¹ See the excellent bibliographical notes at the end of Chapter VI, ‘The Sino-Japanese War and Eastern Triplite’, in Langer, William L., The Diplomacy of Imperialism 1890–1902, New York, 2nd ed., 1965.Google Scholar

² E.g.,Langer, William L. writes, ‘Curiously enough no Blue Book was ever published dealing with the Far Eastern crisis of 1894–95, and the memoir material is strangely silent on the matter’, op. cit., p. 185.Google Scholar

³ According to the Official Record of the Japanese Foreign Office, the following exchange took place between Ito and Li:

Ito: ‘Incidentally, tell me what kind of people are the Formosans?’

Li: (Being surprised by the word ‘Formosa’, yet pretending to be calm) ‘As Your Excellency knows, there are two kinds of people in Formosa: the mainlanders and the natives. Most of the mainlanders emigrated from the Province of Kwangtun. They are big and strong. The proportion between the mainlanders and the natives is about four to six. Now, was it because you were contemplating despatch of troops to Formosa that you did not allow my request to include the area in the Armistice Convention?’

Ito: (Smiling) ‘No, absolutely not.’

Li: ‘Do you think Great Britain will remain silent if your country should occupy Formosa?’

Ito: ‘There is no reason for Britain to intervene as she is a netural country.’

Li: ‘Certainly, Great Britain is neutral in the war. But if matters affect her own interest…’

Ito: (Laughing) ‘Well, the interests to be affected are yours not Britain's.’

Li: ‘Not quite so, because Formosa is close to Hong Kong.’

Ito: ‘True, but we will not attack anyone except our enemy.’

Li: ‘I don't think Britain will be happy to see any country except China in possession of Formosa.’

Ito: (Smiling) ‘Not only Formosa but any part of your territory if you want to cede it. I doubt if any country would ever refuse to accept it.’ (See Nippon Gaiko Bunsho Vol. 28.)

⁴ It was not until the publication of Die Grosse Politik, Vol. IX, in 1923 that the Japanese Government came to know the details of French and German ambitions in regard to Formosa and the Pescadores. See the report from the Japanese Minister to Berlin, 5 December 1923, in Nippon Gaiko Bunsho, Vol. 28, No. 2.Google Scholar

⁵ Hayashi, the Japanese Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, stated: ‘As for Germany, she had no reason whatsoever for being at enmity with Japan, and she had no obligation whatsoever in Europe to oblige her to support Russia, as was the case with France.’ See Pooley, A. M. (ed.), The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, London, 1915, p. 75.Google Scholar

⁶ For the details of German policy, see Bee, Minge C., ‘Origins of German Far Eastern Policy’, in Chinese Social and Political Science Review, 21, April 1937, pp. 65–97.Google Scholar

⁷ The Manchu court finally approved the establishment of the Province of Formosa, separate from Fukien Province on 12 October 1895. For the background, see Kuo, T. I., Taiwan Shisiu Kaiso (Outline of Formosan Historical Events), Chengchong Ssu-chu, Taipei, 1954.Google Scholar

⁸ Import and export values at Tamsui and Tainan, the two major ports of Formosa in 1894 totalled 12,946,502 HK.Tls. The ten-year average (1882–91) shows 73–85 per cent of the import was opium handled mainly by British merchants. In May 1890, Germany appointed Dr C. Merz as Vice-Consul but he resided at Takao, the southernmost port. No other country maintained a consulate in Formosa. See J. D. Clark (compil.), Formosa, Shanghai, 1896. In December 1894, Trench, the British representative at Tokyo transmitted to the Home Office an overall analysis of the value of Formosa and the Pescadores to Great Britain and Japan made by Joseph H. Longford, a British intelligence officer. According to this report, the products of the island are ‘capable of supporting seven million people’. In 1892–93, the islands supported a trade with India amounting to £800,000. Although this report also emphasized the strategic importance of the islands, the Intelligence Division disagreed with this section.

⁹ See Nippon Gaiko Bunsho, Vol. 28, Record of Shimonoseki Conference.Google Scholar

¹⁰ For a first-hand report on the Republic, see Davidson, James W., The Island of Formosa: Past and Present, New York, 1903, Chapter 19, ‘The Rise of the Formosan Republic’.Google Scholar Also Mao, I-po, ‘Formosan resistance against the Japanese in 1895’, in Taiwan wen-hua lun-chi (Essays on Taiwans Culture), Lin, Shun-shan (ed.), Taipei, 1954.Google Scholar

¹¹ F.O. 405, 63, No. 134, British Public Record Office (hereinafter referred to as F.O.).

