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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2008
For many reasons the June election was unusual. To begin with, it was the first time in twenty-seven years that a general election was called due to the passage of a ‘vote of non-confidence’ in the House of Commons.Moreover, it was a ‘double election’ as the regular triennial election of the House of Councillors was scheduled for the same time. Most uniquely, it was also the first time in Japan's electoral history that an incumbent Prime Minister died in office while in the course of the campaign. Finally, it was seen as the first serious opportunity for the combined opposition forces to terminate the uninterruped one-party rule of the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter referred to as the LDP) since 1955. Results of the election and the subsequent choice of Suzuki Zenko as the Prime Minister surprised not only observers but also the ‘insiders’ ofJapanese politics. This paper attempts to: (1) elaborate on the background that led to the election; (2) illustrate and analyze the electoral facts; and (3) examine their implications for Japan's party politics in the 1980s.
1 In the post-War history of the Diet a ‘vote of non-confidence’ motion has been passed twice. The first was on December 23, 1948 when the Minority Government, headed by Yoshida Shigeru, welcomed the motion in order to hold a general election. The second, on March 14, 1953, was cast against Yoshida's fourth cabinet by the Progressives, the Socialists and the Hatoyama faction of Yoshida's own Liberals.Google Scholar
2 The triennial election of one-half of the House of Councillors was originally scheduled for June 29, 1980. The term for Councillors is six years.Google Scholar
3 May 15, 1932, PM Inukai was assassinated—the so-called 5.15 Incident.Google Scholar
4 E.g. see Asahi Shimbun, Mainichi Shimbun, Evening Editions, 05 16, 1980.Google Scholar
5 The most immediate issues which triggered the revolt were the KDD scandal and the Gambling Debt of Dietman Hamada Koichi. The KDD scandal involves briberies to high-ranking government officials, including possible political contributions to former ministers of Communications and Postal Service by the International Telephone & Telegraph Corp. (KDD) in exchange for special favors, e.g. allowing the Corporation to charge overseas services at the exchange rate of $1.00 to 360 yen continuously instead of the new decreased rate. The case of Hamada's gambling in Las Vegas was exposed at the trial of Osano Kenji, a defendant in the series of trials related to airplane purchases by Japan's airline companies. In response to the prosecution's query about the $200,000 cash which they suspected was a payment from the Lockheed Co. made at the L.A. airport, Osano testified that the amount was a payment to the Las Vegas casino on behalf of Dietman Hamada. It is rumored that during a gambling tour to Las Vegas in October 1972, Hamada lost $1.5 million. The anti-mainstream insisted that Dietman Hamada be summoned to testify before the Diet. The mainstream, however, refused. According to reporters, Hamada ‘threatened to talk’ were he summoned. As a cadre of the mainstream, he obviously knows of many improprieties among his colleagues, including some opposition members. PM Ohira owed Hamada a political debt as well since the latter ‘crushed’ the young rebels in the November 1979 coup.Google Scholar
6 See the section, ‘Chicken and Called Bluff’ in Snyder, Glen H. and Paul, Diesing, Conflict Among Nations (Princeton University Press, 1977), Ch. II,Google ScholarFormal Models of Bargaining. For a minute-to-minute record of the May 16 late-afternoon proceedings of the Diet, see Asahi Shimbun, May 17, 1980.Google Scholar
7 For an analysis of the election, see, Mainichi Shimbun, October 8, 1980, and articles selected and translated by Japan Echo in Vol. VII, No. 1 (1980),Google Scholarunder the section, ‘Election’79: Expectations and Results.’ For details of the ‘Forty Days' War’ between Fukuda and Ohira in the post-October 1979 Election, see Kyuzo, Kobayashi, ‘Kenryoku-senso (Power Game): Political Documents,’ in Bungei Shunju, January 1980, pp. 261–309.Google Scholar
8 In exchange for the NLC support, PM Ohira was rumored to have promised a cabinet post to the former. As a matter of fact, the post of Education Ministry was kept open long after the new Government was formed. Obviously, Ohira failed to carry out his commitment to the NLC because of strong objection, even from within the mainstream. The final vote in the House of Commons was: Ohira (138), Fukuda (121), Blank (252). In the House of Councillors, it was: Ohira (97), Asukata (52), Blank (87)and Invalid (1). Factional breakdown of the votes in the house of commons: For Ohira Ohira (49), Tanaka (50), Miki (4), Fukuda (1), Nakasone (6), Others (24), NLC (4).For Fukuda Fukuda (49), Nakasone (34), Miki (28), Nakagawa Group (9), Others (4).
9 For an analysis of the increased and rigidified factional feud within the LDP caused by the introduction of a leadership primary, Taketsugu Tsurutani, ‘The LDP in Transition? Mass Membership Participation in Party Leadership Selection,’ Asian Survey, Vol. XX, No. 8 (08 1980).Google Scholar
10 For a detailed history of the factional feud within the LDP, see Isamu, Togawa, Shosetsu Yoshida Gakko (The Story of Yoshida School), 6 vols (Ryudo Shuppan: Tokyo, 1974–1979), esp. Vol. 3, Kaku-Fuku Kazan (The Volcanic Feud Between Tanaka Kakuei and Fukuda Takeo).Google ScholarFor an interpretation that the May 16, 1980 dissolution was a scheme by Tanaka Kakuei, the former PM and a close ally of PM Ohira, see Tachibana Takashi, ‘Shin Tanaka Kakuei no Kenkyu: Hikokunin to Saisho’ (New Study of Tanaka Kakuei: The Defendant and the Prime Minister), in Bungei Shunju, July 1980, pp. 116–49. For a similar interpretation, see also Fujiwara Kotatsu, ‘Kyokai to Yami-shogun no Ravu Koru’ (Love-call Between the Giant and the Dark Shogun), and Koitabashi Jiro, ‘Tanaka Kakuei to Gundan ga Seikai o Rodan suru’ (Tanaka Kakuei and his troop dictate the political circle), in Gendai, July 1980.Google Scholar
11 See Isamu, Togawa, Shosetsu Yoshida Gakko.Google Scholar
12 Ibid.
13 See footnote 5 above.
14 Referring to PM Ohira's visit to the USA only a few days earlier at which time he responded to the American pressure on Japan for increasing its share of defense with a pledge to increase the defense budget.
