Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2008
With increasing income disparity between the developed and the developing nations of the world, there is an increasing tendency on the part of various governments of the Third World countries to export labour power among other commodities, with the hope of getting overseas remittances to improve their unfavourable balance of payment vis-à-vis the developed nations and/or to improve the economic well-being of the country as a whole. As well, some individual families and communities in dire straits are eager to send their members overseas not only to reduce the number of mouths to be fed but also to earn extra income to keep themselves from sinking too far below the poverty line.
2 McNair, H. F., The Chinese Abroad: Their Position and Protection (Shanghai: Commercial Press Ltd., 1933), p. 31.Google Scholar
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4 The early Ch'ing government saw the Overseas Chinese first as potential supporters of the exile nativist regime on the island of Taiwan (1644–83) and then as unfilial sons who might lure others to pursue mercantilistic riches—a despicable form of wealth in orthodox Confucian eyes. Finally, the Overseas Chinese were seen as ‘running dogs’ of foreign imperialists using extra-territorial privileges in treaty ports as covers for criminal activities. Harsh edicts were passed against Chinese traders going overseas by the early Ch'ing Emperors. Although not strictly enforced, these decrees resulted in considerable permanent settlement in Southeast Asia by mercantile elements in Southeastern China, as local officials used the law as an excuse to blackmail and extort their families. In the 1850s when the practice of kidnapping Chinese for coolie work in mining and plantation projects in Southeast Asia, Oceania and the Americas became more prevalent, Overseas Chinese were looked upon as victims of oppression. In 1859, the Governor of Kwangtung legalized overseas emigration in an attempt to control the human trafficking. This was sanctioned by the Imperial Court in its treaties with Britain and France in 1860 and with the United States in 1868. 1893 saw the official lifting of the emigration ban, allowing the Overseas Chinese free movement in and out of China. The Overseas Chinese were favourably viewed as gentry merchants by the Ch'ing government towards the end of the nineteenth century. See Freedman, M., ‘The Chinese in Southeast Asia: A Longer View’, Tilman, R. O. (ed.), Man, State and Society in Contemporary Southeast Asia (New York, 1969), pp. 431–49Google Scholar; Tsai, S. S. H., ‘Preserving the Dragon Seeds: The Evolution of Ch'ing Emigration Policy’, Asian Profile 7, no. 6 (1979): 497–506Google Scholar; Godley, M. R., ‘The Late Ch'ing Courtship of the Chinese in Southeast Asia’, Journal of Asian Studies 34, no. 2 (1975): 361–85CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Yen, C. H., ‘Ch'ing's Changing Images of the Overseas Chinese (1644–1912)’, Modern Asian Studies 15, no. 2 (1981): 261–85.Google Scholar
5 P. T. Ho estimates that without overseas emigration, the population of Kwangtung and Fukien would have increased more than 23.3% in the last century. Studies on the Population of China 1368–1953 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 287.Google Scholar For a general account of the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ forces leading to massive overseas emigration in Southeastern China, see Perkins, D. H., Agricultural Development in China, 1368–1968 (Chicago: Aldine Press, 1968), pp. 206, 214Google Scholar; Mei, J., ‘Socioeconomic Origins of Emigration: Guandong to California, 1850–83’, Modern China 5, no. 4 (1979): 463–501CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Zo, K. Y., ‘Emigrant Communities in China, Sz-Yap’, Asian Profile 5, no. 4 (1977): 313–23Google Scholar; Ho, , Population of China, pp. 52–3, 139, 167–8.Google Scholar
