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The Malaysian General Election of 1969: A Political Analysis1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Martin Rudner
Martin Rudner
Affiliation:
Institute of Asian and African Studies, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel.
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Extract

Contemporary comparative political science has regarded Malaysia as the most developed politically of the new of Asia and Africa. A good measure of Malaysia's imputed political development derived from its ‘competitive’ electoral process which had several parties vying freely and actively for political representation and, ultimately, power. Impressive as political performances as they have been, elections are really relatively new to Malaysia, the first having been held at the municipal level as late as 1952. General Elections were first held only in 1955, and then for a small majority of the Colonial Legislative Council. Since then General Elections have taken place for a fully-elected Federal Dewan Ra'ayat (House of Representatives) every five years, in 1959, 1964 and again in May 1969. Although one party, the Alliance, consistently won overwhelming Parliamentary majorities and formed the Government, Malaysian General Elections continue to exhibit a high degree of political vitality. At every election a number of more-or-less well organized political parties and independents competed vigorously for electoral support from the plural political community that is Malaysia.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , January 1970 , pp. 1 - 21
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1970

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References

2 Cf. Almond, G., and Coleman, J. S. (Eds.), The Politics of the Developing Areas (1960), esp. p. 542, Table 4;Google Scholar and Hagan, E. E., ‘A Framework for Analyzing Economic and Political Change’ in Mosher, R. E. et al. , Development of the Emerging Countries (1962), pp. 3–6 and Table 1:1.Google Scholar

3 Election studies on Malaysia have been surprisingly few, the most comprehensive among them being Ratnam, K. J. and Milne, R. S., The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964 (1967).Google ScholarOn the 1959 election see Smith, T. E., ‘The Malayan Elections of 1959’, Pacific Affairs (1960).CrossRefGoogle Scholar No detailed analysis of the 1955 election is available, but see Smith, T. E., Report on the First Election of Members to the Legislative Council (1955)Google Scholar and Ratnam, K. J., Communalism and the Political Process of Malaya (1965), esp. Chapter 6.Google Scholar

4 In 1955 and 1964 seven parties also competed, whereas in 1959 only six did. The Alliance, PMIP and PPP competed in all four campaigns, while at least one faction of the Socialist Front ran in the two years that the Front itself did not.Google Scholar

5 On the Alliance formula of trading off economic advantage for political rights between Malays and Chinese, see Silcock, T. H., ‘Communal and Party Structure’ in Silcock, T. H. and Fisk, E. K., (Eds.), Political Economy of Independent Malaya (1963).Google Scholar

6 In one Penang constituency only was this ‘gentlemen's agreement’ violated when the PPP chose to run against the Alliance and GRM, and came out badly. Elsewhere the DAP, GRM and PPP refrained from splitting the non-Malay, non-Alliance vote.Google Scholar

7 Cf. Ratnam, , op. cit., Chapter 6 on this point.Google Scholar

8 In 1955 the PPP contested the election as the Perak Progressive Party. Afterwards the first ‘P’ was changed to ‘People's’, though the Party maintained its Perak identity.Google Scholar

9 For a discussion of a similar pattern for the 1964 election see Ratnam, and Milne, , op. cit., Chapter 7.Google Scholar

10 This holds true for the former United Democratic Party as well, which now formed the nucleus of the GRM.Google Scholar

11 Ratnam, and Milne, , op. cit., pp. 363–4.Google Scholar

12 Ibid., p. 363, passim on the urban-rural character of the 1964 election results.

13 On Malaysian demographic patterns see Caldwell, J. C., ‘The Demographic Background’ in Silcock, and Fisk, , op. cit., esp. pp. 65–6.Google Scholar

14 Urban seats: Bandar Malacca, Dato Keramat, Bukit Bintang, Ipoh, Menglembu, Tanjong Malim. ‘Quasi-urban’ seats: Batu Pahat, Batu Bahat Dalam, Johore Bahru Barat, Johore Bahru Timor, Kluang Utara, Muar Pantain, Alor Star, Sungei Patani, Kota Bahru Hilir, Malacca, Tengah, Seranban Barat, Seranban Timor, Seberang Tengah, Kuantan, Batu, Bungsar, Damanasara, Klang, Rawang, Setapak, Kuala Trengganu Selatan, Bagan Datoh, Larut Selatan, Kampar, Telok Anson.Google Scholar

15 On communal trends in Malaysian urbanization see Ibid., p. 82 passim.

16 Tanjong Malim (Perak): final results excluding spoiled ballots: Lee Seck Fun (Alliance) 7, 822 Keoh Cheng See (DAP) 7,787 Abu Samah b. Majid (PMIP) 1,296Google Scholar

17 According to Article 116 of the Malaysian Constitution the Electoral Commission could adjust the weighting of votes to give rural constituencies half as many voters as urban, thereby doubling the effective electoral power of rural votes. Up until the Constitutional amendment of 1962, its weighting exponent was 30 per cent.Google Scholar

18 Ratnam, K. J., op. cit., p. 205, noted the increasing concentration of representation in Malay hands at higher levels of political power. In 1959 Malays constituted 49 per cent of the population, but won 64 per cent of the seats, figures almost identical to 1969 despite the increase in Chinese political participation.Google Scholar

19 For a treatment of this question regarding 1964 election see Ratnam, and Milne, , op. cit., pp. 368–89.Google Scholar

20 Tan Siew Sin, Alliance Finance Minister, had the highest proportion of Malays in his constituency (almost two-thirds) of all MCA candidates. Whereas in 1964 he obtained 74 per cent of the poll, in 1969 his support in Malacca Tengah fell to just over half the total vote. The UMNO candidate with the highest proportion of non-Malays in his electorate (nearly four-fifths) likewise saw his poll drop from 67 per cent in 1964 to barely half (Rawang).Google Scholar

21 This point was acknowledged in the King of Malaysia's official birthday address published on 5 June 1969. The King noted that during the election campaign racial and religious matters were brought up without regard to consequences, and this had brought on disaster (Straits Times).Google Scholar

22 On the composition of the National Operations Council and Federal Malaysian Cabinet see Keesings Contemporary Archives (1969), P. 23413.Google Scholar