15 That there is a close relationship between Kasuga Ikko of the DSP and Nakagawa Ichiro, the leader of the young rebels among the anti-mainstream of the LDP, is a well-known fact. Kasuga plotted a coalition government in 1974 when the LDP was split because of PM Tanaka's financial scandals.Google Scholar See Kenzo, Kono, Gicho Ichidai (Memoir of the Speaker of the House of Councillors) (Asahi Shimbun-sha: Tokyo, 1978), p. 103.Google Scholar
16 Among the LDP rebels who boycotted the vote of the non-confidence session, Tanaka Isaji of Kyoto [I] was the only one who refused to ask for the party's endorsation. He ran as an independent Conservative and was reelected for his 15th term.
17 A comment by Yoshihiro, Inayama, the President-Designate of the Keidanren, May 17, 1980, Asahi Shimbun.Google Scholar
18 For a comprehensive report on the three platforms, seeAsahi Shimbun, June 7, 1980.Google Scholar
19 Asahi Shimbun, June 10, 1980. See also Shimizu, Minoru, ‘Change of Generations,’ in Japan Times, June 5, 1980.Google Scholar
20 Asahi Shimbun, June 19, 1980.Google Scholar
21 Ike, Nobutaka, A Theory of Japanese Democracy (Westview Press: Boulder, Colorado, 1978).Google Scholar
22 See latest statistics for distribution of party strength in local politics in Asahi Shimbun, June 23, 1980. For an optimistic view of the future of the Kakushin group (Progressive-reformists, usually endorsed by the opposition parties in a United Front against the Conservatives supported by the LDP) at the local level elections,Google Scholar see Tsurutani, Taketsugu, Political Change in Japan: Response to Post-Industrial Challenge (David McKay Co. Inc.: N.Y., 1977).Google Scholar
23 See Naoki, Inose, ‘Tanaka Kakuei to Nakasone Yasuhiro Saigo no Kake’ (The Last Chance for Tanaka and Nakasone), Gendai, August 1980.Google Scholar
24 For a profile of Komoto, see Asahi Shimbun, June 25, 1980. The report quoted Komoto's statement that he provided 10 million yen as campaign funds to his followers. He is also reported to have assigned members of his faction to register new party members, and rumored to have spent 100 million yen for membership fees. For a profile of Miyazawa, see Daizo, Kobayashi, ‘Miyazawas Kiichi—The Chamption of New Rights,’ in Bungei Shunju, October 1976.Google Scholar
25 Yomiuri Shimbun, July 16, 1980. For inside stories related to the birth of the Suzuki government and behind-the-scenes deals, see the series of articles in Mainichi Shimbun, ‘Seiken Dango’ (Negotiation for Power) from July 7 to July 16, 1980, and Yomiuri Shimbun, ‘Seikento’ (The Party in Power) from Junr 25 to July 17, 1980.Google Scholar
26 For the trend before Suzuki's emergence, see, ‘Fujiwara Kotatsu vs. the 10 New LDP Leaders,’ in Gendai, August 1980. (Japanese monthly magazines are usually published a month ahead of the issue date.)Google Scholar
27 Comment by Seicho, Matsumoto, in ‘Dare ga Suzuki Zenko o shimei shitaka’ (Who Appointed Suzuki?) Shukan Shincho, July 10, 1980.Google Scholar See also Soichiro, Tawara, ‘Suzuki Zenko: Gyoji ga Yokozuna ni natte shimata Sori Daijin’ (Prime Minister Suzuki: the umpire who became the champion) in Chuo Koron, October 1980, and Shiota Michihiko, ‘Zenko-san ni aimashitaka?’ (Have you ever met Zenko?), in Bungei Shunju, September 1980, pp. 134–45.Google Scholar
28 Ike, Nobutaka, Japanese Politics: Patron–Client Democracy (2nd edn, Alfred A. Knopf: New York, N.Y., 1972), p. 84.Google Scholar
29 According to Asahi Shimbun, July 29, 1980 survey report, the most desired qualities in a Prime Minister are: decisiveness (35%), internationality (14%), vision (13%), popularity (12%), cleanness (9%), enthusiasm (5%), intellectuality (3%), flexibility (2%), and others (7%).Google Scholar
30 For the revival of factional activities, see Asahi Shimbun, August 31, 1980.Google Scholar
31 The leadership primary has since been suspended since no one but Suzuki registered for the race. Thus, Suzuki is confirmed for a full two-year term till the Fall of 1982. As of January 1981, the factional stand on the issue of a leadership primary is: Komoto—in favor, Fukuda (Abe)—against, Tanaka—undecided, Suzuki—undecided, Nakasone—in favor, and Nakagawa—in favor but with an amended format.Google Scholar