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The Advocacy of Malaysia—before 1961

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Mohamed Noordin Sopiee
Mohamed Noordin Sopiee
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science
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Extract

A Formidable consensus of academic opinion exists on the question of the formation of Malaysia. In its most commonly stated form, this consensus is manifested in an explanation which specifies a date—27 May 1961—and sees Malaysia as the outcome of the attempt to solve the ‘Singapore Problem’. The movement towards Malaysia is, with dull regularity, dated from the Tunku's almost casual, certainly very vague, reference to the need for a ‘closer understanding’ between Singapore, British North Borneo (Sabah), Brunei, and Sarawak, and for ‘a plan whereby these territories can be brought closer together in a political and economic association’ which he made in the course of a speech to the Foreign Correspondents’ Association of South-east Asia on 27 May 1961. The Tunku's initiative arose, it is almost invariably argued, from the fear of future events in Singapore. Since the Republicwould in all probability be granted a separate independence by 1963,the British would no longer be in a position to control the island's internal security, defence and foreign relations. The Federation would be deprived of the Internal Security Council through which it had had (in conjunction with the British) direct control over Singapore's internal Malaya viewpoint if an amenable Singapore government could be guaranteed. By May 1961, however, the opposite appeared imminent. There were indications that the PAP was rapidly losing ground. In the Hong Lim by-election held in late April, its candidate was severely trounced. This, combined with the knowledge that no government had in the past managed to win more than one term of office, and full aware-ness of the seemingly perpetual leftward movement of Singapore politics, ness of the seemingly perpetual leftward movement of Singapore politics, created the impression in Kuala Lumpur that unless something was done, the Republic would become a second Cuba threatening the security of the Federation. The Tunku was convinced, so the argument goes, that the Federation had to ensure control over Singapore's internal security. A reversal of his previous stand on merger was, therefore, necessary. This explanation may be referred to as the security theory on the formation of Malaysia. It has a corollary: having decided that the incorporation of Singapore was necessary, the Tunku had to find a racial counter-balance to the island's Chinese population; the Borneo territories had to be included because it was essential that Singapore be territories had to be included because it was essential that Singapore be brought into the Federation of Malaya. Malaysia was thus the logicalsolution to the Singapore Problem. Among those who have propounded the security theory are Willard Hanna, Arnold Brackman, Gordon Means, George Me. T. Kahin, James Gould, Milton Osborne, Tan Koh Chiang, J. M. Gullick, Emily Sadka, Sir Richard Allen and Justus Van der Kroef.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , July 1973 , pp. 717 - 732
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1973

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References

1 Sunday Times, 28 May 1961.

2 Hanna, W., The formation of Malaysia (New York, 1964), Ch. 3Google Scholar; Brackman, A., Southeast Asia's Second Front (New York, 1961), p. 47Google Scholar; Means, G., Malaysian politics (University of London Press, 1970), pp. 292 ff.Google Scholar; Kahin in Preface to Osborne, M.'s Singapore and Malaysia (Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.: Southeast Asia Program Data Paper No. 53, 1964)Google Scholar; Gould, J., The United States and Malaysia (Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 87 ff.; Osborne, op.cit.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Chiang, Tan Koh, ‘The formation of Malaysia: some aspects of political geography’ (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1966), pp. 534 ff.Google Scholar; Gullick, J. M.Malaysia and its neighbours (London, 1967), pp. 20–21Google Scholar; and his Malaya (London, 1964), p. 155Google Scholar; Sadka, E., ‘Malaysia: the political background’, in Silcock, T. H. and Fisk, E. K. (eds), The political economy of independent Malaya (Singapore, 1966), pp. 33 ff.Google Scholar; Allen, R., Malaysia: prospect and retrospect (London, O.U.P. 1968), pp. 133 ff.Google Scholar; Van der Kroef, J., Communism in Malaya and Singapore (The Hague, 1967), pp. 48 ff. This list can, of course, be much lengthened with ease. As far as I am aware, no serious attempt has been made in academic circles to challenge the security theory on the formation of Malaysia.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Interview with Tan Sri Sardon bin Haji Jubir, 27 March 1970. Sardon became the first elected Malay Legislative Councillor when he won a seat in the Singapore Legislative Council elections of 1948. He has been a Minister in the Federation Cabinet since 1955. Interview with Inche Senu, 26 March 1970. Senu was Secretary General of UMNO from 1955 to 1957, and became Ambassador to Indonesia from 1957 to 1962. In 1964 he was appointed Minister of Information and Broadcasting.

