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British Financial Advisers in Siam in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 November 2008

Ian Brown
Ian Brown
Affiliation:
University of Birmingham
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Beginning in the late 1880s King Chulalongkorn of Siam embarked on a radical reform of the structure of his administration. The existing organization of ministries, which had had its origin in the mid-fifteenth century, was abolished and replaced by a western-style governmental structure in which each ministry had clearly-defined functional responsibilities. In addition an attempt was made to introduce western administrative, accounting, audit and correspondence procedures into the operations of the Siamese bureaucracy. At the same time the Government undertook a number of major public works projects, most notably the construction of railways linking Bangkok with the most distant provinces of the Kingdom. The essential objective of these reforms was to ensure a more effective and efficient administration of the whole Kingdom by the authorities in Bangkok. In turn this was regarded as essential if Siam were to maintain her political independence in a period when all her neighbours had fallen under European colonial rule.

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Articles
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Modern Asian Studies , Volume 12 , Issue 2 , April 1978 , pp. 193 - 215
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1978

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References

This paper is based on research undertaken for a Ph.D. dissertation submitted to the University of London in February 1975. I am indebted to Professor C. D. Cowan of the School of Oriental and African Studies for his supervision of the dissertation. I should like to thank also Mr P. J. Cain and Prof. A. G. Hopkins of the University of Birmingham for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

1 At the time of writing there is no detailed study in English of this period of King Chulalongkorn's reign, or, indeed, of the reign as a whole. However, the reform of particular areas of the Siamese administration in this period is examined in David, K. Wyatt, The Politics of Reform in Thailand. Education in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn (New Haven and London, 1969);Google ScholarTej, Bunnag, ‘The Provincial Administration of Siam from 1892 to 1915: A Study of the Creation, the Growth, the Achievements and the Implications for Modern Siam of the Ministry of the Interior under Prince Damrong Rachanuphap’ (D.Phil. thesis, Oxford, 1968, to be published by O.U.P. as The Provincial Administration of Siam 1892–1915);Google Scholar and my ‘The Ministry of Finance and the early development of modern financial administration in Siam, 1885–1910’ (Ph.D. thesis, London, 1975).Google Scholar

2 Thamsook, Numnonda, ‘The First American Advisers in Thai History’, Journal of the Siam Society, Vol. 62, Pt 2 (07 1974), pp. 121–48.Google ScholarKenneth, Young T., ‘The Special Role of American Advisers in Thailand 1902–1949’, Asia, No. 14 (Spring 1969), pp. 1–31.Both authors argue that the American advisers exercised considerable influence in Siam, though their work was concerned essentially with the conduct of diplomatic negotiations with the major powers, not with domestic reform.Google Scholar

3 James, Ingram C., Economic Change in Thailand Since 1850 (Stanford, 1955).Google ScholarA second edition, with two additional chapters on the period 1950–1970, and entitled Economic Change in Thailand, 1850–1970, was published in 1971. All references to Ingram in this article will be to the 1971 edition.Google Scholar

4 For example: ‘the Financial Adviser…was one of the most powerful figures in the government until about 1930. Without his approval a foreign loan could probably not have been marketed successfully, and the government could scarcely have carried out any financial measures to which he had strong objections. On the whole, the entire line of Financial Advisers (1896–1950) favored conservative monetary and fiscal policies’.Ibid., p. 196.

5 ‘The principal aim of British policy was to maintain order and stability, and to prevent anything from disturbing or endangering her trade or investments. Maintenance of the status quo in Thailand also meant that the would remain a buffer between French and British possessions in Southeast Asia, thus eliminating the need for military expenditures to protect Burma on the east nad Malaya on the north. A conservative financial policy in Thailand was a safe, simple and unimaginative means to this end.’ Ibid., p. 173.

6 For example: Thomas, Birnberg B. and Stephen, Resnick A., Colonial Development: An Econometric Study (New Haven, 1975), particularly pp. 25–6.Google Scholar

7 Rolin-Jaequenmyns to King, 15 February 1896, enclosed in de Bunsen to Lord Salisbury, 20 February 1896, P.R.O. F.O. 69/169.Google Scholar

8 Ibid.

9 Christian de, Saint-Hubert, ‘Rolin-Jaequemyns (Chao Phya Aphay Raja) and the Belgian Legal Advisers in Siam at the turn of the Century’, Journal of the Siam Society, Vol. 53, Pt 2 (07 1965), pp. 181–90.Google Scholar

10 Lord Cromer to de Bunsen, 31 December 1895, P.R.O. Cromer Papers, Vol. 8, F.O. 633. Foreign Office List 1951.Google Scholar

