¹ Asad, Talal (2003) Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Stanford University Press, California.

² Abrams, Philip, (1988: 75). Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State, Journal of Historical Sociology 1 (1): 58–89CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ See for instance, Graham, Fuller, (2003). The Future of Political Islam, Palgrave, New YorkGoogle Scholar.

⁴ I am not suggesting a readily formed and concrete ‘community’ that the Jamaat-e-Islami can mobilize. The Jamaat-e-Islami activists’ own use of the notion of ‘community’ ranges from a small Jamaat-e-Islami core to all the Muslims in the world—the putative community of the ummah. In fact, it is precisely the formation and definition of the community that is the challenge. See David, Gilmartin, (1988). Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, University of California Press, BerkeleyGoogle Scholar, for a perceptive analysis of the creation of particular conceptions of ‘community’ during colonial rule.

⁵ Bayat, Asef, (2005). What is Post-Islamism? ISIM Review 16; and (2007) Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

⁶ Roy, Olivier, (1994). The Failure of Political Islam, Harvard University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar; Kepel, Gilles, (2002). Jihad; The Trail of Political Islam, I.B. Tauris, LondonGoogle Scholar; Ahmad, Irfan, (2009). Islamism and Democracy In India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami, Princeton Univesity Press, Princeton New JerseyCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷ For an exception to this trend see Devji, Faisal, (2005). Landscapes of Jihad: Militancy, Morality, Modernity, Cornell University Press, IthacaGoogle Scholar. While Devji places Islamism within the context of a global political imagination, he is not concerned with changes within Islamism.

⁸ See for instance: Stedman-Jones, Gareth and Katznelson, Ira (eds), (2010). Religion and the Political Imagination, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar; Pagden, Anthony (ed.), (2002). The Idea of Europe from Antiquity to the European Union, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Pagden, Anthony, (1990). Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination, Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar; Skinner, Quentin and Strath, Bo, (2003). States and Citizens: History, Theory, Prospects, Cambridge University Press: CambridgeGoogle Scholar; Pocock, J. G. A., (2009). Political Thought and History: Essays on Theory and Method, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar. Perhaps the example of Europe is a useful one. That Europe is ultimately an idea rooted in a particular imperial imagination rather than a clear geographical zone provides an interesting example for our purposes here. Both Europe and South Asia are appendages to the vast landmass that is Asia. In terms of landmass, physical space, population, number of languages, religions and ethnic groups, South Asia is bigger than Europe. There is a clearer demarcation from Asia in the form of the mighty Himalayan mountains compared with the murky boundary between Europe and Asia. Yet, South Asia is a ‘sub-continent’ while Europe is a ‘continent’. This imagination is linked to specific and concrete sets of institutions such as the European Union. See also Lewis, Martin and Wigen, Karen, (1997). The Myth of Continents: A critique of Metageography, University of California Press, CaliforniaGoogle Scholar.

⁹ Taylor (p. 23) then goes on to distinguish imaginaries from theories on three accounts: (1) imaginaries are how ordinary people ‘imagine’ their world. This is then represented not in theoretical terms but instead carried in images, stories and legends; (2) while theory circulates within a small number of people, imaginaries are shared by large groups of people; and thus (3) social imaginary is that common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy. Taylor, Charles (2004). Modern Social Imaginaries, Duke University Press, DurhamCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Ahmad, Irfan, (2009). Genealogy of the Islamic state: reflections on Maududi's political thought and Islamism, Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute, No. 15 (1): 145–162; Iqtidar, Humeira, (2010). ‘Colonial Secularism and the Genesis of Islamism in North India’ in Stedman-Jones, Gareth and Katznelson, Ira (eds), Religion and the Political Imagination, Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ It is possible to see the richness of debate, and the depth and nuances of alternatives that were discussed within India at the turn of the century as a response not just to the demands made by the idea of nationalism but also to the problem of squaring nationalism with the dominant political entity of the time: the modern state, i.e. how to make a nation-state.

¹² Humeira, Iqtidar, (2009).‘Jama'at-e-Islami Pakistan: Learning from The Left’ in Khan, Naveeda and Das, Veena (eds), Crisis and Beyond: Pakistan in the 20th Century, Routledge, New DelhiGoogle Scholar.

