intervention in the mutiny was designed to ‘perhaps win the loyalty of the defence and other services and to use them for party purposes in the event of a breakdown of political negotiations’. See Misra, B.B., The Indian Political Parties: An Historical Analysis of Political Behavior up to 1947 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 551–552Google Scholar.

¹⁸ Damodaran writes that most of ‘the Congress election speeches in September and October 1945 virulently attacked the British policy-makers and the civil services’. See Broken Promises (1992), p. 303. Wavell reported to London that Congress leaders appeared to provoke public disorder. See 5 November, 1945 entry in VJ, pp. 181–184.

¹⁹ Sumit Sarkar, Modern India (1983), p. 411.

²⁰ Sumit Sarkar, Modern India (1983), p. 419.

²¹ Sumit Sarkar, Modern India (1983), pp. 424–425.

²² Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), p. 135. The consistently uncompromising attitude of the Congress towards the League is well documented. Congress resentment of the League's newfound importance was demonstrated in Azad's autobiography. The one-time Congress president wrote that Gandhi's ‘approach’ to Jinnah was ‘wrong’ because it ‘gave a new and added importance’ to Jinnah's role in subsequent negotiations. The fact that Gandhi was ‘continually running after’ the League leader resurrected Jinnah's political significance. See Azad, Abul Kalam, India Wins Freedom: An Autobiographical Narrative (New York: Longman, Green and Co., 1960), p. 109Google Scholar.

²³ Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), p. 139.

²⁴ See Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), pp. 171–172.

²⁵ Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), p. 139.

²⁶ Leonard Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj (1990), p. 551.

²⁷ Bose, Mihir, The Lost Hero: A Biography of Subhas Chandra Bose, (London: Quartet Books Ltd., 1982), p. 260Google Scholar.

²⁸ Nehru, Jawaharlal, The Discovery of India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 568Google Scholar.

²⁹ Patel to Bishwanath Das, 5 January, 1946 in Chopra, P.N., editor, The Collected Works of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, vol. 10, (Delhi: Konark Publishers Pvt. Ltd., 1996), pp. 165–166Google Scholar. Hereinafter cited as CWSP.

³⁰ Nehru's speech at Delhi, 23 January, 1946 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 373–374. It is significant to note that this statement was made at a speech celebrating Subhas Bose's birthday.

³¹ The First Red Fort Trial was the first of several courts-martial held by the Indian Government to punish former British Indian Army officers and men who had joined the INA. The first trial was the only instance where charges of treason were brought against the defendants, and all later trials focused solely on war crimes and individual acts of brutality. Subsequent INA trials did not captivate public attention as did the First Red Fort Trial, and press articles covering subsequent trials were relegated to the back pages.

³² During the war, Shah Nawaz Khan led an INA division in which Sahgal and Dhillon were regimental commanders. The British learned after the war that men in this division had been executed for attempting to desert to the British. They were therefore able to try the trio for more than merely treason, hoping that this would douse nationalist fervour elicited by Congress leaders as well as demonstrate the brutalities that occurred in the INA. Also, British officers were highly displeased with former Indian Army officers who, they believed, had recruited British troops into the INA against their will.

³³ See Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), pp. 134–138.

³⁴ S.C. Chatterjee points out in his biography of Bose that while Nehru's ‘thoughts developed independently irrespective of the influence of Gandhi, nearly all his deeds were influenced by Gandhi’. Chatterjee, Subhas C., Subhas Chandra Bose: Man, Mission and Means (Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1989), p. 34Google Scholar.

³⁵ In mid-1939, Patel was quoted as saying, ‘whatever I do, I do with the consent, if not at the insistence of Gandhiji’. See Hindustan Times, 9 May, 1939 in CWSP, p. 83.

³⁶ There were two Indian National Armies. One existed from February to December 1942, when disputes between Japanese liaison officers and the General Officer Commanding resulted in Japanese control of the force; the second, under Bose, was in operation from June 1943 until the end of the war in the Pacific in August 1945.

³⁷ Kesar Singh Giani, Indian Independence Movement in East Asia: The Most Authentic Account of the I.N.A. and the Azad Hind Movement (Lahore: Singh Brothers, 1947), p. 29.

³⁸ Nair, Kusum, The Story of the I.N.A. (Bombay: Padma Publications Ltd., 1946), p. 10Google Scholar.

