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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2008
In the years leading up to the outbreak of war in Europe in early September 1939 Japan had been busy tackling the commitments she had made in North China at first and then in the whole of China. Although war was not declared, Japan had been at war with China since July 1937. It was a war of attrition; both Japan and China claimed to be winning, yet neither could, on any occasion, see any prospect of a final and definite victory. So long as Japan's military operations were confined to the area of North China, the war was named the ‘North China Incident.’ It was called the ‘China Incident’ after her successive and more or less successful operations had spread to Central and South China. And when a war broke out in the Pacific in December 1941 the Sino-Japanese war became an inseparable part of the ‘Greater East Asia War’ (Dai-tōa sensō), a name rarely heard by now, since it soon gave way to the ‘Pacific War’ (Taiheiyō sensō) in the sense of Japan waging the war of the Ocean, or to the ‘Second World War’ in the global sense.
1 By far the best account of the background of the ‘Twenty-One Demands’ and its negotiating processes is found in Takeo, Horikawa, Kyokutō kokusai seiji josetsu: nijūikka-jō no kenkyū [An Introduction to the History of International Politics in the Far East: A Study of the Twenty-One Demands] (Tokyo: Yūhikaku, 1958).Google Scholar On Britain's response to this, see Nish, Ian H., Alliance in Decline: A Study of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1908–1923 (London: Athlone, 1972), pp. 153–8;Google Scholar and Thorne, Christopher, The Limits of Foreign Policy: The West, the League and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1931–1933 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1972), pp. 22–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Talking with some elder Japanese, including my father, who experienced the rejection by the United States and Britain of these Japanese demands (they cannot name any other country), it is rather surprising to learn that they all consider it the very beginning of the road to the Pacific war.Google Scholar
3 These were the four-power treaty, signed by Japan, Britain, France and the United States; the five-power treaty between Japan, Britain, France, Italy and the United States; and the nine-power treaty, in which Belgium, China, Holland and Portugal participated, as well as the parties to the five-power treaty. The four-power treaty, by which an end was made to the Anglo-Japanese alliance existing since 1902, dealt with Pacific questions, agreeing to respect each other's rights in the area. The five-power treaty was concerned with naval armaments, consenting that capital ships and aircraft carriers should be at the ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 between the United States, Britain, Japan, France and Italy respectively. The nine-power treaty reaffirmed China's sovereignty over her own land and comprised a promise not to interfere in China's domestic affairs.Google Scholar
4 Beasley, W. G., The Modern History of Japan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, second edn, 1973), p. 211.Google Scholar
5 See, for example, Sadako, Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria: The Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–1932 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1964);Google ScholarToshihiko, Shimada, Kantōgun: Zai-man rikugun no dokusō [The Kwantung Army: The Running Alone of the Japanese Army in Manchuria] (Tokyo: Chūōkōronsha, 1965);Google ScholarIkuhiko, Hata, Nitchū sensō-shi: nihon tairiku seisaku no tenkai [The History of the Sino-Japanese War: The Developments of Japan's Continental Policy] (Tokyo: Kawadeshobō Shinsha, revised edn, 1972);Google Scholar and Thorne, , Limits of Foreign Policy, pt 2.Google Scholar
6 Japanese names are given in Japanese order: surname first, followed by personal name.Google Scholar
7 See, for example, Isamu, Togawa, Shōwa gaikō-shi [The Diplomatic History in the Shōwa Period] (Tokyo: Sekkasha, 1962);Google ScholarRyūkichi, Tanaka, Nihon gunbatsu antō-shi [The History of Secret Strife among the Military Factions] (Tokyo: Seiwadō, 1947.);Google Scholar and Seiichi, Imai and Yutaka, Nozawa, ‘Gunbu no seiha to nitchū sensō [The Military's Control and the Sino-Japanese War]’ in Saburō, Ienaga et al. (eds), Nihon rekishi [The History of Japan] (Tokyo: Iwanamishoten, 23 vols, 1962–1964), Vol. 20: Gendai 3, pp. 255–316.Google Scholar
8 Butow, R. J. C., Tojo and the Coming of the War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 172. The custom of holding imperial conferences originated in the late nineteenth century. ‘Imperial conferences were convened whenever the cabinet or supreme command deemed them necessary by the simple procedure of petitioning the throne. Membership varied with the occasion but almost always included (in addition to the Emperor) the premier, the two chiefs of staff, the service ministers, the vice-chiefs of staff, the foreign and finance ministers, the president of the privy council, and the president of the cabinet planning board. Other cabinet ministers or supreme-command representatives were invited if their presence was considered advisable.’Google ScholarIbid., pp. 170–1.
