¹ Thus Gandhi's programme in 1920 for non-cooperation allowed his followers to continue cooperating on local bodies.Google Scholar

² For Das's attitude towards the decision to boycott the councils, taken by the Calcutta Congress in September 1920 and ratified at Nagpur in December, see R. A. Gordon, ‘Non-Cooperation and Council Entry, 1919–20’, above.Google Scholar

³ The Bengal Provincial Congress Committee [PCC] controlled District Congress Committees [DCCs] in each of the twenty-six districts of the Presidency. In addition, Calcutta was divided into four DCCs, and the two Bengali-speaking districts of Cachar and Sylhet in Assam had committees under the jurisdiction of the PCC.Google Scholar

⁴ Bengal fortnightly report [FR Bengal] for the second half of April 1924 [hence-forth the first and second halves of the month will be indicated by (1) and (2)]; Home Poll file 112 of 1924, National Archives of India, New Delhi [NAI].Google Scholar

⁵ FR Bengal September (2) 1924, ibid.

⁶ The decline of the Dacca DCC illustrates this. Dacca, the second city of the province, was the strongest outpost of the Hindu bhadralok enisled amid the Muslim masses of east Bengal. Das and several of his lieutenants had strong connections with the district. It had been active in non-cooperation, and it was one of Das's chief bases during his struggle to recapture the Bengal Congress in 1923. Das was president of the DCC. Like the president, its two secretaries lived in Calcutta, one of them being Kiren Shankar Roy, an aide of Das's. By October 1923 the organization in Dacca was moribund, its only signs of life being ‘a nice building with a sign board over the door and a few so-called volunteers residing therein’, and its only function being to help the supporters and hinder the opponents of its masters in Calcutta. Amrita Bazar Patrika, 1 July, 6 October, 17 October 1923.Google Scholar

⁷ During this period and until 1934 the Bengal PCC was composed as follows:

⁸ There is an account of Sen Gupta which stresses the charm, if not the talent, in Collis, M., Trials in Burma (London, 1945, second edition), pp. 84–137.Google Scholar

⁹ Report of the Indian Statutory Commission (London, 1930), I, 61–62.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Statistical Returns of the Income Tax Department, Bengal (Calcutta, 1919), p. ii. Peasants in even the remotest hinterland felt the powerful influence of Calcutta. Jute, Bengal's most important cash crop, was grown in twenty-four districts;Google Scholar prices of jute in up-country markets were settled by Calcutta, and often artificially depressed by gambling in jute futures at Calcutta's Bazar, Bhitar. Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, Volume IV, Evidence Taken in the Bengal Presidency (Calcutta, 1927), qq. 21498, 21599–606, 21644–47, 21716–18.Google Scholar

¹¹ Forward, 12 February 1927. Another reason for their hostility was their desire to keep Sasmal from gaining any of the patronage of Calcutta Corporation.Google Scholar

¹² Subhas Bose to Sarat Bose, 17 July 1925, in Subhas Chandra Bose: Correspondence, 1924–1932 (Calcutta, 1967), p. 59.Google Scholar

¹³ The tone of municipal corruption was clearly Set as early as 1924. Calcutta gossip was soon alleging that the party had made Rs. 50,000 by placing a waterworks contract with an understanding firm; and the shopkeepers in the Municipal Market were soon being squeezed into contributing to party funds. FR Bengal July (I) 1924 and December (I) 1924, Home Poll file 25 of 1924, NAI.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Liberty, 19 February, 26 February and I March 1930; Amrita Bazar Patrika, 25 February, I March and 5 March 1930. For the purposes of this campaign the Twenty-Four Parganas DCC claimed itself as one of the Calcutta DCCs, in addition to North, South, Central Calcutta and Burra Bazar DCCs.Google Scholar

¹⁵ J. Nehru to Secretary, Bengal PCC, 7 March 1930, file G120/186 of 1930 of the records of the All-India Congress Committee [AICC], Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.Google Scholar

¹⁶ J. Nehru, ‘Notes of Inspection, Bengal PCC’, 14 March 1929, file P 28(i)/151, AICC.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Kiran Shankar Roy to Secretary, AICC, 14 February 1929, file P24/148 of 1929, AICC.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Their political role during the nineteen-thirties will be discussed below.Google Scholar

¹⁹ For the earlier history of Mahisyas and Namasudras see Chaudhuri, B. B., ‘Agrarian Economy and Agrarian Relations in Bengal, 1859–1885’ (Oxford University, D. Phil. thesis, 1968);Google ScholarRay, R. K., ‘Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal, 1875–1908’ (Cambridge University, Ph.D. thesis, 1973).Google Scholar

²⁰ Report of the Land Revenue Commission, Bengal (Alipore, 1940), III, evidence of the British Indian Association, 279–96.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid., I, final report of the Commission, 29.