³⁹ Demonstrating how seriously the United States regarded Bose's Provisional Government, Subodh Markandeya relates that shortly after Bose's government declared war on the US, American radio stations ‘flashed the news . . . within three hours’. See Markandeya, Subodh, Netaji's Passage to Immortality, (New Delhi: Arnold Publishers, 1990), p. 210Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Captain Mangat, Gurbachan Singh, Indian National Army: Role in India's Struggle for Freedom. (Ludhiana: Gagan Publishers, 1991), p. 91Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Bose's special order of the day, 25 August, 1943, in Bose, Sisir K. and Bose, Sugata, editors, The Essential Writings of Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 296Google Scholar.

⁴² 24 August, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 164.

⁴³ Bose, Subhas Chandra, Testament of Subhas Bose, edited by ‘Arun’ (Delhi: Rajamal Publications, 1946), p. iiGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁴ S.A. Ayer, Unto Him a Witness (1951), p. 215.

⁴⁵ Lord Louis Mountbatten, Report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Supreme Allied Commander South-East Asia 1943–45 (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1951), p. 39.

⁴⁶ Telegram No. 10234 from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 11 August, 1945, in Nicholas Mansergh, editor, The Transfer of Power in India, 1942–7, vol. 6 (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1976), p. 49. Hereinafter cited as TP.

⁴⁷ Telegram No. 10494 from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 21 August, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, pp. 110–111.

⁴⁸ Telegram No. 10494 from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 21 August, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 111.

⁴⁹ Speaking in Bombay in June 1945, Nehru was quoted as saying, ‘When I was [in] Calcutta in 1942, there were talks of Subhas Bose leading an army to India to liberate it, in cooperation with the Japanese. I was asked what I would do. I said that I would fight him. . . . He was quite wrong in his methods when he thought that he could win the freedom of India with the help of the Japanese’. From Nehru's interview to the press, Bombay, 23 June, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 21.

⁵⁰ Bose, Subhas Chandra, Crossroads: Collected Works, 1938–1940, 2nd edition (New York: Asia Publishing, 1964), p. 399Google Scholar, quoted in Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj (1990), p. 479.

⁵¹ This was only eight days after the first trial began.

⁵² Wavell to G. Cunningham, 30 November, 1945 in 24 November, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 189. See also 30 November, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 191.

⁵³ Members of the court-martial included Major-General A.B. Blaxland (President), Brigadier A.J.H. Bourke, Lt. Colonel C.R. Stott, Lt. Colonel T.I. Stevenson, Lt. Colonel Nasir Ali Khan, Major B. Pritam Singh and Major Banwari Lal. All members of the court-martial were British Indian Army officers. Colonel F.C.A. Kerin was appointed Judge-Advocate. See Desai, Bhulabhai J., I.N.A. Defense, (Bombay: Congress Publication Board, [no date]), p. viiiGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁴ Bhulabhai J. Desai, I.N.A. Defense [no date], p. viii.

⁵⁵ CWC resolution on ‘Defense Committee for I.N.A.’, Bombay, 24 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 216. Members of the INA Defense Committee included: Bhulabhai Desai; Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru; Jawaharlal Nehru; Dr. Kailash Nath Katju; Asaf Ali; Bukshi Sir Tek Chand; Rai Bahadur Badri Das; Kanwar Sir Dalip Singh; Sr. P.K. Sen; Mohammed Shafi Daudi; Inder Deo Dua; Shiv Kumar Shastri; Ranbeer Chand Soni; Rajinder Narayan; Sultan Yar Khanm; Narayan Andley; and J.K. Khanna. Sir Nusserwanji P., Engineer, the Advocate-General of India, conducted the prosecution against the three officers. He was assisted by Lt. Colonel P. Walsh. See Bhulabhai J. Desai, I.N.A. Defense [no date], p. viii.

⁵⁶ Ram, Moti, Two Historic Trials in Red Fort (New Delhi: Roxy Printing Press, 1946), pp. 5–6Google Scholar.

⁵⁷ The twelve Working Committee members were: Abul Kalam Azad; Jamnalal Bajaj; Shankarrao Deo; Bhulabhai Desai; Jairam Doulatram; Abdul Ghaffar Khan; JB Kripalani; Harekrushna Mahtab; Sarojini Naidu; Vallabhbhai Patel; Rajendra Prasad; and Pattabhi Sitaramayya. Significantly, Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the three members who did not resign en masse, but he independently withdrew from the Working Committee shortly after Bose's re-election. The remaining two CWC members were Bose and his elder brother Sarat Chandra Bose.

