¹ An early version of this article appeared as ‘Pro-Western Intellectuals and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933’, Nissan Occasional Paper Series (Oxford), no. 3, 1987.Google Scholar

² There are many general descriptions of the Manchurian Incident and subsequent events. In English, see, for example, Ogata, Sadako N., Defiance in Manchuria (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964);Google ScholarYoshihashi, Takehiko, Conspiracy at Mukden (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1963);Google ScholarCrowley, James B., Japan's Quest for Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966);Google ScholarThorne, Christopher, The Limits of Foreign Policy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ In this article, ‘Manchurian Incident’ is used to mean the events near Mukden on 18 September 1931; ‘Manchurian crisis’ denotes the events between that date and Japan's withdrawal from the League of Nations in February-March 1933 or alternatively, the truce of Tangku of May 1933. For a critical discussion of the terms ‘Manchuria’ and ‘Manchurian Incident’ see McCormack, Gavan, Chang Tso-lin in Northeast China, 1911–1928 (Folkestone, Kent: Dawson, 1977), pp. 2–5;Google ScholarKeiichi, Eguchi, Jugonen senso shoshi (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1986), pp. 5–6.Google Scholar

⁴ See Fuhito, Kanda, ‘Showa kyokoki no shakai undo’, in Tokyo Daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo (ed.), Kyoko, Showa (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1978), pp. 290–5;Google ScholarBeckmann, George M. and Okubo, Genji, The Japanese Communist Party 1922–1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1969).Google Scholar

⁵ See Totten, George Oakley III, The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 69–79, 259–66;Google ScholarLarge, Stephen S., Organized Workers and Socialist Politics in Interwar Japan (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 153–5.Google Scholar

⁶ Naimusho, , Keihokyoku, , Showa rokunenju ni okeru shuppan keisatsu gaikan, p. 70Google Scholar; Naimusho, , Keihokyoku, , Showa nananenju ni okeru shuppan keisatsu gaikan, p. 152.Google Scholar

⁷ The term ‘intellectual’ is understood in this paper in a broad sense, along the lines of Herbert Passin's characterization of intellectuals as those who ‘devote themselves to cultivating and formulating knowledge’. No further definition will be attempted here. Passin, Herbert, ‘Intellectuals in the Decision-Making Process’, in Ezra, Vogel (ed.), Modern Japanese Organization and Decision-Making (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1975), p. 254.Google ScholarPassin is quoting Merton, Robert, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1949).Google Scholar For a definition by a Japanese scholar, see Mari, Nakami (comp.), ‘Sabunashonaruakutaa’, in Hosoya, Chihiro and Usui, Katsumi (eds), Kokusai seiji no sekai (Tokyo: Yushindo, 1981), pp. 132–40.Google Scholar

⁸ Pierson, John D., Tokutomi Soho, 1863–1957: A Journalist for Modern Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 368–71. See below for a discussion of the ‘Japanese Monroe Doctrine’.Google Scholar

⁹ Comments on Kiyosawa are based on Kitaoka Shin'ichi, ‘Taibei gaiko no joken: Kiyosawa Kiyoshi kankeikan’, Chuo koron (March 1986), pp. 104–31 and Shin'ichi, Kitaoka, Kiyosawa Kiyoshi (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1987), pp. 52–63, 89–107.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Kiyosawa received a number of encouraging letters from readers after publication of his criticism of Uchida and Matsuoka in Chuo koron in March and May 1933. However, no-one publicly espoused the same opinion. See Kitaoka, ‘Taibei gaiko’, p. 119 and Yamamoto, Tsutomu David, ‘The Japanese Press and Japanese Foreign Policy 1927–1933’, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1981, p. 273.Google Scholar

¹¹ Comments on Ishibashi are based on Nolte, Sharon H., Liberalism in Modern Japan: Ishibashi Tanzan and his Teachers, 1905–1960 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1987), especially pp. 161–3 and ch. 7.Google Scholar See also Okamoto, Shumpei, ‘Ishibashi Tanzan and the Twenty-One Demands’, in Iriye, A. (ed.), The Chinese and the Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interaction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 184–98;Google ScholarKitaoka, , ‘Taibei gaiko’, p. 131; Kitaoka, Kiyosawa, p. 94.Google Scholar