¹³ See for instance, Maududi's (1971) own essay on his life (‘Main hoon Abul Ala Maududi’ ([I am Abul A'ala Maududi], Zindagi, Lahore: January 1971: 21–30) and his daughter's account of life with her parents (Humaira Maududi, (2005). Shajarhai Saya dar, Al-Mansoor Publication, Lahore) where no mention is made of these influences. S. V. R. Nasr, (1996), in Mawdudi and the making of Islamic revivalism, Oxford University Press, New York; and K. K. Aziz, (1987), in The Idea of Pakistan, Vanguard Books, Lahore, hint at these but do not explore them in detail.

¹⁴ I suggest that this leftist imprint is present not despite Maududi's opposition to communism but precisely because of it. What I do not wish to imply is that Maududi or the Jamaat-e-Islami was sympathetic to Leftist ideology. Indeed he saw in communism a challenge but one that he was willing to take on. While commenting on what he saw as the fallacy of a ‘Muslim’ university at Aligarh that did not in fact, aim to produce good Muslims, Maududi wrote: ‘But, you could say that the British will never allow such a university. It is true to a point, but you can ask him that out of all Muslims and all Communists who do you prefer? You will have to choose one of the two. The Anglo-Mohammaden of 1910 will not be found for much longer. Now if you want to see all new Muslim generations as fully Communist then stay firm on your ancient anti-Muslim path. . .only one force can stop this plague and that force is Islam’. (‘Humaray Nizam-e-Talim ka Bunyadi Nuqs’, Tarjuman-ul-Quran, August, 1936. Article reproduced in Abul Ala Maududi ((1939) 1999) Tanfihat: 141).

¹⁵ Maududi's resistance to the formation of Pakistan was due to his distrust of the idea of nationalism and his opposition to the division of Indian Muslims into separate nations. However, it is important to also remember that Maududi and Jamaat-e-Islami disavowed his earlier critique of Pakistan once the leftists brought it up in the 1960s. By then the Jamaat-e-Islami was busy casting itself as the defender of Islam in this nation of Muslims. One way in which the Jamaat-e-Islami side-stepped the issue of Maududi's initial resistance to the formation of Pakistan was to highlight, in Jamaat-e-Islami publications, Maududi's meeting and association with Mohammed Iqbal (the national poet of Pakistan credited with proposing the idea of a separate homeland for the Muslims of India). By stressing that Maududi had been chosen by Iqbal to lead the model community of Muslims that Iqbal had helped fund at Pathankot, the organization attempted to present their relationship as a particularly close one when in reality they had only met once, a little before Iqbal's death (see for instance, Zindagi, January 1971:21–30).

¹⁶ Iqtidar, (2009). ‘Learning from the Left’.

¹⁷ It is interesting to note that the newly-elected fourth amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami, Syed Munawar Hassan, started his political engagement as a leftist activist during the 1950s. Munawar Hassan was initially associated with the leftist National Student's Federation. Later, as a student in Karachi University, he joined the Islami Jami'yat Tulaba the Jamaat's student wing.

¹⁸ This is not to imply that Bhutto provided unconditional support to unions. Indeed, state patronage in certain sectors or for some types of union activity went hand in hand with suppression of others. See Ali, Asdar, (2005). Strength of the Street Meets the Strength of the State: The 1972 Labour Struggle in Karachi, Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 37/1: 83–107CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ See in particular ‘Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan: Learning from the Opposition’ in Humeira Iqtidar (forthcoming 2011), Secularising Islamists? Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat-ud-Dawa in Pakistan, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; also Noman, Omar (1988), The Political Economy of Pakistan, KPI, LondonGoogle Scholar.

²⁰ Nasr, Syed Vali Reza, (2001). Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the making of state power, Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar; and (1994). The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I-Islami of Pakistan, University of California Press, Berkeley.

²¹ Nasr, 1994. One reason for the relative neglect of the Jamaat-e-Islami has been the increased activities of more militant and radical groups and the resulting shift in academic interest towards those.