11 King to Rolin-Jaequemyns, 16 February 1896, enclosed in de Bunsen to Lord Salisbury, 18 February 1896, P.R.O. F.O. 69/169.Google Scholar

12 Prince Sirithat (Minister of Finance) to King, 15 August 1896. National Archives, Bangkok (henceforth N.A.) Ministry of Finance (Khlang) series, 5th regin (henceforth r.5 Kh.) 1/16.Google Scholar

13 Greville, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 12 May 1898, P.R.O. F.O. 69/185.Google Scholar

14 Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, to Greville, 11 July 1898, P.R.O. F.O. 69/185.

15 Greville to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, 3 september 1898, P.R.O. F.O. 69/185.

16 Born in 1853 (interview with Mr D. C. Rivett-Carnac, 18 January 1971), Rivett-Carnac had joined the Financial Department of the Government of India in May 1872. He held a series of accountant positions throughout India until November 1895 when he was transferred to Burma, becoming Deputy Auditor-General in April 1898. This was the position he held when he applied for the post in Siam. India Office List 1905.

17 Bangkok Times, 3 December 1898.Google Scholar

18 Greville to Lord Salisbury, 28 February 1899, P.R.O.F.O. 69/195.

19 Stringer to Lord Salisbury, 27 February 1900, P.R.O.F.O. 69/206. Walter James Franklin Williamson had joined the Indian Service in June 1888, his first post being with the Burma Police. He then held various appointments in Hyderabad and Madras as a finance officer. In June 1896 he was promoted to Assistant AccountantGeneral in Madras, and this was the post he held when he was engaged by Siamese Government. India Office List 1928.

20 Paget to Lord Lansdowne, 16 January 1904, P.R.O. F.O. 69/254.Google Scholar

21 This is not to argue that the Foreign Office and Legation officials were not, in general, pleased to see British nationals holding what they regarded as a powerful post in the Siamese Government, or did not express some concern to each other that when an adviser resigned he could be replaced by a non-British official.

22 The financial advisers' paper (known officially as the ‘Files of the Financial Adviser’—henceforth F.F.A.) are held in the Library of the Ministry of Finance in Bangkok. They Consist of the official correspondence, memoranda and general records of the advisers for the period 1896–1950.

23 This was certainly the case with regards to Mitchell-Innes and Williamson. However, as will be argued later, Rivett-Carnac's positions was rather more complex. Despite his basic loyalty to the Siamese Government he was occasionally guilty of attempting to further British interests in Siam to the possible disadvantage of his employers. However, his schemes in this direction (as, for example, his intermittent plans to float the whole of Siam's first foreign loan in London) invariably collapsed through a combination of Siamese suspicion of his motives and British distrust of his personality.

24 The background to this dispute is examined in my Ph.D. thesis, p. 234.Google Scholar

25 Report by Mr Rivett-Carnac to Prince Mahisa, the Minister of Finance, 31 May 1906, enclosed with Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 29 August 1906, P.R.O. F.O. 371/133. It is clear from other sources (for example, Rivett-Carnac to Phrayā Ratsadā, 10 March 1906, F.F.A. 23/3) that these were indeed Rivett-Carnac's own views. It cannot be argued that in this memorandum the adviser was outlining the Siamese case on instructions from his minister.

26 Minute by Selby attached to, Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 29 August 1906, P.R.O. F.O. 371/133.

27 Minute by Campbell attached to, Beckett to Sir Edward Grey, 29 August 1906, P.R.O. F.O. 371/133.

28 Rivett-Carnac to Valentine Chirol, 14 December 1899, enclosed in Greville to Lord Salisbury, 16 December 1899, P.R.O. F.O. 69/197.

29 Great Britain, France and Siam. Minute by the Financial Adviser upon the present political situation, Rivett-Carrnac, 13 February 1902. Rivett-Carnac to King 14 February 1902, N.A. r.5 b. kh/39.

30 Tower to Lord Lansdowne, 24 March 1902, Lord Lansdowne's Private Papers, P.R.O. F.O. 800/142.

31 Greville to Lord Salisbury, 30 January 1899, P.R.O. F.O. 69/198.

32 Lord Lansdowne to Lord Curzon, 10 April 1902, Lord Lansdowne's Privete Papers, P.R.O. F.O. 800/145. The scale of Rivett-Carnac's political aspirations, and consequently the degree of apprehension he was liable to cause in London and Calcutta, can be judged from the fact that at this time (early 1902) Rivett-Carnac was constantly petitioning the King to be entrusted with a mission to India and the European capitals to discuss his scheme for the neutralization of Siam (Tower to Lord Lansdwne, 20 August 1902, P.R.O. F.O. 69/227).

