I would like to thank the Fulbright-Hays Program, American Institute of Indian Studies, and the East-West Center Resource Systems Institute for financial support, as well as Burton Stein, Brian Murton, John Adams, and Elizabeth Manak for their comments on earlier drafts.

¹ Excellent reviews of the recent literature in this field are found in Charlesworth, Neil, ‘The Russian Stratification Debate in India.’ Modern Asian Studies (13, 1979), pp. 61–95CrossRefGoogle Scholar and Stokes, Eric, ‘The Return of the Peasant to South Asian History,’ South Asia (12 1976), pp. 96–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² Washbrook, D. A., ‘Country Politics: Madras 1880 to 1930,’ Modern Asian Studies (07 1973), pp. 475–531.CrossRefGoogle ScholarWashbrook, D. A., The Emergence of Provincial Politics, The Madras Presidency 1870–1920 (Cambridge: University Press, 1976)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Washbrook, D. A., ‘Economic Development and Social Stratification in Rural Madras: The “Dry Region” 1878–1929,’ in Dewey, Clive and Hopkins, A. G. (eds), The Imperial Impact: Studies in the Economic History of Africa and India (London: The Athlone Press, 1978), pp. 68–82Google Scholar; Baker, Christopher and Washbrook, D. A., South India: Political Institutions and Political Change 1880–1940 (Delhi: MacMillan Co., 1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Baker, Christopher, The Politics of South India, 1920–1937, (Cambridge: University Press, 1976).CrossRefGoogle Scholar Recently the ‘rural magnate’ interpretation of south Indian economic history was adopted by John Harriss in ‘Why Poor People Stay Poor in Rural South India’, Development and Change, (11, 1980), pp. 33–64.Google Scholar

³ Primarily the Ceded Districts of Kurnool, Anantapur, Cuddapah, and Bellary but also including Coimbatore, Salem, Nellore and other low rainfall districts in the former Madras Presidency.

⁴ Washbrook, , Provincial Politics, pp. 64–145.Google Scholar The rural magnate model of agrarian organization is derived from assumptions concerning three basic agro-economic zones of the Madras Presidency: 1) the dry zone, 2) the Cauveri Delta–Malabar regions, and 3) the Kistna–Godavari Deltas. Washbrook concluded that socio-economic stratification was most pronounced in the Cauveri-Malabar zone, followed by the dry zone which composed the majority of land area in the Presidency, and least in the Kistna–Godavari Deltas, a region alleged to have a large ‘middle peasantry’.

⁵ Washbrook, , Provincial Politics, p. 71.Google Scholar

⁶ Washbrook asserts that in the dry districts, ‘the rise in grain prices and development of cash cropping led to the increasing stratification of society.’ Washbrook, ‘Economic Development’, p. 74.Google Scholar Stratification in the context of this paper refers to the unequal distribution of economic opportunities including land ownership. Economic growth is defined as expansion in acreage under cultivation where output per capita is rising. Definitions of agricultural growth using output per acre are inappropriate for this period as yield data are unreliable. The former definition is suitable providing there is no significant demographic change, a condition met during this period.

⁷ See Stein, Burton, ‘Historical Ecotypes in South India’ (paper presented at the 2nd International Conference-Seminar of Tamil Studies,Madras,January, 1967)Google Scholar; Hayami, Yujiro, ‘Economic Approach to Village Community and Institution’, Journal of Rural Development (04 1980), pp. 27–49.Google Scholar

⁸ The average annual rainfall was 23 inches. Madras, Economic Advisor, A Statistical Atlas of the Bdlary District (Madras: Government Press, 1949), p. 28.Google Scholar

⁹ Madras, Madras District Gazetteers, Statistical Appendix for the Bellary District, v. II, 1930, p. 3.Google Scholar

¹⁰ From 1890/91 to 1928/29 the prices of jowar (sorghum) a major food grain rose 60 percent and cotton, the major commercial crop by 56 percent.

