¹ de V. Allen, James, ‘The Kelantan Rising of 1915: Some Thoughts on the Concept of Resistance in British Malayan History’, Journal of Southeast Asian History, IX, 2 (09 1968), 241–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar For further, preliminary remarks on the To' Janggut rebellion see Kershaw, Roger, ‘Cross-currents on the Malayan East Coast’ (Review Article), Asian Affairs, LXIII, 2 (06 1976), 192–6 [hereafter, Kershaw, 1976].CrossRefGoogle Scholar

² I spent three weeks in or near Nering, in Pasir Puteh district, in September 1975. I was in the same district for five months during 1974 and for 10 months during 1966–67. Earlier, I lived for three years at Kota Bharu. Partly for this reason the present article has more to say about Kelantan than about Trengganu, and several points will be illustrated by reference to Pasir Puteh district.

³ See Hugh Bryson's manuscript on the Trengganu Rising, dated 12 February 1962, in the British Association of Malaysia historical collection at the Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London.

⁴ I have not yet had the opportunity to go deeply into this for Trengganu, but the British Adviser's reference to ‘obstruction often in the least expected quarter’, to the new land rent, the year before the outbreak, seems suggestive. Millington, W. M., Trengganu Annual Report 1927 (Singapore, 1928), p. 15.Google Scholar

⁵ I.e. the period of Japanese military government; restored Siamese rule; the British Military Administration; the Malayan Union, successively. It should be noted that the British representative in Trengganu was styled ‘Agent’, not ‘Adviser’, from 1909 till 1919.

⁶ de V. Allen, James, The Malayan Union (Yale University, Southeast Asia Monograph Series No. 10, 1967), pp. 21–2Google Scholar, refers to a peaceful demonstration in Kelantan, with no anti-British overtones, in December 1945 (prior to the foundation of U.M.N.O.). (It may be remarked that the source of this information was the proBritish Nik Kamil, but that does not necessarily disqualify it.) Radical nationalism was, however, also represented in Kelantan in the post-war period, in the form, notably, of Persatuan Persetiaan Melayu Kelantan—one of whose leaders was Ishak Lotfi (later Chief Minister in two P.M.I.P. governments). Persetiaan was involved in the anti-M.U. campaign, Kelantan informants recall; but it can hardly have been as committed to the advisory system as U.M.N.O. was. Indeed, the Malay Nationalist Party (also represented in Kelantan in the late forties) had progressive views on citizenship and was not counted by the Malayan Governor, Gent, among the original opponents of M.U. (Allen, ibid., p. 51). It may be noted, incidentally, that U.M.N.O. was not formally established in Kelantan till 1947, in a series of ceremonies organized by Persatuan Melayu Kelantan (9–13 May 1947).

⁷ Under the Federation of Malaya, 1948–63, Kelantan and Trengganu lost much of the autonomy they had enjoyed as Unfederated Malay States pre-war; the B.A.s' sphere of competence was correspondingly reduced. Under the controversial Malayan Union arrangements, 1946–48, the chief British officer in each State was to be styled ‘Resident Commissioner’ but I am uncertain whether any such appointments were ever made.

⁸ Means, Gordon P., Malaysian Politics (London, 1970), pp. 171–2.Google Scholar

⁹ The Kelantan opposition consisted of 4 Parti Negara, 3 Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (including Mohamed Asri) and 3 Independents. In Trengganu 3 Negara candidates provided the opposition.

¹⁰ Kelantan Gazette, VIII, 20 (13 10 1955), Notification No. 323.Google Scholar

¹¹ The Straits Times, 21 09 1955.Google Scholar

¹² The Straits Times, 1 11 1954.Google Scholar

¹³ Kessler, Clive S., ‘Muslim Identity and Political Behaviour in Kelantan’, in William, R. Roff (ed.), Kelantan: Religion, Society and Politics in a Malay State (Kuala Lumpur, 1974), pp. 272–313.Google Scholar I have borrowed Kessler's insight on this point on a previous occasion. Kershaw, Roger, ‘Politics in Kelantan, West Malaysia: Parochial Integrity versus National Integration?’, in University of London Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Autonomy and Dependence in ‘Parochial’Politics (Institute of Commonwealth Studies Collected Seminar Papers No. 7, 10 1968–03 1969), pp. 50–66Google Scholar [hereafter, Kershaw, 1969]. This was the published version of a seminar paper dated February 1969. Kessler's interpretation, appended (p. 64, note 11) after a brief first meeting in September 1969, is unfortunately garbled by myself where I refer to the U.M.N.O. group as well as Negara as ‘aristocratic’ (cf. also Ibid., p. 65, note 16).