²² FR Bengal September (2) 1923, Home Poll file 25 of 1923; FR Bengal January (2) 1924, Home Poll file 25 of 1924; FR Bengal January (2) 1926, March (2) 1926, Home Poll file 112 of 1926, NAI.Google Scholar

²³ Indian Statutory Commission. Interim Report. (Review of growth of Education in British India by the Auxiliary Committee appointed by the Commission) September 1929 (London, 1929), pp. 46, 258, 260.Google Scholar

²⁴ Royal Commission on Agriculture, IV, evidence of Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, qq. 23509–10, 23549, 23555.Google Scholar

²⁵ East India (Constitutional Reforms…) vol. I, Report of the Committee… to enquire into questions connected with the Franchise…Cmd. 141 (London, 1919), p. 38.Google Scholar

²⁶ Ibid., p. 44. The Franchise Committee estimated that the total number of voters would be 1,228,000, and that the Muslim rural voters would amount to 422,000. At the first election held under the new constitution, 1,021,418 persons voted, of whom 449,382 voted in Muslim rural constituencies. PP, 1921, XXVI [Cmd. 1261], 10–13.

²⁷ The vote was given to persons paying Rs I as a cess or a chaukidari tax. The figure is for those who actually voted in 1926, and not the larger number who were entitled to vote.Google Scholar

²⁸ Government of India: Memorandum on the Development and Working of Representative Institutions in the Sphere of Local Self-Government, February 1928, PP. 31–64, 74–5, 83. This may seem a substantial sum, but it should be compared with expenditure in other provinces.

These comparisons help to explain why politicians in some other provinces took a livelier interest in the institutions of local self-government.

²⁹ FR Bengal March (2) 1927, Home Poll file 32 of 1927, NAI.Google Scholar

³⁰ Six DCCs controlled by Bose's faction also set up such centres. But those in Khulna, Noakhali, Tippera, Bakarganj and Howrah were ineffective, and the success of the sixth (Mahisbathar, in Twenty-Four Parganas) owed more to the Gandhians. The claims of the Bengal PCC are set out in Liberty, 17 April 1930.Google Scholar

³¹ Bengal Council of Civil Disobedience to AICC, 6 November 1930, file 86/186 F, 177 N of 1930, AICC.Google Scholar

³² FR Bengal June (2) 1930, Home Poll file 18/7 of 1930, NAT.Google Scholar

³³ Note on Movements for the Non-Payment of Revenue, Taxes or Rent, n.d., Home Poll file 168 of 1929, NAI.Google Scholar

³⁴ FR Bengal April (I) 1930, Home Poll file 18/5 of 1930, NAI.Google Scholar

³⁵ Minute by H. W. Emerson, 20 June, 1931, on Government of Bengal to Home Department, Government of India, 11 June, 1931, Home Poll file 14/8 of 1931, NAI.Google Scholar

³⁶ On 14 April 1931, Liberty, Subhas's paper, deplored and denied attacks of this sort which were appearing in Sen Gupta's Advance ‘and its supporters in the Calcutta gutter press’.Google Scholar

³⁷ The episode of the Bengal floods in 1931 illustrates this change. Naturally, both factions formed relief committees. To combat the general belief that Gandhi was supporting Sen Gupta's committee against his own, Subhas found it worth his while to send a telegram to the Mahatma (by then on his way to London) asking for impartial support for both relief funds. Advance, 19 August 1931; Liberty, 8 September 1931.Google Scholar

³⁸ B. C. Roy to Vallabhbhai Patel, 7 September 1931, file P 15/379 of 1931, AICC.Google Scholar

³⁹ Report by M. R. Aney on Bengal Congress Disputes, 25 September 1931, file G 25/506 of 1934–1935, AICC.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ ‘The Bengal Council of Civil Disobedience, a Brief Account of its Work’, n.d. (circa 30 September 1930), file G 86/186 E of 1930, AICC.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Liberty, 4 June 1931; Advance, 17 July 1931.Google Scholar

⁴² Liberty, 7 December 1931.Google Scholar

⁴³ Ibid., 13 and 14 December 1931.

