¹ For a sample of more recent studies of this nature, see Rudolph, Susanne H. and Piscatori, James (eds), Transnational Religion and Fading States, Boulder, Colarado: Westview Press, 1997Google Scholar; Portes, Alejandro, Guarnizo, Luis E., and Landolt, Patricia, ‘The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1999), pp. 217–237CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Vertovec, Steve, ‘Conceiving and Researching Transnationalism’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1999), pp. 1–14CrossRefGoogle Scholar; McMullen, Michael, The Baha'i: The Religious Construction of a Global Identity, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2000Google Scholar; Levitt, Peggy, The Transnational Villagers, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2001Google Scholar; Van Der Veer, Peter, ‘Transnational Religion: Hindu and Muslim Movements’, Global Networks, Vol. 2, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Levitt, Peggy, ‘Redefining the Boundaries of Belonging: The Institutional Character of Transnational Religious Life’, Sociology of Religion, Vol. 65, No. 1 (2004), pp. 1–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Katzenstein, Peter J. and Byrnes, Timothy A., ‘Transnational Religion in an Expanding Europe’, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 4, No. 4 (2006), pp. 679–694CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Lacey, Jonathan, ‘The Gulen Movement in Ireland: Civil Society Engagements of a Turkish Religio-cultural Movement’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (June 2009), pp. 295–305CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

² See Roy, Olivier, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, Columbia University Press, Columbia, New York, 2004Google Scholar.

³ The theme of transnational Islam has provided an analytical framework for a number of studies on Muslim identity. See, for example, Eickelman, Dale and Piscatori, James (eds), Pilgrimage, Migration, and the Religious Imagination, Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1990Google Scholar; Masud, Muhammad Khalid (ed.), Travellers in Faith: Studies of the Tablighi Jamaat as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal, Leiden: Brill, 1999Google Scholar; Mandaville, Peter, Transnational Muslim Politics: Re-imagining the Umma, London: Routledge, 2001CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Allievi, Stefano and Nielsen, Jorgen S. (eds), Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and Across Europe, Leiden: Brill, 2003Google Scholar; Werbner, Pnina, Pilgrims of Love: Anthropology of a Global Sufi Cult, London: Hurst and Company, 2003Google Scholar; Saunders, Robert A., ‘The Ummah as a Nation: A Reappraisal in the Wake of the “Cartoons Affair”’, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 14, No. 2 (April, 2008), pp. 303–321CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Mandaville, Peter, ‘Muslim Transnational Identity and State Responses in Europe and the UK after 9/11: Political Community, Ideology, and Authority’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3 (March, 2009), pp. 491–506CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Feener, R. Michael and Sevea, Terenjit (eds), Islamic Connections: Muslin Societies in South and Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009Google Scholar.

⁴ The Ikhwanul Muslimin or Egyptian Brotherhood was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, and is seen as one of the first modern institutions that engage in transnational Islamic activism with chapters in several Muslim countries

⁵ Jama'ah Tabligh and Salafi-Reformist networks are further discussed in separate sections below.

⁶ Horstmann, Alexander, ‘The Inculturation of a Transnational Islamic Missionary Movement: Tablighi Jamaat al-Dawa and Muslim Society in Southern Thailand’, Sojourn: Journal of Social Issues in Southeast Asia, Vol. 22, No. 1 (April 2007), pp. 107–130CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Ernesto Braam, ‘Travelling with the Tablighi Jamaat in South Thailand’, ISIM Review, No. 17 (Spring 2008), pp. 42–43.

⁷ For a discussion of Islam's penetration into Siamese society, see Forbes, Andrew D. W., ‘Thailand's Muslim Minorities: Assimilation, Secession, or Coexistence?’ Asian Survey, Vol. 22, No. 11 (November 1982), pp. 1056–1073CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁸ See Hooker, M. B. and Matheson, Virginia, ‘Jawi Literature in Patani: The Maintenance of an Islamic Tradition’, Journal of the Royal Branch of the Malaysian Asiatic Society, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1988), pp. 1–90Google Scholar.

⁹ Several scholars have dealt with the major traditions of local Islam in the south, including, Bangnara, A., Fatani Dahulu dan Sekarang [Patani Then and Now], Selangor: Penal Penyelidikan, 1977Google Scholar; Cornish, Andrew, Whose Place is This? Malay Rubber Producers and Thai Government Officials in Yala, Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1997Google Scholar; Fatani, Ahmad, Ulama Besar dari Fatani [Patani's Revered Ulama], Kelantan: Pustaka Aman, 2001Google Scholar.