¹² In a passing comment, Kitaoka claims that Ishibashi opposed the Manchurian Incident in terms similar to those used by Kiyosawa. However, no evidence for this is offered (Kiyosawa, p. 94). See Yamamoto, ‘The Japanese Press’, pp. 199–200 for the attitude of Toyo keizai shinpo to withdrawal from the League of Nations.Google Scholar

¹³ Comments on Yokota are based on Mitani, Taiichiro, ‘Changes in Japan's International Position and the Response of Japanese Intellectuals: Trends in Japanese Studies of Japan's Foreign Relation, 1931–1941’, in Borg, D. and Okamoto, S. (eds), Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations 1931–1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 577–8.Google ScholarExamples of Yokota's views can be found in Kokusai chishiki (journal of the League of Nations Association of Japan), to which he was a regular contributor during 1932 and 1933. Yokota was also associated with the Institute of Pacific Relations.Google Scholar

The Kellogg-Briand Pact renounced the use of war. Japan became a signatory in 1928; altogether, sixty-five countries signed the pact. The Nine-Power Pact was signed in 1922 by the USA, Britain, Japan, China, France, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Holland. Signatories subscribed to the ‘open door’ policy, agreeing to respect China's sovereignty, territorial integrity and administrative independence. Japan's China policy from the late 1920s was criticized by other countries as a violation of the pact.

¹⁴ Mitani, , ‘Changes’, p. 579.Google Scholar See also Sogoro, Tanaka, Yoshina Sakuzo (Tokyo: San'ichi shobo, 1971), pp. 327–42.Google ScholarOkamoto, argues that in 1915, Yoshino had been quite willing to accept Japanese imperialism in China: ‘Ishibashi Tanzan’, p. 184.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Mitani, ‘Changes’, pp. 582–4. On Yanaihara, see also Peattie, Mark R., ‘Japanese Attitudes Toward Colonialism, 1895–1945’, in Myers, R. and Peattie, M. (eds), The Japanese Colonical Empire, 1895–1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 114–18. A few individual Christians (but not Christian organizations) and a few socialists also protested against Japanese militarism. See Sadako Ogata, ‘The Role of Liberal Nongovernmental Organizations in Japan’, in Borg and Okamoto, Pearl Harbor, pp. 471, 476.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Mitani, , ‘Changes’, p. 576.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Comments on Tachi are based on ibid., p. 577. Examples of his views can be found in Kokusai chishiki (for example, March 1932, May 1932, March 1933, April 1933).

¹⁸ Comments on Royama are based on Royama, Masamichi, ‘Japan's Position in Manchuria’, in Condliffe, J. B. (ed.), Problems of the Pacific 1929. Proceedings of the Third Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Nara and Kyoto, Japan, October 23 to November 9, 1929 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1969;Google Scholar first published 1930), pp. 524–93; University of Tokyo, Amerika kenkyu shiryo sentaa, Komaba. Takagi Yasaka monjo, file 61: Masamichi Royama, Kisaburo Yokota, Yoshisaburo Matsukata, Shigeharu Matsumoto, Tokutaro Yamanaka and Samitaro Uramatsu, ‘Memorandum on the Plans for the Solution of the Manchurian Problem’ (May 1932; a report for the IPR); Fletcher, M., The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), especially pp. 28–39;Google ScholarMitani, , ‘Changes’, pp. 579–81;Google ScholarWheeler, John K., ‘Royama Masamichi and the Search for a Middle Ground, 1932–1940’, Papers on Japan (Harvard University) 6 (1972), pp. 70–100.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Kawai Eijiro was another intellectual who in 1931 apparently did not believe that control of Manchuria would solve Japan's social and economic problems. However, neither this conviction nor his general opposition to ‘expansionist nationalism’ seems to have led to any opposition to the Manchurian Incident in principle. See Hirai, Atsuko, Individualism and Socialism: The Life and Thought of Kawai Eijiro (1891–1944) (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1986), pp. 158–9.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁰ monjo, Takagi, file 61, ‘Memorandum on the Plans for the Solution of the Manchurian Problem’, p. 22.Google Scholar