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9 The Chinese Exclusion Acts passed by the United States government in 1882 and 1924 prohibited Chinese labourers and their family members from entering the United States; those already in the States were not allowed to naturalize. However, students and merchants and the latter's family members were allowed to enter. American-born Chinese were allowed to sponsor their minor children from China. Although there were cases of labourers changing status to merchants, newcomers immigrating as merchants, and others admitted as sons of merchants or sons of American-born Chinese or as students, the Chinese population in the United States decreased from 107,475 in 1890 to 77,504 in 1940. Few in fact entered the United States from China after 1882. The Chinese Immigration Law (better known as the Chinese Exclusion Law) passed by the Canadian government in 1923 also allowed similar exempted classes to come to Canada. However, it was so stringently interpreted that between 1923 and 1947 (when the Act was repealed) only seven Chinese entered the country. See Lee, R. H., The Chinese in the United States of America (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong Press, 1960), pp. 12, 21–2Google Scholar; Li, P. S., ‘Fictive Kinship, Conjugal Ties and Kinship among the Chinese Immigrants in the United States’, Journal of Comparative Family Studies 8, no. 1 (1977): 51–2Google Scholar; Li, P. S., ‘Immigration Laws and Family Patterns: Some Demographic Changes among Chinese Families in Canada 1885–1971’, Canadian Ethnic Studies 12, no. 1 (1980): 61, 69.Google Scholar
10 The value of Overseas Chinese remittances between 1900 and 1933 was considerable. This was true particularly between 1929 and 1931, owing to the favourable exchange rates between the Chinese yuan and foreign currencies. Most of these remittances flowed into South China, so much so that unlike North and Central China, the South had considerable inflow of capital in the twentieth century. See Remer, C. F., Foreign Investment in China (New York: H. Fertig, 1933), pp. 187–8, 225–8Google Scholar; Wu, C. H., Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Remittances to Communist China (Stanford: The Hoover Institute, 1967), pp. 6, 11, 16Google Scholar; Han-seng, Ch'en, Landlord and Peasant in China, pp. 67–8, 111.Google Scholar
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12 Courting the support of the Overseas Chinese for economic development projects was originally a Ch'ing policy from the 1870s on. It was a last minute move to inject both capital and expertise into the ailing Chinese economy while still maintaining some features of the traditional society. Titles were sold outright to the Overseas Chinese in an attempt to raise funds and also as rewards for relief and charity donations. Overseas Chinese investment was solicited for the establishment of banks, pioneer manufacturing industries, railroad projects (for example the Ch'ao-chow-Swatow Railway and the Hankow-Canton Railway) and projects aiming at the overall economic development of the Hainan Island. Most of the projects were not successful, not only because of the lack of coordination on the part of the Nationalist Government and the continual problems of bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption, but also because the Overseas Chinese were more concerned with their home communities than with China as a whole, until nationalistic fervour was stirred up by Chinese reformers and revolutionaries in the first decade of the twentieth century. See Godley, (see note 4), pp. 361–2, 371–2, 376, 379, 383–5Google Scholar; Yen, C. H., ‘The Overseas Chinese and Late Ch'ing Economic Modernization’, Modern Asian Studies 16, no. 2 (1982): 217, 219, 221–2, 225–7, 229–30.Google Scholar With the success of the Revolution of 1911, the Overseas Chinese were more willing to invest in economic projects in their homeland. Among other innovations, returned emigrants introduced machines to Nan-hai and Shun-te Counties for the unreeling of silk cocoons, opened up pasture land in Western Kwangtung, and experimented on growing tropical cash crops in Leichou Peninsula and Hainan Island. They also introduced electric rice milling in the Ssu-yi area and started a mining project on the Kwangtung-Kwangsi border. See Lee, B. S., Modern Canton (Shanghai: Mercury Press, 1936), pp. 14–18Google Scholar; Vogel, E. F., Canton Under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949–1968 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 26–33Google Scholar; Negishi, B., Minami Shina Nōgyō Keizai Ron (Taihoku: Noda Shobo, 1943), pp. 68, 73–4Google Scholar; Kanton Chōsha Sho (Taihoku: Taiwan Sotoku-fu Rinji Minami Shina Chōsa Kyoku, 1938), pp. 3–4.Google Scholar
