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Ends of the Universal: The League of Nations and Chinese Fascism on the Eve of World War II*
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 October 2013
Abstract
Fascist Italy's 1935 invasion of Ethiopia and the League of Nations’ handling of the crisis resonated strongly in Nationalist China, where it recalled the League's failure to thwart Japan's claims to Manchuria in 1931. As these two crises unfolded, the League became a nexus around which Nationalist Party debates about the position of colonized and semi-colonized countries within the extant world order crystallized. Party adherents reflected on China's and Ethiopia's positions as independent nation states with limited territorial integrity or juridical autonomy, and assessed this situation in light of their respective League memberships. While party liberals continued to view the League as a flawed but worthwhile experiment in global governance, newly-emerged fascist activists within the party denounced it as an instrument for curtailing the sovereignty of weak nations. From these conflicting views of the League, it can be discerned how Nationalist disunity was partially grounded in disagreements over the nature and ideal structure of the global order, and how Chinese fascists agitated to escape from modern structures of imperialist domination while reiterating the latter's racial and civilizational exclusions.
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Footnotes
The author thanks Rebecca Karl, Manu Goswami, Andrew Sartori, Mary Nolan, Harry Harootunian, Quinn Slobodian, Joyce Mao, Sasha Disko, Roger White, Naomi Schiller, and the anonymous reviewers for their exacting feedback on this paper as it transformed from a dissertation chapter into its present form.
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