4 Interview with Tun Dr Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, 19 August 1969. Tun Ismail was appointed Member for Lands, Mines and Communications in 1953, Minister for Natural Resources in 1955, Minister of Commerce and Industry in 1956. He was Malaysia's first Ambassador to the USA and Permanent Head of the Federation delegation to the UN from 1957 to 1959. In 1959, Tun Ismail was appointed Minister of External Affairs. He was appointed Minister of Internal Security in November 1960 and became the Federation representative on the ISC.

5 Interview with Khir Johari, 8 April 1970. Khir Johari was appointed Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry in 1955 and has been a member of the Cabinet up to today.

6 Interview with Tunku Abdul Rahman.

7 Straits Echo, 16 September 1963.

8 Interview with Tan Sri Jaafar Albar, 27 March 1970. He became Chief Publicity Officer of UMNO in 1949 and held the post for a decade. In 1959 he was appointed Assistant Minister of Information and Broadcasting. In 1963, he was elected Secretary General of UMNO.

9 James Gould has written, without citing his authority, that by ‘1958 Tunku Abdul Rahman had endorsed a British suggestion of merger, but favoured joining, only Borneo with Malaya, leaving out Singapore since it raised Malays’ [sic] fears of Chinese predominance. The British refused to release Borneo without the inclusion of Singapore’ op. cit., p. 87.

10 Runciman, S., The white rajahs (Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 195.Google Scholar

11 Singapore Free Press, 26 August 1961.

12 Sarawak and North Borneo were ceded to Britain, and Singapore was separated from the Malayan mainland which was formed into a Malayan Union.

13 Malay Mail, editorial, 14 February 1946.

14 Straits Times, editorial, 22 May 1946.

15 ‘Sagittarius’, ‘Constitutional Problems in Malaya’, in Sunday Tribune, 21 October 1946. ‘Sagittarius’, arguing for the ‘centralization of authority at the centre’ also wrote: ‘The interests of British protected territories in Malaysia are identical.…. It is absurd that a combined population of less than eight million people… should require the separate dignities of four governors to sustain them.’ Italics mine.

16 The Times (London), editorial, 29 07 1947.Google Scholar

17 Colony of Singapore, Interim report of the joint coordination committee (Singapore, 1955), p. 7.Google Scholar

18 Straits Times, 28 November 1949.Google Scholar

19 Hatta, Mohammad, ‘One Indonesian view of the Malaysia issue’, in Asian survey, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 140.Google Scholar

20 Brackman, op. cit., p. 42.Google Scholar

21 Straits Times, 19 October 1962.

22 According to Lim Choon Mong, the Progressive Party arrived at the idea of Malaysia independently of MacDonald. Interview with Lim, 9 March 1970.

23 Wah, Yeo Kim, ‘A study of three early political parties in Singapore, 1945–1955’, in Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. X, No. 1, 03 1969, p. 128.Google Scholar

24 Singapore Free Press, 19 February 1947.

25 Progressive Party, Newsletter, No. 6, July 1952.

26 Colony of Singapore, Singapore Legislative Council proceedings (1948), p. B, 20.

27 Interview with C.C. Tan, President of the Progressive Party from 1947 to 1955, 12, March 1970.

28 Malaya, July 1954, p. 389.

29 Straits Times, 8 February 1955.

30 Straits Times, 2 March 1954.

31 The Merdeka Mission was due to leave in the coming month.

32 The Nanyang Siang Pau, which had been (like the Sin Chew Jit Poh) an advocate of the Malaysia concept since 1953, had on 3 December 1955 once again suggested the creation of a strong, stable, progressive, free and democratic united nation in South-east Asia. Nanyang Siang Pau, 3 December 1955.