⁴⁴ Advance, 8 December 1931.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Advance, 15 December 1931.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ Liberty, 18, 20 and 25 December 1931.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Fute Prices in Calcutta, Rs per 400 Ib. bale.

⁴⁸ Liberty, 2 November 1931. This affair is a good example of the way in which the Muslim political ferment had reached the village level, where it was organized with the help of the district towns. At meetings of tenants in villages of Madhupur, Mymensingh district, ‘ …the discussions practically centred round the question of payment of rent and of the dues of the Mahajans [moneylenders]’. The meetings were addressed by three Muslim members of the district bar.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Liberty, 27 December 1931.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ The last was to be Marxism.Google Scholar

⁵¹ Postmaster-General, Bengal, to Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, 13 February 1932, Home Poll file 21/7 of 1932, NAI. The Challenge was a pert and rather charming cyclostyled paper. There are a few copies in the AICC files.Google Scholar

⁵² FR Bengal April (1) 1932, Home Poll file 18/7 of 1932, NAI.Google Scholar

⁵³ Until October 1933, numerous telegrams from Bengal to Delhi continued to report resistance in Arambagh and Midnapore. Home Poll file 3/1 of 1933, NAI.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Liberty, 12 November 1931, letter from Profulla Chandra Sen (a future Chief Minister of west Bengal).Google Scholar

⁵⁵ ‘Arambagh War Council: Report from January to June 1932’, file 4/406 of 1932, AICC.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Imperial Chemical Industries (India) to Bengal Chamber of Commerce, 5 September 1932, enclosed in Bengal Chamber of Commerce to Commerce Department, Government of India, 27 September 1932, Home Poll file 195 of 1932, NAI.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ ‘Tamluk Sub-Divisional War Council: Report on Civil Disobedience Movement in Tamluk from January to June 1932’, n.d. (circa August 1932), ‘Statistical Report of the Civil Disobedience at Contai, Midnapore, from January to July 1932’, 24 August 1932, file 4/406 of 1932, AICC.Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Das, Narendra Nath, History of Midnapur, Part-Two (Calcutta, 1962), p. 164.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ FR Bengal July (2) 1930, Home Poll file 18/8, NAI.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ By the end of 1932, Hijli gaol had housed some 2,957 prisoners convicted during the second civil disobedience movement. Nearly all of them came from Midnapore and Bankura. They were described as ‘corner boys’ or ‘village youths’ whose level of literacy was much lower than that of the other civil disobedience prisoners in Bengal, who were predominantly bhadralok. Report on Types of Civil Disobedience Prisoners in Bengal, n.d., enclosed in Government of Bengal to Home Department, Government of India, no. 5394, PJ, 26 November 1932, Home Poll file 23/66 of 1932, NAI.Google Scholar

⁶¹ The Challenge, 11 July 1932.Google Scholar

⁶² ‘Civil Disobedience in Tamluk’, a report by G. Singh, Director of Tamluk Civil Disobedience Council, no date [early 1931], file G 86/186 E, 177N, of 1930, AICC.Google Scholar

⁶³ During the first half of 1932, some 16,383 persons were arrested in the province, most of them for picketting. The total compares poorly with the 11,025 arrests in Gujarat, a region with only one-sixth of Bengal's population, The Challenge, 25 July 1932.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ When challenged to be more precise, all he would suggest were joint electorates and a reservation of seats for both Hindus and Muslims on the basis of their populations in those provinces where either community was less than 25 per cent of the population. Indian Round Table Conference (Second Session), Proceedings of the Minorities Committee, Appendix I.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ There were, however, good technical reasons for delay. The question was bound up with whatever extensions might be made to the franchise; the Indian Franchise Committee did not report until May 1932. Moreover, the Cabinet was still uncertain whether to put its plans for provincial self-government and for federating India into one and the same Bill; indeed it was not yet committed to producing any Bill at all.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Willingdon to Hoare, private, 21 March 1932, Templewood Papers, vol. 5, Mss Eur E 240, India Office Library, London [IOL].Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Cabinet Minute, 23 March 1932, file 49 of Private Office Papers [L/PO], IOL.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ Hoare to Willingdon, telegram, secret, 22 March 1932; de Montmorency to Willingdon, private, 29 April 1932; Anderson to Willingdon, private, 5 May 1932, ibid.

