¹ For the role and attitude of the ‘Nationalist Ulema’ towards the Pakistan movement, cf. Faruqi, Zia ul–Hasan, The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963)Google Scholar; Friedman, Yohanan, ‘The Attitude of the Jam-iyyat-i Ulama-i Hind to the Indian National Movement and to the Establishment of Pakistan’, Asian and African Studies, Vol. 7 (1971), pp. 157–180Google Scholar. For Maududi's stance on Pakistan, cf. Nasr, Sayyed Vali Reza, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama'at–i Islami of Pakistan (Berkley: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 103–115Google Scholar.

² The state was neither a purely secular state nor did it adopt Islam as its religion. Instead, a proclamation was made in the affirmation of a single God to make adjustment for the belief system of the Indonesians—especially the Muslim majority population. Ramage, Douglas, Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 11–12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³ For details cf. Saeed, Javaid, Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1994)Google Scholar.

⁴ I have borrowed this classificatory scheme from Ahmad's, Ishtiaq, The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan (London: Pinter, 1987)Google Scholar.

⁵ Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, Islam in Modern History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), pp. 238–239Google Scholar. In line with the statement by Smith, this paper argues that there cannot be a precise definition of an Islamic state. There can be different ideas about what constitutes an Islamic state and variety of options as to how to bring about its establishment. For this reason this paper is limited to giving a historical backdrop to the ideological makeup of the concerned actors in order to trace the continuum whereby ideas about Islamic traditions in general influenced respective visions of an Islamic state in particular.

⁶ This process cannot be described as Islamization since this term has acquired a peculiar connotation. It is understood as referring to the drift towards a theological state based on reified religious traditions or a closed body of religious doctrines, encoded by scholars of yesteryear, in the form of Shariat.

⁷ That by announcing the Islamic character of the state the religious forces had been deprived the chance of maligning the power elite for failing to implement the ‘ideology of Pakistan’, was offered as an explanation during the proceedings of a confidential project titled ‘The Fundamental Conflict’ debating the clash between the ‘enlightened’ and ‘retrogressive’ forces. The projectis discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

⁸ Greetz, Clifford, Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 66Google Scholar.

⁹ ‘Introduction’ in Eaton, Richard (ed.), India's Islamic Tradition, 711–1750 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 2–6Google Scholar. This connectedness to the past, theorized by William Graham as the ‘Isnad Paradigm’, links the believers with the Quran and the idealized age of the Prophet in which it was revealed and implemented to perfection. Graham, William A., ‘Traditionalism in Islam: An Essay in Interpretation’, in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1993), pp. 495–522CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

¹⁰ Eaton, India's Islamic Traditions, p. 24.

¹¹ Celebration of a Sufi's death anniversary signifying his communion with God.

¹² According to Muzaffar Alam, a rigidification of Shariat in South Asia took place during the Colonial era and in the context of medieval South Asian Islam different meanings could be ascribed to the term ‘Shariat’. Alam, Muzaffar, The Languages of Political Islam: India 1200–1800 (London: Hurst, 2004), pp. 8–11Google Scholar. In case there is any scope for such alteration or addition, the Ulema alone are to be entrusted this task since they claim to be the repositories of specialized knowledge on various aspects of Islam. It is mainly for this reason that the demand for an Islamic state on the part of the Ulema is equated with the idea of a theological state, for it empowers the Ulema as the arbiters of legislative process and running of state affairs to the exclusion of elected representatives. Another concept which can be tagged with a theological state is that the state should enforce the Quranic dictum of amr bi'l ma'ruf, that is, establishing those moral values in the society which have been enjoined upon the believers by the Quran.

¹³ In the famous Munir Report of 1954, the commission asked several Ulema about the definition of a Muslim and each one of them suggested a different set of criteria to qualify an individual as a Muslim. Report of the Court of Inquiry to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Government Printing Punjab, 1954), pp. 215–218.

¹⁴ Among them, Jamat–i Islami was the most well organized party actively involved in the electoral politics of the country. It was, however, considerably different from other religious groups which had a large network of madrassas imparting religious education of a particular creed. Jamat–i Islam, instead of being a religious group or sect, was a cadre party committed to establishing an Islamic state through its religiously motivated and ideologically trained members.

¹⁵ For Maududi and Islahi's ideas about an Islamic state, cf. Maududi, Maulana, The Islamic Law and its Introduction in Pakistan (Lahore: Islamic Publishers, repr. 1983)Google Scholar; The Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahore: Islamic Publishers, 1962); Islahi, Amin Ahsan, Islami Riyasat [Islamic State] (Lahore: Dar–ul–Tazkir, repr. 2002)Google Scholar; Islami Riyasat men Fiqhi Ikhtilafat ka hal [Resolving Jurisprudential conflicts in an Islamic State] (Lahore: Faran Foundation, repr. 1998); Islami Qanun ki Tadvin [The Collation of Islamic Law] (Lahore: Faran Foundation, repr. 1998). Besides, Chiragh–i Rah (Karachi)—a journal published by the followers of Maulana Maududi—published a special two–volume issue in the 1950s on Islamic law in which a number of intellectuals contributed articles. Also, an international conference of Islamic scholars was convened in Karachi in 1952 by Sayyid Sulayman Nadavi to deliberate the issues concerning Islamic jurisprudence. Its proceedings have recently been published in Jaridah (Karachi), Vol. 34 (2006).

¹⁶ Sayeed, Khalid B., Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 28Google Scholar.

¹⁷ Waseem, Mohammad, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), especially the first two chaptersGoogle Scholar.

¹⁸ Hussain, Asaf, Elite Politics in an Ideological State: the Case of Pakistan (Folkestone: Dawson, 1979), especially chapter IIGoogle Scholar.

¹⁹ Shirin Tahir–Kheli, Pakistani Elites and Foreign Policy Towards the Soviet Union, Iran and Afghanistan (PhD Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, 1972), p. 3.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 66 and 153. The ascendancy of such figures like Ghulam Muhammad, Iskandar Mirza and Chaudhry Muhammad Ali to positions of Governor General and Prime Minister in the 1950s testifies to the importance of the bureaucratic elite in the power structure of Pakistan.

