¹ In spite of their close identities, India and Pakistan have been, in the most descriptive phrase, ‘distant neighbors’ of each other. See, Nayar, Kuldip, Distant Neighbors (Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1972.)Google Scholar

(a) For a statement of the Pakistani viewpoint on relations with India, see Choudhuri, G. W., Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947–1966 (New York, Praeger, 1968).Google Scholar For the Indian view of relations with Pakistan, see Gupta, Sisir, Kashmir: A Study in India–Pakistan Relations (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966).Google Scholar

(b) The international perspective on Indo-Pakistani relations is covered in Harrison, Selig, India, Pakistan, and the United States (reprint from the August 10, August 24, and September 7 (1969) issues of the New Republic);Google ScholarBarnds, William J., India, Pakistan, and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972);Google ScholarHayes, Louis B., The Impact of U.S. Policy on the Kashmir Conflict (The Institute of Government Research, International Studies Number 2, University of Arizona, Tucson, The University of Arizona Press, 1971).Google Scholar

(c) For the internal and external situation of the United Pakistan, its early years, politics, rule of the military, and developments until General Yahya Khan assumed power in 1969, see Sayeed, Khalid B., Pakistan: The Formative Phase (Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, 1960),Google Scholar and, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967);Google ScholarWilcox, Wayne Ayres, Pakistan. The Consolidation of a Nation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963);Google ScholarKhan, Fazal Muqeem, The Story of the Pakistan Army (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1963);Google ScholarKhan, Mohammad Ayub, Friends, Not Masters: A Political Biography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967);Google ScholarVorys, Karl von, Political Development in Pakistan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1965);CrossRefGoogle ScholarBhutto, Zulfikar Ali, The Myth of Independence (Lahore: Oxford University Press, 1969);Google ScholarZiring, Lawrence, The Ayub Khan Era; Politics in Pakistan 1958–1969 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1971).Google Scholar

² Since 1971 there has been a spate of publications detailing the reasons for Pakistan's break-up. The best of these are:Google ScholarChoudhury, G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975);Google ScholarSayeed, Khalid B., ‘The Breakdown of Pakistan's Political System’, International Journal, XXVII, 3 (Summer 1972), pp. 381–404;Google ScholarManiruzzman, Talukder, ‘“Crises in Political Development” and the Collapse of the Ayub Regime in Pakistan’, The Journal of Developing Areas 5, 2 (01 1971), pp. 221–338;Google ScholarMason, Edward S., Dorfman, Robert and Margolin, Stephen A., Conflict in East Pakistan—Background and Prospects (Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Mimeograph, 04 1971).Google Scholar

On this issue, the leftist interpretation of Pakistani fortunes parallels liberal analyses, with the added inflection that there exists no sociopolitical choice between the two ‘bourgeois regimes’ of India and Pakistan.

For an account of the underground or exiled Pakistani leftist viewpoint, see Ali, Tariq, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power? (London: Morrow Publishers, 1970);Google ScholarAlavi, Hamza, ‘The Crisis of Nationality and the State of Pakistan,’ Journal of Contemporary Asia, I, 3 (1971), pp. 42–66;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Siddiqui, Kalim, Conflict, Crisis and War in Pakistan (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

(See also bibliographic guide by Kayastha, Ved. P., The Crisis on the Indian Subcontinent and the Birth of Bangladesh (revised and enlarged) (Ithaca: Cornell University,Google ScholarSouth Asia Program. South Asia Occasional Papers and Thesis, Number 1. 1972).)Google Scholar

³ There exists no comprehensive study of the stages by which Bengali Moslem demands were made upon the united state of Pakistan in the period up to March 1971. Enough evidence exists to indicate that the process was steady and unequivocal, and eventually found expression in Sheikh Mujibur Rehman's ‘Six-Point Formula.’ A description of the wrangles in Pakistan at the changing of the guard between President Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan, is avilable in Dupree, Louis, A Note on Pakistan (American Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series XII (1) 07 1968);Google Scholar and LaPorte, Robert Jr., ‘Succession in Pakistan: Continuity and Change in a Garrison State,’ Asian Survey, IX, 11 (11 1969), pp. 842–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ The killings were widely reported in the world's news media from March to Decembre, 1971, and are not recounted herein. It is assumed that the atrocities initiated on March 25, 1971 by the Pakistan Army in East Pakistan, symbolized a point of no return for both wings of the state. For the federal government it signified that a political solution was not possible. For the East Pakistani people it may have changed a discussion of autonomy within a united state into an unavoidable demand for secession. See Khan, Zillur R., ‘March Movement of Bangladesh: Bengali Struggle for Political Power,’ pp. 205–28;Google Scholar and Zaman, Raunaq, ‘Reflections on the National Liberation Movement and Some Post-Liberation Priorities in Bangladesh,’ pp. 321–7,Google Scholar both in Thomas, Barbara and Lavan, Spencer (eds), West Bengal and Bangladesh: Perspectives from 1972 (South Asia Series Occasional Paper Number 21, Asian Studies Center, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, 1972).Google Scholar