⁶⁹ Anderson to Hoare, secret, 7 June 1932; Willingdon to Hoare, telegram 438-S, 14 June 1932, ibid. At the same time the Viceroy and his Council thought that the seats to be allotted to the Depressed Classes—then estimated at about ten—should come from the Hindus' ninety-six.

⁷⁰ Willingdon to Hoare, telegram 493-S, 9 July 1932, ibid. One member of the Viceroy's Council dissented. This was the Law Member, Sir B. L. Mitter. He was a Bengali.

⁷¹ Annexure to East India (Constitutionol Reforms): Communal Decision, Cmd. 4147 of 1932, in fact, Hoare was harder on the caste Hindus than Willingdon had been, since some of the General seats were meant for the Depressed. Of course, caste Hindus could expect to pick up a few more from the special constituencies.Google Scholar

⁷² The Bengal Congress could reasonably hope to win some of these thirty seats.Google Scholar

⁷³ Liberty, 17 August 1932.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Advance, 18 August 1932.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ Liberty, 22 January 1933. Although the Poona Pact was made on 25 September 1932, it was not until the following January that the Government of Bengal ruled which castes in Bengal were to be included under its arrangements for the Depressed Classes. By defining some substantial peasants as Depressed, the Government showed once more how British administrative categories rode rough-shod over Indian social facts.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ Advance, 22 January 1933.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ During the civil disobedience movement, Advance took the opportunity of describing a Muslim motion in Council for further amendment of the Tenancy Amendment Act of 1928 as ‘grotesque’. Advance, 23 November 1932. Its rival wrote that ‘The better type of landholder[s] in Bengal… have inspired the best of our cultural movements and financed every public endeavour that has had for its object the accomplishment of something great and good.’ Liberty, 1 March 1933.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ For brevity, this account neglects the role of the Hindu Mahasabha. During the 1920s Bengal had rejected the Mahasabha. After the failure of Das's Pact, the temper of the Bengal Congress was sufficiently anti-Muslim for it to perform the Mahasabha's work without acknowledgement. But the Award gave the Mahasabha a fresh chance in Bengal. It was active in protest (e.g. Advance, 21 August 1932; Liberty, 5 September 1932). It strongly opposed the Allahabad scheme, making impossible stipulations and finally inducing Congressmen to make them as well. For the negotiations over the proposals see Advance, 29 November 1932, and Liberty, 12, 26, 28 and 29 December 1932.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ Government of Bengal to Secretary of State, telegram, 22 August 1932, Home Poll file 41/4 of 1932, NAI.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ Ghaznavi and Nazimuddin told the Governor of Bengal that the Muslims should be given an absolute majority of seats for otherwise ‘the strong section which has always favoured joint electorates without reservation of seats would again assert itself….’, enclosed in Anderson to Hoare, 22 July 1932, file 49 of L/PO, IOL.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Gandhi to Birla, 21 January 1933, Birla, G. D., In the Shadow of the Mahatma (new edition, Bombay, 1968), p. 87.Google Scholar

⁸² Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform, Cmd. 4268 of 1933.Google Scholar

⁸³ For new evidence about the evolution of this decision, see Munshi, K. M., Indian Constitutional Documents, vol. I (Bombay, 1967), pp. 357–82. There is an illuminating account in ‘The Communal Award’, a memorandum prepared by Chandrashankar Shukla, Vallabhbhai Patel Papers. Shukla had acted as one of Gandhi's secretaries in 1934.Google Scholar There is further information in Prasad, Rajendra, Autobiography (Bombay, 1957), pp. 378–9.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ The text of the resolution, as it was approved by the Working Committee, is printed in The Indian National Congress, Resolutions 1934–6 (Allahabad, n.d.), pp. 19–20.Google Scholar Gandhi's draft, which differs in unimportant ways, is in Appendix 2 to the memorandum by Chandrashankar Shukla, loc. cit. The account of these discussions in June by Chaudhry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway to Pakistan (Lahore, 1961), pp. 123–26, differs in some details, and also in some dates.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ Gandhi to Aney, 12 July 1934, quoted in Shukla, ‘The Command Award’, Vallabhbhai Patel Papers.Google Scholar