²¹ For an overview of the religious worldview of Pakistan's military elite, cf. Cohen, Stephen P., The Pakistan Army (Berkley: University of California Press, 1984)Google Scholar.

²² Malik, Jamal, Colonization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (New Delhi: Manohar, 1996), p. 19Google Scholar.

²³ Smith, Islam in Modern History, pp. 225–226.

²⁴ This definition of modernity has been taken from Reetz, Dietrich, Islam in the Public Sphere: Religious Groups in India 1900–47 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 17Google Scholar.

²⁵ For a biography of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, cf. Hali, Altaf Husayn, Hayat–i Javed (Lahore: A'ina–i Adab, repr. 1966)Google Scholar. Sayyid Ahmad's religious ideas have been extensively researched in different studies. Cf. Troll, Christian W., Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Reinterpretation of Muslim Theology (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House, 1978)Google Scholar; Baljon, J.M.S., Reforms and Religious Ideas of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Lahore: Sheikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1964)Google Scholar; Dar, B. A., Religious Thought of Sayyid Ahmad Khan (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture 1957)Google Scholar; and Nizami, K. A., Sayyid Ahmad Khan (New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 1974)Google Scholar.

²⁶ Quoted in Mujeeb, M., The Indian Muslims (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967), p. 449Google Scholar.

²⁷ Hadith is the second most important source of religious guidance after the Quran and in Islamic connotation refers to the words and deeds transmitted on the authority of the Prophet which convey the details about the actions he performed, approved, disapproved or condoned, along with his statements and sayings on various occasions in response to different situations.

²⁸ In this commentary, Sayyid Ahmad Khan clearly opposed the institution of slavery, suggested limits on the practice of polygamy, disallowed prohibition of interest on government loans and sanctioned cordial social interaction between Muslims and members of other faiths. One of the most important themes of Sayyid Ahmad Khan's Tafsir relates to the interpretation of Quranic stories (qissas) in terms of natural causation to prove that none of these stories narrates any supernatural phenomena.

²⁹ ‘Foreword’ by Andrew Rippin in Saeed, Abdullah, Interepreting the Quran: Towards a Contemporary Approach (London: Routledge, 2006), p. ixGoogle Scholar.

³⁰ The outcome of these efforts on the part of Sayyid Ahmad Khan was neither unexpected nor undesirable for him. While religious instruction at Aligarh College had remained in the hands of the more conservative Ulema, Sayyid Ahmad Khan ensured an alternative, more non–traditional reading of Muslim religion and history by hiring ‘traditional modernists’, like Shibli Naumani, and Orientalists, like T.W. Arnold. This was done in accordance with the aim of the college which was, in Sayyid Ahmad Khan's words, ‘to form a class of persons, Muhammedan in religion, Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinion, and in intellect’. Cited in Lelyveld, David, Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India (Lahore: Book Traders, repr. 1991), p. 207Google Scholar.

³¹ Ali, Sayyid Amir, The Spirit of Islam: A History of the Evolution and Ideas of Islam with a Life of the Prophet (London: Methuen, 1965), pp. 183–185Google Scholar. Sayyid Amir Ali's work continues to be in print even today, which testifies to the significance of its impact. Indonesian President Sukarno is said to have been greatly influenced in his religious worldview by this work. Boland, Bernard J., The Struggle of Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), p. 126CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

³² For details about Chiragh Ali, cf. A.N.M. Wahidur–Rahman, The Religious Thought of Moulvi Chiragh ‘Ali (MA thesis, McGill University, Institute of Islamic Studies, 1982).

³³ Ahmad, Aziz and von Grunebaum, G.E. (eds.), Muslim Self Statement in India and Pakistan, 1857–1968 (Lahore: Suhail Academy, 2004), p. 49Google Scholar.

³⁴ Ali, Chiragh, A Critical Exposition of the Popular Jihad (Calcutta: Thacker, Spink and Co., 1885)Google Scholar.

³⁵ I have made use of the Urdu translation of this book, Teh'qiq al–Jihad, trans. Maulvi Ghulam ul–Hasnayn Panipati and Maulvi Abdul Ghafur Rampuri (Lahore: Maktaba Akhuvvat, repr. 2003), ‘Muqaddama’, p. 106.

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 109–110.

³⁷ Little, if any, scholarly attention has been given to an academic study of the Ahl al–Quran. Brown's, Daniel W.Rethinking Tradition in Modern Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) alone discusses at some length the Ahl al–Quran movements, and leading figures associated with itGoogle Scholar.

³⁸ These include Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, Tulu‘–i Islam Trust, The Quranic Research Centre, The Quranic Education Society, Parvez Memorial Research Scholars Library and Bazm–i Tulu‘–i Islam (with branches all over Pakistan and most countries of Europe, North America and other parts of the world).

³⁹ Cited in Ahmed, Akbar S., Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 197Google Scholar.

⁴⁰ Javaid Saeed, Islam and Modernization, pp. 76–77.

⁴¹ Chaudhri, Zahid, Pakistan ki Siyasi Tarikh (Lahore: Idara Muta'la Tarikh, 1997), XI, p. 360Google Scholar. Ishtiaq Husayn Qureshi—the chief architect of ideologically biased history text books taught in Pakistani schools—and S.A. Rahman who later became Chief Justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court, noted that there did not exist a clash between Islamic and Western forms of government. Ulema representatives like Ibrahim Ali Chishti, Naim Siddiqi and Abdul Sattar Niyazi favoured a purely theological state with significant powers in the hands of the Ulema. A contrasting view from all the rest came from the delegates of East Pakistan who emphasized the need for setting up a state with a socialist–secular tenor. Zahid Chaudhri, Siyasi Tarikh, pp. 361–363.

⁴² Quoted in Choudhury, The First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (1947–1954) (PhD Thesis, Columbia University, 1956), p. 87.

⁴³ Ibid., pp. 63 and 70.

