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The Indonesian Military and Economic Policy

The Goals and Performance of the First Five-Year Development Plan, 1969–1974

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Martin Rudner
Affiliation:
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Australian National University, Canberra

Extract

Nothing foments institutional change so much as a sense of past institutional failure. The New Order that came into being as a result of the October 1965 assumption of power by the ABRI (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia) inherited a crisis situation in economic policy. Decades of economic decay and capital dis-investment had brought the Indonesian economy to the brink of catastrophe. However, just as all revolutions are born in an ancien régime, so the heritage of the bygone Sukarno era left control of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy at the disposal of the state and thereby eased the institutional transformation.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1976

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References

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11 Asia Research Bulletin (December 1973). In March 1973 a ‘technocrat’, Radius Praiviro, was made Minister of Trade and Dr Sumitro was removed to become Minister of State for Research Activities.

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