¹ See Gilmartin, D., ‘Religious leadership and the Pakistan movement in the Punjab’, Modern Asian Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, 1979, p. 485 Google Scholar; Gilmartin, D., Empire and Islam: Punjab and the Making of Pakistan, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992 Google Scholar; Talbot, I., Pakistan: A Modern History, Hurst Publishers, London, 2009 Google Scholar.

² Gilmartin, ‘Religious leadership’; Gilmartin, Empire and Islam.

³ Ansari, S., Sufi Saints and State Power: The Pīrs of Sind 1843–1947, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992 Google Scholar.

⁴ Another important reference for the early independence period is Ewing, K., ‘The politics of Sufism: redefining the saints of Pakistan’, Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 42, no. 2, 1983, pp. 251–68Google Scholar.

⁵ See Hasan, R., ‘Religion, society and the state in Pakistan: pirs and politics’, Asian Survey, vol. 27, no. 5, 1987, pp. 552–65Google Scholar; Sherani, R. S., ‘Ulema and pir in the politics of Pakistan’, in Economy and Culture in Pakistan: Migrants and Cities in a Muslim Society, Hasting, D. and Werbner, P. (eds), Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1991, pp. 216–46Google Scholar; Aziz, K. K., Religion, Land and Politics in Pakistan: A Study of Piri-Muridi, Vanguard Publishers, Lahore, 2001 Google Scholar.

⁶ P. Pierson, ‘Increasing returns, path dependency, and study of politics’, American Political Science Review, vol. 94, no. 2, 2004, pp. 251–67.

⁷ Acemoglu, D. and James, A. R., ‘Persistence of power, elites, and institutions’, American Economic Review, vol. 98, no. 1, 2008, pp. 267–93.Google Scholar

⁸ Besley, T. and Reynal-Querol, M., Selection via Dynasties: Theory and Evidence, London, 2013, http://84.89.132.1/~reynal/dynasties_new_draft_131024[1]_ALL.pdf, [accessed 18 July 2017].Google Scholar

⁹ The article also feeds into the literature on religion and political economy explored by Rachel McCleary and Robert J. Barro. See McCleary, R. M. and Barro, R. J., ‘Religion and economy’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 20, no. 2, 2006, pp. 49–72.Google Scholar As part of the overall structure of domination in rural countryside, shrines can shape the political economy of development by shaping patterns of literacy. For a detailed account, see Malik, A. and Mirza, R., Religion, Land and Politics: Shrines and Literacy in Punjab, Pakistan, Washington, DC, 2015 Google Scholar, http://ebrary.ifpri.org/cdm/ref/collection/p15738coll2/id/129245, [accessed 13 July 2017].

¹⁰ Gerth, H. and Mills, C. W., Character and Social Structure: The Psychology of Social Institutions, Brace and Company, Inc., New York, 1953, pp. 193–5Google Scholar.

¹¹ Metcalf, B. D. (ed.), Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985.Google Scholar

¹² In this context, pīrs have considerable sway over personal decisions of devotees (mureeds).

¹³ S. Mohmand and H. Javid, ‘The politics of Majboori’, paper presented at 23^rd European Conference on South Asian Studies, University of Zurich, 23–26 July 2014.

¹⁴ Coser, L. A. and Rosenberg, B., Sociological Theory: A Book of Readings, Macmillan, New York, 1964, p. 129.Google Scholar

¹⁵ R. Bierstedt, in ibid., p. 153.

¹⁶ Heck, P. L. (ed.), Sufism and Politics: The Power of Spirituality, Markus-Weiner Publishers, Princeton, NJ, 2007 Google Scholar, p. 24.

¹⁷ Malik and Mirza, Religion, Land and Politics.

¹⁸ The interested reader is referred to Malik and Mirza, Religion, Land and Politics, for a more detailed exposition.

¹⁹ These were: 1937, 1946, 1950/51, 1962, 1965, 1970, 1977, 1985, 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2008, and 2013.

²⁰ Wakeel, Siasat Key Firaun, Feroz Sons Publishers, Lahore, 1992; Wakeel, Siasat Danaun Kee Kalabaziyan, 3 vols, Feroz Sons Publishers, Lahore, 1995; A. Jaffrey, Pakistan Key Siasi Waderey, Jahangir Books, Lahore, 2007;T. Ismail, ‘Elections 1985’, Maktaba Intikhab-o-Jamhoor, Lahore, 1986.

²¹ Shrines are not a rural phenomenon either. In fact, when purely judged by numbers, urban centres had the largest concentration of shrines with Lahore containing the highest number of shrines (73) followed by Multan (20) and Rawalpindi (17).

²² Similar trends are evident in the relatively developed districts of northern Punjab. Prominent spiritual seat of the shrine (gaddis) in this regard include: the Sharaqpur Sharif (Sheikhupura), Makhad Sharif (Attock), AluMohar Sharif (Sialkot), Aroop Sharif (Gujranwala), and Jalalpur Sharif (Jhelum).