⁵ The bulk of the Indian Army was withdrawn from the territory of the new state by the end of February 1972, i.e., within six weeks of the Pakistani surrender, and ahead of schedule.

⁶ Menon, V. P., The Integration of the Indian States (New York: McMillan, 1956), p. 413.Google Scholar

⁷ Callard, Keith, Pakistan: A Political Study (New York: McMillan, 1957), p. 304.Google Scholar

⁸ While the war took place in September 1965, skirmishes of a serious nature had occurred in the early part of the year (February) in the Rann of Kutch. It is quite possible that the war would have occurred at that early stage, i.e., within two years of India's border war with China.

⁹ Brines, Russel, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict 1965 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968).Google Scholar

¹⁰ They were brought into focus during the war in 1971 when U.S. Naval Task Force 74 sailed into the Bay of Bengal, and threatening troop movements were undertaken simultaneously by Chinese forces in Tibet.

¹¹ See Boulding, Kenneth, Conflict and Defense: A General Theory (New York: Harper and Row, 1962);Google Scholar and Schelling, Thomas, A Strategy of Conflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966).Google Scholar

¹² This would have been probable in spite of any Chinese action on behalf of Pakistan. Had Kashmir ever been in real danger, India would have countered by widening the war, creating greater instability and invoking the superpowers' intervention to deter the Chinese.

¹³ See Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict 1965, passim. By the time of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War the situation was that India did not need to plan an attack on East Pakistan. The threat itself was so overwhelming as to require Indian government efforts at assuring East Pakistan leaders informally against its materializing—cold comfort for East Pakistan within the framework of a united Pakistan.

¹⁴ In 1969 East Pakistan was ravaged by one of the worst natural calamities of this century in the form of cyclones and tidal waves that devastated its coastal regions and apparently lead to the death of over a million people. The Pakistan Government was unable to provide either swift or adequate relief. India's offer of succour due to its close proximity to the affected regions, was conceived as a propaganda effort and refused by the Pakistan government.

¹⁵ The most conspicuous of these in called the ‘Agartala Conspiracy’ case in which the late Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and a number of his colleagues of the Awami League were so accused and lodged in jail (1966).Google Scholar

¹⁶ This evaluation was particularly important with respect to East Pakistan which numerically outnumbered the population of West Pakistan. The assumption may have been that, considering the large number of East Pakistani political groups, its ethnic representation would be splintered between the various parties.

¹⁷ See Mason, Dorfman and Margolin, Conflict in East Pakistan, passim.

¹⁸ There are conflicting speculations about the political negotiations which preceded the Pakistani resort to force in the eastern wing. Indian assessments are that General Yahya Khan went ahead with the army action in consultation with the leadership (Bhutto) of the Pakistan People's Party (which represented West Pakistan).

¹⁹ See Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I (New Delhi: Ministry of External Affairs, 1971), p. 672.Google Scholar

²⁰ Pakistan official sources never admitted to more than four million refugees. However, ‘although Pakistani press releases have occasionally questioned the official refugee figures released by the Indian government, every reporter or analyst who has travelled to India has argued that India's figures are deadly accurate, and a good many random checks by international agencies and reporters have confirmed their accuracy’. Franda, Marcus F., Population Politics in South Asia, Part II: Refugees and Migration Patterns in Northeastern India and Bangladesh (Field Staff Reports, American Universities Field Staff. South Asia Series Volume XVI (3) p. 7).Google Scholar

²¹ See Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, p. 697.Google Scholar

²² Somewhere between sixty to eighty percent of the 1971 refugees belonged to that particular community.

