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² Ibid.

³ Xuefang, Yang, ‘Luda yangeshi bianhou ganyan’, Zhonghua minguo lujun daxue yangeshi, eds Xuefang, Yang, Bingyi, Zhu (Taipei, 1990), pp. 284–5.Google Scholar

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⁷ Romanus, C., Sunderland, R., Stilwell's Mission to China (Washington, D.C., 1953), p. 153.Google ScholarSome people within military circles have already pointed out that Stilwell's criticisms were not valid. In battles, large and small, in the course of the War, an army or division commander usually positioned himself 5 to 6 Chinese miles from the line of combat so that he would be out of the range of enemy artillery. The headquarters of a group army was usually 19–20 Chinese miles from the line of combat, and the headquarters of a war zone was usually located in a major city or town 200 to 300 Chinese miles from the battlefront. See the personal letter by Mr Hu Jingru to the author, 7 Jan., 1993.Google Scholar

⁸ Wedemeyer, A., Wedemeyer Report (New York, 1958), p. 325.Google ScholarPubMed

⁹ Zhongzheng, Jiang, ‘Zhengjun de modi yu gaoji jiangling de zeren’, Jiang zongtong sixiang yanlunji, 19: 68–9 (Taipei, 1966).Google Scholar

¹⁰ Zhongzheng, Jiang, ‘Kangzhan jiantao yu bisheng yaojue: part 2’, Jiang zongtong sixiang yanlunji, 14: 72–3.Google Scholar

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¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 18, 19, 38.

¹⁶ Jiang, ‘Zhengjun xunci’, Jiang Zongtong sixiang yanlunji, 18: 208.Google Scholar

¹⁷ The proportion of graduates of the regular and special courses of Luda found among the general staff officers in the various military organizations and units of the country: 12.1% in September 1939, 10.6% in December 1940, 19.0% in September 1944. See Junlingbu disanting diyichu (ed.), ‘Canmou renyuan tongji tubiao’, 1939, chart one, Archives of the Department of Miiltary Command, Second Historical Archives, No. 769/310, ‘Ershijiunian quanguo junshi jiguan gebudui canmou renyuan chushen tongjitu’ No. 769/309, ‘Canmou ren yuan gezhong tongjitu’, 1944, chart four, No. 769/310.Google Scholar

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²¹ Jiang Jieshi had once compared the quality of the general staff corps of the Chinese army and the Japanese army in a meeting of the chiefs of staff, ‘Let us look at the enemy: if they send a staff officer with the rank of captain to the battlefront, he will be able to take responsibility for a brigade or a regiment. I do not even have to say anything more about how good the Japanese staff officers are at logistical work. For us now, are our middle-echelon staff officers, or even our high-ranking chiefs of staff and general staff section heads, comparable to their staff officers with the mere rank of captain, in terms of leadership ability and the ability to manage military affairs? If we do not strive for improvement in this area, we will not be able to score victories! The reason why foreign armies are so militarily effective, and why they are able to continuously improve their training and know-how within the organization, is precisely due to the fact that they have a strong and intelligent general staff corps behind the scene!’ See Zongzheng, Jiang, ‘Canmouzhang huiyi xunci, 2’, Jiang Zongtong sixiang yanlunji, 15: 308.Google Scholar

²² The American President Roosevelt once criticized Stilwell for ‘obviously hating the Chinese’. One of Stilwell's proposals regarding the training of the Chinese army in India was to replace officers above the rank of battalion commander with Americans and assign many liaison officers to control the Chinese troops.Google Scholar See Rongqu, Luo, ‘China and East Asia in America's Global Strategy, 1931–1949’, American, Chinese, and Japanese Perspectives on Wartime Asia 1931–1949 eds Iriye, A., Cohen, W. (Wilmington, 1990), p. 279.Google Scholar

²³ Liu, ‘Kangzhan’, I: 466. Regarding the statistics on the strength of the army before the war, also see Cheng, Chen, Banian kangzhan jingguo gaiyao (n.p, 1946), p. 2, 3.Google Scholaryingqin, He, Rijun qinhua banian kangzhanshi (Taipei, 1982), pp. 24–7.Google Scholar

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²⁵ Liu, Military History, pp. 147–8.Google Scholar

²⁶ Chongxi, Bai, ‘Wunianlai junxun zhongyao sheshi zhi jiantao’, Junshi zazhi, 149 (06, 1943), pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

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²⁸ See my own work, ‘Kangzhan shiqi lujun de jiaoyu yu xunlian’, taolunji ed. weiyuanhui.Google Scholar

²⁹ ‘Report: Statement on Commissioned Personnel Strength and Classification as to Training’, 28 Jan. 1936, U.S. Military Intelligence Reports: China, 1911–1941, Reel 5, pp. 521–4. The percentages for each category are my own calculations.Google Scholar

³⁰ ‘Report’, p. 521.Google Scholar

³¹ bianyiju, Guofangbu shizheng (ed.), Kangri zhanzheng— zhanqian shijie dashi ji zhongri guoshi gaiyao (Taipei, 1966), p. 62.Google Scholar

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⁴⁶ Xianzong, Chen, ‘Fuwu shizhounian huiyilu’, Junxu xuexiao diqiqi xueshengban tongxun, No. 9 (Jan. 1947), p. 25.Google Scholar

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