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14 Ch'en Han-seng has done a general survey of rural conditions in Kwangtung in 1936 which included some emigrant communities. One of the most notable studies of emigrant communities in Southern Fukien and Eastern Kwangtung is Ch'en Ta's work which has been challenged by Hsu, F. L. K., ‘Influence of Southseas Emigration on Certain Chinese Provinces’, The Far Eastern Quarterly 5 (1945): 47–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar Other works on the same general area include: Kulp, D. H., Country Life in China: The Sociology of Familism Volume I, Phoenix Village, Kwangtung, China (New York: Columbia University Press, 1925)Google Scholar and Ch'uang, W. C., ‘Fu-chien Chin-chiang Chuan-chü Hua-ch'iao T'iao-ch'a Pao-Kao’, Hsia-men Ta-hsüeh Hsüeh-k'e: She-hui-k'e Hsüeh-pan, no. 2 (1958): 93–128.Google Scholar There has been very little research done on the San-yi area. The study done by Yang, C. K., A Chinese Village in Early Communist Transition (Cambridge, Mass.: The Technology Press, 1959)Google Scholar may be relevant here. Unfortunately, he uses the term ‘emigrant’ to mean both overseas migrants as well as rural to urban migrants. Emigrant communities in Western Kwangtung have been depicted by the politically motivated account of Mei-t'ang, Ssu-t'u, Yüeh-chung Ch'iao-hsiang Tu-kai Ch'ien-hou (Peking: Kuang-ming Jih-pao T'e-k'an, 1951).Google Scholar The recent articles by Mei and Zo are more concerned with explaining the various causes of overseas emigration from the Ssu-yi area than with examining the impact of overseas emigration on the Ssu-yi area itself. Because of the chance to do systematic field work, anthropological accounts of emigrant communities in the New Territories of Hong Kong are much more enlightening. Among these are: Aijmer, L. G., ‘Expansion and Extension in Hakka Society’, Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch 7 (1967) pp. 42–79Google Scholar; Bracey, D., ‘The Effects of Emigration on a Hakka Village’ (Ph.D. Thesis in Anthropology, Harvard University)Google Scholar; Watson, J. L., Emigration and the Chinese LineageGoogle Scholar;, Pratt, J. A., ‘Emigration and Unilineal Descent Groups: A Study of Marriage in a Hakka Village in the New Territories, Hong Kong’, Eastern Anthropologist 13, no. 4 (1960): 147–58.Google Scholar
15 Ta, Ch'en, Emigrant Communities, pp. 116–117, 128–130, 145–150, 178–182, 192–6, 206–26.Google Scholar
16 Hsu, (see note 14), pp. 48–50, 56–9.Google Scholar
17 Ibid., p. 57.
18 A ‘lineage’ is a rural based patrilineal kin group. The members of the group believe that they are descended from a common ancestor and practise ancestral rites together on a regular basis. The lineage is a basic unit of social organization in traditional China. For a comprehensive account of lineages in Southeastern China, see Freedman, M., Lineage Organization in Southeastern China (University of London: The Athlone Press, 1958)Google Scholar; Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung (University of London: The Athlone Press, 1966).Google Scholar
19 Watson, , Emigration and the Chinese Lineage, p. 214.Google Scholar
20 Ibid., pp. 199–218.
21 Ibid., p. 215.
22 Ibid., p. 200.
23 In 1973–74, I interviewed fourteen elderly Chinese in Victoria and Vancouver who identified themselves as belonging to the Kuan lineage of K'ai-p'ing County. These informants left K'ai-p'ing between 1906 and 1953. They had spent a major part of their lives there and had visited their native place at different times. They had been both participants and eye witnesses of the changes in the community of T'uo-fu.
