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Inheriting the Raj: Jinnah and the Governor-Generalship Issue

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Ayesha Jalal
Ayesha Jalal
Affiliation:
University of Cambridge
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Extract

In 1947 the British partitioned India and transferred power to two separate Dominions. Partition, however, did not mean the division of India between two ‘successor’ states. ‘India’ inherited British India's unitary centre, while ‘Pakistan’ consisted of areas with Muslim majorities which were merely seen as ‘contracting out’ of the ‘Union of India’. Congress's inheritance of the existing union centre gave it effective control over the joint assets of the two Dominions. The notion of a common Governor-General was, on the face of it, intended to safeguard Pakistan's share in the division of assets. The Indian Independence Bill was drafted on the implicit assumption that Mountbatten would remain as Governor-General for both Dominions until the division of the Indian army had been completed. As common Governor-General, Mountbatten could supervise the reallocation of assets and at the same time encourage co-operation between the two Dominions. But the reallocation of assets could not take place until a new centre had been created for the ‘seceding’ areas. The implication was that if a Pakistan centre was not formed, the assets would not be divided, and a Governor-General with a common touch could guide the Muslim areas back into the ‘Union of India’. Mohammad Ali Jinnah clearly recognized what might happen if there was a common Governor-General for two Dominions, one of which was to be regarded as the ‘successor’ and the other as the ‘seceder’.

Type
Articles
Information
Modern Asian Studies , Volume 19 , Issue 1 , February 1985 , pp. 29 - 53
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1985

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References

1 Various explanations have been put forward to argue for and against Jinnah's decision. On the British side it has been argued that Jinnah's decision was an act of supreme egoism which dealt a vital blow to Pakistan's interests in the division of assets and made it difficult for the two Dominions to co-operate on matters of common concern. The Pakistanis retort that it was Mountbatten whose vanity was hurt and his partiality towards the Congress would have tilted the balance of advantage against Pakistan. (See Campbell-Johnson, Alan, Mission with Mountbatten (2nd edn, Connecticut, 1972), p. 127Google Scholar; Raza, S. Hashim (ed.), Mountbatten and Pakistan (Karachi, 1982)Google Scholar, and Burke, S. M., ‘Quaid-i-Azam's Decision to Become Pakistan's First Governor-General: Its Pros and Cons’, paper presented at the Quaid-i-Azam Centenary Congress, Islamabad, 1976.) A debate at this level does little for a dispassionate understanding of an issue which appears to have been crucial to Pakistan's survival as a separate state.Google Scholar

2 For a detailed account of Jinnah's strategy see my book, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan (Cambridge, 1985).Google Scholar

3 Jinnah's hope seems to have been that the principle of ‘Pakistan’ would be conceded before he had to deal with the question of non-Muslim minorities in these two provinces. It followed that he needed a settlement based on ‘Pakistan’ at the centre before his followers in the Muslim provinces were allowed to settle terms with the non-Muslim populations.

4 The Cabinet Mission's proposed three-tier system was intended as a compromise between Jinnah's full sovereign Pakistan and Congress's demand for a ‘strong and organic’ centre. At the top there was to be the union of all-India which would control three common subjects: defence, foreign affairs and communications. Three groups of provinces, namely the Hindu majority-provinces, the Muslim provinces of the north-west and Bengal and Assam in the north-east, would form the middle tier and have their own separate legislatures. Below them all would be the provinces and States or groups of States which agreed to join one of the three sub-federations. See Cabinet Mission's statement, 16 May 1946, in Mansergh, N. and Moon, P. (eds), The Transfer of Power 1942–7, Vol. VII (London, 1977), pp. 582–91Google Scholar (henceforth T.P. followed by volume number; all references are to page numbers).

5 See Congress Working Committee's resolution,8 March 1947,T.P., IX, 899–900.Google Scholar

6 As for the Indian States, if they failed to join the ‘union’ by June 1948, the centre would automatically slap its authority over them in matters to do with foreign affairs, defence and communications.

7 See note on proposals handed to the Secretary of State by Sudhir Ghosh, annex II to document 524, ibid., pp. 923–4.

8 According to conservative military estimates it would take as long as five years for a complete Indianization of the Indian army. If this process was to be completed by June 1948 and the British were also expected to carve out an army for Pakistan it would have been impossible to meet the deadline for a transfer of power. Moreover, an unified army under effective control seemed the best insurance against a complete breakdown of order before a transfer of power.

9 Record of Mountbatten's interview with Jinnah, 10 April 1947, T.P., X, 186–7.

10 Record of Mountbatten's interview with Jinnah, 7 April 1947, ibid., p. 149.

11 Viceroy's report no. 4, 24 April 1947, ibid., p. 407.

12 Mountbatten's interview with Patel, 25 April 1947, ibid., pp. 424–6.

13 See Viceroy's sixth miscellaneous meeting, 22 April 1947, ibid., p. 364.

14 See minutes of the Viceroy's seventh miscellaneous meeting, 23 April 1947, ibid., p. 381.

15 Viceroy's report no. 5, 1 May 1947, ibid., p. 540.

16 Viceroy's ninth miscellaneous meeting, 1 May 1947, ibid., p. 511.

17 See Nehru's plan, 8 May 1947, ibid., pp. 673–4.

18 Minutes of the Viceroy's twenty-seventh meeting, 7 May 1947, ibid., p. 659.

19 Mountbatten to Ismay, 8 May 1947, ibid., p. 699.

20 Mountbatten to Ismay, no. 54-SC, 11 May 1947, L/PO/428, I.O.L.

21 Ismay to Mountbatten, 9 May 1947, T.P., X, 722.Google Scholar

22 Campbell-Johnson, , Mission with Mountbatten, p. 87.Google Scholar

23 Ismay to Mountbatten, telegram, no. 6142, 12 May 1947, L/PO/428, I.O.L.

24 ibid.

