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Foreign-Training and China's Self-Strengthening: The Case of Feng-huang-shan, 1864–1873

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Richard J. Smith
Richard J. Smith
Affiliation:
Rice University, Houston, Texas
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One of the principal concerns of China's ‘self-strengthening movement’ in the T'ung-chih period (1862–1874) was the question of military reform. Organizational change was not a central issue, for the Ch'ing dynasty had already found in the innovative armies known as yung-ying (lit., ‘brave battalions’) a comparatively effective military system compatible with existing economic and administrative institutions. But changes in training methods—especially officer training—and weapons came to be viewed as essential to the self-strengthening effort. Experience in the huge and devastating Taiping Rebellion (1850–1864), together with the repeated humiliations suffered by China at the hands of foreigners in the two decades following the Opium War of 1839–1842, had brought the Ch'ing government to a greater awareness of the need for introducing Western-style weapons and training in Chinese armies. Particularly convincing was the effective use of foreign troops and foreign-officered contingents (such as the vaunted Ever-Victorious Army) against the Taipings in the area of Shanghai during 1862. But in Chinese eyes, the employment of foreign troops and officers could never be anything more than a temporary expedient. Ch'ing policy-makers aimed at eliminating dependence on foreigners as soon as possible, while building China's own military capabilities in order to contend with both internal and external challenges. These twin goals lay at the heart of self-strengthening.

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Articles
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Modern Asian Studies , Volume 10 , Issue 2 , April 1976 , pp. 195 - 223
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

1 On yung-ying, see my article, ‘Chinese Military Institutions in the Mid-Nineteenth Century,’ forthcoming in the Journal of Asian History. Reorganization of Green Standard forces, notably the so-called Retrained Army (lien-chün) and Ting Jihch'ang's fu-piao, essentially went no further than ‘yung-yingization.’ See Erhmm, Wang, ‘Lien-chün ti ch'i-yüan chi ch'i i-i,’ (The origin and significance of the ‘Retrained Army’), Ta-lu tsa-chih (Mainland Miscellany), 34.6–7, esp. 221;Google Scholar also Shih-ch'iang, Lü, Ting Jih-ch'ang yü tzu-ch'iang yün-tung (Ting Jih-ch'ang and the self-strengthening movement; Taipei, 1972), pp. 186–90.Google Scholar

2 See, for example, Yang-wu yün-tung (The ‘foreign matters’ movement; Shanghai, 1961), Vol. 3, pp. 441, 457, 459, 462–3, 466.Google Scholar

3 Smith, Richard J., ‘Barbarian Officers of Imperial China: Ward, Gordon and the Taiping Rebellion’ (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Davis, 1972), esp. ch. 4.Google Scholar

4 See Wright, Mary C., The Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T'ung-chih Restoration, 1862–1874 (New York, 1967), chas 3 and 9.Google Scholar

5 There are vast amounts of material on the various foreign-training programs, including diplomatic despatches, first-hand accounts from both Western and Chinese observers, and newspaper reports. Much of this material remains to be used. Yang-wu yün-tung, Vol. 3, provides a wealth of information on the training programs at Tientsin (pp. 44358, 475–7, 479, 483–4, 491, 493–4, 496–8, 501–2), Canton (459–66, 468–70, 481, 509–10, 519), Foochow (471–3, 477–8, 482, 597–605) and T'ang-chüeh (Wuchang; 492, 494–6). Additional observations on the problem of foreign-training may be found in Ibid., pp. 441–2, 452–7, 466–8, 482–7, 499, 501–5.

6 The above discussion is based largely on the Yang-wu yün-tung documents cited in note 5, although selected Foreign Office documents and Western-language newspapers such as the North-China Herald and Hong Kong Daily Press have also been consulted.

7 British Consular and Embassy Archives (hereafter F.O. 228), F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, December 31, 1864.

8 Story's ‘reminiscences’ in Hake, A. E., Events in the Taeping Rebellion (London, 1891), p. 517.Google Scholar

9 According to the North-China Herald's estimate (which the head drillmaster did not dispute), the camp cost 150,000 taels per year to maintain. North-China Herald, June 14, 1873 and June 21, 1873. Gordon estimated in 1864 that payment for a contingent of one thousand officers and men (including foreigners) would exceed ten thousand taels per month. F.O. 228/368, Gordon to Brown, September (day missing), 1864. See also Ch'ou-pan i-wu shih-mo (A complete record of the management of barbarian affairs; Peiping, 1930; hereafter I.W.S.M.) T'ung-chih 25: 26b, which provides a similar estimate.