⁴⁴ Ahmed, Munir D., ‘Pakistan: The Dream of an Islamic State’, in Caldarola, Carlo (ed.), Religion and Societies: Asia and the Middle East (Berlin: Mouton Publishers, 1982), p. 265Google Scholar.

⁴⁵ Nasr, Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution, p. 143.

⁴⁶ During debates in the Constituent Assembly, Begum Shah Nawaz had remarked that she would have been happy if the word ‘Sunna’ had not been there because the word ‘Quran’ would have been sufficient. Saeed, Islam and Modernization, p. 77.

⁴⁷ On their part the Ulema neither had the requisite mass support nor a workable or agreed upon blue print for the functioning of a modern state that could force the ruling authorities into submission. Although Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, in 1949, was able to use his influence in appointing a committee of Ulema named the ‘Board of Ta'limat–i Islamiya’ to assist the Constituent Assembly in the task of drafting an Islamic constitution for the country, the committee's proposal for empowering the Ulema to strike down any law as repugnant to the Quran and the Sunna was never considered a serious option. Ulema's unanimous declaration of 22–points for the formation of a welfare Islamic state, too, suffered a similar fate.

⁴⁸ The most important example in this regard is that of Family Laws which were promulgated in 1961. These laws, with discussions surrounding their drafting and proposed amendments, are discussed in detail later in this paper.

⁴⁹ Rahman, S.A., Maqalat–i Rahman, (ed), Majid, Shima (Lahore: Nigarshat, 1989), pp. 77, 109Google Scholar.

⁵⁰ Tarjuman ul–Quran (Lahore), Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 284–285.

⁵¹ Tarjuman ul–Quran (Lahore), Vol. 51, No. 3, pp. 38–39.

⁵² This is not to deny notable exceptions. One of the most illustrious judges of Pakistani superior courts, Justice Cornelius, despite being a Roman Catholic, emphasized the importance of the Quran and Hadith as a source of justice in matters of compassion and fundamental rights. For him Shariat as a grundnorm was not a retrograde step. He used to advise the members of the legal fraternity to learn Arabic in order to have a direct access to the sources of Islamic law. Braibanti, Ralph, Chief Justice Cornelius of Pakistan: an Analysis with Letters and Speeches (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 60Google Scholar.

⁵³ Cited in Ahmad, Aziz, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964 (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 248Google Scholar.

⁵⁴ Begum, Rashida v. Din, Shahab, Pakistan Legal Digest (1960) Lahore, pp. 1153, 1166–1167Google Scholar.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 1174.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 1172.

⁵⁷ Ishtiaq Ahmad, Islamic State, p. 23.

⁵⁸ Earlier, an Iqbal Academy had been established in 1950 which was entrusted with the task of promoting the philosophy of Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) and projecting him as the poet–philosopher of Pakistan. The first monograph published by this academy was written by Khalifa Abdul Hakim and its title was Iqbal aur Mulla (Iqbal and Mulla). Cf. Professor Dr Zulfiqar, Ghulam Husain, Tarikh–i Bazm–i Iqbal (Lahore: Bazm–i Iqbal, 2000), p. 87Google Scholar. Muhammad Afzal Qarshi, currently the deputy director of the Institute for Islamic Culture, claims to have seen an official document in which Khalifa Abdul Hakim had been directed by the government to describe Iqbal's ‘anti–Mulla’ approach and expound him as a proponent of Islamic modernism. Interview with Muhammad Afzal Qarshi, December 2007, Lahore.

⁵⁹ Rahman, Fazlur, Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), p. 123Google Scholar. Freeland Abbott has also described the establishment of Institute of Islamic Culture as an effort to publish books expressing modernist views of Islam. Abbott, , Islam and Pakistan (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1968), pp. 203–210Google Scholar.

⁶⁰ Hakim, Khalifa Abdul, Islamic Ideology: the Fundamental Beliefs and Principles of Islam and their Application to Practical Life (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1961), pp. 242–243Google Scholar. In that period, the Institute was not just to present Islam with a liberal face to counteract the influence of the Ulema but was also to highlight the progressive aspect of Islam's economic commandments so as to present it as a viable replacement for, and also antithetical to, the Communist ideology. Khalifa wrote: ‘An Islamic State would neither be a totalitarian nor a laissez–faire state. The State would leave the individuals free to pursue their individual goals but would certainly interfere where these goals tend to produce an economic or social chaos. . . . I must repeat here that no Muslim country is a lover of Russian Communism, because the latter is atheistic and fanatically tyrannical, while every Muslim nation believes in the truth of Islam and considers it as the panacea of all ills’. Hakim, Khalifa Abdul, Islam and Communism (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1962), pp. 139, 226Google Scholar. In their opposition to Communism both the Ulema and the Islamic modernists seemed to share a common ground and were not averse to receiving patronage from state and external sources. According to Ayesha Jalal, the Jamiat Ulema Islam sought financial aid (Rs. 10,000) to ‘help meet their costs in promulgating the anti–Communist line’ as well as Urdu pamphlets on the ‘treatment of Muslims’ in Russia to demonstrate ‘how Islam. . .[was being] crushed under the Communist system’. Jalal, , The State of Martial Rule: the Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 291Google Scholar.

⁶¹ Abdul Hakim, Islamic Ideology, p. 283.

⁶² This is not to say that there were no ‘conservative’ Islamic scholars in the Institute. Ra'is Ahmad Jafari and Hanif Nadavi were also among the Institute's research fellows, although their contributions during the 1950s published by the Institute fell considerably short of the traditional stance about the powers of the legislation in an Islamic state and that of the Islamic Leviathan proposed by Maududi. This is the impression that can be gathered from works like Ra'is Ahmad Jafari's Siyasat–i Shariyya (1959) and Nadavi's Masala–i Ijtihad (1961) in which the traditionally agreed findings about state authority, free thinking and fresh legislations are put across and argued about in a rather mild tone.

⁶³ Al–Bayan (Lahore), Vol. 2, No. 4, December 1950, pp. 11–12.

