Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-22T23:05:42.686Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Emergency as Prehistory of the New Indian Middle Class*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 February 2011

ARVIND RAJAGOPAL
ARVIND RAJAGOPAL*
Affiliation:
Department of Media, Culture and Communication, New York University, New York NY 10012, USA Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Recent accounts of the National Emergency of 1975–1977 concur that the deviations it represented, while genuine, did not represent any fundamental change on the part of the Indian state, and that the period offers little distinct insight on the post-independence period as a whole. This paper seeks to argue, to the contrary, that the Emergency was a watershed in post-independence history. With its ban on dissent and suspension of constitutional rights, the Emergency sought to suppress all political disturbances to governance. By doing so, it forefronted the problems of postcolonial politics in at least three respects. First, the Emergency demonstrated that coercion was inextricably combined with consent in state-led development. Second, this led to a heavy reliance on practices of communication to redefine coercion and to stage popular consent. Third, in the process, the boundaries of the political were reinforced, emphasizing the friend/enemy difference fundamental to politics. Governance in the aftermath of the Emergency placed an overt reliance on consent over coercion, but in ways that are themselves significant. Categories of culture and community, and related forms of social distinction, gained in importance over earlier developmental distinctions premised on an authoritarian relationship between state and the people. The change meant a shift away from the Nehruvian focus on the economy as the crucial arena of nation-building, involving labour as the key modality of citizenship. Instead, culture and community became the categories that gained political salience in the period of economic liberalization. The mass media were central to this redefinition of the political, multiplying in size and reach, and acquiring market-sensitive forms of address couched in the rhetoric of individual choice. These events, I suggest, are critical to understanding the formation of the new middle class in India, as a category that increasingly defines itself through cultural and consumerist forms of identity, and is less identified with the state.

Type
Research Article
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 45 , Issue 5 , September 2011 , pp. 1003 - 1049
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 See Chakrabarty, Dipesh. “In the Name of Politics: Sovereignty, Democracy and the Multitude in India, Economic and Political Weekly, July 23, 2005, pp. 3293–3301.

2 See discussion below.

3 See Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political. Tr. Schwab, George. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1996Google Scholar.

4 See below.

5 See Chatterjee, Partha. The Politics of the Governed. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2004Google Scholar.

6 See Brass, Paul R.The production of Hindu-Muslim violence in contemporary India. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2003Google Scholar.

7 See Chatterjee, Partha. “Democracy and Economic Transformation.” Economic and Political Weekly, April 19, 2008, pp. 53–62. See also Rajagopal, Arvind, Politics After Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

8 Dhirubhai Ambani, Chairman, Reliance Group of Industries, interviewed in India Today 30 June, 1985, pp. 88–89.

9 See Rudolph, Lloyd I. and Rudolph, Susanne H.. In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 21Google Scholar; Dhar, P.N.Indira Gandhi, the ‘Emergency’ and Indian Democracy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 382Google Scholar.

10 See Kalecki, Michal, Essays on Developing Economies. Hassocks, Eng.: Harvester Press; Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1976Google Scholar.

11 Before long Reliance could claim to be India's first global company, although only a fraction as old as its national competitors. The literature on Reliance is sparse, and the business press in India tends to tread lightly when covering the company. The only volume I am aware of on the topic is by McDonald, Hamish (The Polyester Prince: The Rise of Dhirubhai Ambani. Sydney, Australia: MacMillan and Co., 1999)Google Scholar. Reliance became known for its mastery at using government connections, and in paying no income tax until 1996, when a ‘minimum alternate tax’ of 12 per cent was imposed on company profits. Ibid., p. 61. My thanks to Nandan Maluste in Mumbai, for sharing his recollections with me about Reliance equity and debenture issues during the 1980s and 1990s. Telephone interview, July 2008. It should be noted that, consequent on the 1969 nationalization of the major banks, the share of debentures in borrowings of the 365 largest public limited companies grew four times between 1975–1976 and 1987–1988 (i.e., from 7 per cent to 28 per cent of borrowings), while the relative importance of bank credit was nearly halved during the same period (i.e., from 53 per cent to 32 per cent of borrowings). See Shekhar, Chandra, Political Economy of India. New Delhi: Institute for Studies in Industrial Development, Vikas Publishing House, 1992, pp. 100–101Google Scholar. The former prime minister lists no source for this data in his book.