10 See the general discussion in Wright, The Last Stand, ch. 9, esp. pp. 200–17. Although I do not agree with all of the late Professor Wright's conclusions, I remain indebted to her stimulating and pioneering work.

11 Smith, ‘Barbarian Officers,’ currently being revised for publication.

12 Gordon Papers (British Museum), Additional Manuscripts (Add. MSS.) 52,389, Gordon to Mother, June 2, 1864: ‘The Force is now completely disbanded, and I think a great danger removed both for Shanghai & the Chinese’ See also Hung-chang's, Li memorial in I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 23b–27b.Google Scholar

13 Smith, ‘Barbarian Officers,’ esp. chs 5, 6, 8, and 9.

14 Lane-Poole, Stanley, The Life of Sir Harry Parkes (2 vols, London, 1894), I, 497–505.Google Scholar

15 Documentation on the negotiations leading to the compromise is voluminous in both Chinese and Western languages. See the correspondence in F.O. 228/367 between Parkes and various Ch'ing and British officials; also I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 24b–26; Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi (The complete papers of Li Hung-chang; Nanking, 1908), Letters, 5: 16;Google ScholarFu-Wu kung-tu (Official letters of the governor of Kiangsu [Ting Jih-ch'ang]; Canton, 1877), 50: 6b. I am grateful to Professor K. C. Liu, of the University of California, Davis, for making Ting's papers available to me.Google Scholar

16 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS., 52,387, Hart to Gordon, May 17, 1864; Hong Kong Daily Press, July 29, 1864. Anglo-French rivalry in the establishment of foreign-training programs emerged in 1862 and continued to be a prominent theme in the post-Taiping period. See, for example, Wang, ‘Lien-chun,’ 34.7: 222, note 11 Yang-wu yun-tung, Vol. 3, p. 464; Tch'ouang, Tong Ling, ‘La politique francaise en Chine pendant les guerres des Taipings’ (Ph.D. diss., University of Paris, 1950), p. 305;Google Scholar F.O. 228/376, Robertson to Hammond, January 29, 1862; P.R.O. (Public Record Office) 30/22/49, Bruce to Russell, August 14, 1862.

17 F.O. 228/367, Parkes to Gordon, May 19, 1864; Lane-Poole, , Parkes, 1, 498;Google ScholarFu- Wu kung-tu, 50: 6b. F.O. 228/367 Parkes to Wade, July 29, 1864, highlights the concern of British officials over French foreign-training activity at the time.

18 F.O. 228/366,Bruce to Parkes, June 7, 1864; Ibid., Wade to Parkes, November 28, 1864; see also note 24. Bruce had long been an advocate of Chinese military improvement.

19 See Gerson, Jack, ‘Letter by Frederick Bruce’, Ch'ing-shih wen-t'i, 1.5 (04, 1967), 13.Google Scholar Unfortunately, even such comparatively sympathetic individuals as Wade could be rather heavy-handed in pursuing what they believed to be China's best interests. Wade believed, for example, that Li Hung-chang should be made to adhere to ‘the project of military organization’ at Feng-huang-shan in return for Great Britain's willingness to allow British officers to serve in Li's Anhwei Army as gunners. Wade did acknowledge, however, that Li already seemed ‘seriously disposed’ to support the plan. F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes n.d. (July 6–July 27, 1864).

20 Erh-min, Wang, Huai-chün chih (Treatise on the Anhwei Army; Taipei, 1967), pp. 193–200.Google Scholar

21 I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 27a–b;see also Ibid., 32: 35b–37; Li Hung-chang chih P'an Ting-hsin shu-cha (Li Hung-chang's letters to P'an Ting-hsin Peking, 1960;Google Scholar hereafter Li–P'an Letters), p. 22; Shih-ch'eng, Chou, Huai-chün p'ing-Nien chi (Record of the Anhwei Army's suppression of the Nien; Shanghai, 1877), I: 6b.Google Scholar

22 On Ting, consult Lü, Ting Jih-ch'ang; on Gordon's relationship with Li, see Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,393, confidential memorandum on the ‘Imperialist Sphere’ (n.d.), Ibid., ‘Account of Wushufu’ (n.d.), and Ibid., Add. MSS. 52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon, July 19, 1864. See also Li's, letters to Gordon, in T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao (Historical materials on the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom; Peking, 1950), esp. pp. 369, 374Google Scholar and Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi (Letters), 5: 15b.

23 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,389, Gordon to Henry Gordon, July 3, 1864.