9 The fourteen were: Kijūrō, Shidehara (April–December. 1931);Google ScholarTakeshi, Inukai (December 1931–January 1932);Google ScholarKenkichi, Yoshizawa (January–May 1932);Google ScholarMakoto, Saitō (May–July 1932);Google ScholarYasuya, Uchida (July 1932–September 1933);Google ScholarSenjūrō, Hirota Hayashi (February–March 1937);Google ScholarNaotake, Satō (March–May 1937);Google ScholarKōki, Hirota (June 1937–May 1938);Google ScholarKazushige, Ugaki (May–September 1938);Google ScholarFumimaro, Konoye (September–October 1938);Google ScholarHachirō, Arita (October 1938– August 1939);Google Scholarand Nobuyuki, Abe (August 1939–). Of the above, Inukai, Saitō, Hirota (March–April 1936), Hayashi and Abe were concurrently prime ministers. As for Hirota's exceptionally long tenure of office (September 1933–April 1936), he continued to hold the post under three successive governments.Google Scholar
10 For a brief outline of the formation of the Renovationist faction in the Gaimushō, see Gakkai, Nihon Kokusai Seiji, Taiheiyō Sensō Genin Kenkyū-bu (comp.), Taiheiyō sensō e no michi [The Road to the Pacific War] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 7 vols, 1962–1963), Vol. 5, pp. 3–15.Google Scholar
11 Kenichi, Hatano, Chuōgoku kyōsantō-shi [The History of the Chinese Communist Party] (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 12 vols, 1958–1963), Vol. 7, pp. 334–5.Google Scholar
12 See ibid., Vol. 7, p. 335.
13 For the text of this statement, see Japanese Foreign Ministry (ed.), Nihon gaikō nempyō narabini shuyō bunsho [The Chronological Table and Principal Documents of Japan's Foreign Policy] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 2 vols, 1969), Vol. 2, p. 407;Google Scholar and Tokuzō, Aoki, Taiheiyō sensō zenshi [The Complete History of the Pacific War] (Tokyo: Gakujutsu Bunken Fukyūkai, 3 vols, 1956), Vol. 2, pp. 228–9.Google Scholar
14 Beasley, , The Modern History of Japan, p. 168.Google Scholar
15 Japanese Foreign Ministry Archives, A 2.O.O.xl, ‘Eikoku kyokutō seisaku no kaiko [The Recollections of the British Far Eastern Policy]’.Google Scholar
16 International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Exhibit, No. 216, pp. 2720–7.Google Scholar
17 On the Hugessen incident, see Aoki, , Taiheiyō sensō zenshi, vol. 2, pp. 63–7;Google ScholarLee, B. A., Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, 1937–1939: A Study in the Dilemmas of British Decline (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 40–1;Google Scholar and Lowe, Peter C., Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia, 1937–1941 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 21–2.Google Scholar
18 For well-founded accounts of this incident, see Aoki, , Taiheiyō sensō zenshi, Vol. 2, pp. 129–40;Google Scholar and Lee, , Britain and the Sino-Japanese War, pp. 89–93.Google Scholar
19 For a well-documented account of the Tientsin incident, see Masakuma, Uchiyama, ‘Tenshin eikoku sokai fūsa no haikei [The Background of the Japanese Blockade against the British Concession in Tientsin]’, in Chihiro, Hosoya (ed.), Henyō suru kokusai shakai no hō to seiji [Law and Politics in the Changing International Society] (Tokyo: Yūshindo, 1971), 225–74.Google Scholar
20 The five ministers were Konoye (premier), Ugaki (foreign affairs), Itagaki Seishirō (war), Yonai Mitsumasa (navy) and Ikeda Masanosuke (finance).Google Scholar
21 Jun, Tsunoda, Masao, Inaba, et al. , (eds), Gendai shiryō [Documents on Contemporary History] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 45 vols, 1963–1973), Vol. 10:Google ScholarNitchū sensō 3, p. 172;Google Scholar and Aoki, , Taiheiyō sensō zenshi, Vol. 2, p. 348.Google Scholar
22 The Japanese started groping for a resumption of negotiations just a few days after the outbreak of war in Europe; and the long-awaited agreement was finally reached and emerged as the Tripartite pact between Japan, Germany and Italy on 27 September 1940.Google Scholar
23 Saburō, Hayashi, Taiheiyō sensō rikusen gaishi [The History of the Japanese Army in the Pacific War] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1951), p. 23.Google Scholar