²³ Talbot, I. A., ‘The Punjab under colonialism: order and transformation in British India’, Journal of Punjab Studies, vol. 14, no. 1, 2007, pp. 3–10 Google Scholar.

²⁴ Gilmartin, ‘Religious leadership’.

²⁵ Amongst the cohort that made an early entry into politics were the Kirmanis of Daud Bandagi, Khawajas of Taunsa Sharif, the Diwans of Pakpattan, Makhdooms of Mianwali Qureshiyan, and Gilani Syeds of Musa Pak Shahid and Makhad Sharif.

²⁶ See Aziz, Religion, p. 39. The ratio for 1946 elections was calculated by Malik and Mirza, Religion, Land and Politics.

²⁷ As Aziz, Religion, p. 109, notes: ‘Medium-size shrine makes him a small landowner and a local squire. The big shrine gives him an entrée into the zamindar club and makes a magnate of him. A leading shrine is a gold mine, which catapults him into the aristocratic category and brings him riches large enough to . ..enter politics directly at the highest level.’

²⁸ Rather than aiming at a comprehensive treatment of the subject.

²⁹ Still, a few managed to succeed, mostly taking refuge under the banner of Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam.

³⁰ In Sind, however, several shrine families defied the temptation to support the military regime, and remained loyal to the People's Party. Prominent amongst these were the Makhdums of Hala.

³¹ The religiously inspired name given to the national legislative assembly.

³² The Korejas of Rahimyar Khan, for example, have followed a very similar trajectory.

³³ Especially resources controlled by the Waqf department.

³⁴ Di Lampedusa, G. T., The Leopard, Collin Harvills, London, 1960.Google Scholar

³⁵ Talbot, ‘The Punjab under colonialism’.

³⁶ Sayeed, K. B., Pakistan—the Formative Phase 1857–1948, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968, p. 283.Google Scholar

³⁷ The Diaries of Field Marshall Ayub Khan contain some interesting references on this matter. At one point, he complains: ‘I am told that Pir of Dewal having exploited my name for so long and amassing so much wealth by skilfully duping people now talks against me in an attempt to rehabilitate himself.’ He notes on another occasion: ‘A spate of religious leaders came to see me on Tuesday. Pīr Dewal and Pīr Zakor all had plans for moulding public opinion . . .. The explanation of these plans was of course followed by a series of personal requests and favours’; Baxter, C. (ed.), Diaries of Field Marshall Ayub Khan, 1966-72, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007 Google Scholar, p. 200. While a large number of shrine families sided with military rule, the Gilani Syeds of Multan declined to lend support to Ayub Khan.

³⁸ Ghulam Ahmad Maneka.

³⁹ Cheema, A., Khwaja, A., and Qadir, A., ‘Decentralization in Pakistan: context, content and causes’, in Decentralization and Local Governance in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective, Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee, D. (eds), MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006 Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Khan, S. R., Khan, F. S., and Akhtar, A. S., Initiating Devolution for Service Delivery in Pakistan: Ignoring the Power Structure, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2007 Google Scholar.

⁴¹ Elections under the BD system instituted by Ayub Khan.

⁴² This includes many regions in central and western Punjab.

⁴³ Ewing, ‘The politics of Sufism’.

⁴⁴ One of the first conferences organized after the military takeover by General Zia was held on 22 September 1980 and was attended by around 100 pīrs. See Lewis, P., Pirs, Shrines and Pakistani Islam, Christian Study Centre, Rawalpindi, 1985, p. 54Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ This is also important for patronage directed at smaller shrines. The larger, more politically influential shrines can control the allocations for repair and maintenance of smaller shrines.

⁴⁶ The incumbent state minister for religious affairs is Pīr Amin-ul-Hasnat. Another pīr, Syed Hamid Kazmi of Multan, occupied the ministerial slot in the PPP government that assumed power in 2008.

⁴⁷ Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani's son is married to the granddaughter of the Pīr Pagara of Sind.

⁴⁸ The pīr of Muzaffargarh also enjoyed nuptial bonds with Nawab Mushtaq Ahmed Gurmani, the powerful governor of Punjab.

⁴⁹ The nephew of Major Ashiq Hussain Qureshi was married to the niece of Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan of Wah.

⁵⁰ Two of Pakistan's leading pīr-zamindars, Syeda Abida Hussain and Syed Fakhar Imam, are grandchildren of Syed Maratab Ali. For further details, see Hussain, S. A., Power Failure: The Political Odyssey of a Pakistani Woman, Oxford University Press, Karachi, 2015 Google Scholar.

⁵¹ Jugnu Mohsin, editor of Friday Times and spouse of noted journalist Najam Sethi, is the daughter of Syed Mohsin Ali (former chairman of Mitchells Fruits) and niece of Syed Sajjad Haider Kirmani (see family political representation in Table 1, first entry).