²² The vast amount of literature produced on Islamism in both the Middle East and South Asia falls within this category (e.g., Ayubi, Nazih, (1991). Political Islam: religion and politics in the Arab world, Routledge, LondonGoogle Scholar; Esposito, John, (1997). Political Islam: Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? Lynne Rienner, Boulder, ColoradoGoogle Scholar; S. V. R. Nasr, (1994). The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at-I-Islami of Pakistan; Sivan, Emmanuel, (1985). Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar; Tibi, Bassim, (1988). The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake CityGoogle Scholar; and (1998). The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder, University of California Press, Berkeley). Useful exceptions focusing on ordinary members and looking beyond leaders include Eickelman and Piscatori, (1996). Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press, Princeton New Jersey; Singerman, Diane, (1995). Avenues of Participation: Family, Politics and Networks in the Urban Quarters of Cairo, Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar; Ahmed, Irfan, (2009). Islamism and Democracy In India: The Transformation of Jamaat-e-Islami; and Collins, Kathleen, (2007). Ideas, Networks and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucus, World Politics, 60 (October), 64–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

²³ There is some variation in the Jamaat-e-Islami's mobilization strategies across different parts of Pakistan. For instance, in the 2002 elections the Jamaat-e-Islami made political alliances with electable candidates of religious leanings who emphasized public morality in Sarhad closer to the Afghan border. In urban Karachi and Lahore the campaign emphasis was much more on service delivery and political accountability.

²⁴ The mission statement of the Al-Khidmat Foundation denies affiliation with any ‘regional, ethnic or political party’ but Jamaat-e-Islami activists claim it as their own. The Jamaat-e-Islami website listed the Foundation among its affiliates http://www.jamaat.org/new/urdu/otherweb/ [last accessed 7 June 2009]. However, the recently revamped Jamaat-e-Islami website does not contain a direct reference to Al-Khidmat.

²⁵ Interview, daughter of the founder of Al-Khidmat Trust (she did not wish to be named), at her residence, Defence Housing Authority, Lahore, 10 December, 2005.

²⁶ These are in addition to the schools that have been started by Jamaat-e-Islami affiliates as private ventures such as the Dar-ul-Arqam Schools of Islamic and Modern Sciences.

²⁷ In 2005 the Jamaat-e-Islami Women's Commission alone operated 125 schools, 24 madrassas and 14 industrial homes with enrolment by 11,010 students (male and female), 1,295 (male and female) and 265 (females only) (Raftar newsletter, Women's wing Jamaat-e-Islami, Islamabad, April–June 2005: 9).

²⁸ See Gupta, Akhil, (1995). Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics and the Imagined State, American Ethnologist 22:(2), 375–402CrossRefGoogle Scholar for a subtle treatment of the relationship between the discourse of corruption, the imagining of the state, media and international financial agencies such as the IMF.

²⁹ Most critiques of nationalism were locally generated and in response to repressive aspects of it, but as Arif Dirlik has pointed out there was too easy an appropriation of these critiques by the supporters of neo-liberal globalization. Dirlik, Arif, (1994). The Postcolonial Aura: Third World Criticism in the Age of Global Capitalism, Critical Inquiry, 20:(2), 328–356CrossRefGoogle Scholar,

³⁰ For an excellent overview of these debates see Mitchell, Timothy, (1991). ‘The limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their critics’, The American Political Science Review 85:(1), 77–96CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also Migdal, Joel, (2001). State in society: studying how societies and states transform and constitute one another, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³¹ Skocpol, Theda, (1985). ‘Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research’, in Evans, P., Rueschemeyer, D. and Skocpol, T. (eds), Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar; Hall, John, (ed.), (1986). States In History, Basil Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar; Held, David, et al. , (1983). States and Societies, Martin Robertson, OxfordGoogle Scholar; Vincent, Andrew, (1987). Theories of the State, Basil Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar; Jessop, Bob, (1990). State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in Perspective, Polity Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar; Migdal, Joel, (1988). Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton New JerseyGoogle Scholar.

³² Held, David, (1983). ‘Central Perspectives on the Modern State’, in Held, David, et al. , States and Societies, Martin Robertson, Oxford, p. 1Google Scholar.

³³ Skinner, Quentin, (2007). ‘What is the State?’ The Tang Li Lecture, Wolfson College, 24 October, 2007.

³⁴ Mitchell Timothy, (1991).

³⁵ Mitchell, Timothy, (2002). Rule of Experts: Egypt, Technopolitics, Modernity, University of California Press, BerkeleyGoogle Scholar.