33 Tower to Lord Landsdowne, 10 March 1902, Lord Lansdowne's Private Papers, P.R.O. F.O. 800/142.

34 It should be noted that Mitchell-Innes and Williamson rarely, if ever, strayed beyond their official area of responsibility.

35 Greville to Lord Salisbury, 16 December 1899, P.R.O. F.O. 69/197.

36 It is significant that Rolin-Jaeqeumyns (a Belgian) was succeeded in 1903 by an American subject (Edward Strobel), the United States at that time having few political intersets in Siam.

37 Tower to Lord Lansdowne, 24 March 1902, Lord Lansdowne's Private Papers, P.R.O. F.O. 800/142. Tower to Lord Lansdowne, 30 March 1902, P.R.O. F.O. 69/228.

38 Tower to Lord Lansdowne, 30 March 1902, P.R.O. F.O. 69/228.

39 The major economic and financial reforms undertaken in the second half of the reign of King Chulalaongkorn–and the financial advisrs’ influence on those reforms–are examined in considerable deteil in my Ph. D. thesis More detailed refernces will be given in the following paragraphs.

40 Brown, , Ph. D. thesis, p. 132–8, 200–1, 325–30, 334–6.Google Scholar

41 Van der, Heide, General Report on Irrigation and Drainage in the Lower Menam Valley (Bangkok, 1903).Google Scholar For a detailed examination of van der Heide's proposals see Ingram, , Economic Change in Thailand, 1850–1970, pp. 81–3, 196–202.Google Scholar For a more general discussion of irrigation projects in the central plain region, see Leslie, E. Small, ‘Historical Development of the Greater Chao Phya Water Control Project: An Economic Perspective’, Journal of the Siam Society, Vol. 61, Pt 1 (01 1973), pp. 1–24.Google Scholar

42 Prince Devawongse to King, 24 August 1903, N.A.r.5. Kh. 5.1/19.

43 Note: In regard to the cost of the Irrigation Scheme at reduced capacity. Van der Heide, 12 March 1906, F.F.A. 18/5. Memorandum: Further proposed schemes of Irrigation Department. Williamson, 14 August 1908, F.F.A. 18/4. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850–1970, pp. 197–8.Google Scholar

44 Prince Chanthaburi (Minister of Finance) to King, 17 March, 1909, N.A.r.5. Kh. 5.1/27.

45Van der, Heide to Chao Phrayā Thēwēt (Minister of Agriculture) 3/19, April 1909, F.F.A. 18/5.Google Scholar

46Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850–1970, pp. 197–9.Google Scholar

47Memorandum: Further proposed schemes of Irrigation Department. Williamson, 14 August 1908, F.F.A. 18/4. This memorandum is quoted by Ingram, in Ibid., p. 198.

48 It should be noted that for his research Professor Ingram had access only to the financial advisers' papers and not to the Siamese administrative records now held in the National Archives.

49 See, in particular, Prince Devawongse to King, 18 July 1903, N.A.r.5. Kh. 25/3.

50 Memorandum by the Financial Adviser upon the Cash Balances of the Government. Rivett-Carnac, 25 November 1903, F.F.A. 30/6.

51 Prince Mahit (Minister of Finance) to King, 18 December 1902, N.A.r.5. Kh. 25/1.

52Report of the Financial Adviser on the Budget of the Kingdom of Siam for the year 122 (1903–04), p. 12.Google Scholar Indeed, already in the previous financial year (1902–03) just over 40% of the allocation for railway construction had had to be met from the reserves. Report of the Financial Adviser on the Budget of the Kingdom of Siam for the tear 121 (1902–03), p. 14.Google Scholar

53 This was certainly the view of Prince Chanthaburi when he was Minister of Finance (letter to King on 17 March 1909 N.A.r.5. Kh. 5.1./27).

54 Prince Devawongse to King, 18 July 1903, N.A.r.5. Kh. 25/3; Ingram, , Economic Change in Thailand, 1850–1970, p. 199, fn. 11. The direct return to the Government was to comne from the sale of newly-irrigated land and the sale of irrigation water.Google Scholar

55 For example, it was suggested that the Chao Phrayā river would become less navigable in its lower reaches. Note in regard to the various particulars of the irrigation sheme at reduced capacity. r.s.125. F.F.A.18/5.