¹⁰ For a more detailed discussion about these early trends of Islamic reform and modernism, see Liow, Joseph Chinyong, ‘Religious Education and Reformist Islam in Thailand's Southern Border Provinces: The Roles of Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir and Ismail Lutfi Japakiya’, Journal of Islamic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2010), pp. 29–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹¹ The concept of ‘reform’ in Islamic studies has often been caricatured, and remains the subject of much debate and disagreement. The manner in which it is used here is in reference to Islamic movements whose objectives follow the train of thought described above. For a deeper, critical discussion on concepts of reformism and traditionalism in Islam, see Osella, Filipo and Osella, Caroline, ‘Introduction: Islamic Reformism in South Asia’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2–3 (2008), pp. 247–257CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹² Interview with Abdul Roziz Kanie, Phuket, 25 May, 2008.

¹³ Interview with Saravud Sriwan-nayos, Bangkok, 27 May, 2008.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Interview with Nikmanasay Sama-ali, Yala, 24 May, 2008.

¹⁶ See Scupin, Raymond, ‘The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand’, Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 12 (December, 1980), p. 1233CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Hassan, M. Kamal, ‘The Influence of Mawdudi's Thought on Muslims in Southeast Asia’, The Muslim World, Vol. 93 (July/August 2003), pp. 429–464CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁷ Interview with Saravud Sriwan-nayos, Bangkok, 27 May, 2008.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ See Scupin, ‘The Politics of Islamic Reformism in Thailand’, p. 1231. This was confirmed in the course of an interview with Pakorn Priyakorn, Bangkok, 25 January, 2005.

²⁰ Interview with Saravud Sriwan-nayos, Bangkok, 27 May, 2008.

²¹ Interview with Nikmanasay Sama-ali, Yala, 24 May, 2008. Other target groups include youths (in general), scholars and intellectuals, politicians and political activists, business people, Mosque committee members and local leaders.

²² Ibid.

²³ It is believed that about 200,000 to 300,000 Baht is collected annually for the Ummah Fund that is administered by YMAT officials.

²⁴ Interview with Nikmanasay Sama-ali, Yala, 24 May, 2008.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ According to a YMAT Advisory Council member, this is because the organization ‘does not have the resources to do international outreach. . .and there is no money for international networking’. Interview with Saravud Sriwan-nayos, Bangkok, 27 May, 2008.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Interview with Pakorn Priyakorn, Islamic Central Committee of Thailand, Bangkok, 25 January, 2005.

²⁹ Narrations of the words and deeds of the Prophet Muhammad.

³⁰ Interview with Ustaz Mahmud, general manager of Markaz Yala, Yala, 21 May, 2008.

³¹ See Braam, ‘Travelling with the Tablighi Jamaat in South Thailand’, p. 42. Braam suggests that up to 20,000 people conduct their dakwah every year in southern Thailand.

³² Interview at Madrasah Tahfiz Alkuran, Yala, 11 December, 2006.

³³ Married women are permitted to partake in Tabligh activities, but have to live with either relatives or female friends during the course of their khuruj.

³⁴ According to Imtiaz Yusuf, there had been other attempts by the Jama'ah Tabligh to build schools in Bangkok, but these were rebuffed by the Muslim community. Conversation with Imtiaz Yusuf, Bangkok, 14 January, 2006. The figure of 60 was suggested by Tabligh members during an interview at Madrasah Tahfiz Alkuran, Yala, 11 December, 2006.

³⁵ Interview with Pakorn Priyakorn, Secretary-General, Islamic Centre of Thailand, Bangkok, 25 January, 2005; email interview with a local Malay-Muslim scholar, 2 February, 2006.

³⁶ Given the nature of the Jama'ah Tabligh, which effectively has a ‘rotating door’ approach to membership, we need to appreciate that it is impossible to obtain definite figures regarding the organization. Any Muslim can volunteer to do dakwah with the Jama'ah Tabligh without necessarily committing to the organization itself in any formal capacity.

³⁷ Interview at Markaz Tahfiz Alkuran, Yala, 11 December, 2006.