²¹ Mitani, , ‘Changes’, pp. 577, 581–2. Examples of Kamikawa's views on the League and related issues can be found in Kokusai chishiki (for example, December 1931, May 1932, October 1932).Google Scholar

²² See, for example, Condliffe, Problems of the Pacific, pp. 207–9; Takagi monjo, file 57, round-table discussion of 27 October 1931 at Shanghai Conference, pp. 5–6.Google Scholar See also Sadako, Ogata, ‘Gaiko to yoron: Renmei dattai o meguru ichikosatsu’, Kokusai seiji I (1969), pp. 51–2.Google Scholar

²³ On Inoue's statement: Mitani, Taiichiro, ‘Japan's International Financiers and World Politics, 1904–31’, Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, 5, 1 (1980), pp. 51–2.Google ScholarThe text of Inoue's statement is given in a newspaper article included in file 60 of the Takagi monjo; also in Gaiko shiryokan (Diplomatic Records Office, Tokyo), Foreign Ministry Papers. A.1.1.0.21–4–2 (Manshu jihen. Yoron narabi shinburn roncho. Yoron keihatsu kankei), vol. 1. The appeal to British public opinion by Prince Tokugawa, Viscount Ishii, Mr Wakatsuki, Baron Matsui, Baron Sakatani and Baron Dan is mentioned in William Axling, ‘Be Just to Japan’, Christian Century (13 April 1932), pp. 12–14 of version included in file 61 of Takagi monjo.Google Scholar

²⁴ See Iriye, Akira, After Imperialism: The Search for a New Order in the Far East 1921–1931 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965);Google ScholarBrown, Sidney DeVere, ‘Shidehara Kijuro: The Diplomacy of the Yen’, in Richard, Burns Dean and Edward, M. Bennett (eds), Diplomats in Crisis: United States–Chinese–Japanese Relations, 1919–1941 (Santa Barbara and Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1974), pp. 201–25.Google Scholar For another view, emphasizing the supposedly fundamental differences between ‘Shidehara Diplomacy’ and ‘Tanaka Diplomacy’, see Bamba, Nobuya, Japanese Diplomacy in a Dilemma: New Light on Japan's China Policy, 1924–1929 (Kyoto: Minerva Press, 1972).Google Scholar

²⁵ Connors, Lesley, The Emperor's Adviser: Saionji Kinmochi and Pre-War Japanese Politics (London, Oxford, etc.: Croom Helm and Nissan Institute for Japanese Studies, University of Oxford, 1987), pp. 130–3; also p. 108.Google Scholar See also Oka, Takashi, ‘Saionji and the Manchurian Crisis’, Papers on China (Harvard University), 1954, pp. 38–74.Google Scholar

judges that Saionji aConnors cquiesced in the military action in Manchuria (though he did attempt to prevent escalation of the ‘Incident’ in the initial period) because of his assessment of the strength of the anti-liberal forces in Japan. It seems likely that his acquiescence may also have stemmed from a willingness to condone the use of force if this could be done without damaging Japan's image in the West.Google Scholar

²⁶ The immediate stimulus for formation of the IPR arose from issues related to Asian immigrants in Hawaii and on the west coast of the USA. At the second conference in 1927, six national conucils were represented: the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, China and Japan. There were also representatives from the UK, Korea and the Philippines. National councils were later added from the UK, France and the USSR. There were committees on finance, research, education and publications. Each member council was to be self-supporting; the American Council was the largest and best-funded, and it dominated the organization. Apart from its funcation as a forum for the exchange of ideas between private individuals of different nationalities, the IPR also became the major organization for Western study of East Asia. It was the target of a highly-publicized investigation by the US Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security in 1951, eventually dissolving itself at the end of 1960.Google Scholar For a study of the IPR from the American perspective, see Thomas, John N., The Institute of Pacific Relations: Asian Scholars and American Politics (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1974).Google Scholar For a Japanese perspective, see Mari, Nakami, ‘Taiheiyo mondai chosakai to Nihon no chishikijin’, Shiso 728 (F02 1985), pp. 104–27.Google Scholar

