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The Sarawak—Indonesian Border Insurgency
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 28 November 2008
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On 28 November 1967, outnumbered Indonesian commandos, battling against more than five hundred guerrillas in the heavily jungled, mountainous area near Bengkajang, in the extreme western part of Indonesian Kalimantan (Borneo) close to the south-western frontier of Sarawak, were compelled to call for air support and reinforcements from the nearby crack Siliwangi army division, as the heavy automatic rifle and mortar fire of the insurgents was decimating commando ranks. The plight of the Indonesian regulars gave added significance to the concern voiced in the Indonesian Parliament a few weeks before that the Communist-led insurgents along the Sarawaken-Indonesian border should be prevented ‘from becoming a Viet Cong type terrorist band’, and to reports that Indonesian forces, engaged for some time in running battles with the guerrillas, had recently discovered in the forests near Sajung Kampong, Sebaloh and Punti various guerrilla caches of arms and supplies, including 'insignias with quotations of Mao Tse-tung’s teachings inscribed on them’.
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References
1 Antara Daily News Bulletin, 10 October 1967, p. 1, and 14 October 1967, p. IV.Google Scholar
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38 Antara Daily News Bulletin, 29 November, pp. II–III; I and II December 1967, p. III. In November 1967 (see The Sarawak Tribune, 30 November 1967), the Philippine government also denied that Kifli was the guest of its defence department, according to Malaysian deputy premier Razak. Kifli had earlier gone to Manila declaring his readiness to lead a new guerrilla campaign if Malaysia did not agree to a referendum on the status of Sabah and Sarawak. Despite Manila's disavowal, recent discovery of an alleged guerrilla training camp on Corregidor island, in Manila Bay, where forces were allegedly trained for a campaign in Sabah in conjunction with the Philippine claim on Sabah, has given Kiffi's visit to Manila a new significance. For some time to come the conflicting interests of Kuala Lumpur, Manila and Djakarta, combined with secessionist sentiment in Sarawak and Sabah, are going to provide a setting for the machinations of ambitious opportunists and their guerrilla followers in the North-west Borneo region.Google Scholar
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