24Ibid., June 19, 1864.

25 The troops eventually sent to Feng-huang-shan included remnants of the Ever-Victorious Army, men from the British training camp at Fa-hua, and some new recruits. See I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 26a–27b; T'ai-p'ingt'ien-kuoshih-liao, pp. 371–3, 416–17, 427–8; Lü, Ting Jih-ch'ang, pp. 41–2; F.O. 228/367, Gordon to Parkes, May 17, 1864 (two communications and one memorandum); ***Ibid.., Parkes to Bruce, May 21, 1864; Ibid.., Parkes to Bruce, June 6, 1864; Ibid.., Parkes to Russell, June 21, 1864; Ibid.., Parkes to Bruce, June 27, 1864.

26 Hong Kong Daily Press, July 26, 1864; T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao, p. 372.

27 F.O. 228/380 Layard to Under-Secretary of State, War Department, July 25, 1865. See also Chinese and Japanese Repository, Vol. 3 (06, 1865), pp. 300–2.Google Scholar

28 On July 26, 1864, about the time Gordon began drilling troops at Feng-huang-shan, the Hong Kong Daily Press opined: ‘The information about Gordon's rejoining the Chinese sounds strangely [sic]. It is clearly a move to thwart the French.’ At the time, the French operated a small training program at Kao-ch'ang-miao, near Shanghai. See Lü, Ting Jih-ch'ang, pp. 22–3, 44–5. Most probably, the comment by the Hong Kong Daily Press was prompted by Anglo-French competition in areas other than Shanghai, however—notably Canton. See Hong Kong Daily Press, July 27, 1864. For Anglo-French rivalry in foreign-training at Foochow, consult F.O. 228/366, Parkes to Bruce, June 8, 1864 and F.O. 228/408, Hewlett to Alcock, April 21, 1866; for problems at Ningpo, see Hong Kong Daily Press, July 29, 1864, and November 1, 14 and 15, 1864.

29 Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52, 389, Gordon to Henry Gordon, August 17, 1864.

30ibid, August 26, 1864.

31 F.O. 228/368, Gordon to Brown, September (no day), 1864.

32 See, for example, T'ai-p'ing t'ien-kuo shih-liao, p. 372.

33 Undoubtedly Gordon was influenced by a letter from Robert Hart, who informed him of Li Hung-chang's comment that if the men of the Anhwei Army ‘were placed under any other chief than himself, or left in the province under another Footae [governor] he could not answer for them, and was of the opinion that they would be impossible to be controlled.’ Gordon Papers, Add. MSS. 52,387, Hart to Gordon, May 17, 1864. Italics in the original.

34 Jebb, who had trained British troops at Fa-hua in 1862, was the British commander-in-chief's choice. F.O. 228/368, Brown to Parkes, October 3, 1864. See also, Poole, Lane, Parkes, I, 501–4.Google Scholar

35 The agreement, and correspondence leading up to the agreement, are enclosed in F.O. 228/368, Parkes to Wade, November 23, 1864.

36 Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi (Memorials), 7: 50a–b.

37 F.O. 17/410, Bruce to Russell, June 12, 1864.

38 F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, December 31, 1864. See also F.O. 228/387, Wade to Parkes, March 24, 1865 and Li-P'an Letters, p. 21.

39 F.O. 228/366, Wade to Parkes, November 28, 1864.

40 For an example of Wade's warnings in the Taiping period and the Chinese response, consult Gregory, John S., Great Britain and the Taipings (New York and Washington, 1969), pp. 93–4.Google Scholar

41 Hsün-Hu kung-tu (Official letters of the Shanghai taotai [Ting Jih-ch'ang]), 7 (Ting-cheng 32): 10b–11; Fu-Wu kung-tu, 50: 8; Hake, Events, pp. 526–7.

42 Winstanley obviously sought the position. See Boulger, Demetrius, The Life of Sir Halliday Macartney (London and New York, 1908), p. 147.Google Scholar

43 Hsün-Hu kung-tu, 7 (Ting-cheng 32): 11–12b.

44 F.O. 228/387, Wade to Parkes, August, 1, 1865; see also F.O. 228/524, Wade to Medhurst, February 13, 1873.

45 For Alcock's views, consult Wright, The Last Stand, p. 216.

46 Gerson, ‘Letter,’ p. 13.

47 On Medhurst's aggressiveness, see Wolfson, Martin, ‘The English and the Ever-Victorious Army’ (M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1962), pp. 136–55.Google Scholar

48 Lamprey, J., ‘The Economy of the Chinese Army,’ The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. 11 (1867), pp. 430–1;CrossRefGoogle Scholar Hake, Events, pp. 515–19.