⁵⁸ Of course each of the accused officers’ statements had its own focus—in Singh's, Durlab (editor) The I.N.A. Heroes: Autobiographies (Lahore: Hero Publications, 1946)Google Scholar, Shah Nawaz Khan stated that he initially sought to ‘keep out’ of the INA and tried to prevent his men from being recruited (p. 17); Sahgal intended to prevent the INA from becoming a ‘puppet army’ of the Japanese, sought to participate in the independence movement (p. 89), and pointed out that the British had ordered the Indian POWs to obey the Japanese, as if they were a mercenary force rather than an established army (p. 112); and Dhillon wanted to secure the ‘comfort, safety and welfare’ of his men (p. 175) and saw the INA as an ‘old stick to kill a snake’, the snake being India's ‘old enemy the British’ (p. 261).

⁵⁹ Bhulabhai J. Desai, I.N.A. Defense [no date], pp. 74–75. §121 of Chapter VI of the 1860 Indian Penal Code, ‘Of Offenses Against the State’, defined ‘Waging, or attempting to wage war, or abetting waging of war, against the Government of India’ as ‘Whoever, wages war against the Government of India, or attempts to wage such war, or abets the waging of such war, shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine’.

⁶⁰ Bhulabhai J. Desai, I.N.A. Defense [no date], p. 26.

⁶¹ Bhulabhai J. Desai, I.N.A. Defense [no date], p. 33.

⁶² Bhulabhai J. Desai, I.N.A. Defense [no date], p. 52.

⁶³ Bhulabhai J. Desai, I.N.A. Defense [no date], p. 57.

⁶⁴ Bhulabhai J. Desai, I.N.A. Defense [no date], pp. ix–x.

⁶⁵ Moti Ram, Two Historic Trials in Red Fort (1946), p. 305.

⁶⁶ Moti Ram, Two Historic Trials in Red Fort (1946), p. 305.

⁶⁷ Moti Ram, Two Historic Trials in Red Fort (1946), p. 305.

⁶⁸ CWC resolution on ‘War Preparation’, Wardha, 12 August, 1939, in INC, vol. 4, p. 54.

⁶⁹ Linlithgow's message to India, 3 September, 1939 in 2^nd Marquess of Linlithgow, Speeches by the Marquess of Linlithgow, (New Delhi: Bureau of Public Information, Government of India, 1945), pp. 199–200. Hereinafter cited as SSML.

⁷⁰ CWC resolution on ‘Political Situation’, Delhi, 7 July, 1940 in INC, vol. 3, p. 124.

⁷¹ In a press statement given on 24 April, 1942, Nehru was quoted as saying, ‘Hitler and Japan can go to hell. I shall fight them to the end and this is my policy. I shall also fight Mr. Subhas Bose and his party along with Japan if he comes to India’. Quoted in Leonard A. Gordon's Brothers Against the Raj (1990), p. 477.

⁷² See: AICC resolution on ‘War Danger & Amendment of the India Act’, Tripuri, 8 March, 1939 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 28–29; CWC resolution on ‘War Preparation’, Wardha, 12 August, 1939 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 53–54; CWC resolution on ‘War Crisis’, Wardha, 15 September, 1939 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 62–67; CWC resolution on ‘War Crisis’, Wardha, 10 October, 1939 in INC, vol. 4, p. 68; AICC resolution on ‘War Crisis’, Wardha, 10 October, 1939 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 34–35; CWC resolution on ‘Negotiation with the British Government’, 23 October, 1939 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 70–72; CWC resolution on ‘Political Situation’, Allahabad, 23 November, 1939 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 73–76; CWC resolution on ‘Political Situation’, Wardha, 22 December, 1939 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 82–84; CWC resolution on ‘India and War Crisis’, Patna, 1 March, 1940 in INC, vol. 4, p. 115; AICC resolution on ‘India and War Crisis’, Ramgarh, 19 March, 1940 in INC, vol. 4, p. 99; Ramgarh Congress resolution on ‘India and the War Crisis’, 20 March, 1940 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 95–97; CWC resolution on ‘Political Situation’, Wardha, 21 June, 1940 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 121–123; CWC resolution on ‘Political Situation’, Delhi, 7 July, 1940 in INC, vol. 4, p. 124; AICC resolutions on ‘President's Statement’ and ‘Wardha Statement’, Poona, 28 July, 1940 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 101–102; CWC resolution on ‘Viceregal Declaration’, Wardha, 23 August, 1940 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 128–130; CWC resolution on ‘Satyagraha’, Wardha, 23 August, 1940 in INC, vol. 4, p. 118; AICC resolution on ‘Satyagraha’, Bombay, 16 September, 1940 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 102–104; CWC resolution on ‘Political Situation’, Bardoli, 30 December, 1941 in INC, vol. 4, p. 143; AICC resolution on ‘Political Situation’, Wardha, 16 January, 1942 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 150–152; CWC resolution on ‘Draft Proposals of the British Government’, Delhi, 11 April, 1942 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 172–175; AICC resolutions on ‘Rejection of Cripps’ Proposals’ and ‘Non-Violent Non-Cooperation’, Allahabad, 2 May, 1942 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 154–155, 156–158; CWC resolution on ‘National Demand’, Wardha, 14 July, 1942 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 181–184; and AICC resolution on ‘Quit India’, Bombay, 8 August, 1942 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 161–165.