²⁷ Fairbank, John K., ‘William L. Holland and the IPR in Historical Perspective’, Pacific Affairs 52, 4 (Winter, 1979–1980), p. 587.Google Scholar

²⁸ Ibid., pp. 588–9. For descriptions of the conference atmosphere by a young Japanese participant, see Shigeharu, Matsumoto, Shanhai jidai: janarisuto no kaizo 1 (Tokyo: Chuo koronsha, 1974), pp. 23–35, 43–57;Google ScholarShigeharu, Matsumoto, ‘Daigaku jidai, kaigai yugaku, Taiheiyo kaigi’, in Matsumoto, Shigeharu et al. (eds), Matsukata Saburo (Tokyo: Kyodo tsushinsha, 1974), pp. 121–5.Google Scholar

²⁹ On liberal Christian groups, see Ogata, ‘Role’, pp. 464–5. The IPR was originally linked with the YMCA, but was later completely separate. This paragraph is based on Nakami, ‘Taiheiyo’, pp. 106–7; Ogata, ‘Role’ esp. pp. 463–6; Kitaoka, ‘Taibei gaiko’, p. 112. See also University of Tokyo, Kido nikki kenyukai, ‘Ushiba Tomohikoshi danwa kiroku dai nikai’ and ‘Ushiba Tomohikoshi danwa kiroku dai nikai’: Transcripts of interviews with Ushiba Tomohiko on 15 November 1979 and 1 December 1979 respectively.Google Scholar

the League of NOn ations Association, see Ogata, ‘Role’, especially pp. 462, 470, 474–5; also Ogata, ‘Gaiko’ p. 42.Google Scholar Some materials from meetings of the League of Nations Association immediately after the Manchurian Incident can be found in ryumonsha, Shibusawa Eiichi seien kinen zaidan (ed.), Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryo 37 (Tokyo: Shibusawa Eiichi denki shiryo kankokai, 1961). Most of the remarks which follow concerning attitudes of JIPR members could also be applied to the active members of the League of Nations Association.Google Scholar

³⁰ Nakami, , ‘Taiheiyo’, pp. 106–7. See Ogata, ‘Gaiko’, pp. 42–4 for a discussion of early Japanese attitudes to pacifism and the League of Nations, including the views of critics of the League.Google Scholar

³¹ Yuzo, Ota, ‘“Taiheiyo no hashi” toshite no Nitobe Inazo: 1’, Misuzu 286 (08 1984), p. 5Google Scholar

³² Ogata, , ‘Role’, p. 469.Google Scholar

³³ Cited in Doenecke, Justus D., When the Wicked Rise: American Opinion–Makers and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933 (Lewisburg, London and Toronto: Bucknell University Press, Associated University Presses, 1984), p. 10Google Scholar

³⁴ Yasaka, Takagi, ‘Footsteps of a Pioneer’, in American Studies Center, University of Tokyo (ed.), The Collected Works of Yasaka Takagi: Vol 5. Toward International Understanding. Enlarged Edition (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1971), p. 168.Google Scholar

³⁵ See, for example, Takagi monjo, file 57;Google ScholarInazo, Nitobe, Editorial Jottings: vol. 16 of Nitobe Inazo zenhu (Tokyo: Kyobunkan, 1969), pp. 330–1 (‘A Gentleman' Victory’, 27 March 1932). Editorial Jottings is the Collective name for a regular column written by Nitobe for the English Mainichi (Osaka) in the last years of his life.Google Scholar

³⁶ monjo, Takagi, file 59, pp. 82–3.Google Scholar

³⁷ monjo, Takagi, file 66, p. 14. See also Hu Shih's opening address as President of the Shanghai Conference (1931) for an exposition of the principles along which conference discussions supposedly ran.Google Scholar Excerpt in Bruno, Lasker (ed.), Problems of the Pacific, 1931: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hangchow and Shanghai, China, October 21 to November 2 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1932), v–vi.Google Scholar