33 Straits Times, 27 December 1955.

34 Sunday Standard, editorial, 27 December 1955.

35 Malay Mail, 28 December 1955.

36 Singapore Standard, editorial, 3 January 1956.

37 Singapore Free Press, 10 January 1956.

38 Utusan Melayu, 31 December 1955.

39 Utusan Melayu, 31 December 1955.

40 Utusan Melayu, 31 December 1955.

41 Singapore Standard, 20 February 1956.

42 Malay Mail, 21 February 1956.

43 Sunday Times, 11 March 1956.

44 Straits Times, 24 July 1957.

45 Singapore Standard, 20 June 1956.

46 Singapore Standard, 23 June 1956.

47 Straits Times, 24 August 1956.

48 Straits Times, 13 September 1956. There were probably also other reasons.

49 Straits Times, 11 February 1957.

50 Straits Times, 20 October 1956.

51 Straits Echo, 6 September 1956. Italics mine.

52 Straits Times, 6 April 1956. The congress also protected against the refusal of the British authorities to allow the entry of Dr Burhanuddin Alhemy of the PMIP and Ahmad Boestamam of the Malayan Party Raayat.

53 Straits Times, 22 April 1957.

54 No. 21 UMNO SUA 197/56 in Ibu Pajabat UMNO papers. The Tunku mentioned Sarawak support for UMNO in my interview with him.

55 Utusan Melayu, 6 November 1957.

56 Straits Times, 26 August 1957.

57 Singapore Standard, 25 September 1957.

58 Malay Mail, 30 September 1957.

59 Malay Mail, 7 October 1957.

60 See the Tunku's statement above.

61 Malaya, August 1957, p. 24.

62 Malaya, October 1957, p. 43.

63 The Times (London), 11 February 1958.Google Scholar

64 Brackman, op. cit., p. 68.

65 Sunday Times, 16 February 1958.

66 Sunday Times, 16 February 1958. Italics mine.

67 Sunday Standard, 16 February 1958. Italics mine.

68 Straits Echo, 12 February 1958.

69 Straits Echo, 27 February 1958.

70 Singapore Tiger Standard, editorial, 10 May 1958.

71 Malay Mail, editorial, 27 May 1958.

72 Straits Times, 31 May 1958.

73 Straits Times, 20 October 1958.

74 Malaya, November 1958, p. 38.

75 Sunday Gazette, 28 September 1958.

76 Straits Times, 10 November 1958.

77 Straits Times, 20 October 1958. Brunei's previous Sultan, Sultan Ahmad Tajudin Akhazul, had married the Sultan of Selangor's daughter in 1934. The children of Brunei royalty were sent to the Malay College, Kuala Kangsar. Sultan Omar himself went to school in Malaya—as did his children. The present Sultan attended secondary school at the Victoria Institution in Kuala Lumpur.

78 Straits Times, 20 October 1958.

79 Malay Mail, 11 November 1958.

80 Brackman, op. cit., p. 37.

81 Ibid., p. 37. This is corroborated by two of my interviewees. See also Gould, op. cit., p. 87.

82 In the 1955 elections the Alliance won 79.6 per cent of the votes. In 1959 it won another landslide victory but managed to win only 51.8 per cent of the votes in a much expanded electorate. However, it lost control of the state of Kelantan and Trengganu to the PMIP, a shocking defeat in view of the fact that in 1955 the PMIP had managed to win only 3·9 per cent of the votes. In 1959 the PMIP had increased its percentage five-fold.

83 In fact, both Lee and the British concentrated on convincing the Tunku to agree to the merger of Singapore with the Federation. (The Tunku was never to agree to a straight merger.) It was the Federation Government which had to persuade Whitehall to agree to the Tunku's plan on Malaysia with its integral timing aspect. British agreement came after hard negotiations only in mid-1962.