No CrossRef data available.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2008
The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902 committed Great Britain to the defense of Manchuria, an area of the Chinese Empire which the Foreign Office and Cabinet never had considered to be vital to Britain's strategic or commercial interests. In the years preceding the alliance, British policy in Manchuria was weak and indecisive. The government consistently refused to run the risk of war and was genuinely concerned about the unacceptable level of tension generated by half-hearted attempts to maintain some semblance of the open door. Successive attempts to negotiate a diplomatic settlement that would provide a degree of protection for British trade while acknowledging Russia's special political and economic rights were wrecked by the uncompromising views of Sergie Witte. Under these circumstances, it was only natural that Britain should give serious thought to abandoning Manchuria.
1 Ministry of Communications, Republic of China, Chiao-t'ung-shih Lu-cheng-pien (History of Communications, section on railways and motor roads), Tsung-kang (general introduction) (Nanking, 1930), pp. 42–6 (hereafter cited as L.C.P.)Google Scholar; Kuo-ch'i, Li, Chung-kuo tsao-ch'i t'ieh-lu ching-ying (The management of early Chinese railways) (Taipei, 1961), pp. 61–73Google Scholar.
2 Ibid. Also To, Wu, ‘Chin-T'ung t'ieh-lu ti cheng-i,’, (The debate over the Tientsin-Tungchow railway), reprinted in Chung-kuo chin-tai shih lun-ts'ung—tzu-ch'iang yun-tung (Collection of essays on modern China—the self-strengthening movement) (Taipei, 1956), Series I, Vol. 5, pp. 135–70Google Scholar; Yang-wu yun-tung (The foreign affairs movement), in series Chung-kuo chin-tai shih tzu-liao ts'ung-k'an (Modern Chinese historical materials), edited by Office of Ming and Ch'ing Archives (Peking, 1960), Vol. 6, pp. 200–31 (hereafter cited as Y.W.Y.T.)Google Scholar.
3 L.C.P.—Tsung-kang, pp. 67–70; Y.W.Y.T., pp. 250–6; 292–5Google Scholar.
4 Hai-fang tang (Maritime defense archives), compiled by the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica (Nan-kang, 1960), section on t'ieh-lu (railways), Vol. I, pp. 188–90, 225–7Google Scholar.
5 The cost of the indemnities and war loans totalled £54,450,000 and required the annual expenditure of Tls. 20,000,000, a sum equivalent to 22 per cent of the government's pre-war budget. While these costs were partially balanced by increased income from taxes on foreign trade, it is clear that the inelastic and inefficient fiscal system of China could not support a wide variety of military and industrial projects. See Coons, Arthur, The Foreign Public Debt of China (Philadelphia, 1930), pp. 50–6CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Feuerwerker, Albert, China's Early Modernization, Sheng Hsuan-huai (1844–1916) and Mandarin Enterprise (Cambridge, 1958), pp. 44–56CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
6 Langer, William, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890–1902 (New York, 1960), pp. 385–412Google Scholar; Malozemoff, Andrew, Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881–1904 (Berkeley, 1958)Google Scholar; Romanov, B. A., Russia in Manchuria (1892–1906), trans. Jones, S. W. (Ann Arbor, 1952), pp. 84–93Google Scholar.
7 Ibid.
8 Hsuan-huai, Sheng, Yü-chai ts'un-kao (The collected papers of Sheng Hsuanhuai) (Taipei reprint, 1963) (hereafter cited as Y.C.T.K.), Ch. 26/24b, Li to Sheng, 17 04 1897 for Li's analysis of Russian intentionsGoogle Scholar.
9 Romanov, , Russia in Manchuria, p. 74Google Scholar.
10 Hu Yü-fen was a chin-shih degree-holder and had served under Li Hung-chang as commissary officer. He subsequently was appointed as provincial judge for Kwangsi. In 1895 he was named to train the modern army, but the following year he left his military post to assume control of the railway. See Hsing-chien, Fei, Chin-tai mingjen hsiao-chuan (Brief biographies of modern personages) (Taipei, reprint, 1966), p. 302Google Scholar. Also Chih-chün, T'ang, Wu-hsü pien-fa jen-wu chuan-kao (Draft biographies of people in the Hundred Days Reform) (Peking, 1961), p. 71Google Scholar.
11 Rosenbaum, Arthur, ‘China's First Railway: The Imperial Railways of North China, 1880–1911.’ (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1971), pp. 156–61 for details. Y.C.T.K., Ch. 25/34–36; Ch. 26/12–24 for the correspondence between Li, Sheng and Wang, dealing with the disposition of the railwayGoogle Scholar.