12 For example, Ashok V. Desai, economic advisor in the Ministry of Finance's Department of Economic Affairs from 1991–1993, when asked about his belief in a market-based system, remarked, ‘Liberalism is not so much an ideological issue for me, it is more a practical issue. I might perfectly well be a fire-eating socialist in, let us say Germany, simply because bureaucracy works there. Here the bureaucracy does not work, it is extremely corrupt, it is extremely inefficient, and that's why I am for elimination of bureaucracy in trade policy by means of zero tariffs.’ Balasubramanyam, V.N.Conversations With Indian Economists. New Delhi: Macmillian, 2001, p. 165Google Scholar.

13 See, inter alia, Ghosh, Jayati. ‘Liberalization Debate’, in Byers, Terence J. ed., The Indian Economy: Major Debates Since Independence. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 295–334, 329–331Google Scholar; Vaidyanathan, 1995, pp. 71–96.

14 Kalecki, 1976; Raj, 1973, pp. 1189–1198; Stein, 1991: PE9–PE20.

15 For example, Misra, 1961; Seal, Anil. The emergence of Indian nationalism: competition and collaboration in the later nineteenth century. London: Cambridge University Press, 1971.

16 Joshi, 2001.

17 Jaffrelot, Christophe and van der Veer, Peter eds. Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in India and China. New Delhi: Sage, 2008; Fernandes, 2006CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

18 Butler, DavidLahiri, Ashok and Roy, Prannoy, A Compendium of Indian Elections. New Delhi: Arnold Heinemann, 1984, p. 112Google Scholar.

19 For example, Nayar, Kuldip. The Judgement: the inside story of the emergency in India. New Delhi: Vikar, 1977.

20 Dhar 2001, p. 264.

21 Thengadi, Dattopant. ‘Preface—Lamp at the Threshold’, in Sahasrabuddhe, P.G. and Vajpayee, Manik Chandra, The people versus emergency: a saga of struggle. Tr. Raje, Sudhakar. New Delhi: Suruchi Prakashan, 1991, pp. 11–46Google Scholar.

22 Chandra 2003; Dhar 2003; Tarlo 2004.

23 Named after its leader, Jayaprakash Narayan.

24 Chandra, 2003, pp. 262–272. For Dhar's arguments see Dhar, 2003, pp. 263–268; for Tarlo see pp. 21–61, 218–225. Each of them questions the exceptional status granted to the Emergency and point to its continuities with post-independence tendencies before and afterwards. Tarlo, for instance, points to the persistence of popular memories of sterilization as defining the Emergency, but also acknowledges that sterilization campaigns predated that time (2003, p. 91n).

25 Shah Commission of Inquiry. Interim Report. Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1978Google ScholarPubMed.

26 It was symptomatic that while Justice Shah sought to express shock and indignation at the testimonials of erring officials, the courtroom audience responded with laughter and mockery.

27 Guha, Ramachandra. ‘The Emergency: Dictators’ Defence’, India Today, 3 July, 2000. http://india-today.com/itoday/20000703/view.html. Accessed 21 July, 2010. For discussion, see Chatterjee 1997, p. 62.

28 The information and publicity budget, excluding radio and television, for the Information and Broadcasting Ministry rose from Rs. 11.9 cr. in 1974–1975 to Rs 14.55 cr. in 1975–1976 to Rs 18.7 cr. in 1976–1977, or by 58 per cent in two years. The major rise was due to expenditure in the Directorate of Audio-Visual Publicity, from Rs. 2.66 cr. to Rs. 3.51 cr. to Rs. 5.15 cr., or by 93 per cent across the same years. Government of India, Publications Division, ‘Mass Media in India’, White Paper on Misuse of Mass Media, 1977, p. 60.