⁵² Two of Hameed Sultan's sons held important bureaucratic positions as well. Sheheryar Sultan was the director general of Local Government and Urban Development Punjab and his brother, Shehzada Sultan, was a senior superintendent of police. For further information, see http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13-18945-Scions-of-political-families-occupy-important-positions-in-Federation-Punjab, [accessed 13 July 2017].

⁵³ Officials of British colonial administration, including Sir Louis Dane (the lieutenant governor of Punjab) and Lady Dean, and Sir Arthur Reed and Lady Reed made personal visits to the shrine of Musa Pak Shahid in Multan as a mark of respect. The Dynast, Pīr Sadruddin Shah, was invited to the coronation ceremony of George V in 1910. For details, consult Gilani, Y. R., Chah-E-Yusuf Sey Sada, Nigarshat Publishers, Lahore, 2006.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Arguably, similar brokerage and delegation can be witnessed in many non-shrine constituencies, especially those dominated by landlords and tribal chiefs.

⁵⁵ In the run-up to the 2013 general elections, a large number of pīrs joined the PML(N).

⁵⁶ He was later dropped as a prime-ministerial candidate after he faced warrants for a case involving drugs.

⁵⁷ Hussain, Power Failure, p. 240.

⁵⁸ Despite their strong political enmity, the Qureshis and Gilanis enjoy a cordial relationship at the personal level and are often seen together at important social events (see http://www.dawn.com/news/1184083, [accessed13 July 2017]).

⁵⁹ In Jhang, the competition between Rojoa Syeds has been associated with the rise of alternative challengers to the supremacy of the Shah Jewana family as noted by U. Farooq, ‘Diminishing returns: Sufi shrines in Pakistan's politics’, The Revealer, 2014, https://wp.nyu.edu/therevealer/2014/01/15/diminishing-returns-sufi-shrines-in-pakistans-politics/ [accessed 18 July 2017].

⁶⁰ In one of the early governments after independence, the father of Yusuf Raza Gilani voted against the Daultana faction associated with Pīr Safiuddin Gilani of Makhad Sharif. However, soon after the vote of no-confidence was successful, Gilani's father asked Pīr Safi's hand for his sister overriding all political differences (Gilani, Chah-E-Yusuf Sey Sada, p. 31).

⁶¹ Possible exceptions in this regard include constituencies influenced by Pakpattan Sharif, Shah Jewana, and Pur Qaboola.

⁶² Mehdi Shah's grandson, Syed Hasnat Mahmood Shah, became the District Nazim of Gojra in 2002.

⁶³ Shami, M., ‘Collective action, clientelism, and connectivity’, American Political Science Review, vol. 106, August 2012, pp. 588–606 Google Scholar.

⁶⁴ Based on a conversation with a leading shrine caretaker of central Punjab.

⁶⁵ In central and north Punjab, most shrine families have strong preference for the Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and Imran Khan's Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI).

⁶⁶ Observation based on interview with a close associate of Maulana Tariq Jameel.

⁶⁷ Numerous examples can be offered from the Shah Jewana in Jhang to Golra Sharif in Islamabad; please see Farooq, ‘Diminishing returns’.

⁶⁸ Siddiqa, A., The New Frontiers: Militancy and Radicalism in Punjab, SISA Report no. 2, Centre for International and Strategic Analysis, Norway, 2015.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ T. Kamran, ‘Jhang and the wedge of sectarianism’, in The News on Sunday, 10 January 2016, http://tns.thenews.com.pk/jhang-wedge-sectarianism-ii/#.WBjDLdWLRhE, [accessed 13 July 2017].

⁷⁰ Despite recent challenges to their political power, the Gilanis and Qureshis have traditionally enjoyed a similar advantage in Multan over the Bosan family.

⁷¹ Interview with a former chief secretary of Punjab.

⁷² Even while serving as Pakistan's foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi would shorten his overseas visits to ensure that he is back in Multan for the annual Urs proceedings where he could mingle with his followers.

⁷³ The kingmaker role can also be played by shrines whose families directly participate in elections. This is because the influence of prominent shrines extends beyond the constituency where they are located.

⁷⁴ Golra Sharif played a key role in the Khilafat Movement in the 1920s and the opposition alliance (PNA) against Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1977. See Lewis, Pirs, Shrines and Pakistani Islam.

⁷⁵ By one estimate, there are nearly 1 million followers of Golra Sharif. See Chaudhry, H., Saints and Shrines in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspective, National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, Islamabad, 2013, p. 352Google Scholar.

⁷⁶ Ibid.; Lewis, Pirs, Shrines and Pakistani Islam.

⁷⁷ Lewis, Pirs, Shrines and Pakistani Islam.

⁷⁸ Werenfels, I., ‘Beyond authoritarian upgrading: the re-emergence of Sufi orders in Maghrebi politics’, Journal of North African Studies, vol. 19, no. 3, 2014, pp. 275–95Google Scholar.