³⁶ Abrams (1998) p. 70.

³⁷ For a useful attempt at analysing some of the reasons for this moratorium see Bartleson, Jens, (2001). The Critique of the State, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ See in particular: Hansen and Stepputat, (2001). ‘Introduction: States of Imagination’, in States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Post colonial state. T. Blom-Hansen and F. Stepputat (eds), Duke University Press Durham and London; and (2005). Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World, Princeton University Press, Princeton; Corbridge, Stuart et al. , (2005). Seeing the state: governance and governmentality in India, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ghosh, Kaushik, (2006). Between Global Flows and Local Dams: Indigenousness, Locality, and the Transnational Sphere in Jharkhand, India, Cultural Anthropology, 21:(4), 501–534CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Li, Tania Murray, (2007). The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics, Duke University Press, DurhamCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Trouillot, Michel Rolph, (2001). The Anthropology of the State: Close Encounters of a Deceptive Kind Current Anthropology 42:(1), 125–38CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Gupta, Akhil and Aradhana, Sharma, (2006). ‘Introduction: Rethinking Theories of the State in the Age of Globalization’, in Gupta and Sharma (eds), The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, Blackwell Publishing, OxfordGoogle Scholar.

³⁹ Scott, James C., (1998). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁰ See Sassen, Saskia, (1996). Losing Control? Sovereignty in an age of globalization, Columbia University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar, for an argument about the re-territorialization and strengthening of state control to facilitate economic globalization. Also Dunn, John (ed.), (1995). Contemporary Crisis of the Nation State? Blackwell, OxfordGoogle Scholar.

⁴¹ In Pakistan's recent history, the Musharaf regime received $18 billions from the US alone to strengthen its policing, espionage and military services. For some details and deeper fears about the changes in the US context see Ackerman, Bruce, (2006). Before the Next Attack: preserving civil liberties in an age of terrorism, Yale University Press, New HavenGoogle Scholar.

⁴² My intention here is not to suggest an uncomplicated narrative about the failure of the state with the market having to step in to correct the wrongs of the state. Again Mitchell (2002, Rule of Experts) provides a useful corrective to this view through a detailed look at the performance of public sector enterprises in Egypt. These were, he argues, predominantly financially vibrant and viable. It was the construction of a particular discourse that exacerbated the crisis in state legitimacy by focusing on the inefficiencies of these state enterprises. While there are important variations due to local contingencies and modalities, as discussed later, there was a similarity in how the idea of the state was discredited through an enhanced and positive emphasis on the idea of the market as an alternative engine for growth and equity. For a critical account of the sale of the profitable state owned telecommunications company with a similar unsubstantiated focus on state inefficiency and the alleged need for its replacement by a putatively more efficient private entity in Pakistan, see Munir, Kamal, ‘PTCL's Sullied Sale’, Herald, December 2009. Munir shows how in fact the replacement of a public monopoly by a private monopoly led to a dramatic decrease in profitability and long term viability of the company.

⁴³ This is particularly noticeable in the discourse on development. For a critical look at the process through which such a decentring takes place see Ferguson, James, (1990). The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeGoogle Scholar; and (2006). Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order, Duke University Press, Durham; Escobar, Arturo, (1995). The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton University Press, Princeton New JerseyGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁴ Names have been changed where individuals showed a preference for not using their real names.

⁴⁵ At the same time there is a deep realization within the Jamaat-e-Islami that its base is primarily within the cities and not in the rural areas. Chaudhry Rehmat Ilahi, long time Shura member and one of the oldest members in Lahore (interview 22 November 2005, residence Mansoorah) reflected often repeated opinions among Jamaat-e-Islami activists when he said: ‘Our base is sronger in the cities because there is less pressure from feudal obligations, biradari ties (kinship). There the waderas (feudal lords) and the chaudhries can exert such pressure as to make life difficult for those who sympathize with us. Generally, resistance is easier in cities. There is a feeling of openness. It is easier for us to take our message to people and also for people to stand up in our favour’.

⁴⁶ Many Jamaat-e-Islami activists think of the Jamaat-e-Islami as both a movement (tehreek) and a political party (party, jamaat).