¹¹ Hurd, John, ‘Railways and the Expansion of Markets in India, 1861–1921,’ Explorations in Economic History, 12 (1975), pp. 263–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar In Bellary the price of foodgrains from 1874/75 to 1930/31 in district markets shows a high correlation coefficient (r) of 0.98. The correlation of inter-district market prices indicates a relatively high degree of price integration.

¹² Madras, Bellary Statistical Atlas, p. 12.Google Scholar

¹³ Madras, Board of Revenue, Season and Crop Report (Madras: Government Press), 1902/1903–1929/1930.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Benson, C., A Statistical Atlas of the Madras Presidency (Madras: Government Press, 1895), p. 9;Google ScholarMadras, A Statistical Atlas of the Madras Presidency 1930/31 (Madras: Government Press, 1936).Google Scholar

¹⁵ From 1891 to 1931 population in the district declined at an average annual rate of – 0.06 percent.

¹⁶ Washbrook, , Provincial Politics, pp. 69–70.Google Scholar The ‘rent-roll’ is a categorical distribution of pattadars based on the amount of tax paid. Since the average tax rate per acre in the black soil taluks was approximately one rupee, the rent-roll serves as a proxy for actual landholding distribution.

¹⁷ Washbrook, , ‘Economic Development’, p. 73.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Kumar, Dharma, ‘Land Ownership and Inequality in the Madras Presidency: 1853/54–1946/47.’, The Economic and Social History Review (07–09, 1975), pp. 229–73.Google Scholar

¹⁹ The growth rate of new pattadars or holders during this period exceeded the population growth rate by 3 to 1. The increased cultivation was the result of cultivation of darkhast (cultivable waste) lands. These new holders were entering at the bottom of the landholding ladder thereby increasing the ranks of small holdings. A survey conducted on twenty villages in the black soil taluks of Bellary and Anantapur districts during the early 1920s note that 4, 154 new holders were registered in pattas paying less than Rs 10 in land revenue since the previous survey in 1892, an average increase of 225 pattas per village. See Madras, Board of Revenue, Resettlement Scheme Report of the Black Soil Taluks of Bellary and Anantapur Districts, Board's Proceedings no. 700, pp. 274–6.Google ScholarMadras, Report of the Settlement of the Land Revenue of the Madras Presidency (Madras: Government Press, 1935/1936), p. 26.Google Scholar

²⁰ Washbrook, , ‘Economic Development’, p. 71.Google Scholar

²¹ Robert, Bruce, ‘Agricultural Credit Cooperatives in Madras, 1893–1937: Rural Development and Agrarian Politics in Pre-Independence India’, The Indian Economic and Social History Review (01–04 1979), p. 165Google Scholar; Indian Central Cotton Committee (I.C.C.C.), Report on an Investigation into the Finance and Marketing of Cultivators’ Cotton in Madras (Bombay, 1929), p. 12.Google Scholar Short-term credit at 9–12 percent was not high since cooperative or institutional credit was advanced at 9·75 percent.

²² Washbrook, , Provincial Politics, p. 70.Google Scholar

²³ Ibid., pp. 71–3.

²⁴ Report, The Madras Provincial Banking Enquiry Committee (M.P.B.E.C.) (Calcutta: Government Press, 1930), v. 5.Google Scholar The competitive nature of the credit structure is discussed in Andrew Kolliner, ‘The Structure of Rural Credit in The Ceded Districts of the Madras Presidency’ (unpublished manuscript presented at the Conference on Rural Agrarian History held at the University of Pennsylvania, April 1975), pp. 75–7.Google Scholar The number of available credit sources, moderate interest rates (between 9 and 12 percent), and the lack of formal security suggest to Kolliner a rural credit system which was comparatively open and competitive.