³⁸ Interview at Yala Islamic College, Yala, 18 January, 2005.

³⁹ This view was expressed by several Malay-Muslim community leaders during field interviews conducted in Pattani in July, 2005.

⁴⁰ Interview with Ustaz Mahmud, general manager of Markaz Yala, Yala, 21 May, 2008.

⁴¹ The dakwah movement in Malaysia, for instance, is focused on student organizations and university campuses. See Shamsul, A. B., ‘Inventing Certainties: The Dakwah Persona in Malaysia’ in James, Wendy, The Pursuit of Certainty: Religious and Cultural Formulations, London: Routledge, 1995Google Scholar. Having said that, there are tertiary education students who are members of the Jama'ah Tabligh in southern Thailand.

⁴² The author was informed by Alexander Horstmann that the Thai chapter of the Jama'ah Tabligh might have as many as 200,000 members.

⁴³ See Horstmann, Alexander, ‘The Tablighi Jama'at, Transnational Islam, and the Transformation of Self between Southern Thailand and South Asia’, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2007), pp. 26–40CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁴⁴ Interview at Markaz Dakwah Yala, Yala, 11 December, 2006.

⁴⁵ Liow, Joseph Chinyong, Islam, Education, and Reform in Southern Thailand: Tradition and Transformation, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009, p. 141Google Scholar.

⁴⁶ Dietrich Reetz, ‘Sufi Spirituality Fires Reformist Zeal: The Tablighi Jamaat in Today's India and Pakistan’, paper presented to the workshop entitled ‘Modern Adaptations of Sufi-Islam’, Berlin, 4–5 April, 2003.

⁴⁷ Interview at Azizstan School, Yala, 11 January, 2005.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Interview at Tabia Witthaya, Yala, 2 August, 2006.

⁵⁰ One should bear in mind here that this criticism of the ‘lesser hadith’ is a common, often polemical, device through which Muslims contest and counter alternative traditions within Islam.

⁵¹ Horstmann, ‘The Tablighi Jama'at in Southern Thailand’, pp. 24–25.

⁵² These features of Salafi-based Reformism are summed up from the numerous interviews conducted with both reformist and traditionalist religious teachers during the course of fieldwork carried out for this project.

⁵³ Prior to obtaining his doctorate, Ismail Lutfi obtained a B.A. in Usuluddin from Madinah University and an M.A. in Comparative Fiqh at the Ibn Saud University.

⁵⁴ Interview with Abdul Aziz Yanya, Pattani, 17 May, 2008.

⁵⁵ Ibid. This criticism is not unlike that being made in conservative and traditionalist Christian circles against the ‘health and wealth gospel’ of their charismatic and Pentecostal counterparts.

⁵⁶ According to local religious and community leaders, aside from Bamrung Islam Witthaya school (at which Ismail Lutfi is the Principal), the main Salafi-Reformist schools in southern Thailand are Islahiyah Nadtokmong (Muang, Yala), Islam Phattanasat Witthaya Bangpu (Yaring, Pattani), Suksan Sasana Witthaya (Muang Narathiwat), Islam Dua (Tung Yang-Daeng, Pattani), and Islam Prachasongkroh Bede (Tung Yang-Daeng, Pattani).

⁵⁷ It should be noted though, that after 11 September, 2001, the Thai government legislated that all foreign donations have to be channelled through Thai embassies and consulates, and not given directly to the intended recipient.

⁵⁸ A Muslim student from America, and one from Sweden, had also previously graduated from the university.

⁵⁹ It should be noted here that since being appointed Amir al Haj in 2007, Lutfi has through his connections managed to increase Thailand's quota for the annual pilgrimage from 2,000 to 16,000.

⁶⁰ Needless to say, the provision of substantial amounts of funding means that in most instances, these foreign foundations are permitted to either nominate or even to appoint the imam of ustaz for the mosque/school.

⁶¹ The following information was gleaned from an extensive interview in the foundation's office in Muang, Narathiwat, on 20 May, 2008.

⁶² This was made known to me by a local Malay recipient of support during an interview in Pattani, 15 January, 2005.

⁶³ Interview with a senior Thai security official, Singapore, 11 December, 2007.

⁶⁴ From the perspective of religious scholarship, Lutfi's rebuttal should hardly be surprising given his Salafi-Reformist credentials and the very traditionalist, sufi nature of the Berjihad di Patani document.