⁴⁷ Michael Sandel, “Markets and Morals”, BBC Reith Lectures, Tuesday 9 June, 2009.

⁴⁸ Incidentally, the key contracts for his security company were with three major international banks in Lahore.

⁴⁹ See for instance, the 2002 Jamaat-e-Islami election manifesto. In addition, CDs produced by the Jamaat-e-Islami affiliate Islamic Mass Media covering speeches by Sayeed Munawar Hussain (particularly, Ijtima-‘am, 2004), Liaqut Baloch, and Professor Ghafoor Ahmed contain discussions along similar lines.

⁵⁰ Gilmartin, David, (1994). Scientific Empire and Imperial Science: Colonialism and Irrigation Technology in the Indus Basin, The Journal of Asian Studies, 53:(4), 1127–1149CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵¹ Escobar, Arturo, (1995). Encountering Development; Ferguson, James, (1990). The Anti-Politics Machine; Agrawal, Arun, (2005). Environmentality: Technologies of Government and the Makings of Subjects, Duke University Press, DurhamCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁵² See also Hatem, Mervat, (1998). ‘Secularist and Islamist Discourses on Modernity in Egypt and the Evolution of the Postcolonial Nation-State’ in, Haddad and Esposito (eds), Islam, Gender and Social Change, Oxford University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar, for similarities in the Egyptian context.

⁵³ Daechsel, Markus, (2006). The Politics of Self Expression; the Urdu Middle Class Mileu in Mid-Twentieth Century India and Pakistan, Routlege, New YorkCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chakrabarty, Dipesh, (1991). Open space/public place: Garbage, modernity and India, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, No. 1, pp. 15–31; Joshi, Sanjay, (2001). Fractured Modernity: Making of a Middle Class in Colonial India, Oxford University Press, DelhiGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁴ Osella, Filippo and Caroline, Osella, (2009). Muslim entrepreneurs in public life between India and the Gulf: making good and doing good, Journal of Royal Anthropological Institute 15:(1), 202–221CrossRefGoogle Scholar provide an insight into middle class aspirations and the promise of the market from the point of view of the entrepreneur.

⁵⁵ Seal, Anil, (1968). The Emergence of Indian Nationalism, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chatterjee, Partha, (1986). Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse? Zed Books, LondonGoogle Scholar.

⁵⁶ The critics of the Board of Governors and Model University Ordinance (2002) pointed towards a World Bank report on the education sector in Thailand that was replicated almost verbatim by a Boston based consortium of consultants hired, with World Bank money, to formulate an education policy for Pakistan. The suggestion was that the Board of Governors scheme is part of a larger World Bank agenda to open up developing country markets for multinational institutions wishing to profit from the strong demand for higher education within these countries. Interview Nazim Husnain, President All Pakistan Lecturers’ Association, at his residence in Iqbal Town, Lahore, December 2002.

⁵⁷ To become a rukn (or full member) of the Jamaat-e-Islami at his age (early thirties) means that Waqas Anjum is seen by those within the Lahore Jamaat-e-Islami hierarchy as a particularly promising activist.

⁵⁸ Interview Waqas Anjum Jaafari, 29 November 2005, Idara-Marafat I Islam, Mansoorah.

⁵⁹ See also Navaro-Yashin, (2004). Faces of the State, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, Chapter 3 on Islamist fashion and consumption in Turkey.

⁶⁰ One important private school chain started by a Jamaat-e-Islami affiliate is the Dar-al-Arqam School system.

⁶¹ Such strict gender segregation of service providers is a very recent development in urban middle class weddings and social functions.

⁶² For some discussion on the resistance that residents of Lahore's inner city had shown to the JI see Iqtidar, Humeira, (2008). ‘Terrorism and Islamism: Differences, Dynamics and Dilemmas’ in special issue on ‘Terrorism, Security and Business’, Global Business and Economic Review, 10:(2), 216–228CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶³ On such disjunctures between the local and the global see Aziz, this volume.