⁷³ ‘Suggested Lines of Indian Settlement’, Cripps’ note, 8 March, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 377.

⁷⁴ Cripps’ note on an interview with Azad and Asaf Ali, 25 March, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 479.

⁷⁵ Cripps’ note on an interview with Azad, 28 March, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 514.

⁷⁶ See: Cripps's note on an interview with Govindh Ballabh Pant and B.G. Kher, 29 March, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, pp. 528–529; Cripps’ note on an interview with Azad and Nehru, 29 March, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 530; Cripps’ note on an interview with Nehru, 30 March, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, pp. 557–558; telegram No. 845-S from Cripps to Amery, 30 March, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 571; note by Mr. Pinnell on an interview between Cripps and Linlithgow, 31 March, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 594; Cripps to Azad, 1 April, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 598; Cripps’ note on an interview with J.C. Gupta, 1 April, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, pp. 598–599; Telegram No. 890-S from Cripps to Churchill, 4 April, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 636; Azad to Cripps, 4 April, 1942 in Kumar, Ravindra, editor, Selected Works of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors, 1991), p. 227Google Scholar (hereinafter cited as SWMAKA); Cripps to Azad, 7 April, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, pp. 683–684; Azad to Cripps, 10 April, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 727; and Azad to Cripps, 10 April, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 726.

⁷⁷ AICC resolution on ‘Non-Violent Non-Cooperation’, Allahabad, 2 May, 1942 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 156–158.

⁷⁸ Azad to Cripps, 4 April, 1942 in SWMAKA, vol. 1, p. 227.

⁷⁹ Azad to Cripps, 10 April, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 727. See also SWMAKA, vol. 1, pp. 232–235.

⁸⁰ CWC resolution on ‘Draft Proposals of the British Government’, Delhi, 11 April, 1942 in INC, vol. 4, p. 175.

⁸¹ Telegram No. 980-S from Linlithgow to Amery, 10 April, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, p. 725.

⁸² Refer to Wavell's draft reply to Gandhi, in 9 August, 1944 entry of VJ, pp. 83–84. See also the following resolutions framed by the AICC at Bombay, 23 September, 1945—‘The Struggle of 1942 and After;’ ‘Congress Policy;’ and ‘Commitments of Present Government not Binding’ in INC, vol. 4, pp. 191–196. Freshly released from prison, in June 1945 the members of the Working Committee demanded that any consideration of India's political future should include an immediate clarification of the extent to which a ‘nationalist character’ could be applied to the Indian Army and superficial barriers isolating soldiers from the general population should be eliminated; see CWC resolution on ‘Instructions’, Bombay, 22 June, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 205.

⁸³ ‘On Cripps’ Statement on Results of His Mission’, Govind Ballabh Pant's interview to the press, 27 April, 1942, reported by The Leader, 28 April, 1942, in Nanda, B.R., editor, Selected Works of Govind Ballabh Pant, vol. 6 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 399Google Scholar.

⁸⁴ See Rajendra Prasad's statement to the press, 25 April, 1942 in Rajendra Prasad Papers, doc.51, microfilm reel #1, University of Toronto. Rajendra Prasad, Vallabhbhai Patel, JB Kripalani and Prafulla Chandra Ghosh objected to creating a national government because it ‘contemplates association in the present war in the remote contingency of the British Government making an offer acceptable to the Congress’.

⁸⁵ CWC resolution on ‘National Demand’, Wardha, 14 July, 1942 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 181–182.