49 Compare the Li-Staveley agreement of January 14, 1863 with the Li-Parkes agreement of November 23, 1864. On the former, consult Li, Lillian, ‘The Ever-Victorious Army: Sino-Western Cooperation in the Defense of Shanghai Against the Taiping Rebels.’ Papers on China, Vol. 21 (02, 1968), pp. 17.Google Scholar Following an incident involving the massacre of some Taiping leaders at Soochow in late 1863, the British commander-in-chief actually assumed command of the Ever-Victorious Army. Smith, ‘Barbarian Officers,’ p. 218.

50 I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 32: 36b.

51ibid, 33: 12b; also 38: 37. Winstanley, for his part, described the Chinese soldiers at his camp as having ‘belonged’ to Li. See Winstanley's report of November 20, 1868 in F.O. 228/453.

52 Lamprey, ‘Chinese Army’, p. 431. Compare with the organization of yung-ying such as Li Hung-chang's Anhwei Army (Wang, Huai-chün, p. 76) and the Kaoch'ang-miao ‘foreign-arms corps’ (yang-ch'iang tui). Hsün-Hu kung-tu, 7 (Ting-cheng 32): 8b–10.Google Scholar

53 I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 38: 37. Assuming that the pay of Chinese officers at Feng-huang-shan approximated that of officers in the Anhwei Army and the Kaoch'ang-miao contingent, the pay of a captain (shao-kuan) was nine taels per month; that of lieutenant (shao-chang), six taels; and that of a corporal (shih-chang or p'engt'ou), 4.8 taels.

54 Although not stipulated in the Li-Parkes agreement of November 23, 1864, we may assume that the pay of the Western doctor attached to the camp was 250 dollars per month (Gordon's estimate). There may also have been a Chinese doctor, who received about 50 dollars per month.

55 I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 26.

56 North-China Herald, June 11, 1864.

57 Lamprey, ‘Chinese Army,’ p. 430.

58 F.O. 228/367, Parkes to Bruce, June 8, 1864; F.O. 228/411, Winchester to Alcock, January 25, 1866.

59 Lamprey, ‘Chinese Army’, p. 431. At the time of disbandment, the Ever-Victorious Army's park of artillery consisted of at least twenty-three howitzers, mortars and rocket tubes. F.O. 228/367, Gordon to Parkes, May 17, 1864 (second communication of that date).

60 Boulger, Macartney, pp. 147–8.

61 See, for example, F.O. 228/432, Winstanley's report, dated January 10, 1867; F.O. 228/453, Winstanley's report, dated November 20, 1868.

62 Lamprey, ‘Chinese Army,’ pp. 430–1. Winstanley's report for the last quarter of 1865 (enclosed in F.O. 228/411, Winchester to Alcock, January 25, 1866), includes a day-by-day account of affairs at the camp, providing much interesting detail on drill and payment procedures. Winstanley's log also mentions visits by Chinese and Western officials, and problems with the Chinese officers at Feng-huang-shan, two of whom did not get along well with one another, and one of whom was frequently absent from drill.

63 Coates, Charles, ‘The Chinese Army,’ The Illustrated Naval and Military Magazine, Vol. I, pt 3 (September, 1884), pp. 199–200;Google ScholarWilson, Andrew, ‘Colonel Gordon's Chinese Force,’ Blackwood's Magazine, Vol. 101 (02, 1867), p. 171.Google Scholar

64 F.O. 228/411, Winstanley's report, January 25, 1866; Lü, Ting Jih-ch'ang, p. 42.

65 See, for example, F.O. 228/411, Winstanley to Winchester, January 23, 1866; Ibid.., Winstanley's report, January 25, 1866; F.O. 228/412, Winchester to Alcock, April 16, 1866, and Winstanley's report (n.d.); F.O. 228/432, Winchester to Alcock, January 14, 1867; Ibid.., Winstanley's ‘Journal of Proceedings,’ January 10, 1867.

66 F.O. 228/453, Winchester to Alcock, April 16, 1866, and Winstanley's report (n.d.).

67 See, for example, F.O. 228/432, extract on the Feng-huang-shan camp (n.d.) enclosed in Winchester to Alcock, January 14, 1867.