24 K'ai-p'ing Hsien-chih (Hong Kong: Ch'eng-wen Ch'u-pan-she, 1933), pp. 56–61Google Scholar; Negishi, , Minami Shina, pp. 76–9.Google Scholar
25 Lang, C. H., ‘Ch'ing-tai Yüeh-t'ung Hsieh-tou Shih-shih’ Ling-nan Hsüeh-pao 4, no. 2 (1935): 103–51Google Scholar; K'ai-p'ing Hsien-chih, pp. 30, 46Google Scholar; Zo, (see note 5), pp. 313–23.Google Scholar
26 Feng, H. F., Chung-kuo Nung-ts'un Ching-chi Tzu-liao (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1935), PP. 772–3Google Scholar; Han-sang, Ch'en, Landlord and Peasant in China, p. 109.Google Scholar
27 K'ai-p'ing Hsien-chih, pp. 139–43, 217–34.Google Scholar
28 While they were farmers most of the time, these servile household members (known as hsia-fu, hsi-min or hsi-tzu, depending on the locality in Kwangtung) were similar to the outcasts in other societies. They carried sedan chairs in wedding ceremonies, coffins during funerals, presents between families on all ceremonial occasions. They did all the cooking during the ancestral rites or other festivities for their Kuan overlords. For a general description of servile households in Southeastern China, see Watson, J. L., ‘Chattel Slavery in Chinese Peasant Society: A Comparative Analysis’, Ethnology 15, no. 4 (1976): 361–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
29 According to Watson, there were two patterns of emigration in Southeastern China: the traditional pattern in which not more than half of the members of the lineage emigrated and only a very few were successful; and the modern pattern in which more than half of the members emigrated and the success rate was extremely high. The Kuan as well as lineages in Southern Fukien and Eastern Kwangtung exemplified the traditional pattern while the Man in San-t'in exemplified the modern pattern. In the latter case, more than half of the members had emigrated to England and Western Europe. Their livelihood was almost completely dependent upon the overseas emigrants. Unlike the Kuan, the Man did not control an important market-town to be a commercially successful lineage. This probably explains why the whole of the Man lineage was geared towards facilitating emigration whereas the same was not true of the Kuan of T'uo-fu (See Watson, , Emigration and the Chinese Lineage, pp. 88–90, 92–102, 206).Google Scholar
30 In 1885, the Immigration Office in Canada began to collect a head tax of $50 from every Chinese immigrant. In 1905, the head tax was increased to $500. Still the Chinese continued to come in large numbers. In 1923, the Government of Canada thought it wise to prohibit Chinese immigration altogether. The ban was lifted in 1947 and the head tax was abolished.
31 Woon, Y. F., ‘Social Discontinuities in North American Chinese Communities: The Case of the Kuan in Vancouver and Victoria, 1880–1960’, Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology 15, no. 4 (1978): 443–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
32 There may be some truth in the official view of the People's Republic of China in its early years that Overseas Chinese were poor peasants and landless labourers before they emigrated. While overseas, they were members of the proletariat class. Their family members left at home were subjected to ‘feudalistic exploitation’ (Nan-fang Jih-pao, 1951 P. 6).Google Scholar
33 Watson, , Emigration and Chinese Lineage, pp. 139, 145, 152–3.Google Scholar
34 Ssu-yi Ch'iao-pao (Seattle: University of Washington Microfilm), 09 1948, p. 11.Google Scholar
35 Ibid., September 1948, p. 17.
36 Ibid., October 1949, p. 19.
37 All the Kuan I interviewed were members of the K'ai-p'ing Association in Vancouver or Victoria. Before 1949, among its various functions, the K'ai-p'ing Association was responsible for the transportation of bones of the deceased K'ai-p'ing natives back to their home villages for a decent reburial. This was done every eight years. The expenses incurred were paid out of the $2 (Canadian) compulsory donation each member of the Association had to make when they were buying a ticket from the Chinese shipping agencies in Vancouver or Victoria in order to visit China.
38 K'ai-p'ing Hsien-chih, pp. 185–7, 190–1 196.Google Scholar
39 Ibid., p. 198–9.
40 Ibid., p. 190; Chu-yun Ch'üan-chia K'ai-p'ing Tsung-hui-kuan Te-k'an (Vancouver: K'ai-p'ing Association, 1947), pp. 5, 80.Google Scholar
41 Much like the migrants in Southern Fukien and Eastern Kwangtung (Ta, Ch'en, Emigrant Communities, pp. 186–7Google Scholar) tne Kuan emigrants were concerned with territorial peace; they realized that one cannot protect one's life and property amidst unprotected territories, so instead of aiming at the aggrandizement of their own lineage, they donated to County-wide defense efforts. The Man of San-t'in did not have to do this, as the British authorities of Hong Kong were policing the area quite effectively (Watson, , Emigration and the Chinese Lineage, p. 205).Google Scholar
42 Kongmoon Trade Reports, 1913, 1916 (U.B.C. Microfilm Holdings: Imperial Maritime Customs Service Publications); Kanton Chōsa Sho, pp. 16–17.Google Scholar
43 K'ai-p'ing Hsien-chih, pp. 87–8.Google Scholar
44 Ibid., pp. 77–8, 82, 84, 206.
45 Ibid., pp. 206, 252.
46 See also Yao, T. Y., Kuang-tung-sheng ti Hua-ch'iao Hui-k'uan (Chungking: Institute of Social Sciences, 1943), p. 5.Google Scholar