²³ See letters of Soviet President Nikolai Podgorny dated April 3, 1971, and Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin of April 23, 1971, both addressed to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan (reproduced in News Review on Pakistan, 4/71, The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, New Delhi, pp. 20–21).Google Scholar Subsequently Arshad Hussein, a former Foreign Minister of Pakistan proceeded to Moscow as a personal emissary of President Yahya Khan, seeking Soviet support against Indian interference in Pakistan's internal affairs.

²⁴ From text of Chinese Premier Chou En-Lai's letter of 12 April 1971 addressed to General Khan, Yahya, and as reported by Dawn (Karachi), 13 04 1971 (reproduced in News Review on Pakistan, pp. 24–5).Google Scholar

²⁵ From interviews. The demarche was apparently conveyed to the Indian Government through its Ambassador in Washington, D.C. Coming within a few days of Dr Kissinger's visit and consultation with Chinese leaders, the communication from the U.S. Administration created large-scale uncertainties for Indian policy makers.

²⁶ Bangladesh Documents, Vol. I, p. 708.Google Scholar

²⁷ There is speculation that a Treaty of this nature had been urged by the Soviet Union on India for the previous two years, and further, that it reduced India to a client status vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Indian understanding is that the Traaty was politically useful for the Soviet Union, and that one of its clauses re-affirmed India's nonalignment.

It is interesting to note that the wording and clauses of the Indo-Soviet Treaty follow closely treaties with similar titles and content signed by India with Nepal and Afghanistan in 1950. As such, the drafting of the treaty probably owed as much to Indian design as to Soviet effort. Assessment within Indian policy making official-dom is that the Soviets needed a treaty for its general impact, whereas India required the document for specific and geostrategic purposes.

²⁸ It has been a general complaint among military leaders in India that on earlier occasions—in 1962 and 1965—they were not provided sufficient notice to mobilize for military campaigns.

²⁹ Eventually almost forty to fifty thousand of them were trained in Indian camps.

³⁰ Indira Speaks (New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1971).Google Scholar

³¹ When the war actually commenced, the mountain passes were not snow-bound due to the unpredictabilities of climate. Nevertheless, for the Chinese to have contemplated military action then would still have been risky. Their forces to the south of the mountain passes could have been caught by snowfalls at any time, leaving them open to decimation at Indian hands.

³² Major General Palit, D. K., The Lightning Campaign: Indo-Pakistan War 1971 (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1972), pp. 151–2.Google Scholar According to another Indian observer who may have close contacts with the Indian military, ‘…the Indians budgeted for 40,000 casualties and a war of several months duration.’ (Rikhye, Ravi, ‘Why India Won: The Fourteen Day War,’ Armed Forces Journal, 1972, p. 38).Google Scholar

³³ Figures from the Strategic Survey 1971, The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p. 52.Google Scholar

³⁴ To safeguard its territory on the west, India has, over the years, constructed at least three succeeding defense lines running more or less from the northern (Kashmir) borders all the way to the edges of the Indian desert (to the south). Even in normal times it would be a difficult proposition for Pakistan to contemplate serious inroads into Indian territory with all the forces at its command. The innermost of these three defense lines lies well ahead of an alternate road and communication system connecting with Kashmir and Ladakh (to guard against disruption of the first and regular rail link which runs close to the Indo-Pakistan border).

³⁵ Thus in an anonymous article appearing in the Pakistan Observer Supplement (September 6, 1970), entitled ‘An Approach to Warfare in Pakistan’ it was suggested that Pakistan lacked depth, was physically two areas to be defended, and could only fight a short war because of its narrow industrial base. Therefore, a decisive armored thrust ‘outside the gate’ was the way in which a bargainable military gain could be achieved. Meanwhile, both wings of Pakistan would have to ‘sustain themselves’ separately.Google Scholar

³⁶ Major General Palit, D. K., ‘Pakistan's Military Policy—I’, Hindustan Times (New Delhi), 12 3, 1970.Google Scholar

³⁷ The Indian Air Force mounted an average of six hundred sortees night and day over Pakistan for each of the thirteen days of the war. The Indian Navy blockaded naval entrances to either wing of that country for the duration of the war.

³⁸ The reasons for the U.S. naval movement are complex. For an interesting analysis, see McConnell, James M. and Kelly, Anne M., ‘Super-Power Naval Diplomacy: Lessons of the Indo-Pakistani Crisis 1971’ (reprinted in Survival, XV, 6 (11–12 1973), pp. 289–95).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁹ During the advance, special detachments of the Indian Army were ordered to take hold of the Pakistan Army's unused war material so as to prevent it from falling into (future) unaccountable hands.