68 F.O. 228/492, Winstanley's report, January 13, 1870.

69 F.O. 228/524, Medhurst to Wade, January 10, 1873; see also Winstanley to Medhurst, November 20, 1868.

70 See, for example, F.O. 228/411, Winstanley's report, January 22, 1866; North-China Herald, June 14, 1873.

71 Kingsmill, T. W., ‘Retrospect of Events in China and Japan during the Year 1865,’ Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society (1866), p. 142;Google Scholar Lü, Ting Jih-ch'ang, pp. 43–4; Huai-chün p'ing-Nien chi, 1: 6b; Li-P'an Letters, pp. 22–3, 25–6.

72 Huai-chünp'ing-Nien chi, 1: 6b; I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 33: 12a–b.

73 I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 61: 4; Boulger, Macartney, pp. 146–54.

74 North-China Herald, June 6, 1867; Ibid., September 14, 1867; Ibid., October 25, 1867; Ibid., November 23, 1867.

75 F.O. 228/492, Winstanley's report, january 13, 1870.

76 ibid; also F.O. 228/453, Winstanley's report, November 20, 1868.

77 F.O. 228/492, Winstanley's report, January 13, 1870.

78 For early reports of corruption, consult Hake, Events, p. 517.

79 North-China Herald, October 2, 1869.

80 Fu-Wu kung-tu, 50: 7b–8.

81 As taotai, Ting occasionally supervised affairs at Feng-huang-shan, but increasing demands on his time and disgust with the program after 1866 caused him to curtail his direct participation at the camp. For Winstanley's criticisms of Ting's successors, see North-China Herald, June 21, 1873.

82 Lamprey, ‘Chinese Army,’ p. 422, provides an example of Jebb's interference in matters of discipline at Feng-huang-shan. Undoubtedly such interference was not unique.

83 F.O. 228/473, Medhurst to Alcock, March 18, 1869.

84 On Ting's fu-piao, see Lü, Ting Jih-ch'ang, pp. 186–90, 196 note 2; Fu-Wu tsoukao, 5: 9b, 12–14; and the detailed proposals in Fu-Wu kung-tu, 40: 9–39. On the ‘Retrained Army,’ consult Wang, ‘Lien-chün’; Erh-kang, Lo, Lü-ying ping-chih (Treatise on the Green Standard Army; Chungking, 1945), pp. 58–9;Google Scholar Wright, The Last Stand, p. 205. Ting's book is reprinted in Yü-jih, Li (ed.), Chung-kuo ping-hsueh ta-hsi (A corpus of Chinese military studies; Taipei, 1957), (ts'e 12) 6.Google Scholar

85 F.O. 228/492, Winstanley to Medhurst, July 16, 1870.

86 ibid, Medhurst to Shen, July 16, 1870.

87 The year 1870 seems to have been a turning point in the fortunes of the camp, although, as we have seen, the Chinese had already made plans to eliminate the program. Lacking strong Chinese support at every level, Feng-huang-shan was by this time doomed to failure.

88 Ta-Ch'ing Mu-tsung I-huang-ti shih-lu (Veritable records of the T'ung-chih emperor's reign), 348: 8b–9.

89 F.O. 228/524, Winstanley's memorandum, January 6, 1873; North-China Herald, January 16, 1873.

90 F.O. 228/524, Medhurst to Wade, January 10, 1873. Medhurst notes here that he has the impression the Chinese are looking for a pretext to eliminate the program— which, of course, they were. See Fu-Wu kung-tu, 50: 6–7b; I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 89: 1a–b.

91 F.O. 228/524, Medhurst to Wade, January 10, 1873.

92 Ibid. Medhurst clearly misrepresents the degree of control exercized by the French at Kao-ch'ang-miao in arguing for greater powers to be given to Winstanley. See Lü, Ting Jih-ch'ang, pp. 22–3, 44–5; Hsün-Hu kung-tu 7 (Ting-cheng 32): 4–10.Google Scholar

93 F.O. 228/524, Wade to Medhurst, February 13, 1873.

94 ibid, Shen to Medhurst, May 8, 1873. See note 90; also, I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 89: 49a–b.

95 F.O. 228/524, Medhurst to Wade, May 9, 1873.

96 ibid, Medhurst to Shen, May 9, 1873.

97 ibid, Medhurst to Wade, May 9, 1873.

98 ibid, Wade to Medhurst, May 23, 1873.

99 ibid, Wade to Medhurst, September 3, For the arrangements, Consult ibid, Shen to Medhurst, May 8, 1873; ibid, Medhurst to Wade, August 13, 1873. The foreign instructors received a month's pay and passage money to England (equivalent to six months' pay) in addition to gold badges of merit (kung-p'ai). Three of the six foreign instructors remained in China, prompting Medhurst to withhold 150 dollars of their gratuity pending proof that they could ‘maintain themselves respectably.’