25 See revised draft plan, T.P., X, 723–8.

26 Mountbatten to Ismay, 11 May 1947, ibid., pp. 776–7.

27 Nehru to Mountbatten, 11 May 1947, ibid., pp. 756–7.

28 Mountbatten to Ismay, 11 May 1947, ibid., pp. 779–80.

29 Viceroy's eighteenth staff meeting,21 April 1947,Google Scholaribid., pp. 348–9.

30 Jinnah had told Mountbatten that he feared that some Congress leaders were planning to ‘seize power by a coup d'état’ in which ‘he [Jinnah] and Mr Liaquat Ali Khan would be the first to be taken prisoner’. (See minutes of the Viceroy's seventh miscellaneous meeting, 23 April 1947, ibid., p. 381.) Patel was publicly calling for an immediate transfer of power to the interim government on the basis of Dominion Status. In this way ‘the central Government would form a strong centre and would have the necessary powers to put down disorder’. (See Patel's statement to the Associated Press of America, 9 May 1947, ibid., pp. 716–17.)

31 Viceroy's eighteenth staff meeting,21 April 1947,Google Scholaribid., p. 349.

32 Secretary of State's memorandum, 17 May 1947, ibid., pp. 876–7.

33 See the Muslim League's comments on the draft announcement, 17 May 1947, ibid., pp. 852–3.

34 See document no. 466, ibid., pp. 861–2.

35 Mountbatten's interview with Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, 17 May 1947, ibid., pp. 872–3.

36 Jinnah to Mountbatten (via Sir Eric Mieville), 19 May 1947, Quaid-i-Azam Papers (QAP) File no. 22, pp. 64–6.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid., p. 66.

39 See Nehru's comments in V.C.P.50, 16 May 1947, document no. 464, T.P., X, 857(j), and the revised draft announcement in document 476, ibid., p. 887, paragraph nineteen.

40 See Nehru to Brockman, 19 May 1947, ibid., pp. 892–3.

41 See document no. 466, ibid., p. 861, paragraph five.

42 See Nehru's comments on the transfer of power proposals, 17 May 1947, ibid., p. 869.

43 See QAP/File no. 22, p. 103.

44 Jinnah to Mieville, ?20 May 1947, ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Jinnah was still offering the olive branch to the Congress: ‘I envisage an alliance, pact or treaty between Pakistan and Hindustan in the mutual interest of both and against any aggressive outsider’. (See Jinnah's remarks on Pakistan, 21 May 1947, T.P., X, 929–30.)Google Scholar

47 Ibid.

48 See India and Burma Committee meeting,I.B.(47)27 meeting,22 May 1947,Google Scholaribid., pp. 953–4.

49 Ibid.

50 Record of Henderson's conversation with Krishna Menon, 23 May 1947, ibid., p. 962.

51 Ibid.

52 Collins, Larry and Lapierre, Dominique, Mountbatten and the Partition of India: March 22-August 15, 1947 (New Delhi, 1982), p. 49.Google Scholar

53 The Partition Council consisted of two top ranking leaders each from the Congress and the League with Mountbatten acting as chairman without arbitral functions.

54 The Arbitral Tribunal consisted of three members, all of whom had judicial experience and were selected by the Partition Committee (the percursor to the Partition Council). The services of the Arbitral Tribunal were available to the provinces which were to be partitioned.

55 Mountbatten to Listowel, 27 June 1947, T.P., XI, 709.

56 See meeting of the Partition Council, 27 June 1947, ibid., 676.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 See Jinnah's memorandum on the Viceroy's proposal for the reconstitution of the interim government, 29 June 1947, ibid., pp. 750 and 753.

60 Ibid., pp. 752–3.

61 Ibid., p. 752.

62 See Indian Independence Bill, section 9(e), ibid., p. 788.

63 See the Indian Independence Bill, section 9(1) and 9(5), ibid., pp. 787–9.

64 See Muslim League's comments on the Indian Independence Bill, 3 July 1947, Ibid., p. 860.

65 Nehru to Mountbatten, 4 July 1947, ibid., p. 888.

66 Mountbatten's interview with Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, 17 May 1947, T.P., X, 873.Google Scholar

67 Indian Independence Bill, section 19(c), T.P., XI, 792.Google Scholar

68 Croft to Turnbull, 7 July 1947, ibid., p. 955.

69 Indian Independence Bill, section 8(2), p. 786.

70 Ibid., pp. 787–8.

71 Mountbatten's press conference, 4 June 1947, ibid., p. 151, fn. 2.

72 Mountbatten's interview with Dr. Khan Sahib, 5 June 1947, ibid., p. 150.

73 Caroe to Mountbatten, 4 June 1947, ibid., p. 126.

74 Caroe to Mountbatten, 5 June 1947, ibid., p. 152.

75 Mudie to Mountbatten, 7 June 1947, ibid., p. 194.

76 Viceroy's report no. 11, 4 July 1947, ibid., pp. 898–900.

77 Ibid., p. 899.

78 Ibid., p. 900.

79 Viceroy's report no. 13, 18 July 1947, R/3/1/150, I.O.L.