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Indian Famines and Peasant Victims: the Case of Bengal in 1943–44
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2008
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What, in detail, do Indian peasants do when famine looms? How do they defend themselves, who succumbs and who survives? Recently several talented economic historians have given these questions a vigorous airing. Morris D. Morris in particular set off the discussion by suggesting that South Asian peasants are well prepared for periodic drought famines. He argues (I compress him almost to parody) that long experience with the monsoon's periodic failures has taught the Indian cultivator prudence: when crops begin to fail the cultivator draws upon previously stored substances—his wife's jewelry, grain, cattle, etc.—and sells them or barters them to keep up his usual level of food consumption. Thus, while his assets are cyclically depleted and replenished, he can usually stave off the most feared effect of drought, which is starvation. N. S. Jodha, however, has partially contradicted Morris by adducing evidence from Rajasthan and elsewhere which shows the peasant cultivator to be more likely to cut back his current food intake rather than risk a loss of future production by depleting his capital assets. Like Morris, Jodha sees that farmers are rational and plan for the future, the disagreement being whether they plan for crop failures in the midst of good harvests or plan for good harvests in the midst of crop failures In fact these two views, suitably softened, are not incompatible, and one can imagine both operating at different phases of a worsening episode of drought.
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References
1 Morris, Morris D., ‘What is a Famine?’ Economic and Political Weekly (Bombay), IX (1974): 1855–1864;Google ScholarMorris, Morris D., ‘Needed: a New Famine Policy,’ Economic and Political Weekly, X (Annual Number 1975): 283–94;Google ScholarJodha, N. S., ‘Famine and Famine Policies: Some Empirical Evidence,’ Economic and Political Weekly, X (1975): 1609–23.Google Scholar
2 See Table 1 in text.
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20 These explanations were offered by both capitalists and communists. E.g., ‘the traders offered the peasants a little more than the control rate—an undreamt of price for the peasant—and collared the whole crop,’ memo from the People's Relief Committee (CPI) to the Famine Inquiry Commission, Nanavati Papers, NAI, vol. 1, p. 2; and ‘the persons acting ‘as rice purchasing agents’ on behalf of Government do not always act tactfully or fairly and the Association got the information that in many cases undue pressure was used on the growers and sellers to compel them to sell…. It was reported that considerable pressure amounting in some cases to oppression was used on many people for obtaining stocks….’ Memo from the Bengal Rice Mills Association, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 180.
21 The Report on Bengal summarizes the series of errors and wrong assumptions made by the Bengal government and its advisers.Google Scholar
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23 Ibid., p. 16.
24 The index table appears Ibid., p. 17. These 12 occupational categories are not further defined.
25 Ibid., pp. 32–5.
26 Ibid., pp. 42–3.
27 Ibid., pp. 21 and 26.
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35 Rural occupational categories are not, of course, perfectly discrete or convertible directly into modes of clientage with land-controllers. There is a tendency for these to correlate, however, and in the absence of better data this is sufficient to establish my argument.
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48 Ibid., calculated from table 3. See pp. 84–7.
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57 Inden, and Nicholas, , Bengali Kinship, pp. 4–8, 17–18. In a strict sense it is the vamsa par excellence or ‘the continuing succession of males (purusa-parampara) in a kula’ rather than the kula (lineage) which famine abandonment helps to maintain.Google Scholar
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