⁸⁶ Resolution of the first session of the All-Indian Communal Award Conference, enclosed in Ramanand Chatterjee to Rajendra Prasad, 27 October 1934, file G/24 of 1934–1936, AICC.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ Here are some of the messages of protest from east Bengal all addressed to Vallabhbhai Patel, President of the Congress:Joginchandra Chakravarty [Dinajpur], telegram, 7 September 1934; Saratchaira Guha, telegram, 7 September 1934; Mohin Das, 7 September 1934; Mymensingh conference, 7 September 1934; Khulna Congress Committee, telegram, 6 September 1934; Pabna Congress Committee, 8 August 1934 Jhenida Congress Committee [Jessore], 12 August 1934; statement by President, Dacca DCC, enclosed in Secretary, Congress Nationalist Party, Bengal, to AICC, 6 August 1934. There were also protests from Hooghly, Burdwan, Calcutta and Birbhum in west Bengal, file G 24 of 1934–36, AlCC.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ For the development and the temporary settlement of this devious affair see K. M. Munshi to Gandhi, n.d. [circa 8 April 1934], in Munshi, Indian Constitutional Documents, I, 369; Bhulabhai Desai to unnamed correspondent, 10 May 1934Google Scholar, in Setalvad, M. C., Bhulabhai Desai (New Delhi, 1968), pp. 120–1; J. C. Gupta, Amarendranath Chatterjee, D. C. Chakravarti and others to AICC, II May 1934, file G 25/506 of 1934–35, AICC; Munshi to Gandhi, 23 May 1934, in Munshi, Indian Constitutional Documents, I, 374.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ J. C. Gupta to Gandhi, 16 August 1934, Vallabhbhai Patel Papers.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Forward was Liberty under a new name.Google Scholar

⁹¹ Birendra Nath Gupta to Gandhi, 21 August 1934, Vallabhbhai Patel Papers. Like everyone else in Bengal, the Gandhians had their factions. B. N. Gupta belonged to the group led by Suresh Chandra Banerji.Google Scholar

⁹² B. C. Roy to Gandhi, 22 August 1934; Gandhi to B. C. Roy, 25 August 1934; Gandhi to B. C. Roy, 30 August 1934; Vallabhbhai Patel Papers. In fact, Gandhi had offered a version of the conscience clause to Malaviya. He proposed to apply it in individual cases. Malaviya demanded that it must apply to all candidates.Google Scholar

⁹³ Malaviya and Aney demanded twenty seats. Gandhi and Vallabhbhai then proposed local arrangements in which the ‘demonstrably weaker party’ should retire. Forwarding this second scheme, Gandhi commented: ‘I do not know what view the Parliamentary Board will take but Sardar [Patel] accepts it in substance.’ Gandhi to Malaviya, 3 September 1934, Vallabhbhai Patch Papers. This is an interesting commentary on the powers of the Board.Google Scholar

⁹⁴ Aga Khan to Fazl-i-Husain, Private, 21 January 1934, Fazl-i-Husain Papers [italics in original].Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Resolutions of the Muslim League on the Communal Award, 25–6 November 1933, All-India Muslim League Resolutions, 1924–36 [n.d.], pp. 57–8.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ In 1933 the Muslim leaders of the Punjab calculated that by conceding joint electorates they could turn their representation of 49 per cent, guaranteed by the Award, into an absolute majority. But the plan cleft the Muslims of west Punjab, where the majority was large, and the Muslims of east Punjab, where the Hindus had the majority in the Ambala division. Moreover, the plan exposed the split of interests between the rural Muslims of the west, and the urban Muslims whose chance of representation in Lahore and Amritsar would be much reduced. Fazl-i-Husain to Zafrullah Khan, 8 May 1933; to Shafat Ahmad Khan, 19 June 1933, Fazl-i-Husain Papers. For Sind, see Fazl-i-Husain to Abdulla Haroun, 16 December 1932, ibid.

⁹⁷ In any case, Jinnah still saw himself less as a party leader than as a go-between whose role lay in the central Assembly (to which he had been re-elected in October 1934). There the support of the Congress members would strengthen his claim to be a national leader.Google Scholar

⁹⁸ In January 1934 Jinnah had suggested a combined attack against the proposals of the White Paper, if Congressmen would accept the Communal Award; Munshi to Gandhi, 27 January 1934, in Munshi, , Indian Constitutional Documents, I, 360, 361.Google Scholar