⁸⁶ In July 1934 the CWC ruled that purna swaraj meant ‘unfettered national control, among other things, over the army and other defense forces’. See CWC resolution on ‘Congress Goal & the Means of Its Attainment’, Benares, 30 July, 1934 in INC, vol. 3, p. 267.

⁸⁷ CWC resolution on ‘Instructions’, Bombay, 22 June, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 205.

⁸⁸ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 5 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, pp. 442–443.

⁸⁹ 3 November, 1945 entry of VJ, pp. 180–181.

⁹⁰ 5 November, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 182.

⁹¹ Auchinleck's appraisal, 31 November, 1945, enclosure to Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 2 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, pp. 433–436.

⁹² Auchinleck to Wavell, 24 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 533.

⁹³ Telegram No. 13814 from Governor-General to Secretary of State, 30 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, pp. 571–573.

⁹⁴ 24 June, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 145.

⁹⁵ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 22 October, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 375.

⁹⁶ Sir H. Twynham to Wavell, 26 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 542.

⁹⁷ The mutineers, protesting about conditions and rates of promotion, went on strike and were joined by Bombay workers. Street-fighting occurred between the mutineers/workers and British Indian Army troops sent into the city to restore order. Congress opposed the Naval Mutiny and encouraged the sailors and workers to cease their activities.

⁹⁸ Vinita Damodaran describes demobilization as one of the factors contributing to ‘a fertile ground for discontent;’ see Vinita Damodaran, Broken Promises (1992), p. 284. In her treatment of post-war elections in the Punjab, Ayesha Jalal also links demobilization to the political situation, observing that the ‘demobbed soldiers wanted their reward’ and emphasizing that the Muslim League was the ‘political beneficiary of jawan discontent;’ see Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), pp. 142–143.

⁹⁹ ‘Revolution Betrayed’, Narendra Dev's article in Janata Weekly, 10 February, 1946 in Dev, Narendra, Articles and Speeches by Acharya Narendra Deva, (Delhi: Anupama Publications, 1988), p. 271Google Scholar.

¹⁰⁰ Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (1985), p. 451. See also Norman, Dorothy, editor, Nehru: the First Sixty Years, vol. 2, (New York: John Day Company, 1965), p. 22Google Scholar.

¹⁰¹ Patel's speech at Bombay, 21 October, 1945 in CWSP, vol. 10, p. 105.

¹⁰² Nehru's interview to the press, Delhi, 2 December, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 363.

¹⁰³ Nehru's speech at Patna, 24 December, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, pp. 279–280.

¹⁰⁴ Nehru's speech at Benares, 14 February, 1946 in SWJN, vol. 14, pp. 519–520.

¹⁰⁵ Note prepared by the Director, Intelligence Bureau, Home Department for the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, 20 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 515.

¹⁰⁶ Nehru's interview to the press, Karachi, 9 January, 1946 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 326.

¹⁰⁷ S.A. Ayer, Unto Him a Witness (1951), p. 129.

¹⁰⁸ Nehru's speech at Barpeta, 13 December, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 262.

¹⁰⁹ ‘In Lahore Fort’, Jayaprakash Narayan's article, 20 August, 1944 in Brahamanand, editor, Nation Building in India, (New Delhi: Indrapastha Press, [no date]), p. 115.

¹¹⁰ Nehru's interview to the press, Srinagar, 19 August, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, pp. 331–332.

¹¹¹ Nehru's interview to the press, Delhi, 29 August, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 193.

¹¹² Patel's statement reported by the Bombay Chronicle, 1 November, 1945 in CWSP, vol. 10, pp. 117–118.

¹¹³ Nehru to Govind Ballabh Pant, 19 August, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 335.

¹¹⁴ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 9 October, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, pp. 319–320.

¹¹⁵ 31 August entry of VJ, p. 88.

¹¹⁶ Wavell to Churchill, 24 October, 1944 in VJ, p. 99.

¹¹⁷ In January 1945, Bhulabhai Desai and Liaquat Ali Khan discussed the creation of an interim arrangement that would be a coalition government at the Centre based on parity between the two organizations. Wavell wrote that this proposal was ‘very near to what I have put to H.M.G’. See 18 January, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 110.

¹¹⁸ 30 January, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 112.

¹¹⁹ 25 December, 1944 entry of VJ, p. 106.

¹²⁰ 2 August, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 160.