⁶⁴ One of the reasons for which Jafar Shah proposes a limited ban on polygamy is that it would help control the population growth as well. His proposals also carried favour with members of women activist groups like Begum Sha'istah Ikram Ullah and Salma Tasaddaq Husayn. The latter had submitted similar proposals in a legislative draft in 1954 calling upon modifications in various aspects of family laws in the ‘spirit’ of Quranic injunctions. Islahi, Amin Ahsan, Maqalat–i Islahi (Lahore: Faran Foundation, 2004), II, pp. 119–120Google Scholar.

⁶⁵ Jafar Shah has enlarged the scope of legislative authority on the rationale that the Islamic Shariat is not permanent and is open to revision. In case there is a consensus on some aspect of Shariat, it does not mean that a new consensus cannot replace it. Even in case of the eternally binding Quranic laws there can be a scope for flexibility. This can be achieved by applying these laws gradually and selectively or by laying emphasis on their ‘spirit’ alone while implementing them. Phulvarvi, , Ijtihadi Masa'il (Lahore: Idara Thaqafat Islamiyya, 1999), pp. 16–17Google Scholar.

⁶⁶ The principles of policy enumerated by the 1962 constitution had the provision for the elimination of Riba which, in parenthesis, was translated as ‘Usury’ and not ‘Interest’. Rahman, Fazlur, ‘Some Islamic Issues in the Ayyub Khan Era’ in Little, Donald P. (ed.), Essays on Islamic Civilization: Presented to Niyazi Berkes (Leiden: Brill, 1976), p. 292Google Scholar.

⁶⁷ Phulvarvi, Jafar Shah, Kamarshal Interest ki Fiqhi Haythiyyat (Lahore: Idara Thaqafat Islamiyya, 1997)Google Scholar. Muhammad Ishaq Bhatti—who worked with Jafar Shah Phulvarvi at the Institute of Islamic Culture—claims that Jafar Shah rescinded on this interpretation of Interest in the later part of his life. Bhatti, , Bazm–i Arjumandan (Lahore: Maktaba Qudussiya, 2006), p. 376Google Scholar.

⁶⁸ Gauhar, Altaf, Gauhar Guzisht (Lahore: Sang–e–Meel Publications, 2007), p. 63Google Scholar. This article on the ideology of Pakistan was written in 1957.

⁶⁹ Khan, Ayyub, Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 198Google Scholar.

⁷⁰ Ayyub Khan to Ghulam Ahmad Parvez, 2 July, 1960, Islamabad, Parvez Memorial Research Scholars Library, Ghulam Ahmad Parvez Papers (hereafter GAPP). (emphasis added). Even for a radically revisionist Islamic thinker like Parvez, it was difficult to accept Ayyub's thesis. He interpreted Ayyub's statement as suggesting that the meanings of the Quran should be considered anew in the light of prevailing circumstances. ‘The phrase cannot possibly mean that the Quran should partly be taken as immutable, partly as redundant and partly as alterable’. Parvez to Ayyub, 6 July, 1960, Lahore, GAPP, pp. 7–8. The fact that Parvez safely preserved the entire record of his correspondence with Ayyub Khan—despite the fact that some aspects of its contents can be considered as ‘objectionable’ both by his supporters and detractors—is a comment on Parvez's intellectual honesty and a testimony to his genuine belief that cooperation with the Ayyub regime was beneficial in the interest of religion and inevitable for his own success as a scholar of Islam.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 285.

⁷² Ayyub Khan, Friends not Masters, pp. 195 and 203.

⁷³ Mumtaz Ahmad has distinguished three different periods in Ayyub Khan's policy regarding Islam. The first period, between 1958 and 1962, has been regarded by him as the most progressive component of Ayyub's regime during which massive programmes of economic modernization and institutional reorganization were undertaken while projecting Islam as a forward-looking religion and vehicle of progressive change. The period between 1962 and 1965 has been described as the one during which divisive politicking forced Ayyub to underscore the value of Islam as a basis of national unity. In the last period, between 1965 and 1969, Ayyub Khan is said to have been using Islam to ensure political stability and regime legitimacy. Ahmad, Mumtaz, ‘Islam and the State: The Case of Pakistan’, in Moen, Mathew C. and Gustafson, Lowell S. (eds.), The Religious Challenge to the State (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992), pp. 240–241Google Scholar. Such a periodization is useful but arbitrary and, as will be shown in this paper, Ayyub Khan continued to espouse his version of Islamic modernism and did extend covert or overt support to institutionalized efforts for curbing ‘Mullahism’.

⁷⁴ The act was later superseded by the Waqf Properties Ordinance of 1961 and Auqaf (Federal Control) Act of 1976. These revisions helped increase the authority of the Auqaf department. Ewing, Katherine, ‘The Politics of Sufism: Redefining the Saints of Pakistan’, in Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 2 (1983), p. 258CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

⁷⁵ Malik, Colonization of Islam, p. 59.

⁷⁶ Mumtaz Ahmad, ‘Islam and the State’, p. 244. The Auqaf department took many initiatives in this regard: New and attractive pay scales were introduced for the prayer leaders of the government-controlled mosques; an Egyptian scholar was engaged to set up an academy to teach the Ulema courses in the history, geography and politics of Pakistan, international affairs, problems of economic development, and unity and harmony among the Muslim sects. Ibid., p. 245. During the deliberation of ‘The Fundamental Conflict’ committee, proposals were floated for an enhanced role of the Auqaf department towards increasing the economic and social stature of the Ulema.

⁷⁷ Zahid–ur–Rashidi, one of the scholars consulted for changes in the Hudud Ordinance in 2007, has explained the ‘un–Islamic’ provisions of the latest changes in the Hudud Ordinance. In his various writings critiquing various provisions of the amended Hudud laws published in various Urdu newspapers, Rashidi argues that the rape victim shall be provided justice under the criminal law in case the condition of ‘four pious male witnesses’ for punishment required under the Hudud Law cannot be met. But the same has not been done for cases of fornication or adultery. In fact, it has been made increasingly difficult to register such cases under the new Hudud Ordinance.