⁶⁴ Asad, Talal, (2003). Formation of the Secular: Christianity, Islam and Modernity, Stanford University Press, CaliforniaGoogle Scholar; Asad, Talal, (1993). Genealogies of Religion: discipline and reasons of power in Christianity and Islam, John Hopkins University Press, LondonGoogle Scholar; See also Salvatore, Armando, (2005). The Euro-Islamic Roots of Secularity: A Difficult Equation Asian Journal of Social Science, 33:3, 412–437CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁵ Cohn, Bernard, (1996). Colonialism and its Forms of Knowledge: The British in India, Princeton University Press, PrincetonGoogle Scholar; Chatterjee, Partha. Nations and Nationalism; Van der Veer, Peter, (2001). Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain, Princeton University Press, New JerseyGoogle Scholar. However, see Washbrook, David, (1999). ‘. . . And Having Melted Into Thin Air, Then Rains Down Again’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 42:4, 571CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for some important questions regarding the precise modalities of colonial governmentality.

⁶⁶ Notable exceptions in the case of India include Chatterjee, Partha, (2004). Politics of the Governed: Reflections on Popular Politics in Most of the World, Columbia University Press, New YorkGoogle Scholar; Corbridge, Stuart, et al., Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India; Ghosh, Kaushik, ‘Between Global Flows and Local Dams, Indigenousness, Locality, and the Transnational Sphere in Jharkhand, India’.

⁶⁷ See Kaushik Ghosh, Between Global Flows, 2006, for a perceptive discussion along these lines. Also Scott, David, (1995). Colonial Governmentality, Social Text, 43 (Autumn), 191–220CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁶⁸ For an insight into the genealogy of cynicism in Pakistan see Khan, Naveeda, (2003). Grounding Sectarianism: Islamic Ideology And Muslim Everyday Life In Lahore, Pakistan (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University)Google Scholar.

⁶⁹ Rudnyckyj, Daromir, (2009). Spiritual Economies: Islam and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia, Cultural Anthropology. 24:(1), 104–141CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Rudnyckyj, Daromir, (2009). Market Islam in Indonesia, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. 15:(1), 183–201CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁰ See also Rudnyckyj, Spiritual Economies: Islam and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia, for his discussion of spiritual economies.

⁷¹ Turner, Bryan, (2009). ‘Goods not Gods: New Spiritualities, Consumerism and Religious Markets’ in, Ian Rees Jones, Paul Higgs and David J. Ekerdt (eds), Consumption and Generational Changes. The Rise of Consumer Lifestyles, Transaction, New Brunswick.

⁷² For prosperity religions see brief introduction in Garett, Jeremy and King, Richard, (2005). Selling Spirituality: The silent takeover of religion, Routledge, London, p. 19Google Scholar; and Coleman, Simon, (2000). The Globalisation of Charismatic Christianity: Spreading the Gospel of Prosperity, Cambridge University Press, CambridgeCrossRefGoogle Scholar; for spiritual economy Rudnyckyj (2009), Spiritual Economies: Islam and Neoliberalism in Contemporary Indonesia; and for occult capitalism, Comaroff, Jean and Comaroff, John, (2000). Millenial Capitalism: First Thoughts on Second Coming, Public Culture, 12:(2), 291–343CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and their (1999) Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: Notes from the South African Postcolony, American Ethnologist 26:(2), 279–303.

⁷³ This may vary across classes. Turner (2009), ‘Goods not Gods: New Spiritualities, Consumerism and Religious Markets’ p. 50, quotes the example of superstar Madonna moving from Catholic themes to more Jewish ones as Rachel after her exposure to Kabbala.

⁷⁴ See Trentman, Frank, (2006). The Making of the Consumer: Knowledge, Power and Identity in the Modern World, Berg Publishers, OxfordCrossRefGoogle Scholar, for an insight into historical and sociological discussions about the relationship between new subjectivities and consumerism.

⁷⁵ For instance, Baxter, C. and Wasti, S. R., (1991). Pakistan: Authoritarianism in the 1980s, Lahore: Vanguard PublicationsGoogle Scholar; Waseem, Muhammed (1987) Pakistan under Martial Law 1977–85, Vanguard, LahoreGoogle Scholar; Malik, Iftikhar, (1999). Islam, nationalism, and the West: issues of identity in Pakistan, Macmillan, BasingstokeCrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁶ Also see Sharma, Aradhana, (2006). Crossbreeding Institutions, Breeding Struggle: Women's Empowerment, Neoliberal Governmentality, and State (Re)Formation in India, Cultural Anthropology, 21:(1), 60–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar.