¹ Hereafter the ‘Communists’ means the Chinese Communists, unless it is specified otherwise.Google Scholar

² See Zagoria, D., ‘Containment and China’, Caging the Bear, Gati, C. (ed.) (Indianapolis, 1974), pp. 109–27;Google ScholarHunt, M., ‘Mao Tse-tung and the Issue of Accommodation with the United States, 1948–1950’, Uncertain Years, ed. by Borg, D. & Heinrichs, W. (New York, 1980), pp. 185–233;Google ScholarGittings, John, The World and China (London, 1974), ch. 8;Google ScholarEsherick, J., Lost Chance In China (New York, 1974), introduction;Google ScholarTucker, N., Patterns in the Dust (New York, 1983), chs 2 & 3;Google ScholarMcLean, D., ‘American Nationalism, the China Myth and the Truman Doctrine’, Diplomatic History, 1986, vol. 10, pp. 25–42.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³ Hunt, M. and Westad, O., ‘A Field Report on New Historical Sources’, (China Quarterly, vol. 122, 06 1990, pp. 258–72.)CrossRefGoogle Scholar offer us a valuable bibliographical review of the CCP's historical sources made available in the 1990s. I wish to add that a line should be drawn in 1985. Before that year, the release of documents in CCP publications was still very limited, especially in comparison to the amount released after 1985. This is probably why the American scholars' articles in the recently published Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955, A Joint Reassessment of a Critical Decade (ed. by Harding, H. & Ming, Yuan, Wilmington, 1989)Google Scholar are quite disappointing in terms of how much they add to our knowledge about the CCP's policy on top of what we have known from the articles in Uncertain Years, published in1980. There is only one article in this new book, S. Goldstein's ‘Sino-American Relations, 1948–1950: Lost Chance or No Chance?’, which is written by an American scholar on the subject of the CCP's policy toward the US, while there are four articles out of a total of 17, which are written by Chinese scholars on the US policy toward China.

⁴ Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu, waijiaoshi bianjishi (the Office of Diplomatic History, the Foreign Ministry of the PRC), ed. Yanjiu Zhou Enlai (Study Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1989), p. 240.Google Scholar R. Keith interprets this metaphor to mean to build a new foreign ministry, thereby reducing the importance of this strategic principle to a matter of technicality. See The Diplomacy of Zhou Enlai (Macmillan, 1989), pp. 33–6.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations, ed. by Cohen, W. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1983), pp. 143–4.Google Scholar

⁶ Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi (The Archival Research Office of the Central Committee of the CCP), ed. Zhou Enlai nianpu (Chronology of Zhou Enlai) (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1989), p. 794.Google Scholar

⁷ Western scholars tend to speculate that the Party Centre had little control over the conduct of foreign policy at the local level; therefore, the ‘Ward Case’ was the action of pro-Soviet factions in Manchuria. For an example of such a misconception, see Goldstein's article in Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955, pp. 130–3.Google Scholar

⁸ State Department, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948, vol. 7, pp. 829–33.Google Scholar

⁹ Ibid., p. 833.

¹⁰ The CCP's sweeping victory in Manchuria in October 1948 made Mao keenly aware that within the year the GMD regime could be overthrown. His prediction was announced on 14 November. See Renmin ribao (the People's Daily), 16 November 1948. Given the fact that the CCP had been keeping close contact and consultation with Moscow, it would not be surprising if there were a cable from Moscow in the first ten days in November, which advised the CCP to adopt a radical policy toward the West. However, as we will see, the CCP had enough reasons of its own to do what it did. The CCP—Moscow close relations will be discussed in a separate paper.

¹¹ Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 796.Google Scholar This author recently obtained the unpublished parts of this telegram of 10 November which explicitly stated that the CCP's policy intended to ‘squeeze out’ (jizhou) the US and western diplomatic presence in Manchuria. To achieve this goal, the telegram suggested that certain measures be taken to confine western diplomats' freedom of action. ‘We should use such measures,’ the telegram continued, ‘in order to confine and isolate them. [If we] do not give them freedom of movement for some time, they will have to withdraw.’ Mao personally sent a telegram to Gao Gang on 17 November 1948, which reads: ‘[We] agree with your policy of squeezing out the US, British, and French consulates from Shenyang.’ The next day, Mao telegraphed Gao again to authorize the Communists in Shenyang to seize western consulates' radio communication equipment. These three telegrams are found in the Central Archives of the CCP in Beijing.

¹² He Di (Sino-American Relations, 1945–55, pp. 31–50)Google Scholar believes that the enlarged Politburo meeting in early January 1949 was a turning point of CCP foreign policy. Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai also indicate early 1949 as a critical moment in the CCP foreign policy making process. (China Quarterly, vol. 121, 03 1990, p. 97.)Google Scholar However, as the 10 November directive indicates, the decision for a radical policy toward the US had been made by Mao in November 1948 before an enlarged Politburo meeting could discuss and approve it. Hao and Zhai's article uses anonymous interviews to make a very important statement: ‘It was in early 1949 that Mao decided to abandon his hope of balancing American and Soviet influence and began to “lean to one side”’. If it is so, how can they explain the Party Centre's directive of 10 November, and the beginning of the ‘Ward Case’? This kind of source of information can only create confusion, and therefore should not be used in any serious studies.

¹³ Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 805.Google Scholar

¹⁴ See He Di, Sino-American Relations. It will be further discussed later.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 809.

¹⁶ FRUS, 1949, vol. 9, pp. 219–20.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ See Yanjiu Zhou Enlai, pp. 240–1;Google ScholarMartin, E., Divided Counsel (Kentucky, 1986), pp. 119–52.Google Scholar

¹⁹ In his Present at the Creation, Acheson admitted that the Ward Case was one of the principal reasons for the US non-recognition policy toward Beijing in 1949. It so happened that US non-recognition was exactly what the CCP wanted. This was apparently beyond Acheson's comprehension, and the comprehension of many later American scholars.

²⁰ FRUS, 1948, vol. 7, p. 840.Google Scholar

²¹ Ibid., pp. 834–7.

²² See Hunt (see In. 2), p. 204;Google ScholarGittings (see fn. 2), pp. 177–8.Google Scholar

²³ See Reardon-Anderson, James, Yenan and the Great Powers (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1980), pp. 93–4.Google Scholar

²⁴ FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, p. 952.Google Scholar

²⁵ Zhou Enlai nianpu, pp. 824–5.Google Scholar

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, p. 746.Google Scholar

²⁹ Selected Works of Mao Tse-turzg (SW) (Peking, 1961), vol. 4, p. 370.Google Scholar

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Uncertain Years, pp. 261–4;Google ScholarSino-American Relations, 1945–1955, pp. 130–5.Google Scholar I am not so sure about where Goldstein stands on the following two propositions: Mao and his colleagues did not want a working relationship with the US because of who they were and what they believed, just as a rabbi would not eat a ham sandwich (Goldstein's analogy). Or, the CCP leadership wanted a working relationship with Washington, but this ‘ham sandwich’ was denied by the US, or the CCP leadership could not eat it because of the opposition from below and from Moscow. The first is a proposition of the ‘ideological school’, while the second is of the ‘situational school’ (terms borrowed from Levine, Steven, Uncertain Years, pp. 181–4).Google Scholar It appears to me that Goldstein takes both positions.

³² Zhonghao, Wen, ‘Shixi xin zhongguo chengli qianhou zhonggong duimei zhengce’ (On the CCP's policy toward the US before and after the proclamation of the new China), a presentation at the Second Conference on Sino-American Relations, 1988, Nanjing. Wen is a faculty member of the Central Party School of the CCP. A copy of the manuscript is in my possession.Google ScholarAlso see Di, He, ‘The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Party's Policy toward the United States, 1944–1949’, Sino-American Relations, 1945–1955, pp. 31–50.Google Scholar

³³ Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 808.Google Scholar

³⁴ Wen Zhonghao (see fn. 32).Google Scholar

³⁵ Ibid.; He Di, Lishi yanjiu, 1987, no. 3, pp. 15–23.

³⁶ See Wen and He (see fn. 32).Google Scholar

³⁷ FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, p. 746.Google Scholar

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 766–7.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 753.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 746.

⁴² Ibid., pp. 357–60.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 363.

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 384.

⁴⁵ See Martin, , Divided Counsel, p. 34.Google Scholar Edwin Martin is probably the first historian in the US who systematically challenges the myth of the ‘lost chance in China’. Also see his article, ‘The Chou Demarche: Did the US and Britain Miss a Chance to Change Postwar History in Asia?’, Foreign Service Journal, November 1981.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, pp. 398–9.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Martin, , Divided Counsel, pp. 35–6.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Tucker, , Patterns in the Dust, pp. 42–3.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See the CCP's ‘Manifesto of the Second National Congress’, Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (Selected Documents of the CCP Party Centre) (Beijing: Zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1989), vol. 1, pp. 99–118. (Hereafter referred to as xuanji.)Google Scholar

⁵⁰ ‘Zhongyang tonggao disanhao’ (The Parry Centre's Circular No. 3), 18 Sept. 1928; ibid., vol. 4, pp. 590–603.

⁵¹ Zhou Enlai nianpu, p. 496.Google Scholar

⁵² Jiefang ribao, 9, 10 04 1945.Google Scholar The above paragraphs offer only a few examples of how the CCP perceived the nature of US economic expansion. A detailed discussion of the CCP's policy toward the US before 1945 is the subject of a separate paper.

⁵³ SW, vol. 4, pp. 370–1.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 368–9. Tozer, Warren (‘Last Bridge to China’, Diplomatic History, 1977, no. 1, pp. 64–78.)Google Scholar believes that the CCP would have let the American-owned Shanghai Power Company survive, had Washington dealt with Beijing in a reasonable fashion. But, in light of Mao's explicitly-stated policy toward foreign enterprises and trade, and given the fact that even Chinese-owned private enterprises, or peasant private ownership, were not tolerated by the CCP when Mao was alive, Tozer's argument is questionable. Yes, the CCP was tactful in dealing with the American Power Company because they wanted to continue Shanghai's supply of electricity before the Chinese could effectively take over. They also intended to use American ownership to protect the power plant from the GMD's air raids. Nonetheless, one should not confuse the CCP's tactfulness with sincerity in maintaining business relations with the US. If one looks into what happened to British-owned enterprises in China, Tozer's assumption that the American Power Company might have survived under the CCP seems hardly convincing.

⁵⁵ It is interesting to note that to this day the CCP is still very much concerned about the political and ideological impact that come to China together with western goods and capital. Beijing's policy of establishing ‘special economic zones’ is designed to minimize that western impact detrimental to the Communist system, while taking advantage of western technology and capital. It can be reasoned that the CCP's fear of the western political and ideological impact was much stronger 40 years ago.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 369–70.

⁵⁷ See ‘Information Circular Airgram’, 30 March, Box 11, RG 84, WNRC (Washington National Record Centre, in Suitland).

⁵⁸ FRUS, 1949, vol. 9, pp. 976–7.Google Scholar This explanation of ‘radical following vs. moderate leadership’ offered by the CCP confused many Americans, contemporaries and historians alike. For instance, Steven Goldstein argues that ‘Much of the antiAmerican and antiforeign outburst that occurred in 1949 was clearly contrary to the wishes of the CCP leadership’. See ‘Chinese Communist Policy Toward the United States’, Uncertain Years, pp. 261–4.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, p. 370.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 373.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 377.

⁶² Ibid. For Acheson's signature, see footnote 48.

⁶³ FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, pp. 1184–6;Google Scholar see Martin, , Divided Counsel, pp. 39–43.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Martin, , Divided Counsel, p. 42.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, p. 175.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Di, He, Lishi Yanjiu, 1987, no. 3.Google Scholar

⁶⁸ SW, vol. 4, pp. 425–32.Google Scholar

⁶⁹ FRUS, 1949, vol. 8, pp. 174–7.Google Scholar

⁷⁰ Ibid.

⁷¹ SW, vol. 4, pp. 451–9.Google Scholar For the text of the China White Paper and Dean Acheson's letter, see the version republished by Stanford Univ. Press in 1969 with Van Slike's introduction.

⁷² For the Mao–Zhang interview, see Zhonggong dangshi tongxun, no. 13, 10 July 1989.Google ScholarFor Mao's article, see Mao Zedong ji, vol. 10, pp. 291–307.Google Scholar