³⁸ See, for example, Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries, reel 3, vol. 18 (microfilm edition), 22 September 1931 and passim. Also Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, Henry Lewis Stimson Papers (microfilm edition), Stimson to Elihu Root, 14 December 1931 (reel 82), record of a conversation between Stimson and Ambassador Debuchi, 22 September 1931 and 19 November 1931 (reel 63). (Microfilm copies of Diaries and Papers are also lodged in University Library, Cambridge).Google Scholar

US Ambassador Cameron Forbes also thought highly of Shidehara: ‘Shidehara is a very suave gentleman and seems to talk our language more than in the linguistic sense’. Cited in Lensen, George Alexander, ‘Japan and Manchuria: Ambassador Forbes’ Appraisal of American Policy Toward Japan in 1931–32’, Monumenta Nipponica XXIII, I (01 1968), p. 76.Google Scholar

³⁹ Hoover, Herbert, The Memoirs of Herbert Hoover: The Cabinet and the Presidency, 1920–1933 (London: Hollis and Carter, 1952), p. 363. According to the preface, the text of Hoover's memoirs covering 1921–1933 was written between 1933 and 1936, ‘and has changed only by condensation and some clarification’ (vii).Google Scholar

⁴⁰ ‘Taiheiyo’, p. 112.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Nitobe, , Editorial Jottings, pp. 295–6 (‘China's New Government’, 7 January 1932); pp. 326–7 (‘We are Not They’, 22 March 1932). See also pp. 271–2 (‘Brotherly Advice on Introspection’, 8 October 1931); p. 532 (‘Equality of Men and States’, 29 September 1933).Google Scholar

⁴² Nakami, , ‘Taiheiyo’, pp. 108–10. The Koreans lost their eligibility for independent membership of the IPR under the new covenant in 1927, and from then on had to obtain the approval of the JIPR to attend the conference. They persisted in seeking independent status, but did not succeed until 1942.Google Scholar

At the Shanghai Conference, it was widely noted by Japanese and others that Nitobe was very angry with the Chinese delegates. See Ota, ‘“Taiheiyo no hashi”’ 4 (April 1985), pp. 57–8.

⁴³ monjo, Takagi, file 57. ‘Contact of Nations’, p. 7. 29 October 1931, Evening Meeting. In Ota's view (‘“Taiheiyo no hashi”’ part 5, Misuzu 295 (May 1985), p. 45), one reason that Nitobe was able so firmly to defend Japan's actions in Manchuria was his long-standing dislike of and psychological distance from the Chinese.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Editorial Jottings, p. 382 (‘Sino-Japanese Friendship’, 31 July 1932).Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Nakami, , ‘Taiheiyo’, pp. 108–9; Ogata, ‘Role’, pp. 467–8 (includes the remarks quoted above about Shibusawa);Google ScholarUchikawa, Eiichiro, Nitobe Inazo: The Twilight Years (transl. Newton, Michael R.; Tokyo: Kyo Bun Kwan, 1985), p. 123Google Scholar; Tadashi, Fujino, ‘Showa shoki no “jiyushugisha”: Tsurumi Yusuke o chushin toshite’, Nihon rekishi 415 (12 1982), pp. 65, 67Google Scholar; Kitaoka, , ‘Taibei gaiko’, pp. 109–10. In 1930, Tsurumi believed relations between Japan and the USA to be in very good shape. He expected the Immigration Law to be revised at the end of 1930 or in 1931: Fujino, ‘Showa shoki’, p. 70.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Beasley, W. G., Japanese Imperialism 1894–1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. 204–5Google Scholar; Crowley, James B., ‘Intellectuals as Visionaries of the New Asian Order’, in Morley, J. W. (ed.), Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 319–73.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ On the ‘moral authority’ of the Japanese intellectual, see Passin, ‘Modernization’, p. 486. See also Nakane, Chie, ‘Characteristics of Japanese Intellectuals’, in Irwin, Scheiner (ed.), Modern Japan: An Interpretive Anthology (New York: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 202–7.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ ‘World Peace Machinery and the Asia Monroe Doctrine’, in Toward International Understanding, p. 16. This article was published under the same title in Pacific Affairs 5, 11 (November 1932), pp. 941–53.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Cited in Uchikawa, Nitobe, p. 121. It is probably significant that Nitobe made this trip soon after the Shanghai Incident, which had a marked effect on public opinion in the USA towards Japan.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ ‘Taiheiyo’, p. 117.Google Scholar