¹⁴ Gazette, Kelantan, VII, 20 (14 10 1954)Google Scholar, Notification No. 526: Amendment No. 1 to the Constitution of the State of Kelantan. In Trengganu the 15 popular representatives were balanced by 16 ex officio and appointed members (The Straits Times, 1 November 1954). On the background to the decision not to create elective majorities in the State Councils see ‘Some Lost Majorities’ (Editorial), The Straits Times, 24 02 1955.Google Scholar

¹⁵ The Ulama Conference of U.M.N.O. established a Persatuan Ulama Sa-Malaya in 1951. It was renamed Persatuan Islam sa-Malaya in the same year. It seceded effectively in 1952 by removing itself from U.M.N.O. discipline. It registered the name Parti Islam sa-Malaya or Pan-Malayan Islamic Party for election purposes in 1955. Within its own ranks it remained a ‘Persatuan’, changing only the ‘sa-Malaya’ to ‘sa-Tanah Melayu’ in 1958. Finally, in 1971, it adopted, internally and externally, the title Partai Islam sa-Malaysia. (For some of the earlier details I am grateful to Encik Safie Ibrahim, Universiti Kebangsaan.) Whether as Persatuan Islam or Partai Islam, it has always been referred to in Malay as PAS. This usage will be observed for the rest of the paper.

¹⁶ In Kelantan the other opposition in the State elections was provided by 21 Negara, 20 Socialist Front, and 11 Independents. (U.M.N.O. had put up 27, M.C.A. 3 candidates; PAS contested all seats.) In Trengganu the opposition comprised 20 Negara, 16 Socialist Front and 6 Independents. (U.M.N.O. put up 22, M.C.A. 2; PAS contested all seats.) The Federal Elections, for 104 seats in the new parliament, held in August 1959, involved 10 constituencies in Kelantan and 6 in Trengganu. See Appendix A for details (the Negara candidate elected in Trengganu was Dato'Onn; one U.M.N.O. candidate was unopposed.) These federal results merely confirmed the pro-PAS tide in the State elections. The State elections were nationally significant because they alarmed M.C.A. and brought on a crisis in the Alliance over the division of candidacies between U.M.N.O. and M.C.A., culminating in the resignation of Dr Lim Chong Eu as M.C.A. President and later from the party.

¹⁷ Kessler, ‘Muslim Identity and Political Behaviour’, p. 284. Kershaw, 1976, p. 196, queries peasant class feeling.

¹⁸ This account is distilled from Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 231–2. He in turn cites The Straits Budget (various issues).

¹⁹ Ratnam, K. J. and Milne, R. S., The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964 (Singapore, 1967), p. 55Google Scholar. I am not aware whether Parti Negara in Trengganu was associated with any particular social group. Ratnam and Milne attribute the party's previous appeal in Trengganu purely to Dato' Onn's personal popularity. The eclipse of Negara in the 1964 State election was an un-surprising sequel to the death of Onn in 1962. It is noteworthy that Onn saw the east coast as a potential redoubt of Malay culture from which to carry his struggle back to the national level, very much as PAS did.

²⁰ In the Trengganu State election 1969, the single M.C.A. candidate was opposed by a Chinese of Parti Rakyat. For full details of these State elections, and equivalent federal elections, see Appendix A.

²¹ This was felt particularly in road construction. However, the Central Government used the Ministry of Rural Development as a channel for small-scale funds to ‘loyal’ or potentially winnable villages. A number of mosques and public pavilions were constructed.

²² For a ‘national’ (and ‘patron-client’, non-class conflict) view of village politics, see Kershaw, 1969. But there are some inaccuracies: Asri is described as a former ‘religious teacher’; the foundation of PAS is placed in 1955; Tengku Abdul Rahman is said to have attended the funeral of the PAS leader, Zulkifli, in 1964; Malay medium (‘national’) primary schools are described as ‘national-type’; and the Kelantan Malay population is recorded as a mere 80 per cent, rather than 93 per cent.