29 Franda, Marcus. India's Double Emergency Democracy (Pts I, II and III). American Universities Field Staff Reports, vol. XIX No. 19, 1975Google Scholar.

30 T.A. Pai, Economic and Political Weekly, 13 September, 1975. Pai, T.A. ‘Public Sector in Our Developing Economy’, Yojana, vol. XIX no. 8, 15 May, 1975Google Scholar.

31 Dhar 2003, pp. 329–330.

32 Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, pp. 296–298; Fernandes 2006, pp. 21–22. See also the editors’ Introduction in Baviskar, Amita and Raka Ray (eds) Both Elite and Everyman: The Cultural Politics of the Indian Middle Classes (Routledge, forthcoming)

33 A crucial development in this context was the decision taken by the Hindu nationalist the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh to enter the larger political process, and forsake mere ‘character-building’, which had been its chief focus since 1925. See Rajagopal, Arvind, Politics After Television: Hindu Nationalism and the Reshaping of the Public in India. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001, pp. 30–71CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. pp. 51–63.

34 Sharma, Mukul. ‘Media and Governance’, Seminar No. 514, 2002. http://www.india-seminar.com/2002/514/514%20mukul%20sharma.htm. Accessed 21 July, 2010.

35 For example, the circulation of all newspapers and periodicals increased from 34.08 millions in 1976 to 50.92 millions in 1980, to 64.05 millions in 1986, reflecting growth of 49 per cent in four years and nearly 100 per cent in ten years. In the case of television, it was more dramatic. There were 0.479 million sets in 1976, growing to 1.55 millions by 1980 and to 11 millions by 1986, tripling in four years and then increasing by nearly 22 times in ten years. Television at this time was entirely state-controlled; its revenues increased from Rs. 7.7 millions in 1976–1977 to Rs 80.8 millions in 1980–1981, to Rs. 602 millions in 1986, i.e., growing by more than ten times in four years, and nearly eighty times in ten years. Government of India. Publications Division. Mass Media in India, 1977, 1981, 1987. Also see http://www.ddindia.gov.in/About+DD/Commercial+Service. Accessed 21 July, 2010. For discussion on ‘political excitement’ see Jeffrey, Robin. India's Newspaper Revolution, Oxford, 2000, p. 51Google Scholar.

36 Owner-editors constitute crucial nodes of influence in this process. More than three-quarters of newspapers are owned by individuals rather than by joint stock companies. See Sharma, 2002, ibid., for discussion.

37 The exceptions are of course significant, e.g., Nehru's decision not to present Ambedkar's Hindu Code Bill in toto before Parliament. He introduced the legislation piecemeal in anticipation of conservative objections to it. See e.g., Ambedkar, B.R. Statement of Resignation as Law Minister, 10 October, 1951, in Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar, Writings and Speeches, Vol. 14, Part Two, Section IV. Vasant Moon (ed.). Education Department, Government of Maharashtra, 1995, pp. 1322–1326.

38 Pai, 1975, p. 25.

39 Government of India. Planning Commission. Annual Plan 1976–1977. New Delhi, 1976–1977, pp. 1–2.

40 The positive influence of the monsoon was acknowledged by the Planning Commission during the period. Annual Plan 1976–1977 ibid., p. 1. For discussion, see Toye, J.F.J. ‘Economic Trends and Policies in India During the Emergency’, World Development vol. 5, no. 4, 1977, pp. 303–316CrossRefGoogle Scholar, esp. p. 304.

41 Seminar, December, 1975. Government of India, Publications Division, Economic Survey, New Delhi, 1975–1976.

42 Yojana, November, 1975.

43 Toye, 1977, p. 307.

44 Yojana, September 1975.

45 Economic Survey 1975–1976, pp. 12–13.

46 ‘Plus and minus points of Emergency’, Blitz, 26 June, 1976, p. 9.