⁵¹ See, for example, Miller's, Frank O. comment in this context on the famous ‘liberal’ constitutional theorist Minobe Tatsukichi: Minobe Tatsukichi: Interpreter of Constitutionalism in Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965), p. 193. On Minobe as a liberal, see pp. 192–3. On his view of the Manchurian crisis, see pp. 182–3.Google Scholar

⁵² Miller's phrase (ibid., p. 193).

⁵³ Fujino, , ‘Showa shoki’, p. 74. Fujino remarks that it is quite likely that Tsurumi had himself in mind as the ‘Showa hero’.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Nitobe, Editorial Jottings, p. 391 (‘Democracy and War’, 25 August 1932). See also pp. 212–13 (‘People's Diplomacy’, 10 June 1931). Nitobe's contempt for the people is quite clear in ibid., pp. 534–5 (‘Has Democracy Failed?’, 3 October 1933).

⁵⁵ Nakami, , ‘Taiheiyo’, pp. 111–12. JIPR intellectuals and others with similar views are often described as ‘liberals’, but the term does not seem entirely appropriate. Fujino (‘Showa shoki’, p. 62), who accepts Tsurumi as a liberal, identifies two features common to Japanese liberals from the Meiji period onwards: an acceptance of democratic ideals in some form, and an interationalist outlook. JIPR intellectuals certainly had an internationalist (or pro-Western) outlook, in the sense that they addressed themselves to the USA and Britain. As such, they can be distinguished from other intellectuals who were primarily (at least in the later 1930s) pan-Asianist or ‘Japanist’, as well as from the Marxists, who also had an ‘internationalist’ perspective. However, the fact that they conceived of the relations between social classes and between nations in such elitist terms makes it difficult to call them ‘liberals’. Not all can be considered deeply committed to democratic ideals. Thus they are referred to as ‘moderates’ in this paper. JIPR intellectuals did consider themselves to be liberals: see, for example, Takayanagi Kenzo's comment in Lasker, Problems of the Pacific, p. 230.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Nakami, ‘Taiheiyo’, pp. 106–8, 111. Nakami argues that the JIPR gave priority to the ‘scientific’ approach over the ‘political only insofar as it could be effectively used to justify Japan's expansion. In 1937, When the International Secretariat of the IPR announced plans for a ‘scientific’ inquiry into the causes of the Sino-Japanese War, there was strong and emotional opposition from the JIPR. Abandoning the ‘factual’ approach the JIPR attempted to prevent the inquiry from taking place. when this attempt failed, it announced it would not co-operate with the inquiry, and from 1938 to 1950 the JIPR did not participate in IPR conferences on the Pacific (ibid., pp. 112–15).