²³ The People's Action Party was not communal in intention but it had that effect in the Malaysian context. After the expulsion of Singapore it was reregistered as the Democratic Action Party.

²⁴ See Appendix B, infra; a similar role was promised for Trengganu in the PAS manifesto for that State: see Appendix C. These documents probably represent both the high-point and the end-point of Malayan electoral communalism. I am the translator of each manifesto reproduced here.

²⁵ See the Alliance manifesto for Kelantan, excerpted in Appendix D.

²⁶ Berita Harian, 19 08 1968Google Scholar. (Tun Razak claimed the initiative came from the PAS members, and that there had been similar initiatives as early as 1966: Berita Harian, 14 09 1968.)Google Scholar

²⁷ The Straits Times, 21 08 1968.Google Scholar

²⁸ For a slightly fuller account of the 1969 election in West Malaysia, leading into a detailed analysis of the 1974 election, see Kershaw, Roger, ‘National and Local Perspectives of a Non-ideological Election: West Malaysia, August 1974 (with special reference to Kelantan)’, in Dahm, B. and Draguhn, W. (eds), Politics, Society and Economy in the ASEAN States (Wiesbaden: A Publication of the Institute of Asian Affairs, Hamburg, 1975), pp. 185–224Google Scholar [hereafter, Kershaw, 1975]. On U.M.N.O.'s ‘materialist’ strategy see p. 209 (in 1969 it rather stimulated religious sentiment).

²⁹ The coalition was operative to the advantage of PAS (the minority group) in Kedah and Trengganu and in the Federal Government, and to the advantage of the Alliance (the minority group) in Kelantan. U.M.N.O. needed the collaboration of PAS to make a success of the new policies but the price U.M.N.O. paid was not intolerably high, as PAS could justify its entry into the coalition in ideological terms and was willing to sacrifice Kelantan. Today, despite the security for PAS seats in Kelantan which the National Front affords—cf. paragraph after next—the Federal Prime Minister in effect chooses the Chief Minister: see Kershaw, , 1975, p. 204.Google Scholar

³⁰ Ibid., p. 193.

³¹ I U.M.N.O. man was unopposed. 33 United Independents, 8 other Independents and 13 P.S.R.M. contested these State elections. In the Kelantan federal election 5 U.M.N.O. and 7 PAS were elected against the opposition of 8 United Independents (3 U.M.N.O. and 1 PAS were unopposed).

³² I U.M.N.O. man was unopposed. The opposition consisted of 14 Independents and 27 P.S.R.M. In the Trengganu federal election 4 U.M.N.O. and 3 PAS were elected against the opposition of 6 P.S.R.M. and 3 Independents (I U.M.N.O. was unopposed). On the problems and techniques of identifying candidates' parties under the National Front, see Kershaw, , 1975, pp. 189, 213Google Scholar. (On a small point of detail, the last figure in the P.S.R.M. ‘contests lost’ column on p. 214 should read: 1.) The basic results for 1974 are available in The Straits Times, 26 08 1974Google Scholar.

³³ Kershaw, , 1975, pp. 202–5.Google Scholar

³⁴ See Appendix F, infra, or Kershaw, , 1975, p. 221–2.Google Scholar

³⁵ Cik Gu' Musa, the United Independents candidate in Bandar Pasir Puteh—equivalent to Pasir Puteh Tengah before the number of State constituencies was raised from 30 to 36—had contested the latter in a by-election in March 1974, likewise as an Independent but after failing to be adopted as P.S.R.M. candidate owing to his too recent membership. He is a former member of the Peninsular Malay Union and was detained during the sixties.