⁹⁹ ‘Summary of conversation between Mr. Jinnah and myself’, Vallabhbhai Patel Papers. This document is unsigned and undated. It is uncertain who made the summary, since copies of many documents circulating among the Congress high command found their way into Vallabhbhai's papers. But its date is fairly clear. The report had been published in December 1934. Jinnah returned to India in January 1935. The Aga Khan was also in India during that month. Jinnah's unknown interlocutor suggested that if there were to be conversations, they ‘should take place before the Muslim League met’. The Council of the League met on 25–6 January. We may therefore conclude that the date of the conversation must have been very shortly before 23 January, when the talks between Jinnah and Rajendra Prasad did, in fact, begin.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ ‘Substance of conversation… on the 23rd January 1935’, Rajendra Prasad Papers [RPP] XI/35/1/2; ‘Notes on conversation on 28 January 1935’, RPP XI/35/1/6.Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ ‘Notes of conversation between… Malaviya… Patel … Desai… and… Prasad… on the 30th of January 1935’, RPP XI/35/I/9. This meeting ratified the agreement reached earlier that day between Prasad and Jinnah, that in all provinces other than Bengal, the Punjab and Assam, the weightage given to minorities under the communal decision should stand; and that in Bengal both Hindus and Muslims should try to persuade the Europeans to surrender some of their seats. These were then to be divided between the two communities.Google Scholar

¹⁰² ‘Notes of conversation… on 31st January, 1935’, RPP XI/35/I/10. If a given percentage of seats was to be reserved for either Hindus or Muslims under a system of separate electorates, this could be contrived by allotting to each community that percentage of constituencies which were bound to elect Hindu or Muslim members. In the Punjab the Sikhs possessed separate constituencies as well. This system had existed under the Montagu–Chelmsford constitution. But if separate electorates were to be replaced by joint electorates, then seats might still effectively be reserved by altering the terms of the franchise. Such schemes for a differential franchise implied altering British proposals by readjusting the franchise so that the electoral rolls reflected the proportion of population formed by Hindus and Muslims in Bengal and the proportion of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in the Punjab.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ ‘Notes on conversations… on the 13th and 14th February, 1935’, RPP XI/35/I/17. The Muslims were also to keep the one-third share of seats in the new central legislature which Hoare had allotted them.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ Rajendra Prasad to Vallabhbhai Patel, 14 February 1935, Vallabhbhai Patel Papers.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ Rajendra Prasad to Vallabhbhai Patel, 14 February 1935, Vallabhbhai Patel Papers.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ The Mahasabha were demanding that no seats should be reserved for either community in Bengal: Hindu Sabha to Prasad, telegram, 16 February 1935; Ramanand Chatterji, H. N. Dutt, J. N. Basu, Rajendra Dev, B. N. Majumdar and Indra Narayan Sen to Prasad, telegram, n.d.(?16 February 1935); Secretary, All-Bengal Hindu Conference to Prasad, 16 February 1935, RPP XI/35/I/21.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ Malaviya also opposed the scheme for giving the Muslims too much in the new central legislature.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ ‘Daily Notes’ 20 and 22 February 1935, RPP XI/35/30.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Sarcar to R. M. Chatterji, 18 February 1935, N. N. Sarcar Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ ‘Daily Notes’, 25 February 1935, RPP XI/35/30.Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² ‘Daily Notes’, 27 February 1935, RPP XI/35/30.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Rajagopalachari to Rajendra Prasad, 2 March 1935, RPP XI/35/40.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ ‘Daily Notes’, 26 February 1935, RPP XI/35/30.Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Birla to Mahadev Desai, 28 February 1935, Birla, In the Shadow of the Mahatma, p. 150.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ ‘Summary Report of informal talks held… at Bengal P.C.C., 19–3–35’; ‘At Dr. B. C. Roy's residence, 19–3–35’; ‘Conference with Congress Workers… outside the present Bengal Executive, 20–3–35’, RPP IV/36/I.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Bengal PCC to AICC, 10 July 1936 file P6/707 of 1936, AICC.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ At first, the Bengal Congress claimed that its membership was 56,750; after checking the lists, the AICC reduced the figures to 42,385. Rajendra Prasad to Bengal PCC, 8 March 1936, RPP IV/36/21. The PCC accepted the correction; the higher figures given in Table 4 were alleged to have been the result of later recruitment.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ The huge membership figures returned from Tippera are an obvious overstatement. Nevertheless, membership may have been quite high, since Congress had benefited from the disputes between the Raja and his tenants.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ They argued that the Act of 1935 empowered the British Government to amend its terms by Order in Council, subject to the approval of both Houses of Parliament.Google Scholar

¹²¹ Memorial enclosed in Maharaja of Burdwan to Zetland, 4 June 1936, Bengal Anti-Communal Award Movement; a Report (Calcutta, 1939), pp. 3–9.Google Scholar

¹²² Ibid., pp. 11–35.