See the emphasis on ‘facts’, ‘correct information’ and ‘scientific investigation’ in Nitobe, ‘The Manchurian Question and Sino-Japanese Relations’, in vol. 15 (Lectures on Japan) of Nitobe Inazo zenshu, especially pp. 221–3;Google ScholarYasaka, Takagi, ‘Relations Between Japan and the United States’ (Address at University of Washington, Seattle, 22 January 1943), in Toward International Understanding, pp. 41–3, 48.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ Editorial Jottings, p. 454 (‘A League's Mistake’, 6 April 1933); p. 479 (‘Great Hopes for the League’, 6 June 1933). See also pp. 484–5 (‘Undiminished Utility of the League of Nations’, 20 June 1933); pp. 429–30 (‘American Attitude to World Peace’, 15 December 1932); Nakami, ‘Taiheiyo’, pp. 112–13.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ On the view that Manchuria was to be regarded as separate from the rest of China, see Takagi, ‘Relations Between Japan and the United States’, p. 43. Stanley K. Hornbeck, Chief of the Far Eastern Division of the US Department of State, writing some years earlier, also stated that Manchuria was not an integral part of China. See Doenecke, Justus D. (comp.), The Diplomacy of Frustration: The Manchurian Crisis of 1931–1933 as Revealed in the Papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 56.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ Version in ‘Japan in the Modern World’, Foreign Affairs 9, 2 (01 1931), p. 262.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ ‘World Peace Machinery and the Asia Monroe Doctrine’, p. 8.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Nitobe, , ‘The Manchurian Question and Sino-Japanese Relations’, pp. 221–33.Google Scholar Nitobe's attitude to both the Sino-Japanese and the Russo-Japanese Wars had been very similar to his stance during the Manchurian crisis. He supported the earlier wars as just and unavoidable, and necessary to maintain Japanese security. The Russo-Japanese War according to Nitobe was necessary to protect Japan from the Russian menace and to save Japan's honour. (Nitobe did express reservations about some of the effects of the wars, such as indiscriminate patriotism.) Japan's ‘honour’ was central to Nitobe's attitude to the Triple Intervention, the Russo-Japanese War, the US Immigration Act and the Manchurian crisis. See Ushioda, Sharlie C., ‘Man of Two Worlds: An Inquiry into the Value System of Inazo Nitobe (1862–1933)’, in Hilary, Conroy and Miyakawa, T. Scott (eds), East Across the Pacific: Historical and Sociological Studies of Japanese Immigration and Assimilation (Santa Barbara and Oxford: ABC-Clio, 1972), pp. 193–5, 202–3.Google Scholar

⁶² Nitobe, , ‘Japan the League of Nations, and the Peace Pact’ (texts of two radio broadcasts in the USA, 8 May 1932 and 20 August 1932), in Nitobe Inazo Zenshu, vol. 15, p. 248.Google Scholar

⁶³ See Ogata, ‘Gaiko’, pp. 45–6. On the reasons for Uchida's close identification with the army line on Manchukuo, despite earlier mild opposition, see Masaru, Ikei, ‘Uchida Yasuya—shodo gaiko e no kiseki’, Kokusai seiji 2 (1976), pp. 1–21.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ Takagi, , ‘World Peace Machinery and the Asia Monroe Doctrine’, p. 19.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ Nitobe, , ‘Japan, the League of Nations, and the Peace Pact’, pp. 249–52. Matsuoka Yosuke's address to the League in December 1932 (‘Japan's Case As Presented Before the Special Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations’) is included in file 61 of the Takagi monjo. See pp. 18ff. on the creation of Manchukuo and its recognition by Japan.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Statement of Japanese government in recognizing Manchukuo, 15 September 1932. In Takagi monjo, file 61, p. 58.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Takagi, , ‘World Peace Machinery and the Asia Monroe Doctrine’, pp. 9, 14–16; see also ‘Relations Between Japan and the United States’, pp. 43–4. The origin of the ‘Japanese Monroe Doctrine’ is discussed in Eguchi Keiichi, ‘Manshu jihenki kenkyu no saikento’, Rekishi hyoron 377 (September 1981), pp. 7–9. According to Eguchi, the term ‘Asian Monroe Doctrine’ probably emerged during the 1905 Portsmouth Conference during talks between US President Theodore Roosevelt and Kaneko Kentaro. Roosevelt said that the Japanese should become the ‘leaders’ and ‘protectors’ of the Asian peoples; he called this a ‘Japanese Monroe Doctrine’. In return, America was to have a free hand in China. It was during the Frist World War, however, particularly in relation to the ‘Twenty-One Demands’, that the term was first specifically applied to Japan's foreign policy. The Manchurian crisis added significant new dimensions to the ‘Japanese Monroe Doctrine’.Google Scholar