100 More work remains to be done, of course; this article represents a preliminary investigation of the problem based on a single case study.

101 Instead of performing a modernizing function, the Chinese officer corps actually hampered China's military modernization. See Wright, The Last Stand, pp. 201–2. For the potential role of the military in effecting political, economic and even social change, consult Ward, Robert E. and Rustow, Dankwart A. (eds), Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey (Princeton, 1964);CrossRefGoogle ScholarJanowitz, Morris, The Military in the Political Development of New Nations (London, 1964)Google Scholar; Johnson, John J. (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, 1962);CrossRefGoogle ScholarFairbank, John K., et al. , ‘The Influence of Modern Western Science and Technology on Japan and China,’ Explorations in Entrepreneurial History, Vol. 7 (1954), esp. pp. 198–200, provides an illuminating discussion of the modernizing role played by the Japanese military during the Meiji period.Google Scholar

102 See, for example, Vagts, Alfred, Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign Relations (New York, 1956), pp. 177, 185, 222 note 51;Google Scholar also Wright, Stanley F., Hart and the Chinese Customs (Belfast, 1950), pp. 479–81;Google ScholarRawlinson, John Lang, China's Struggle for Naval Development, 1839–95 (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), pp. 93–4.CrossRefGoogle Scholar The debate over maritime versus frontier defense underscores the growing complexity of China's choices in military affairs. See Hsü, Immanuel, ‘The Great Policy Debate in China, 1874: Maritime Defense vs. Frontier Defense,’ Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 25 (1964–1965), pp. 212–228;CrossRefGoogle Scholar also Liu, K. C., ‘Li Hung-chang in Chihli: The Emergence of a Policy, 1870-1875,’ in Feuerwerker, Albert, et al. (eds), Approaches to Modern Chinese History (Berkeley, 1967), pp. 68–104.Google Scholar

103 See Smith, ‘Barbarian Officers,’ pp. 292–5.

104 Chinese Times, January 29, 1887.

105 Vagts, Defense and Diplomacy, p. 184. Chapter 6, on military missions and instructors, provides a useful, if somewhat superficial, discussion of the use of foreign advisers, instructors and officers in various countries, including Turkey, Persia, India, Egypt, Portugal, Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece, Morocco, and, of course, China and Japan.

106 Wright, The Last Stand, p. 201. Professor Wright's general conclusion is that ‘True military modernization proved to require greater changes than the Ch'ing was willing to make: basic changes in the class structure, the system of values, the tax system, and the principles of organization of the Empire's administrative hierarchy,’ (ibid, p. 196.) Generally speaking, there is little to criticize in this view, although it tends to reduce the issue of military reform to an either/or proposition, minimizing the modernizing role of the military. (See note 101.) To be certain, China's immense size and population, historical continuity, ideological orthodoxy and bureaucratic inertia, no less than the unremitting pressure of competing Western nations seeking four hundred million customers and souls, magnified all of China's problems and complicated all of her solutions. But change was still possible in China. The question confronting Chinese policymakers was, how much change was necessary, and how much was desirable?

107 Implicit here is the argument that we cannot adequately assess the failure of the self-strengthening movement until we understand the problems facing its constituent programs. Self-strengthening was a complex process, and all facets of the movement did not encounter the same obstacles and pressures, except in a very general sense. Compare, for example, the introduction of foreign-style training and the introduction of foreign military technology. On the latter, see Yoshihiro, Hatano, ‘The Response of the Chinese Bureaucracy to Modern Machinery,’ Acta Asiatica, Vol. 12 (1967), pp. 27–8.Google Scholar

108 See, for example, Chang, Hao, ‘The Anti-Foreignist Role of Wo-jen (1804–1871),’ Papers on China, Vol. 14 (1960), pp. 1–29.Google Scholar

109 Quoted in Liu, K.C., ‘The Confucian as Patriot and Pragmatist: Li Hungchang's Formative Years, 1823–1866,’ Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies, Vol. 30 (1970), p. 34.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

110 Fu-Wu kung-tu, 50: 6b–7.

111 See, for example, Wang, ‘Lien-chün,’ 34.7: 221.

112 Yang-wu yün-tung, Vol. 3, p. 510.Google Scholar

113 Bell, Mark, China. Being a Military Report on the Northeastern Portions of the Provinces of Chihli and Shangtung; Nanking and Its Approaches; Canton and Its Approaches; etc. (Simla, 1884), II, 9, 57;Google Scholarsee also Yang-wu yün-tung, Vol. 3, p. 487.Google Scholar

114 The situation at Feng-huang-shan following the Tientsin Massacre suggests that the Chinese officers there may have promoted anti-foreign sentiment at the camp for many of the same reasons that Chinese gentry members fomented anti-missionary outbreaks: In both cases, the foreign presence represented a political threat (diplomatic intervention), an unsettling local influence (disregard for Chinese customs), and a challenge to local elites (usurpation of traditional prerogatives).