¹²³ Advance, 8 July 1936.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ Statement by Indra Narayan Sen Gupta, General Secretary, Congress Nationalist Party, Amrita Bazar Patrika, 22 November 1936.Google Scholar

¹²⁵ Suresh Chandra Majumdar to Jawaharlal Nehru, 18 July 1936, file P6/707 of 1936, AICC; cf. Sarat Bose to Nehru, 11 August 1936, ibid.

¹²⁶ Jawaharlal Nehru to Suresh Chandra Majumdar, 6 August 1936, ibid.

¹²⁷ K. S. Roy to Jawaharlal Nehru, 6 August 1936, RPP IV/36/83.Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Statement by Akhil Chandra Dutta, President of the Bengal Congress Nationalist Party, Amrita Bazar Patrika, 27 August 1936.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Resolution enclosed in Sarat Bose to Jawaharlal Nehru, 19 September 1936, file G 24/710 of 1936, AICC.Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Sarat Bose to Jawaharlal Nehru, 19 September 1936, ibid. He went on, maliciously, to quote Nehru's own judgement: ‘The Congress attitude to the Communal Award was extraordinary…. It was the inevitable outcome of the past neutral and feeble policy’. Nehru, J., An Autobiography (London, 1936), p. 575.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Jawaharlal Nehru to Sarat Bose, 4 October 1936, file G 24/710 of 1936, AICC.Google Scholar

¹³² B. C. Roy to Rajendra Prasad, 4 October 1936, ibid.

¹³³ Statement by Indra Narayan Sen Gupta, Secretary, Bengal Congress Nationalist Party, Amrita Bazar Patrika, 22 November 1936.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ Vallabhbhai Patel to B. C. Roy, 9 October 1936, file G 24/710 of 1936, AICC.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ Secretary, Bengal PCC to all members of the Working Committee, 13 November 1936, ibid.

¹³⁶ Sarat Bose to Jawaharlal Nehru, 18 November 1936, ibid.

¹³⁷ B. C. Roy to G. B. Pant, 30 November 1936, file P 6/707 of 1936, AICC.Google Scholar

¹³⁸ Jawaharlal Nehru to B. C. Roy, 3 December 1936, ibid.

¹³⁹ B. C. Roy to G. B. Pant, 17 December 1936, ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Now that important powers were at stake, provincial politiciand were compelled to woo the localities.Google Scholar

¹⁴¹ Baker, C. J., ‘Political Change in South India’ (Cambridge University, Ph.D. thesis, 1972), Chapter IX.Google Scholar

¹⁴² Congress candidates in Bengal won forty-three of the forty-eight General Seats, six of the seats reserved for the Depressed Classes and five of the seats reserved for Labour. Of the 250 seats in the new Assembly they won fifty-four.Google Scholar

¹⁴³ Nalinaksha Sanyal to Nehru, 20 February 1937; file E 5/840 of 1937, AICC.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁴ On 18 March the Working Committee agreed in principle that in provinces where Congress held a majority of Assembly seats, they might consider forming ministries. Of course, this did not apply to Bengal. On 29 April this permission was withdrawn. On 8 July, after a great deal of negotiating with Government, the Working Committee again granted permission for accepting office, but Nehru directed that in Bengal the Congress should not negotiate for membership of any coalition.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁵ J. C. Gupta to Jawaharlal Nehru, 14 August 1937, file P 5/868 of 1937, AICC.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁶ Bose won support from the Punjab and Bengal, provinces without Congress ministries. He also won support from the UP, where some sections of the provincial Congress were opposed to the tenancy legislation of the Pant ministry; from Madras, where the Rajagopalachari ministry had alienated a number of supporters; and from Karnatak, where there was dislike of the tenancy legislation of the Kher ministry in Bombay. For details of this coalition I am indebted to the work of Mr B. R. Tomlinson of Trinity College, Cambridge.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁷ For the moves and counter-moves between Subhas and Gandhi, see Bose, S. C., Crossroads (London, 1962), pp. 126–70.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁸ This was the Communist Party of India in sheep's clothing.Google Scholar