See also Tsurumi's, rather ingenious argument about the Monroe Doctrine in ‘The Difficulties and Hopes of Japan’, Foreign Affairs 3, 2 (15 12 1924), pp. 254–5. Tsurumi's emphasis on the period after the Great War as ‘the Pacific era’, in which the ‘countries bordering on that great ocean are destined to play great roles’ (p. 254), is typical of his later speeches as well.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Ogata, , ‘Gaiko’, pp. 51–2.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ Yamakawa, Tadao, ‘Should Japan Leave the League?’, Contemporary Japan I (09 1932), p. 228.Google ScholarSee also, for example, Kikujiro, Ishii, ‘Kokusai renmei to Nihon’, Kokusai chishiki, 12 1932 pp. 4–12.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Ogata, , ‘Role’, pp. 474–5; Sakatani Yoshiro, ‘Nihon no Kokusai renmei dattai o ikani miru ka’, Kokusai chishiki, April 1933, p. 8.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Editorial Jottings, pp. 485–6 (‘The Humble Seeking Knowledge’, 22 June 1933);Google ScholarOta, , ‘“Taiheiyo no hashi”’, part 5, Misuzu 295 (05 1985), p. 44.Google ScholarNitobe, accused China of having an inferiority complex: Editorial Jottings, p. 478 (‘National Inferiority Complex’, 1 June 1933).Google Scholar According to Saito Makoto, however, Nitobe did state that Japanese culture owed much to the Koreans, and the Chinese, and that ‘the day will come when we will boast of the Koreans and Chinese in our lineage’: ‘Sekai no Nitobe’, in Sapporo-shi, kyoiku iinkai bunka shiryoshitsu (ed.), Nitobe Inazo (Sapporo: Hokkaido shinbunsha, 1985), p. 261. See also Tsurumi, ‘What Young Japan Thinks’, Asia, July 1931.Google Scholar

⁷² Ogata, , ‘Role’, p. 470.Google Scholar

⁷³ Fujino, , ‘Showa shoki’, p. 68.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Nakami, , ‘Taiheiyo’, pp. 16–18.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Ibid., and Kitaoka, ‘Taibei gaiko’, p. 129.

⁷⁶ Nitobe, ‘Japan, the League of Nations, and the Peace Pact’, p. 243. See also Kenzo, Takayanagi, ‘On the Legality of the Chinese Boycott’, Pacific Affairs 5, 10 (10 1932), pp. 855–62.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See, for example, Nitobe, ‘Japan, the League of Nations, and the Peace Pact’. See Ota, , ‘“Taiheiyo no hashi”’, part 4, Misuzu 294 (04 1985), pp. 55–6 for a discussion of whether Nitobe is likely to have believed the official version of the events of 18 September 1931.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ ‘Ei-Bei hon'i no heiwashugi o haisu’, Nihon oyobi Nihonjin 146 (15 December 1918). See also Ogata, ‘Gaiko’, pp. 43–4.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ ‘Japan in the Modern World’, pp. 264–5. See also Takagi, ‘Relations between Japan and the United States’, p. 42.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ ‘What Young Japan Thinks’. See above for Tsurumi's argument about ‘walls’.Google Scholar

⁸¹ ‘World Peace Machinery and the Asia Monroe Doctrine’, p. 17.Google Scholar

⁸² On the ‘Matsuyama Incident’, see Uchikawa, Nitobe, pp. 105–20;Google ScholarOta, , ‘“Taiheiyo no hashi”’, part 5, Misuzu 295 (05 1985), pp. 45–6. Ota believes that in his earlier years, Nitobe was inclined to change his ideas according to whether his audience was Western or Japanese: see part 3 (Misuzu 288, October 1984), pp. 43–5.Google Scholar

⁸³ For a discussion of this point, see Toshikazu, Inoue, ‘Kokusai renmei dattaigo no Nihon gaiko’, Hitotsubashi ronso, 93, 2 (02 1985), pp. 210–29.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ Rappaport, Armin, Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931–33 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 18, 78, 124.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Stimson Papers, reel 82, 14 December 1931.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ On Western sympathy for Japan and the limits to that sympathy, see my forthcoming article, ‘Japanese Diplomats and the Manchurian Crisis’.Google Scholar