¹² On 17 February 1895, Baron de Morenheim, the Russian Minister to Paris, informed M. Hanoutaux, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, that when the issue of annexation of Formosa arose, it would meet with British objection. (Documents Diplomatiques Français (1871–1914), I^e Série (1871–1900), No. 371. Hereinafter referred to as French Document.)

¹³ Grey, Viscount, Twenty-five Years, 1892–1916, London, 1925, pp. 23–4.Google Scholar

¹⁴ The French Minister in London also made the same judgement concerning the British attitude. See French Document, Vol. XI, No. 376.Google Scholar

¹⁵ A similar proposal was made by Timothy Richard, a British missionary who was an intimate of Viceroy Chan Chi-tung of Nanking in March 1895. Richard's draft of an Anglo-Chinese Secret Alliance proposed that the British take over the negotiation for peace with Japan on behalf of China. In return for this, the Chinese would concede to the British the rights and responsibilities of developing China in terms almost identical to those of O'Conor's proposal. (F.O. 405, Nos. 134 and 165.)

¹⁶ A similar proposal was made by Timothy Richard, a British missionary who was an intimate of Viceroy Chan Chi-tung of Nanking in March 1895. Richard's draft of an Anglo-Chinese Secret Alliance proposed that the British take over the negotiation for peace with Japan on behalf of China. In return for this, the Chinese would concede to the British the rights and responsibilities of developing China in terms almost identical to those of O'Conor's proposal. (F.O. 405, Nos. 134 and 165.)

¹⁷ A similar proposal was made by Timothy Richard, a British missionary who was an intimate of Viceroy Chan Chi-tung of Nanking in March 1895. Richard's draft of an Anglo-Chinese Secret Alliance proposed that the British take over the negotiation for peace with Japan on behalf of China. In return for this, the Chinese would concede to the British the rights and responsibilities of developing China in terms almost identical to those of O'Conor's proposal. (F.O. 405, Nos. 134 and 165.), Vol. 63, No. 161.

¹⁸ French Document, Vol. XI, No. 270.

¹⁹ As to point (4) of O'Conor's judgement, the other powers, including Russia, had the same opinion. Even as late as 24 April 1895, O'Conor wrote: ‘As far as I can ascertain the German Government does not contemplate armed intervention at the present moment except under circumstances which would entail considerable advantages while incurring slight risk from the coalition with other Powers. Her maritime force is not such as to indicate extreme measures. Nevertheless, if she has joined as now seems certain with Russia and France in remonstrating at Tokio, she may possibly conclude that her interest will be best served by common action with those Powers. The French Minister has, I know, been for some time past in favour of a conference of the European Powers.’ (See F.O. 17, China 1234, No. 157.) On 23 May 1895, in his private correspondence, O'Conor was still saying, ‘I don't believe in any joint action of the Three Powers.’ (Letter to F. Bertie.)

²⁰ He gave this impression to M. de Courcel, the French Ambassador in London, on 23 February 1895. (French Document, Vol. XI, No. 376.)

²¹ In regard to Formosa the Admiralty reported: ‘From a naval point of view, Formosa possesses no really good harbour; as Keelung, the only place worthy of consideration, is exposed to the strong north-easterly winds and sea.’ The Intelligence Division reported that the ‘military value of the Pescadores are practically identical with that of Formosa’. In general, both offices did not see any immediate strategic value in these islands. See F.O. 405, Vol. 63, Parts 3 and 4, Nos. 213, 216, 226 and 42.

²² French Document, Vol. XI, No. 376.

²³ F.O. 405, Vol. 63, Part 3, No. 208.

²⁴ F.O. 405, Vol. 63, Part 3, No. 183.

²⁵ See above, note 22.

²⁶ Interestingly enough, the intrigued reporter asked Holstein, the German Minister, later in the autumn of 1895, why Germany had allowed herself to take part in the intervention. Holstein proudly replied, ‘The opportunity was too good to be lost, of driving a German wedge in between Petersburg and Paris’. See The History of The Times, 1884–1892, London, 1947, Chapter 8, pp. 180–1.Google Scholar

²⁷ French Document, Vol. XI, No. 422.

²⁸ The Canton Intelligence Report Quarterly, 31 March.