12 Romanov, , Russia in Manchuria, pp. 118–24Google Scholar; Hsiang-hsiang, Wu, O-ti ch'in-lueh Chung-kuo shih (A history of Russian aggression in China) (Taipei, 1964), pp. 140–5Google Scholar; Y.C.T.K., Ch. 27/4b–5a, Changs to Wang, 15 May 1897, for an example of rumours circulating within the bureaucracyGoogle Scholar.
13 Y.C.T.K., Ch. 26/18b–19a, Li to Sheng, 13 April 1897Google Scholar.
14 Ibid., Ch. 26/24b, Li to Sheng, 26 April 1897.
15 Ibid., Ch. 27/9b, Sheng to Li, 28 May 1897.
16 Hai-fang-tang, T'ieh-lu, pp. 347–8, Document 192, Tsungli Yamen memorial, 31 July 1897Google Scholar.
17 Ibid., p. 348, Document 193, edict dated 31 July 1897.
18 Rosenbaum, , ‘China's First Railway,’ pp. 229–37, provides a detailed analysis of the company's finances. With Tls. 1,000,000 in short-term loans falling due within a year it is inconceivable that anyone associated with the railway could have expected the company to generate sufficient income to finance new construction estimated at Tls. 4,000,000Google Scholar.
19 Wu Mou-ting, better known to Western sources as Woo Jim-pah, was a former comprador of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and a minor reformer. See T'ang, , Wu-hsü, p. 400Google Scholar.
20 Romanov, , Russia in Manchuria, pp. 126–7Google Scholar.
21 Ibid., p. 128.
22 Grenville, J. A. S., Lord Salisbury and Foreign Policy (London, 1964), pp. 3–23Google Scholar.
23 Great Britain, Foreign Office, Original Manuscripts of Foreign Office Documents in archives of British Public Records Office, London (hereafter referred to as F.O., with additional notations referring to series and volume). F.O. 228/1243, Tel. 37, MacDonald to Salisbury, 16 August 1897; Tel. 38, MacDonald to Salisbury, 17 August 1897Google Scholar.
24 Ibid., Tel. 42, Salisbury, to MacDonald, , 18 August 1897Google Scholar.
25 F.O. 228/1235, Desp. 139, MacDonald, to Salisbury, , 17 October 1897Google Scholar.
26 Ibid., Desp. 143, MacDonald, to Salisbury, , 19 October 1897Google Scholar.
27 Grenville, , Lord Salisbury, pp. 136–47Google Scholar; F.O. 405/76, No. 63, Tle. 7, Salisbury to O'Connor, 17 January 1898; No. 88, Salisbury to O'Connor, 25 January 1898.
28 F.O. 405/76, No. 243, Tel. 55, Salisbury, to MacDonald, , 7 March 1898; No. 244, Tel. 56, Salisbury, to MacDonald, , 7 March 1898; Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, pp. 468–70Google Scholar.
29 Ibid., No. 285, Tel. 46, O'Connor, to Salisbury, , 13 March 1898; No. 238A, Tel. 33, O'Connor to Salisbury, 22 February 1898Google Scholar.
30 Sun, E-tu Zen, Chinese Railways and British Interests, 1898–1911 (New York, 1954), pp. 35–48Google Scholar.
31 L.C.P.—Ching-Feng (section on the Peking-Mukden Railway), pp. 13–14, Hu's memorial, 24 March 1898; pp. 14–16, Hu's memorial, 6 June 1898Google Scholar.
32 Ibid.
33 F.O. 405/77, No. 122, Tel. 137, MacDonald to Salisbury, 25 April 1898Google Scholar.
34 Ibid., No. 308, Desp. 61, MacDonald, to Salisbury, , 11 April 1898; No. 112, Tel. 155, Salisbury to MacDonald, 23 April 1898; No. 122, Tel. 137, MacDonald to Salisbury, 25 April 1898Google Scholar.
35 L.C.P.—Ching-Feng, pp. 14–16, Hu's memorial of 6 June 1898Google Scholar.
36 Romanov, , Russia in Manchuria, pp. 151–4Google Scholar; F.O. 405/78, No. 134, Desp. 129, MacDonald to Salisbury, 23 June 1898.
37 F.O. 405/77, No. 348, Tel. 200, Salisbury, to MacDonald, , 9 June 1898Google Scholar.
38 Pelcovits, Nathan, Old China Hands and the Foreign Office (New York, 1948), pp. 236–7; F.O. 405/78, No. 11, China Association to Salisbury, 8 07 1898Google Scholar.
39 F.O. 405/78, No. 63, Military Intelligence, 18 July 1898Google Scholar.
40 Ibid., No. 44, Tel. 222, Salisbury, to MacDonald, , 13 July 1898Google Scholar.
41 Ibid., No. 77, Tel. 233, MacDonald, to Salisbury, , 23 July 1898Google Scholar.
42 Ibid.
43 MacMurray, John V. A., Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919, 2 Vols (New York, 1921), Vol. I, p. 127Google Scholar.