⁷⁸ For details, cf. Masud, Muhammad Khalid, ‘Apostasy and Judicial Separation in British India’ in Powers, David S., Messick, Brinkley and Masud, Muhammad Khalid (eds.), Islamic Legal Interpretation: Muftis and Their Fatwas (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 192–203Google Scholar. Reportedly Maulana Maududi, in view of the peculiar conditions of women in British India, did not find the idea of putting restrictions on the practice of polygamy objectionable. Shahab, Rafi Ullah, Ahkam ul–Quran men Tehrif (Lahore: Dost Associates, 2000), p. 88Google Scholar.

⁷⁹ With regard to the role and status of women, the wife of the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, Begum Ra'na Liyaqat Ali Khan, frequently spoke about the rights and freedoms granted to women by Islam and argued for their greater contribution in the social and economic life of the country. Her efforts—and that of other ‘elite Begums’—and statements against purdah and other women–discriminatory laws, practices and customs, invited a hostile reaction from conservative quarters. Amin Ahsan Islahi, who at the time was an important member of the Jamat–i Islami, wrote a rejoinder to the calls for greater women participation and laid down the ‘Islamic guidelines’ for women, the duties assigned to them and the rights reserved for their protection. Islahi, , Islami Mu'ashra men ‘Aurat ka Maqam (Lahore: Faran Foundation, repr., 2001)Google Scholar.

⁸⁰ Women carried out a number of demonstrations. They carried placards with slogans reading: ‘Down with Polygamy’, ‘Go Back Aliya Saddy’ and ‘You Should Marry A Bachelor’. For other activities of women groups, cf. Sylvia A Chipp, The Role of Women Elites in a Modernizing Country (PhD Thesis, University of Syracuse, 1970), p. 172.

⁸¹ Maulana Ehtasham ul–Haq Thanavi was the only member of the commission who was trained in the traditional scholarship of Islam. The so–called ‘non–specialist's’ right to draft this report was defended by Khalifa Abdul Hakim in one of his articles published by Idara Thaqafat–i Islamiyya. Phulvarvi, Jafar Shah (ed.), Masala–i Ta'ddud–i Izdavaj (Lahore: Idara Thaqafat Islamiyya, 1959), p. 36Google Scholar.

⁸² Thanavi, Tanvir ul-Haq (ed.), Ehtasham ul–Haq Thanavi, ‘A'ili Qavanin aur Ikhtilafi Not (Karachi: Maktaba Ehtashamiya, 2007), p. 42Google Scholar. Maulana Ehtasham ul–Haq Thanavi was the only member to write a dissenting note. He criticized the Commission's understanding of Ijtihad whereby there had been changes in the established practices of the Muslims. He noted various ‘Western influences’ on the members of the commission in their opposition to polygamy.

⁸³ What facilitated the women further was the promulgation of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act of 1964 which eased the matters relating to matrimonial litigation. Sylvia A Chipp, The Role of Women Elites, p. 187.

⁸⁴ Jalal, Ayesha, ‘The Convenience of Subservience: Women and the State in Pakistan in Kandiyoti, Deniz, (ed.), Women, Islam and the State (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1991), p. 94Google Scholar. In his criticism of the Family Laws, Mufti Shafi—the chief cleric of Deoband in Pakistan—lamented that the Prophet's precedent of marrying 9–year old Aisha has been outlawed by the present laws. This was stated in a detailed letter written by Mufti Shafi to Ayyub Khan about what he regarded as the un–Islamic provisions of the Family Laws. The contents of Mufti Shafi's letter were reprinted in Bayyinat (Karachi), ca. March–April 1963. The presidency sent this letter of objection to Ghulam Ahmad Parvez and asked him to draft a response. Qudrat Ullah Shahab to Ghulam Ahmad Parvez, 28 April, 1961, Islamabad, GAPP.

⁸⁵ Parvez, Qayamat–i Maujud (Lahore: Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, ca. 2000), p. 19.

⁸⁶ For more details about the suggestions put forward by the Ulema, cf. Muslim Family Laws Ordinance par Ulema Karam ka Tabsara (Lahore: n.p, n.d.).

⁸⁷ al–Salafi, Maulana Muhammad Ismail, Fatava Salafiyya (Lahore: Islamic Publishing House, 1991), pp. 61–3Google Scholar.

⁸⁸ Tulu‘–i Islam (Lahore), August 1962, p. 18.

⁸⁹ Anderson, Norman, Law Reform in the Muslim World (London: University of Athlone Press, 1976), p. 76Google Scholar. In 1967, the Islamic Advisory Council unanimously proposed changes in the provisions relating to an orphaned grandchild's right to inheritance. It was suggested that instead of fixing a legal provision for his or her share, a financially strained grandchild should be allowed to seek judicial redress. The proposed amendment, however, could not be made into actual law for some unknown reasons. For the suggestions made by the members of the Council of Islamic Ideology on various aspects of Family Laws, cf. Report on Muslim Family Laws (Islambad: Council of Islamic Ideology, Government of Pakistan, 1983). Also, Fazlur Rahman, ‘Some Islamic Issues in the Ayyub Khan Era’, pp. 289–290.

⁹⁰ Report on Muslim Family Laws, p. 32. It is pertinent to note that the composition of the Council of Islamic Ideology's membership shifted in favour of the Ulema in the 1970s till it became a wholly Ulema–dominated institution because of General Zia–ul–Haq's ‘Islamization’ drive. Under Ayyub Khan, the Council's membership was more favourably disposed towards academic and non madrassa-trained scholars of Islam. For details, cf. Malik, Colonization of Islam, p. 291.

⁹¹ Interview with General Mujib–ur–Rahman, January 2008, Islamabad.

⁹² Even the supposedly liberal English daily, Dawn, sided with the protestors, and warned of grave consequences regarding Fazlur Rahman's policies. Fazlur Rahman, ‘Some Islamic Issues in the Ayyub Khan Era’, p. 294.

⁹³ Rahman remarked: ‘A certain percentage of alcoholic content comes to exist even in the drink made from churning milk called Lassi in the Punjab, if it is left for a day or so’. Ten Year Report 1962 to 1972 (Islamabad: Council of Islamic Ideology, Government of Pakistan, n.d.), p. 59.