115 Prominent examples would be John Pennell and William Mesny. On the former, see I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih 16: 11 and Yang-wu yün-tung, Vol. 3, pp. 479–80;Google Scholar on the latter, see ibid., pp. 498–501, 516 and I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih 70: 38a–b, 41b–42. For some others, consult ibid., 79: 11.

116 Bell, , Military Report, II, 57.Google Scholar

117 See Powell, Ralph, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, 1895–1912 (Princeton, 1955), pp. 41–2.Google Scholar For the resistance of Li's officers to Western drill in the Taiping period, consult Li Wen-chung-kung ch'üan-chi (Letters), 2: 46b–47.Google Scholar

118 See Lang, Kurt, Military Institutions and the Sociology of War (London, 1972), p. 30.Google Scholar

119 Liu, K. C., ‘Nineteenth Century China: The Disintegration of the Old Order and the Impact of the West,’ in Ho, P. T. and Tsou, Tang (eds), China in Crisis (Chicago, 1968, 1 (book 1), p. 132.Google Scholar For the low status of military men in late imperial China, see Chih-tung's, Chang views, cited in Ayers, William, Chang Chih-tung and Educational Reform in China (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 107–8, 165, 181; also Smith, ‘Chinese Military Institutions.’Google Scholar

120 See Young, Ernest, ‘Nationalism, Reform, and Republican Revolution: China in the Early Twentieth Century,’ in Crowley, James B. (ed.), Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation (New York, etc., 1970), pp. 160–2.Google Scholar

121 This was true even of the Anhwei Army officers sent by Li Hung-chang to supervise affairs at Feng-huang-shan. It was not until 1885 that the first Chinese military academy was established (by Li, nearly a decade after General Emory Upton first suggested the idea to him—see Yang-wu yün-tung, Vol. 3, p. 592), and not until 1904 that the first large-scale program of military education was initiated.Google Scholar See Yoshihiro, Hatano, ‘The New Armies,’ in Wright, Mary (ed.), China in Revolution: The First Phase, 1900–1913 (New Haven and London, 1968), p. 373.Google Scholar

122 See Smith, ‘Chinese Military Institutions.’

123 It may be suggested that the spread of abuses at Feng-huang-shan reflected the growing indifference of Chinese officials to the program as well as the natural tendency of the officers to think in particularistic rather than nationalistic terms.

124 See, for example, Janowitz, The Military, pp. 80–1.

125 Consult Upton, Emory, The Armies of Asia and Europe (New York, 1878), pp. 13–32.Google Scholar For the situation as late as 1898, see Beresford, Lord Charles, The Break-up of China (New York and London, 1899), pp. 267–89, esp. 270–80.Google Scholar

126 On Meiji military development, consult Presseisen, Ernst, Before Aggression: Europeans Prepare the Japanese Army (Tucson, 1965).Google Scholar It must be remembered, however, that the problems facing military modernizers in China were far more formidable than those facing modernizers in Japan. And even so, military modernization in Meiji Japan proceeded slowly—especially at first. See Kublin, Hyman, ‘The“Modern,” Army of Early Meiji Japan,’ Far Eastern Quarterly, Vol. 9 (1949), pp. 20–41;CrossRefGoogle Scholar also Presseisen, Before Aggression, pp. 52–5, 89, 90–2.

127 On this system, see Smith, ‘Chinese Military Institutions.’ One may argue that the presence of the Manchus on the throne had greater significance for military modernization than for, say, economic modernization. See Gasster, Michael, ‘Reform and Revolution in China's Political Modernization,’ in Wright, (ed.), China in Revolution, p. 88.Google Scholar

128 Wright, The Last Stand, p. 56.

129 See Lang, Military Institutions, p. 30, on military elites and their drawbacks. For efforts to disband the Banners in 1907, consult Powell, The Rise of Chinese Military Power, pp. 245–6.