⁴⁰ American officials, however, insist that India had plans to move against West Pakistan after occupying East Pakistan. According to the ‘Anderson Papers’, U.S. Intelligence Services had informed Washington that, ‘…as soon as the situation in East Pakistan is “settled” Indian forces will launch a general offensive against West Pakistan,’ and that ‘…India now intends not only to liberate East Bengal but also to straighten its borders in Kashmir and destroy West Pakistan's air and armored forces. To accomplish this, the Indian Army would transfer four to five divisions to the west as soon as it had gained full control in the east. There have been reports that initial movements of these forces have already begun.’ (Anderson, Jack, The Anderson Papers (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974), pp. 278–88).Google Scholar

There is speculation, in line with the preceding, that the U.S. conveyed a serious warning to India against any contemplated moves in West Pakistan. Indian officials, on the other hand, have contended that reports of this nature were after-the-event justifications to claim intervention and success. There is, however, no knowledgeable information available on the subject.

⁴¹ The U.N. observer group remains on both the Indian and Pakistani sides of the cease-fire line. On the Indian side, however, their jurisdiction does not now extend to the new line.

⁴² For further details about the war, see Jackson, Robert, South Asian Crisis: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh (New York: Praeger, 1975);CrossRefGoogle Scholar Major General Palit, D. K., The Lightning Campaign (New Delhi: Thomson Press, 1972), pp. 151–2;Google ScholarDupree, Louis, Bangladesh. Part II: Indian Intervention Wins Bangladesh Its Independence (American Universities Field Staff Reports, South Asia Series, Volume XVI, 6 (07 1971);Google ScholarStrategic Survey 1971 (The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1971, pp. 46–53);Google ScholarAyoob, Mohammed and Subrahmanyam, K., The Liberation War (New Delhi: S. Chand and Company, 1972);Google ScholarStanhope, Hilary, ‘The Indian Plan That Worked, The Pakistani One That Did Not’, The Times (London), 12 24, 1971.Google Scholar

⁴³ Bangladesh Observer (formerly The Pakistan Observer), August 11, 1972.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Both in Far Eastern Economic Review, Decembre 18, 1971, pp. 6 and 4, respectively.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See India Weekly, July 15, 1971. Information relating to the five-point peace proposal has been publicized by a former Communications Minister and Constitutional Adviser to General Yahya Khan during the latter's Presidency in 1971.Google Scholar See Choudhury, G. W., The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1975).Google Scholar

⁴⁶ A significant lesson derived from the experience, and presumably incorporated in future military contingencies, relates to the time-element. Post war reviews of India's military campaign and planning carry the critique that Indian military preparations should be geared to swifter mobilization techniques than before (see Major General Palit, D. K., ‘Need to Narrow Reaction Time’, The Hindustan Times, 04 28, 1972).Google Scholar The objective might be to maintain about a hundred thousand combatants in such a state of contingent preparation as would allow effective response by a large body of troops within days of any unpredictable situation.

⁴⁷ A review of Bangladesh's political condition in the period following the war and preceding the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, may be seen in Maniruzzaman, Talukder, ‘Bangladesh: An Unfinished Revolution?’, The Journal of Asian Studies, XXIV, 4 (08 1975), pp. 891–911.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴⁸ New York Times, August 19, 1975.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Far Eastern Economic Review, October 31, 1975, p. 5.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ New York Times, August 25, 1975.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Time, November 17, 1975, p. 57.Google Scholar

⁵² Despite its pre-election rhetoric, the post-Indira Gandhi government of India has made few changes in India's foreign policy, particularly in relations with the Soviet Union.

⁵³ The exact monetary value of the investment deal has still to be worked out in detailed negotiations, but it was described as ‘generous’ by Indian officials. On the Iranian side the offer was made ‘to give a boost to bilateral cooperation between India and Iran which in turn… would provide a basis for multilateral and regional cooperation.’ Indian Express, (Delhi), 02 4, 1978, p. 1.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Almost 25 percent of India's total exports now go to the Middle East and Persian Gulf states, and the projection is that the percentage will rise to 30 percent by 1985.Google Scholar See Ezekial, Hannan, ‘India's Trade Prospects and Potential,’ in Mellor, John W. (ed.), India, A Middle Power and the U.S. Interest (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1979, forthcoming).Google Scholar