⁹⁴ Fazlur Rahman, ‘Some Islamic Issues in the Ayyub Khan Era’, p. 297.

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 299–300.

⁹⁶ Zafar, S.M., Through the Crisis (Lahore: Book Center 1970), pp. 25–26Google Scholar. Zafar half–heartedly tried to defend Fazlur Rahman by saying that he had found nothing objectionable in the book but did not want the same to be reported in the press. Fazlur Rahman, ‘Some Islamic Issues in the Ayyub Khan Era’, pp. 300–301. In his personal diary, Ayyub Khan noted with regret the saga surrounding the unseating of a scholarly figure like Rahman. Baxter, Craig (ed.), Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayyub Khan 1966–1972 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 253Google Scholar.

⁹⁷ The publication of various volumes on Islamic Law by Tanzil–ur–Rahman was one example. The principles on the basis of which Tanzil–ur–Rahman codified these laws, ranked Ahadith next to the Quran along with Tafsir and Dr Tanzil–ur–Rahman, Fiqh., Majmua Qavanin–i Islam (Islamabad: Idara Tehqiqat Islami, 2004), I, pp. 18–19Google Scholar. Many of his findings went against the provisions of the Family Laws. For all these reasons, this work—which was published under the aegis of Islamic Research Institute—was appreciated by the conservative religious quarters as well. It was even suggested by one influential Deobandi journal that this compendium should be promulgated in the country once a council of Ulema had debated its contents extensively and suggested suitable amendments where necessary. Tanzil–ur–Rahman, Majmua Qavanin–i Islam (Islamabad: Idara Tehqiqat Islami, 2005),V, appendix. However, it is interesting to note that the book, in its note of dedication to Iqbal, has quoted from a letter he had written to Sufi Tabbassum acknowledging Khvaja Ahmad ud–Din Amritsari's scholarly capabilities for the drafting of a compendium of Islamic law and practices derived alone from the Quran.

⁹⁸ The inside details of this interaction between the two were first disclosed by Altaf Gauhar when excerpts from his book on Ayyub Khan were published in 1983. Parvez was alive at that time and himself wrote in response to refute the growing impression that he ever asked for favours from Ayyub Khan for the promotion of his ideas or organization. However, he did admit requesting unsuccessfully for government-sanctioned free land for constructing a ‘Quranic College’ in Lahore. Tulu‘–i Islam (Lahore), January 1984, p. 35.

⁹⁹ The specific report in question is just two pages long and does not carry any title or date, but its content suggests that it was submitted sometime shortly after the promulgation of the 1962 constitution. It was probably given to Parvez by his admirer and a key figure during the Martial Law regime of Khvaja Shahab–ud–Din (1898–1977). For his brief historical sketch, cf. Ahmad Said, Muslim India (1857–1947): A Biographical Dictionary (Lahore: Institute of Pakistan Historical Research, 1997), p. 301.

¹⁰⁰ The question of withdrawing financial support from Parvez as a sign of the government distancing itself from him did not arise because—as the report noted—Parvez was not receiving any direct support from the government at that time.

¹⁰¹ Only once, in 1957, did Parvez become part of any government body dealing with its policy statement on Islam when an Islamic Law Commission was set up as demanded by one of the provisions of 1956 Constitution to make recommendations for bringing the existing laws of the country in concurrence with Islam. Amin Ahsan Islahi was also part of the commission. Because Parvez was included in the commission, it was mockingly referred to as the ‘Parvezi Commission’. However, with the imposition of Martial Law, the Commission was disbanded before it could submit any of its findings. Parvez, Manzil ba Manzil (Lahore: Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, 1968), p. 57.

¹⁰² Tulu‘–i Islam (Lahore), December 1980, pp. 13–14.

¹⁰³ Parvez's Telegram to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 11 March, 1972 and 14 May, 1972, Lahore, GAPP. The Tulu‘–i Islam organization, even after the death of its mentor, received ‘support’—albeit indirectly—during the regime of Parvez Musharraf. It is because Parvez Musharraf's father, Musharraf–ud–Din, had worked with Ghulam Ahmad Parvez in the Delhi secretariat and held him in high esteem. It is reported that he personally came all the way from Islamabad to attend Parvez's funeral prayers. Parvez Musharraf's mother, Begum Zarin Musharraf, used to contribute money to the fund set up by Tulu‘–i Islam. The husband of Parvez Musharraf's maternal aunt, Maliha Abdullah Jamal, had converted to Islam from Hinduism because of the teachings of Ghulam Ahmad Parvez. Such connections helped Tulu‘–i Islam lift the ban on some of Parvez's books which had been imposed during Musharraf's regime. Interview with Husayn Qaysarani, Manager Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, December 2007, Lahore.

¹⁰⁴ This suggestion by Tulu‘–i Islam was cited in Rahiq (Lahore), November 1957, p. 3. Parvez expressed a number of similar views which were unabashedly undemocratic and called for the centralization of state authority. The most important view was his condemnation of the party system which he described as a form of shirk (associating partners with God). Immediately after independence, Parvez recommended that the Muslim League, having served its purpose of achieving a homeland for the Muslims, should be dissolved as a political party. He argued that there did not exist any scope for a party system in an Islamic state as there is no concept in Islam of extending governmental powers and functions to the members of one party alone and depriving non–members from sharing it. Tulu‘–i Islam (Karachi), May 1948, p. 91. Also, on matters of the federal nature of the state, Parvez was supportive of the one–unit scheme and of a powerful central government, regarding centrifugal pulls on the basis of sub–nationalisms or ethnic identities as a recipe for disaster. What Tulu‘–i Islam favoured was a unitary, presidential form of government, established in the name of Allah's sovereignty. Tulu‘–i Islam (Karachi), February 1951, pp. 23–40.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with General Mujib–ur–Rahman, 7 January, 2008, Islamabad. General Mujib, like his brother, greatly admired Parvez's writings. He headed the information ministry for a considerable number of years under the Zia regime. Given the hard line Islamic tone of the Zia's regime, there was nothing much that General Mujib could have done publicly to favour Parvez. But it was an achievement in itself that Parvez was able, at least once to my knowledge, to deliver a lecture on the Quran on Pakistani Television – the only TV channel in Pakistan at that time. On one occasion, General Mujib used his official influence to force the daily Nava’–i Vaqt—a major Urdu daily—to print a couple of articles in favour of Parvez after a column had been written against him by Ata–ul–Haq Qasmi, published in the same newspaper. Interview with Ata–ul–Haq Qasmi, December 2007, Lahore.

