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The Emergence of the Asian System of Powers

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

A. W. Stargardt
A. W. Stargardt
Affiliation:
Project on Asian Diplomatic History, Cambridge
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Extract

The ‘downward sweep’ of Japan after Pearl Harbor has been widely noted for its long-term effects in Southeast Asia. The rule of the established colonial masters was shattered, and those failing to escape disappeared into the camps of the Kempeitai. In Burma and Java, in particular, Japanese rule promoted local organizations, local administratiors, the indigenous language and, in Burma, a ‘national’ government and a ‘national’ army, under Japanese supervision: the one thing Japan did not bring was freedom and independence. Yet the greatly-increased social mobility and political, military and administrative experience had long-term consequences: none of the post-war attempts at colonial restoration proved viable.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 23 , Issue 3 , July 1989 , pp. 561 - 595
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

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References

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