44 F.O. 405/78, No. 74, Tel. 230, Salisbury, to MacDonald, , 22 July 1898Google Scholar.
45 Ibid., No. 229, Tel. 122, Scott, to Balfour, , 2 September 1898Google Scholar.
46 Romanov, , Russia in Manchuria, pp. 155–7Google Scholar.
47 F.O. 405/78, No. 316, Desp. 165, Salisbury, to MacDonald, , 27 September 1898Google Scholar.
48 L.C.P.—Ching-Feng, pp. 16–24, ‘Loan Agreement of 1898,’ 10 October 1898Google Scholar.
49 Romanov, , Russia in Manchuria, pp. 166–70Google Scholar.
50 F.O. 405/85, No. 247, Ironside, Bax to Salisbury, , 10 May 1898; No. 306, Tel. 142, Bax Ironside to Salisbury, 18 May 1898; No. 313, Tel. 149, Bax Ironside to Salisbury, 18 May 1898Google Scholar.
51 Ibid., No. 468, British and Chinese Corporation to Foreign Office, 21 June 1899Google Scholar.
52 Ibid., No. 482, Foreign Office to British and Chinese Corporation, 26 June 1899Google Scholar.
53 Malozemoff, , Russian Far Eastern Policy, pp. 122–44Google Scholar; Wu, , O-ti ch'in-lueh, pp. 185–210Google Scholar.
54 F.O. 405/93, No. 189, ‘Memorandum on the Taku-Tientsin Railway,’ by SirArdagh, John, 16 July 1900Google Scholar.
55 F.O. 405/96, No. 263, Satow, to Salisbury, , 20 October, 1900Google Scholar.
56 F.O. 405/97, No. 181, Lansdowne, to Hardinge, , 23 November 1900Google Scholar.
57 F.O. 405/93–97, for examples.
58 Ibid., also Grenville, , Lord Salisbury, pp. 327–9Google Scholar.
59 F.O. 405/96, No. 135, Tel. 128, Salisbury, to MacDonald, , 15 October 1898. The ‘strong representations’ were made in Berlin in order to pressure Waldersee to turn over the I.R.N.C.'s intra-mural lines to the British. Throughout the crisis, Japanese military authorities in China had supported the British positionGoogle Scholar.
60 Malozemoff, , Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 148Google Scholar.
61 F.O. 405/97, No. 102, Hardinge, to Lansdowne, , 14 November 1900; No. 181, Lansdowne to Hardinge, 23 November 1900Google Scholar.
62 F.O. 405/105, No. 17, Satow, to Lansdowne, , 7 February 1901Google Scholar.
63 F.O. 405/98, No. 64, Tel. 221, Satow, to Lansdowne, , 11 December 1900. I have accepted the statement of the British representative of the British and Chinese Corporation, Hillier, that Witte initiated the discussions. However, Russian sources claim that Hillier approached Witte but was turned down because his asking price was too high. However, it seems unlikely that Witte would reject a deal for a line that would give Russia uncontested control of Manchuria. For the Russian side see Malozemoff, Russian Far Eastern Policy, p. 148Google Scholar.
64 Ibid.
65 F.O. 405/102, No. 70, Foreign Office to British and Chinese Corporation, 8 January 1901Google Scholar.
66 F.O. 17/2758, Memorandum by Bertie, , 12 February 1901Google Scholar.
67 Ibid.
68 Lieh-ch'iang ch'in-lueh (Aggression by the great powers), in the series Chung-hua min-kuo k'ai-kuo wu-shih-nien wen-hsien (Historical records on the fifty years of the establishment of the Republic of China), 1st series, No. 6 (Taipei, 1965), pp. 439–40Google Scholar.
69 Grenville, , Lord Salisbury, p. 332Google Scholar.
70 Ibid., pp. 332–43.
71 Ibid. It also should be noted that the Russian claims were for exclusive rights, not preferential rights, and Britain had steadfastly refused to acknowledge exclusive rights which would violate British treaty rights. Moreover, a number of the provisions of the proposed Manchurian convention specifically were directed against the I.R.N.C. This was especially embarrassing because in January, the British bondholders had been informed, ‘that the interests of the bondholders of the railway are, in the main, identical with those of British forces in China.’ See F.O. 405/102, No. 70, Bertie to British and Chinese Corporation; No. 72, Godley to Foreign Office, 9 January 1901.
72 F.O. 405/93–106 in passing, for examples.
73 Grenville, , Lord Salisbury, pp. 401–2Google Scholar; Nish, Ian, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance. The Diplomacy of Two Island Empires, 1894–1907 (London, 1966), pp. 177–81Google Scholar.
74 F.O. 17/1758, Lansdowne's comments on memorandum by Bertie, , 3 October 1903Google Scholar.