²⁵ Washbrook, , ‘Economic Development’, p. 74.Google Scholar

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ I.C.C.C. Report 1926/27, p. 16.Google Scholar

²⁸ Ibid., p. 27.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 18.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ M.P.B.E.C. Report, vol. I, found that approximately 36 percent of the credit needs of the sample villages in Bellary district were met by professional moneylenders. This is more than the 27 percent found by the I.C.C.C. Report; however, the villages surveyed by the M.P.B.E.C. were closer to the market town. Also see the oral evidence of K. T. Alwa, Deputy Director of Agriculture, Bellary in M.P.B.E.C. Report, vol. II, p. 116.Google Scholar

³² Kolliner, , ‘Structure of Rural Credit’, p. 45.Google Scholar

³³ M.P.B.E.C. Reports of Investigators, vol. V.

³⁴ See Uma Lele, ‘Working of the Grain Markets in Selected States, India 1955/56–1964/65.’ Occasional Paper no. 12, Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell University. Her analysis provides a comprehensive overview of the competitive structure of Indian grain markets.

³⁵ Washbrook, , ‘Economic Development’, p. 81.Google Scholar

³⁶ The subsistence or ‘safety-first’ orientation of peasant cultivators is discussed in a series of works. Although it may appear logical for small farmers to prefer ‘safety-first’ choices, i.e. food over cash crops, it does not exclude the possibility of farmers choosing profitable and ‘safe’ (low risk) crops as well. See Lipton, Michael, ‘The Theory of the Optimising Peasant’, Journal of Development Studies (10–07 1967–1968), pp. 327–51Google Scholar and, Scott, James, The Moral Economy of the Peasant (New York; Yale University Press, 1976).Google Scholar A thoughtful critique of this approach is presented in Samuel Popkins, The Rational Peasant (Berkeley: University of California Press).Google Scholar

³⁷ I.C.C.C. Report 1936/27, p. 8.Google Scholar

³⁸ Rao, C. H. Hanumantha, Agricultural Production Functions, Cost, and Returns in India (Bombay, 1965), p. 54.Google Scholar Recent analysis of the cropping pattern of Yalpi-Kaggal (1978) by the author shows that over 50 percent of the plots of farmers under 5 acres were sown in cotton.

³⁹ M.P.B.E.C. Reports of Investigators, vol. V; Kolliner, , ‘Structure of Rural Credit’, pp. 15–16.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Local cotton had a long tap root system which improved its drought resistance ability relative to other crops. The variance in price during this period (1902/03–1929/30) for cotton was 0.138 and 1.91 for jowar, the competitive food crop. Also cotton was easier to store (no spoilage) and relatively easy to market.

⁴¹ Report of the Famine in the Madras Presidency 1896 and 1897 (Madras: Government Press, 1898), vol. II, p. 303.Google Scholar The collector of Anantapur district noted that the increased ‘railway and roads reduce the amount of grain stored by the agriculturalist … consequently, the ryot is readier than he used to be to exchange his grain for money …’.

⁴² Naraian, Dharm, The Impact of Price Movements on Areas Under Selected Crops in India, 1900–1939 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965)Google Scholar; Parikh, A., ‘Market Responsiveness of Peasant Cultivators: Some Evidence from Pre-War India’, Journal of Development Studies (10–07 1971–1972), pp. 291–306.Google Scholar

⁴³ Parikh, , ‘Market Responsiveness’, p. 305.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Rao, , Agricultural Production Functions, p. 57.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ A rural real wage index for Bellary District was constructed by deflating money wages of the lowest category (field labor) by the price of jowar, the most common foodgrain. The quinquennial agricultural wage censuses were indexed by this method using 1900 as the base year. The results are presented below:

The decline in 1921 was the result of extremely high prices for grain. Generally, real wages were above those found at the turn of the century. Real wages were not declining as suggested by Washbrook. Madras, Board of Revenue, Quinquennial Wage Censuses, 1906–1936. Tamil Nadu State Archives.