130 The phrase is Lei Hai-tsung's. See Kuhn, Philip, Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), p. 12.Google Scholar

131 See K. C. Liu, ‘The Limits of Regional Power in the Late Ch'ing Period’ (summary) to appear in the Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies.

132 For this tendency, see Chu, Samuel, ‘On the Capacity of the Ch'ing Government to Effect Modernization in the Early Kuang-hsü Period,’ Ch'ing-shih wen-ti, 1.10 (02, 1969), esp. 35, 38–40;Google Scholar also, Fairbank, John K., ‘Synarchy under the Treaties,’ in Fairbank, (ed.), Chinese Thought and Institutions (Chicago and London, 1947), esp. pp. 225–7.Google Scholar On the modernizing role of such ad hoc adjustments, consult Gasster, ‘Reform and Revolution,’ pp. 89–90.

133 See, for example, Wright, The Last Stand, pp. 205, 208–10; Liu, ‘The Limits.’ Despite this effort, yung-ying continued to exist alongside the ‘regular’ forces of the empire throughout the remainder of the nineteenth century. Wang, Huai-chün, pp. 387–9.

134 Compare the piecemeal and unsystematic employment of foreign instructors by local Chinese officials with the Meiji government's policy toward foreign employees. Noburo, Umetani, ‘Foreign Nationals Employed in Japan during the Years of Modernization,’ East Asian Cultural Studies, Vol. 10, pt 1 (03, 1971), esp. pp. 18–21.Google Scholar

135 Feng-huang-shan was an exception—perhaps because of British pressure. Shanghai was, after all, the leading treaty port in China, and rumors of a Taiping resurgence continued to circulate in the area throughout the 1860s.

136 Lack of sufficient revenue was one reason given for disbanding Feng-huang-shan. See Fu-Wu kung-tu, 50: 6–7b.Google ScholarPerkins, Dwight, ‘Government as an Obstacle to Industrialization: The Case of Nineteenth Century China,’ Journal of Economic History, Vol. 27, pt 4 (12, 1967), pp. 487 and 491–2, argues that the Ch'ing government's lack of adequate funds posed a major obstacle to China's modern development.CrossRefGoogle Scholar See also Mary Wright's discussion of the T'ung-chih economy and its limitations.

137 F.O. 17/408, Bruce to Russell, Peking, June 12, 1864. See also I.W.S.M. T'ung-chih, 25: 3. The most prominent effort to reinvigorate the Banners was the Peking Field Force (Shen-chi ying). See Morrison, Esther, 486–9.Google Scholar

138 The phrase is A. B. Freeman-Mitford's. See Sheng, Hu, Imperialism and Chinese Politics (Peking, 1955), p. 76.Google Scholar

139 Liu, ‘Li Hung-chang in Chihli,’ pp. 100–1; Lo, Lü-ying ping-chih, p. 61.

140 For an overview of Ch'ing reform proposals regarding foreign-training, consult Ch'ing-shih (History of the Ch'ing dynasty; Taipei, 1961), 3 (ping-chih, 10).Google Scholar Also, Ch'ing-shih kao (Draft history of the Ch'ing dynasty; Peking, 1928)Google Scholar, ping-chih, 10: 5b–9.

141 For this orientation, see Teng, S. Y. and Fairbank, John K. (eds), China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey 1839–1923 (New York, 1966), p. 62;Google ScholarYangwu yun-tung, Vol. 3, p. 441.Google Scholar

142 Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, p. 119;North-China Herald, January 13, 1866; Ibid., June 15, 1867.

143 In 02, 1887, The Chinese Times observed: ‘[It] is true that foreign officers have been employed [in various parts of China], and that they have taught the Chinese recruits a great deal of drill,… But reforms have not penetrated to the essential factors in a campaign, the handling of troops, the transport, commissariat, medical staff, etc., without which a drilled army is as much loose rabble as if they had no drill.’Google ScholarThe Chinese Times, 02 19, 1887.Google Scholar It is interesting to note that foreign observers were making similar criticisms of Japan in 1884. Presseisen, Before Aggression, p. 90. An interesting question is the degree to which Western-trained Chinese armies actually employed Western tactics in the field. My impression from a general reading of Chinese and foreign materials is that Western firepower counted for more than Western formations, particularly against poorly armed internal enemies. For a useful discussion of the revolution in tactics produced by new developments in weaponry and the chaos this created in the West, consult Presseisen, pp. 71–7.

144 See Powell, , Chinese Military Power, pp. 60–9.Google Scholar

145 Ibid., pp. 59–60, 62.

146 See Presseisen, Before Aggression, pp. 135–43.