47 Ibid., pp. 10–11, 15, 22.
48 Watson, , Emigration and the Chinese Lineage, pp. 52–6, 81, 132, 146–7, 155–7, 167, 170, 204.Google Scholar
49 Ta, Ch'en, Emigrant Communities, pp. 20–1, 74–5, 149–50, 206–10Google Scholar; Ch'uang, (see note 14), p. 122Google Scholar; Yen, (see note 12), pp. 228–9.Google Scholar
50 Davis, M. and Krauter, J. F., The Other Canadians: Profiles of Six Minorities (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1978), pp. 60–84.Google Scholar
51 Skinner, G. W., ‘Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China, Part II’, Journal of Asian Studies 24 (1964–1965): 195–228.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
52 Of a total of 201 primary schools established in K'ai-p'ing between 1911 and 1930, only 5 were financed by the County Government (K'ai-p'ing Hsien-chih, pp. 67–71).Google Scholar
53 Ibid., pp. 87–8.
54 Ssu-yi Ch'iao-pao, May 1948, pp. 15, 17.Google Scholar
55 The emigrants of Southern Fukien and Eastern Kwangtung who had gone to Southeast Asia were equally, if not more, enthusiastic about promoting education in their home communities (Ch'uang, (see note 14), p. 117Google Scholar; Ta, Ch'en, Emigrant Communities, pp. 146–61, 275–80).Google Scholar Like those in North America, the Overseas Chinese there wished to send their children to attend schools in China because the latter could not enter the civil service in the colonial governments of Southeast Asia. In addition, the Chinese there were also interested in training bookkeeping personnel and shop assistants to help with business overseas. This motive was not present among the emigrants to North America because of the stringent immigration restrictions after 1923. Thus the type of vocational schools in the Eastern Kwangtung and Southern Fukien area that provided apprenticeships in Southeast Asia were not present in the T'uo-fu area. In San-t'in, the emigrants were so successful abroad as restaurant workers that the sons of the Man did not see any reason for going to school. Enthusiasm for education was thus entirely lacking (Watson, , Emigration and the Chinese Lineage, pp. 193–5).Google Scholar
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59 The figures cited by Ssu-t'u (pp. 25, 61) when he talks about the Ssu-yi-Ho-shan area support my data in T'uo-fu. In one Hsiang in Ho-shan, for example, 14.4% of the inhabitants were emigrant family members; together they owned only 20% of the land.
Compared to the rest of Kwangtung, the rate of tenancy in K'ai-p'ing County as a whole was relatively low. According to Negishi (p. 252) the average rate of tenancy in K'ai-p'ing was only 36% in the 1930s. This was much lower than the 77–94% tenancy in the Pearl River Delta and the Han River Delta reported by Ch'en Han-seng (pp. 22–3, 115–16) and Ch'en Ta (p. 68).
60 Some Overseas Chinese who failed to improve their economic standing would not even return. See Siu, P., ‘The Sojourners’, American Journal of Sociology 58 (1952): 35–6, 42Google Scholar; Li, ‘Immigration Laws and Family Patterns’, p. 67.Google Scholar
61 Watson, , Emigration and the Chinese Lineage, pp. 158–9, 208–9.Google Scholar
62 The Chinese family did not operate on the principle of primogeniture. Landed property was usually divided equally among sons when one or both parents had passed away.
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64 This eagerness to build houses was traditional in the sense that members of non-emigrant villages such as Sheung Ts'uen in the New Territories were also concerned with building houses. It was felt that it was much more prestigious to own one's house, however shabby (Nelson, H. G. H., ‘The Chinese Descent System and the Occupation of Village Houses’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Hong Kong Branch 9 (1960): 113–27.Google Scholar
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65 Ssu-t'u (pp. 51–2) estimates that about 80% of the emigrants from the Ssu-yi area were very poor; 15% had just enough to maintain themselves and only 5% were rich. See also Yang (p. 142) for similar observations of the village of Nanching in the Pearl River Delta; and Kulp (p. 53) for his estimation of the high failure rate among emigrants in the Phoenix Village of Eastern Kwangtung.
66 In most villages in Southeastern China, particularly in single surname villages, people from each segment of the same lineage usually occupied one sector of the village (Freedman, , Chinese Lineage and Society, p. 4).Google Scholar
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