⁶⁵ Ismail Lutfi Japakiya, Islam Agama Penjana Kedamaian Sejagat [Islam as the Pathway to Harmony], Alor Star: Pustaka Darussalam, 2005. For a detailed study of this and other aspects of Ismail Lutfi's contribution to Islamic knowledge in southern Thailand, see Liow, Islam, Education, and Reform in Southern Thailand.

⁶⁶ Interview at Pondok Dalor, Pattani, 19 January, 2006.

⁶⁷ Interview at Aliman Foundation, Narathiwat, 18 January, 2006.

⁶⁸ Interview with Babo Broheng Payedueramae, Narathiwat, 21 May, 2008.

⁶⁹ Ismail Ali is an assistant professor at the Prince of Songkhla University—Pattani Campus, Abdulghani Kahama is secretary of the Islamic Private School Association and Principal of Prachasongkroh Bede Islamic School, Yusuf Sidek is a lecturer at the Prince of Songkhla University—Pattani Campus, while Ismail Dusong-nyo has relocated to Bangkok.

⁷⁰ Interview with Nidir Waba, Pattani, 20 May, 2008. Nidir Waba is the Chairman of the Islamic Private School Association and a respected ulama in southern Thai Muslim circles.

⁷¹ Interview, Pattani, 20 May, 2008.

⁷² For a deeper analysis of this, see Liow, Joseph Chinyong, Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics, Washington D.C.: East-West Centre, 2006Google Scholar.

⁷³ See Liow, Joseph Chinyong, ‘International Jihad and Islamic Radicalism in Thailand? Toward an Alternative Explanation’, Asia Policy, Vol. 2 (2006), pp. 89–108CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁴ This point was made by Sidney Jones during a seminar at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore on 29 October, 2008.

⁷⁵ See Noor Huda Ismail, ‘Southern Thailand's Conflict: A Rare Perspective’, Jakarta Post, 30 March, 2008.

⁷⁶ Interview with a pemimpin (leader) involved in the current conflict, Yala, 13 August, 2007. It bears noting that there is no evidence that JI had operated in Aceh either.

⁷⁷ Information leading to their arrest came from a Singaporean JI member, Arifin bin Ali, aka John Wong, who was apprehended in Bangkok on May, 2003, and quickly handed over to the Singaporean government. Press statement from Singapore's Ministry of Home Affairs, 10 June, 2003.

⁷⁸ Some examples include ‘Thais: Bangkok Embassy plot foiled’, CBS News, 10 June, 2003; ‘The Hard Cell’, Time Magazine, 16 June, 2003; ‘Jemaah Islamiyah's Terror Campaign’, CNN.com, 26 February, 2004; ‘Thailand: Al-Qaeda's Second Front’, Washington Times, 3 May, 2004; ‘Can Thailand keep a lid on the South’, Australia Broadcast Service Transcript, 8 May, 2004.

⁷⁹ See B. Raman, ‘Bangladesh-Myanmar-Thailand-The Jihadi Corridor’, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper no. 1102, 28 August, 2004.

⁸⁰ John R. Bradley, ‘Waking up to the terror threat in southern Thailand’, Straits Times, 27 May, 2004.

⁸¹ See John Funston, ‘Troubles in the Deep South: Importance of External Linkages?’ paper presented at the 9^th International Conference on Thai Studies, DeKalb, Illinois, 3–6 April, 2005.

⁸² Consider, for instance, statements made by Ayman al-Zawahiri after the Madrid and London bombings. See website: http://www.redorbit.com/news/international/228330/aljazeera_website_carries_more_on_alzawahiri_statement/ [Accessed 28 January, 2011].

⁸³ Anthony Davis, ‘Thailand faces up to southern extremist threat’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 October, 2003.

⁸⁴ According to Lutfi, the ‘orang keras’ began the conversation by asking about Islam. They then moved on to ask about the oppression of the Malay-Muslims in southern Thailand. It was at this junction that Lutfi claimed he became suspicious of their intentions. Following this, the three men raised the issue of violence as a legitimate response to the oppression that was taking place in the southern provinces. Lutfi claimed he got involved in an argument with the men over the question of the use of violence to resolve the problems in the south, and he subsequently dismissed them. Interview with Ismail Lutfi, Pattani, 14 January, 2006.