³⁶ See Appendix E, infra. In Kelantan P.S.R.M. used an abbreviated version of the national manifesto. The latter may be read in Kershaw, , 1975, pp. 223–4.Google Scholar

³⁷ My calculation of the P.S.R.M. parliamentary vote in the 6 parliamentary constituencies contested (this excluded Besut, incidentally) is 30.7 per cent. But in order not to place excessive weight on the events in Trengganu one should bear in mind that a part of the vote may have been simply a protest against the coalition concept and National Front. If there had been an Independent phenomenon on the Kelantan scale (where the 33 United Independent State candidates picked up 21.6 per cent of the overall State vote) the P.S.R.M. would surely have performed much worse—as it did, for instance, in the March 1974 Pasir Puteh Tengah by-election when faced with a good Independent candidate, despite an effective campaign on inflation (cf. the analysis by Mohamed, H.A.R., ‘Pasir Puteh: Bukti rakyat faham konsep Campuran’, Berita Harian, 31 03 1974)Google Scholar. (The absence of a strong Independent opposition in Trengganu may be explicable, speculatively, in terms of the fact that no incumbent leadership was blocking the ambitions of more radical PAS members.) On the difficulties facing P.S.R.M. in Trengganu, see Ismail, Samad, ‘Socialists Keep on Soldiering’, The Straits Times, 22 08 1974.Google Scholar

³⁸ U.M.N.O. appealed largely to the material aspirations and wants of the electors on the east coast in the sixties (Kershaw, , 1969, p. 55Google Scholar), and the small-scale inducements of the 1974 campaign (Kershaw, , 1975, p. 210)Google Scholar as well as the ‘macro’ vision of the N.E.P. are in the same line of development. But while a decline of communal ideology may be bought by welfare politics, an ideology of class may be its equally logical outgrowth where per capita income falls and an Islamic party loses its left wing.

³⁹ When PAS was the national opposition, it flattered the Kelantan electors for the unique and sterling qualities of their regional culture (cf. the PAS manifesto, 1969: Appendix B, infra). U.M.N.O. in 1955 reminded the voters of Pasir Puteh district of the To'Janggut rebellion and their ‘heritage’ as a proud and resistant people (personal communication, Senator Nik Hassan bin Haji Nik Yahya). For a romantic view of the contradictions and unpredictability of the Kelantan character see: ‘M.S.’, ‘Kelantan negeri terbalek kop’, Mingguan Kota Bharu, 146 (10 05 1969), p. 7Google Scholar. Whatever the original objective reality of these regional traits, there has been no lack of encouragement for their objectivization.

⁴⁰ Parti Rakyat, formed in 1955, has always had a mainly Malay membership and image. But it joined up with the Labour Party in the Socialist Front, 1957–65, and in the late sixties adopted Marxist ideology and took the title Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya. Many young Kelantanese intellectuals will still prefer to promote Socialism in an Islamic guise, as through Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (ABIM).

⁴¹ The Straits Times, 3 July 1974. Batu Melintang is situated at the headwaters of Sungai Pergau, close to the Thai and Perak borders. The M.C.P. has, in fact, for a number of years been striving to attract Malay support, and has recruited Malays in South Thailand with a view to improving its appeal among the Malays south of the border. The spectre of Communist success among the Malays stalks the Malaysian Government continually. In October 1970 two Malay defectors from the insurgency were taken on a tour of Kelantan villages, by the Government, to explain the dangers of communism (The Straits Times, 23 10 1970Google Scholar). The most vulnerable group were landless Malays who had been tacitly allowed by District Officers to squat in the Ulu to relieve the pressure on land in the Kelantan plain (personal communication, Brian Parkinson, 1970).

⁴² Cf. P.S.R.M. manifesto, 1974, printed in Kershaw, 1975, pp. 223–4. (One correction is due: line 4 in the second paragraph should read: ‘national debt of more than $8,000 m.’)

⁴³ Interview with Dato' Asri, ‘PAS tak akan keluar dad Barisan Nasional’, Berita Minggu, 6 06 1976Google Scholar. ‘… PAS joined the National Front with the aim of bringing about a situation of stability in the political sphere and in our social relations, and especially in order to establish a state of unity and strength in face of the security issue and also the issue of national development in the economic sphere’.

⁴⁴ This paper has neglected the shadowy scheme for an east coast federation based on Kelantan and Patani (of which there were occasional rumours in the 1960s), leaving it in the shadows where it seems properly to belong. Most Malay nationalists would like to see Patani secede from Thailand and join Malaysia rather than attract a part of Malaya into a bi-lateral secession movement.