²⁹ In reply to the telegram from Trench in Tokyo reporting Japanese acceptance of the Tripartite Intervention, Lord Kimberley telegraphed: ‘Furnish me with any information you may be able to obtain as to the causes which have induced Japan to give way, and whether promises and threats have been made by Russia, Germany or France. Your report a fortnight ago was that Japan would not yield unless they resorted to force.’ (See F.O. 405, Vol. 63, Part 3, No. 233.)

³⁰ See Joseph, Philip, Foreign Diplomacy in China 1894–1900, London, 1928, pp. 129–30.Google Scholar

³¹ See O'Conor's letter to Bertie.

³² For criticism and subsequent change of British foreign policy in the Far East, see William L. Langer, op. cit., Chapters 14 and 15.

³³ Curtius, Frederich (ed.), Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe, London, 1916, trans. Chrystal, George W., p. 464.Google Scholar

³⁴ The other powers most likely to be involved in the congress would have been the U.S.A., Italy and Spain. The last was particularly interested in the issue of Formosa. On Spanish ambition about Formosa, see French Document, Vol. XI, Nos. 320 and 366.Google Scholar

³⁵ According to Prince Hohenlohe, ‘The Emperor then said he had written in the spring to our Emperor, saying that he would have nothing against our acquiring something in that quarter, so as to have a fixed depot or coaling station. I told him that the Emperor had mentioned this to me under the seal of secrecy, whereat the Czar made a gesture of approval. I then mentioned the Chusan Islands, to which, however, the British lay claim. “Yes”, said the Czar, “they always want everything for themselves. Whenever anybody takes anything, the English immediately want to take much more”; and he made a gesture of the arm. Thus he had read in a news paper than an Englishman had declared that England ought to acquire a point a thousand miles north of Hong Kong.’ (See Frederich Curtius (ed.), op. cit., p. 463.)

³⁶ Bunsho, Nippon Gaiko, Vol. 28. No. 819.Google Scholar

³⁷ Confidential despatch from Byron Brenan, British Consul in Canton on 14 May 1895. F.O. 405, Vol. 63, No. 201.Google Scholar

³⁸ In a confidential despatch to Lord Kimberley, O'Conor reported his conversation with the Chinese ministers in regard to the renewed proposal of handing Formosa over to Great Britain and stated: ‘If such an offer had been made before the War it would have been a very different thing but making it now seemed to me like proposing a loan on a bankrupt estate already pledged to another person.’(F.O. 17, China 1234, No. 160.) See also the secret despatch from the British Consul at Tamsui dated 20 April 1895, regarding the overture which was made in Taiwan for handing over the island to Great Britain.

³⁹ On 4 June 1895, O'Conor, in his secret despatch to the Foreign Office, wrote that ‘the strange development—independence in Formosa was alien-inspired’. His estimation of the situation was that the French would proceed to assume the protectorate of Formosa only ‘if the representation of three Powers should lead to complication with Japan’, otherwise the French were ‘not prepared to move singlehanded, although pleased with the idea of the proclamation of a republican form of government in the Far East’. Two days later in his private letter to his superior colleague at the Foreign Office, O'Conor proudly stated that he had ‘proved up to the hilt the connexion between the French and the proclamation of a republic in Formosa’. Three events prompted the British to believe that the independence was not genuine—the appointment of General Tcheng Ki-tong, the ex-Chinese Military Attaché to Paris, first as the confidential adviser to the Governor of Formosa and later as the Minister of External Affairs of the Republic; the visitation of the French fleet to Formosa between 17–24 May, a week before the proclamation of independence; and the republican form of government that independent Formosa proposed to adopt. (F.O. 405, Vol. 63, Part 3, No. 199.)

⁴⁰ At the request of Viceroy Li and John W. Foster, the British Minister sent a telegram on 26 May 1895 to L. C. Hopkins for help. The flag of the Republic of Formosa represented a tiger, or regardant, on a field azure, and was first raised on 26 May, with a salute of 21 guns, over the fort of Tamsui. (See J. D. Clark, op. cit., p. 187.)

⁴¹ Foster, John W., Diplomatic Memoirs, New York, 1910, p. 159.Google Scholar

⁴² Foster, John W., Diplomatic Memoirs, New York, 1910, p. 160.Google Scholar

⁴³ Foster, John W., Diplomatic Memoirs, New York, 1910, p. 156.Google Scholar