¹²¹ Wavell's suggestions were those discussed at the Governors’ conference. See 18 August, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 163.

¹²² 22 August, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 164.

¹²³ Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), pp. 135–137.

¹²⁴ The British government had reverted to the formula contained in the Draft Declaration of March 1942 in which it declared that once the war was over, ‘steps shall be taken to set up in India’ an ‘elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India’. Specifically, once hostilities were concluded, ‘the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of a constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation’. See Draft Declaration, 7 March, 1942 in TP, vol. 1, pp. 357–358.

¹²⁵ On 8 August, 1942, the AICC passed the Quit India Resolution, with pertinent excerpts as follows: ‘[T]he immediate ending of British rule in India is an urgent necessity both for the sake of India and for the success of the cause of the United Nations. The continuation of that rule is degrading and enfeebling India and making her progressively less capable of defending herself and of contributing to the cause of world freedom. . . . The AICC therefore repeats with all emphasis the demand for the withdrawal of the British power from India. On the declaration of India's independence, a Provisional Government will be formed and Free India will become an ally of the United Nations, sharing with them in the trials and tribulations of the joint enterprise of the struggle for freedom. . . . [T]he Committee feels that it is no longer justified in holding the nation back from endeavouring to assert its will against an imperialist and authoritarian government which dominates over it. . . . The Committee resolves, therefore to sanction for the vindication of India's inalienable right to freedom and independence. . . . A time may come when it may not be possible to issue instructions or for instructions to reach our people, and when no Congress Committee can function. When this happens, every man and woman, who is participating in this movement must function for himself or herself within the four corners of the general instructions issued. Every Indian who desires freedom and strives for it must be his own guide urging him on along the hard road where there is no resting place and which leads ultimately to the independence and deliverance of India. . . . Lastly, whilst the AICC has stated its own view of the future government under free India, the AICC wishes to make it quite clear to all concerned that by embarking on mass struggle it has no intention of gaining power for the Congress. . . . The power, when it comes, will belong to the whole people of India’. See AICC resolution on ‘Quit India’, AICC Bombay, 8 August, 1942 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 161–165. In Wavell's broadcast of 14 June, 1945, orders were given for the immediate release of CWC members. See 14 June, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 142.

¹²⁶ For a detailed description of the Simla Conference, see Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), pp. 126–136.

¹²⁷ 5 November, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 182.

¹²⁸ Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (1960), p. 142.

¹²⁹ Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom (1960), p. 141.

¹³⁰ AICC resolution on ‘The Struggle of 1942 and After’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 191–192.

¹³¹ AICC resolution on ‘Congress Policy’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 194.

¹³² ‘Revolution Betrayed’, Narendra Dev's article in Janata Weekly, 10 February, 1946 in Articles and Speeches by Acharya Narendra Deva (1988), p. 272.

¹³³ AICC resolution on ‘The Struggle of 1942 and After’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 191–193.

¹³⁴ AICC resolution on ‘Congress Policy’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 195.

¹³⁵ AICC resolution on ‘Indian National Army’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 198–199.

¹³⁶ CWC resolution on ‘Defense Committee for I.N.A.’, Bombay, 24 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 216.

¹³⁷ AICC resolution on ‘New Proposals of the British Government’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 200–201.

¹³⁸ AICC resolution on ‘New Proposals of the British Government’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 201.

¹³⁹ AICC resolution on ‘Election Manifesto’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 202.

¹⁴⁰ The manifesto was issued prior to December 1945 and emphasized ‘the policy and programme of the Congress for the information of the public and the guidance of the Congress candidates’. See CWC resolution on ‘Election Manifesto’, Calcutta, 11 December, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 217. See also AICC resolution on ‘Election Manifesto’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 202. Concurrently, the Working Committee began to draw back from its celebration of the violence of 1942—see CWC resolution on ‘Non-Violence’, Calcutta, 11 December, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, pp. 217–218.

¹⁴¹ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 1 October, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, doc. p. 305.

¹⁴² Nehru's speech at Lahore, 26 August, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 166.

¹⁴³ Nehru's speech at Tekri Kalan, 30 August, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 173.

¹⁴⁴ Nehru's speech at Allahabad, 2 October, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 208.

¹⁴⁵ Nehru's speech at Lucknow, 4 October, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 211.

¹⁴⁶ Nehru's speech at Azamgarh, 13 October, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 220.

¹⁴⁷ Nehru's speech at Delhi, 3 November, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 194.