¹⁰⁶ Parvez to Ayyub, 30 August, 1959, Lahore, GAPP, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ Parvez to Ayyub, 15 September, 1961, Lahore, GAPP, p. 4.

¹⁰⁸ Bexter, ed. Diaries, p. 65. The meeting took place on 20 February, 1967. The particular writing of Parvez mentioned by Ayyub Khan is probably the pamphlet titled ‘Mao Ze Tung aur Quran’ (Lahore: Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, repr. 1990).

¹⁰⁹ Parvez to Ayyub, 19 September, 1959, Lahore, GAPP, p. 3. In one letter to Qudrat Ullah Shahab, Parvez complained that the fiscal plan for the propagation of Quranic literature still awaited approval and that the matter of inclusion of Parvez's books in the syllabi had not been resolved. Parvez to Shahab, 1 September, 1960, Lahore, GAPP. He again raised the issue of funds while writing to Ayyub Khan about the progress he had made in preparing several tracts and distributing them extensively. They dealt with such topics as Islamic ideology, Quranic economics, political system of Islam etc. Parvez to Ayyub, 10 March, 1960, Lahore, GAPP. However, it should be noted that Parvez was able to establish Al–Mizan publications—a private limited printing company—in the 1960s with initial capital of about Rs. 54,000 contributed by some of his affluent followers from Karachi. Al–Mizan publications had to be wound up some years later because of the acrimonious relationship that developed between Parvez and the managers on the financial affairs of the company. For details, cf. Kelani, Abur Rahman, A'ina–i Parveziyyat (Lahore: Dar–us–Salam Publications, 2004), pp. 873–874Google Scholar.

¹¹⁰ Parvez noted on the margin of this letter that ‘no secret job has been assigned to me’. D.O.No.10/1/63–Accounts (I), 27 May, 1964, Islamabad, GAPP. Parvez was sent a reminder letter on 29 June, 1964 in which he was asked to acknowledge that he had received the bank draft. Parvez sent an acknowledgment receipt and promised to write a detailed reply after resuming his normal activities following an operation he had undergone. Parvez to Amanat Ali (Section Officer), 2 July, 1964, Lahore, GAPP.

¹¹¹ Parvez to Ayyub, 6 August, 1964, Lahore, GAPP. Parvez's ‘codification of the Quran’ project had been in the pipeline for many years before it was finally published in the 1960s. Ayyub, too, used to think about the need for, and utility of, such a work. Shahab, Qudrat Ullah, Shahab Nama (Lahore: Sang–e–Meel Publications, 2000), p. 722Google Scholar. The ‘literature in English’ probably refers to Parvez's only work in that language, titled Islam: A Challenge to Religion (Lahore: Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, 1968), published in 1968.

¹¹² Parvez to Brigadier F.R. Khan, 5 November, 1959, Lahore, GAPP. A similar lack of interest by the Bureau was expressed when it refused to sponsor the publication by Tulu‘–i Islam of a tract on family planning. Bureau of National Reconstruction to Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, D.O.No.32–65/60–CR, 29 December, 1960, Islamabad, GAPP.

¹¹³ At the time when Parvez had not completely renounced the Hadith literature, Maududi supported his doctrine of Hadith which stipulated that more scrutiny of Hadith literature is possible and additions can be made to the research already done by the previous Traditionists. Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, Maqam–i Hadith (Karachi: Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, ca. 1953), I, p. 88.

¹¹⁴ Most of these themes were effectively dealt with in a booklet published by Idara Tulu‘–i Islam entitled Qatl–i Murtad, Ghulami aur Laundiyan aur Yatim Pote ki Virathat (Lahore: Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, 1986).

¹¹⁵ Mizaj Shanas–i Rusul (Lahore: Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, 1996), p. 92.

¹¹⁶ Maqam–i Hadith (Karachi: Idara Tulu‘–i Islam, ca. 1953), II, p. 412.

¹¹⁷ Nazim Idara Tulu‘–i Islam to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 2 November, 1959, Lahore, p. 2. The ministry initially showed interest in purchasing a number of copies of the proposed book, but the initial enthusiasm waned when Parvez expressed his displeasure in a letter to Brigadier F.R. Khan for backing out of the understanding reached between them whereby the publication cost of the new book was agreed to be paid by the government. Parvez to Brigadier F.R. Khan, 22 December, 1959, Lahore, GAPP. Nevertheless, a thin volume comprising well argued articles on Maududi's ideas of Jihad, slavery, concubines, apostasy and property rights was published by Idara Tulu‘–i Islam in June 1962.

¹¹⁸ S.F.H. Faizi, Senior Research Officer, Bureau of National Research and Reference, to Parvez, 5 June, 1965, Islamabad, GAPP.

¹¹⁹ The proposals titled as ‘Measures to Curb the Activities of Jamat–i–Islami’ was attached as an appendix to a letter. Cf. Parvez to Ayyub Khan, 9 June, 1967, Lahore, GAPP.

¹²⁰ Parvez, too, was aware of that. In a letter to Ayyub Khan, written probably after September 1968, Parvez admitted that the opposition might target Ayyub for his association with Parvez even though he, unlike Fazlur Rahman whose case had been ‘settled’ by then, was never officially part of any government organization.