47 Dhar 2003, p. 266.

48 Goffman, Erving. Forms of Talk. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981, p. 144Google Scholar.

49 Force was abundantly actuated: over 100,000 detainees, at least 43 dead in jail or while in police custody, 700,000 rendered homeless due to demolitions, perhaps 400 killed in police firing against those resisting demolitions, over 8 millions sterilized in a single year under the family planning programme, over 1600 deaths due to sterilization. Again it should be stressed, the Emergency is continuous rather than exceptional in relation to post-independence history as a whole. The availability of these figures is a result of a set of conjunctional political developments that sought to bestow an exceptional status on the Emergency as an undemocratic phase. The importance of those efforts, and their implications for subsequent politics, are beyond the scope of this paper. Government of India. Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Family Welfare Programme in India, Yearbook 1978–1979, New Delhi, 1980, p. 66.

50 Dhar 2003, p. 320.

51 Fernandes, in 1974 presented a picture of militancy when he told railwaymen that they could make the country starve if they chose to strike work for a period of fifteen days, and later was implicated in the Baroda Dynamite Case; he went on to become Union Minister of Industries in the Janata Government. For Fernandes’ speech to railwaymen, see The Hindu, 30 March 1974. Cited in P.N. Dhar, Indira Gandhi, p. 242. My discussion here on industrial conflict owes an enormous debt to Gautam Mody of the National Trades Unions Initiative (NTUI), New Delhi; the usual disclaimers apply.

52 See E.A. Ramaswamy, Worker Consciousness and Trade Union Response. The government's favouring millowners in the textile strike, as the textile industry experienced technological shifts, amid a broader wave of de-industrialization, signalled the change most immediately, pp. 18–57. See also Van Wersch, H.The Bombay Textile Strike, 1982–83. Bombay, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992, esp. pp. 8–65Google Scholar.

53 For an argument along these lines see Goldman, Robert and Rajagopal, Arvind, Mapping Hegemony: Television News and Industrial Conflict. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Press, 1991, pp. 209–217Google Scholar.

54 This is not to regard workers and citizens as passive elements in elite political designs, but to point to different political emphases that gain importance, for reasons we need to inquire into. See Dipesh Chakrabarty on the ambiguous loyalties of workers given their ties of class and community, in his Rethinking Working-Class History: Bengal 1890–1940. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990, pp. 198–218.

55 Deshpande, 2000, pp. 48–73.

56 Ramaswamy, E.A.Worker Consciousness and Trade Union Response. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 212–239Google Scholar.

57 Rajgopal, P.R.Communal Violence in India. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, 1987, pp. 16–17Google Scholar.

58 Vicziany, Marika. ‘Coercion in a Soft State: The Family-Planning Programme of India: Part I: The Myth of Voluntarism’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 55, No. 3. Autumn, 1982, pp. 373–402Google Scholar; and Vicziany, Marika, ‘Coercion in a Soft State: The Family-Planning Program of India: Part 2: The Sources of Coercion’, Pacific Affairs, vol. 55, no. 4, Winter 1982–1983, pp. 557–592Google Scholar; Tarlo 2003; Tarlo 2004; Connelly, Matthew, ‘Population Control in India: Prologue to the Emergency Period’, Population and Development Review, 32 (4): 629–667, 2006Google Scholar; Connelly, Matthew, Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008Google Scholar.

59 Rudra, 1989, p. 144.

60 Patnaik, Prabhat, Chandrasekhar, C.P. and Sen, Abhijit, ‘The Proliferation of the Bourgeoisie and Economic Policy’, in Sathyamurthy, T.V. (ed.) Class Formation and Political Transformation in Post-colonial India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996, pp. 55–79Google Scholar.

61 S.C. Bhatt, ‘The Indian Press: Achievements and Shortcomings’, in Mass Media in India 1989–1990, p. 23.