¹⁴⁸ Nehru's speech at Calcutta, 21 December, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 257.

¹⁴⁹ Nehru to V.K. Krishna Menon, 27 October, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, pp. 343–344.

¹⁵⁰ Nehru to V.K. Krishna Menon, 2 December, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, pp. 358–359.

¹⁵¹ Wavell's memorandum for the Cabinet, enclosure to Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 6 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 451.

¹⁵² Patel to T.K Ghosh, 21 February, 1946 in Sardar's Letters, p. 87. Patel urged that ‘exclusive pictures of I.N.A. activities’ should be published ‘simultaneously’ in several newspapers to provide for ‘greater publicity’.

¹⁵³ ‘Mob Rule’, The Statesman, 13 February, 1946 in The Statesman: An Anthology, compiled by Niranjan Majumdar (New Delhi: The Statesman Ltd., 1975), p. 495.

¹⁵⁴ 3 November, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 180. See also Wavell's interview with Nehru, 3 November, 1945, reported in Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 6 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 440.

¹⁵⁵ 5 November, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 181. See also Wavell's secret memorandum to the Cabinet, contained in Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 6 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 451.

¹⁵⁶ Note prepared by the Director, Intelligence Bureau, Home Department for the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, 20 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, pp. 512–513.

¹⁵⁷ 24 October, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 178. In this entry, Wavell also surmised that ‘perhaps imprisonment has quite upset his [Nehru's] balance which was never his strong point’.

¹⁵⁸ Nehru privately discussed the ‘question of setting up Shah Nawaz’ as a Congress candidate. Nehru asked the three officers if they were interested and ‘all three were willing’. See Nehru to Patel, 26 November, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 121.

¹⁵⁹ Nehru to V.K. Krishna Menon, 27 October, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, pp. 343–344.

¹⁶⁰ Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj (1990), p. 552.

¹⁶¹ AICC resolution on ‘Indian National Army’, Bombay, 23 September, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 199.

¹⁶² ‘Of the Indian National Army’, Nehru's interview to the press, 19 August, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 326. See also Nehru, vol. 2, p. 175.

¹⁶³ Nehru's speech at Azamgarh, 13 October, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 220.

¹⁶⁴ Nehru's speech at Subhas Chandra Bose's birthday celebration in Delhi, 23 January, 1946 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 373.

¹⁶⁵ Copy of a letter from Mr. Wint to Sir G. Schuster, enclosure to a letter from Schuster to Pethick-Lawrence, 4 December, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 594.

¹⁶⁶ Wavell's note of 5 November 1945 on the political situation, in 5 November, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 182.

¹⁶⁷ Sir A. Hope to Wavell, 10 December, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 631.

¹⁶⁸ Wavell's appreciation of the political situation, 27 December, 1945 in 22 December, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 198.

¹⁶⁹ Sir G. Cunningham to Wavell, 27 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 546.

¹⁷⁰ Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 553.

¹⁷¹ In one speech, R.S. Ruikar, threatened that ‘Indians would not spare their last drop of blood in saving’ the lives of the INA men; he also urged the people to be ready for ‘a movement more powerful and mightier than that of 1942’. Posters in Delhi proclaimed death for ‘twenty English dogs for every I.N.A. man executed’ and one Congressman from the Central Provinces was reported to have said in private that the upcoming movement ‘would not only be of a violent character but would be reinforced by the co-operation of released I.N.A. personnel’ unless ‘Gandhi gave a clear-cut directory to the contrary’. See Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 554.

¹⁷² Abul Kalam Azad, India Wins Freedom, pp. 155–156.

¹⁷³ Nehru to Baldev Singh, 25 December, 1946 in Nehru, vol. 2, p. 176.

¹⁷⁴ Sir J. Colville to Wavell, 27 February, 1946 in TP, vol. 6, p. 1084. This perspective is also supported by Jagannath Sarkar, A.B. Bardhan, and Balaram, N.E., editors, India's Freedom Struggle—Several Streams, (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1986), p. 229Google Scholar. The inability of Congress to fully maintain control over its Left wing was evident in the Calcutta riots and the Bombay Naval Mutiny.

¹⁷⁵ Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army (1993), p. 435.

¹⁷⁶ 3 November, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 181.

¹⁷⁷ Patel to Bishwanath Das, 5 January, 1946 in CWSP, vol. 10, p. 165.

¹⁷⁸ 6 September, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 170. Wavell had consulted his governors regarding the practicability of autumn elections as early as August 1945. See 2 August, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 160.