¹²¹ Parvez wrote: ‘It is time that our younger generation is introduced to Tolu–e–Islam literature without delay. And this will be possible only if you identify yourself with my Quranic movement, the sole object of which is to inculcate in the minds of our younger generation that habit of constructive thinking in the light of Divine guidance’. Parvez to Ayyub Khan, 6 February, 1965, Lahore, GAPP. (emphasis added) The idea of distributing Tulu‘–i Islam literature through the platform of the Muslim League was discussed briefly by them. Ayyub Khan offered to speak to Navabzada Abdul Ghufur Khan of the Muslim League in this regard. Parvez to Ayyub, 24 November, 1967, Lahore, GAPP.

¹²² He was told, on behalf of the president, that since land in Lahore was scarce and costly, he should raise funds from among his supporters and try to purchase the land at concessionary rates if the rules so permitted. S. Fida Hassan to Parvez, 5 August, 1966, Islamabad, GAPP, No.D.7134–Pre/66. In 1967, a Quranic Education Society, set up by the Tulu‘–i Islam, approached the Governor of West Punjab, the Revenue Department, the Auqaf Department and the Evacuee Trust Board requesting an allocation of 50 acres of government land for the construction of a Quranic College. The land was finally acquired in the late 1970s with a payment of Rs. 400,000. Half the acquired land was to make up one Ahbab Cooperative Housing Society, and the sale of its plots was to finance the construction of the Quranic College. The proposed college, however, was never built as the stakeholders lost interest after the death of Ghulam Ahmad Parvez.

¹²³ The fatwa was issued by almost 1,000 Ulema from a variety of sects. It observed that Pervez was the sum total of all those ideas and movements that had plagued the Muslim society since the advent of British rule in India. Parvez ke Bare men Ulema ka Muttafiqqa Fatwa (Karachi: n.p, ca. 1961). Parvez argued his case, but the correspondence between him and Mufti Shafi ceased due to the intransigence shown by the latter. In vain, Pervez wrote to Ayyub Khan and reminded him of the Martial Law regulations prohibiting provocative writings against any Muslim sect. He expressed the fear that the Ulema might try to use the situation to stoke up agitation similar to that of 1953 to gain prominence or to destabilize the regime. Parvez to Ayyub Khan, 15 March, 1962, Lahore, GAPP. All these concerns were unfounded. There has never been a serious demand or an effort on the part of the Ulema to get the ‘Parvezis’ declared non–Muslims, although in some Middle Eastern countries the literature of Ghulam Ah'mad Parvez has been banned. The closest the Pakistani government came to evaluating the status of ‘Parvezis’ was in 1999 when the then religious affairs minister, Raja Zafar–ul–Haq, asked the advice and opinion of the Ulema about the status of Ghulam Ahmad Parvez and his followers as Muslims. Tariq, Rehmat Ullah, Quran ka Muashi Nazariyya (Lahore: Sir Sayyid Memorial Library, 2002), p. 46Google Scholar.

¹²⁴ Lau, Martin, The Role of Islam in the Legal System of Pakistan (Leiden: Nijhoff, 2006), p. 7, fn. 14Google Scholar.

¹²⁵ S.M. Zafar, Through the Crisis, pp. 23–24. Parvez had warned of a similar threat to Ayyub Khan after the 1965 presidential elections when he pointed out the increasing numbers of seminaries and their graduates and the fact that the religious Mullahs were the ones to vote against him. He attributed this to flawed government policy in allowing Auqaf money to be used for building Madrassas and for incorporating into the constitution the provision for the inclusion of the Sunnat as one of the sources of Islamic law. Parvez to Ayyub, 6 February, 1965, Lahore, GAPP.

¹²⁶ Ayyub Khan, Friends not Masters, p. ix. (emphasis added).

¹²⁷ Interview with S.M. Zafar, 18 January, 2008, Lahore.

¹²⁸ ‘Meetings of the Governor's Conference 23–25 February, 1967: Minutes’, Case No. GC8/1/67, GAPP, p. 2. This preliminary meeting was attended by the Ministers of Information, Foreign Affairs, and Law, along with important members of the government ‘machinery’ like Qudrat Ullah Shahab, Altaf Gauhar and Fazlur Rahman. Ghulam Ah'mad Parvez was especially invited and inducted as a non–official member of this project.

¹²⁹ ‘Committee on Fundamental Conflict’, 17 April, 1967, GAPP, pp. 2–3. (emphasis added).

¹³⁰ ‘Minutes’, GAPP, p. 4.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 2.

¹³² Ibid., pp. 4–5. A paper entitled ‘Making the Mullah Useful in the Process of Nation Building’ with the sub–heading ‘Winning Over or Neutralizing the Die–Hard Section of the Mullah’ was circulated among the members of the project ‘Fundamental Conflict’. The paper, which had probably been written by Dr Fazlur Rahman, gave similar suggestions regarding the co–option of Mullahs.

¹³³ This was stated in Ghulam Ahmad Parvez's article titled ‘Fundamental Conflict’ which was distributed among the members of the committee for their perusal. Parvez, ‘Fundamental Conflict’, GAPP, p. 28.

¹³⁴ ‘Summary for the Governor's Conference: The Fundamental Conflict’, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, GAPP, p. 4.

¹³⁵ ‘Committee on Fundamental Conflict’, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 17 April, 1967, GAPP, p. 7. S.M. Zafar told the author that his stance was supported by most of the others present during the session. He was appreciated for boldly challenging the parameters of the project by the then Governor of West Pakistan, Navab Malik Amir Muhammad Khan of Kalabagh. Interview with S.M. Zafar, 18 January, 2008, Lahore. Zafar believes that the votaries of the ‘Fundamental Conflict’ did not take the winding up of the project too kindly. In order to emphasize their point in favour of taking on the Mullah, they did not take sufficient steps to quell the agitation against Dr Fazlur Rahman and allowed it to reach such a level that the only option open to Rahman was to resign. S.M. Zafar, Through the Crisis, pp. 25–26.

¹³⁶ Martin Lau remarked: ‘The paucity of reported cases involving an explicit recognition of Islam as an additional source of law indicates that in the 1950s and 1960s judges were still able and willing to reject any express reliance on Islamic law. The areas of law occupied by Islamic law were confined to family law, which had continued to be governed by the British Indian system of personal laws’. Lau, The Role of Islam, p. 11.