¹⁷⁹ Wavell's announcement, 19 September, 1945, enclosure of a letter from Patel to G.D. Birla, 20 September, 1945 in Nandurkar, G.M., editor, Sardar's Letters—Mostly Unknown, vol. 4, (Ahmedabad: Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel Smarak Bhavan, 1977), p. 175Google Scholar.

¹⁸⁰ 22 August, 1945 entry of VJ, p. 164.

¹⁸¹ Auchinleck to Wavell, 24 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 531.

¹⁸² Note prepared by the Director, Intelligence Bureau, Home Department for the Secretary, Political Department, India Office, 20 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 513.

¹⁸³ Azad to Patel, 12 October, 1945 in Das, Durga, editor, Sardar Patel's Correspondence, 1945–50, vol. 2, (Ahmedabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1977), p. 24Google Scholar. Jalal illustrates the Muslim League's efforts to use Pakistan as an electoral issue in these two Muslim-majority provinces as the means for defeating non-League Muslim candidates. Winning these two provinces was a vital strategic component to the League's demands for Pakistan as a counterweight to the Congress's domination at the Centre. See Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), pp. 147, 160.

¹⁸⁴ Jalal described the League's campaign as standing on the ‘plausible’ notion that ‘the League and Pakistan alone stood between Muslims and a black future’. See Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), p. 137.

¹⁸⁵ Peter Ward Fay describes the Muslim League's defence of Abdul Rashid, and highlights that Rashid joined the INA to ‘arm themselves’ against the ‘conspiracy’ to impose Hindu raj with Japanese support. See Peter Ward Fay, The Forgotten Army (1993), pp. 497–499.

¹⁸⁶ Bhulabhai J. Desai, I.N.A. Defense [no date], p. 77.

¹⁸⁷ Moti Ram, Two Historic Trials in Red Fort (1946), p. 306.

¹⁸⁸ S.A. Ayer, Unto Him a Witness (1951), p. xvi.

¹⁸⁹ Jagannath Sarkar, A.B. Bardhan, and N.E. Balaram, editors, India's Freedom Struggle—Several Streams (1986), p. 223.

¹⁹⁰ Nehru to V.K. Krishna Menon, 27 October, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 344.

¹⁹¹ CWC resolution on ‘I.N.A. Inquiry & Relief Committee’, Calcutta, 11 December, 1945 in INC, vol. 4, p. 218. See also the enclosure to Patel's letter to Amrita Bazar Patrika, 26 December, 1945 in Sardar's Letters (1977), vol. 4, p. 79.

¹⁹² S.A. Ayer, Unto Him a Witness (1951), p. xv.

¹⁹³ S.A. Ayer, Unto Him a Witness (1951), p. xvi.

¹⁹⁴ Subhas C. Chatterjee, Man, Mission and Means (1989), p. 131.

¹⁹⁵ Nehru's speech at Barpeta, 13 December, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, p. 262.

¹⁹⁶ See Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj (1990), p. 551. Gandhi selected ‘communal and class unity, self-sacrifice, and discipline’ but claimed that Bose had instructed Shah Nawaz Khan and the INA men to ‘return to India, retain their discipline and patriotism, but act non-violently and help the Congress’ (p. 552). Even while praising the INA, Gandhi felt obligated to point out that Bose's methods were ‘doomed to failure’ (p. 551).

¹⁹⁷ Patel to Bishwanath Das, 5 January, 1946 in CWSP, vol. 10, p. 166.

¹⁹⁸ Nehru to Baldev Singh, 25 December, 1946 in Nehru, vol. 2, p. 176.

¹⁹⁹ ‘Internal Situation in India’, an appreciation by the Commander-in-Chief, 24 November, 1945 in TP, vol. 6, p. 582.

²⁰⁰ See CWC resolution on ‘Congress Goal & the Means of Its Attainment’, Benares, 30 July, 1934 in INC, vol. 3, p. 267.

²⁰¹ Nehru's speech at Patna, 24 December, 1945 in SWJN, vol. 14, pp. 279–280.

²⁰² Ayesha Jalal relates that the Muslim League won all of the reserved seats in the central legislature and captured 75 per cent of the Muslim vote in all provincial assemblies throughout India. Conversely, the Congress won only 4.6 per cent of Muslim votes, but could claim 59.8 per cent of the total votes for the central assembly. See Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman (1994), pp. 171–172.