56 This is view which Professor Ingram acknowledges: ‘We cannot put the blame for the postponement of irrigation works from 1903 to 1916 on Williamson alone. No doubt there were many other officials who disapproved of the scheme…All we wish to assert here is that Financial Adviser did exert a conservative influence in the determination of capital expenditures. However, because of his position, the influence was probably a poerful one…Since about 1903 the government has of its own volition followed rather conservative policies. Probably it has preferred such policies.’Ingram, , Economic Change in Thailand, 1850–1970, p. 202. See also pp. 199–200. But this quotation raises a crucial Point: how can it be said that the financial advisers exerted a powerful conservative influence in the determination of capital expenditures when it can be shown that the actual allocation of resources decided was that which the Government itself—for clear reasons—preferred? The argument here is that the advisers would have been powerful figures only if they had persuaded the Siamese Government to adopt a particular policy with regard to an important issue, contrary to the ministers' own inclinations and wishes.Google Scholar

57Brown, , Ph.D. thesis, pp. 119–49.Google Scholar

58King to Prince Demrong, 22 June 1904, N.A.r.5. Kh. 25/7. Strobel, Edward Henry (1855–1908), a distinguished American diplomat and international lawyer, was Bemis Professor of International Law at Harvard Law School from 1898. In 1903 he was granted leave of absence to become General Adviser in Siam in succession to Rolin-Jaequemyns. He held the post until his death in 1908. Who was Who in America, Vol, I, 1897–1942.Google Scholar

59 Memorandum by the General Adviser on the Question of the Loan. Strobel, 25 October 1904, N.A.r.5. Kh. 25/5.

60 Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 18 November 1904, N.A.r.5. Kh. 25/8.

61Report of the Financial Adviser on the Budget of the Kingdom of Siam for the year 124 (1905–06), p. 7.Google Scholar

62 In a memorandum for Prince Mahit written in Augest 1902 (Lopburi-PaknampoUttaradit Railway Loan, 28 Augest 1902, N.A.r.5. Kh. 25/1) Rivett-Carnac had Suggested that, if possible Siamese loan should be divided between London and Paris. Yet at an interview at the Foreign Office in London in March 1903, he suggested that when the time came for the Siamese Government to raise her European loan he, thought he had to ‘hellip;make a show of inviting international competition…would do his utmost to secure that it should be actually placed in London’ (Memorandum: Interview with Mr Rivett-Carnac. Campbell, 23 March 1903, P.R.O. F.O. 69/250). Prince Devawongse was apparently aware of RivettCarnac's intentions: certainly he was adamant that in all his work in Europe with regard to the proposed laon, the financial adviser should be under the close supervision of Phrayā Suriyā, the Siamese Minister in Paris (Prince Devawongse to King, 24 December 1902, N.A.r.5. Kh. 25/3).

63 It is not difficult to see why the Siamese ministers turned to Strobel in June 1904—he was impartial. He was an American (and American banks had shown no interest in the proposed loan); he was not attached to the Ministry of Finance; he had at that time expressed no formal views on the issue. On each point the contrast with Rivett-Carnac and Williamson is clear.

64 For example, Memorandum: Lopburi-Paknampo-Uttaradit Railway Loan. Rivett-Carnac, 28 August 1902, N.A.r.5. Kh. 25/1.

65 Report of the Financial Adviser on the Budget of the Kingdom of Siam for the Year 124 (1905–06), p. 7.Google Scholar

66Cf. Ingram, Economic Change in Thailand, 1850–1970: ‘Without his approval a foreign loan could probably not have been marketed successfully’ (p. 196). ‘British Financial Advisers largely decided whether additional foreign loans were wise or not’ (p. 200). With regard to loans raised in the 1920s, ‘the Financial Adviser saw to it that loans were handled by British banks and floated in London’ (p. 182).Google Scholar

67Ibid., p. 198.

68 Paper Currency Act. r.s. 121 (1902). F.F.A. 24/2.

69 Memorandum: Shortage of ticals in the Treasury. Williamson, 18 October 1906, N.A.r.5. Kh. 26/15. F.F.A. 23/2.

70 Monthly Report of the Paper Currency Department, June 1910, N.A.r.5. Kh. 11/4. In fact, in that month the coin reserve was 12.1m. baht; this was equivalent to approximately 18% of total government revenue in the financial year 1910–1911.

71 Note on the creation of the Gold Standard Reserve Fund. Williamson, 27 February ary 1911, F.F.A. 23/14. Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam, 1902–1923. Williamson, June 1923, F.F.A. 30/22.

72Ingram, , Economic Change in Thailand, 1850–1970, pp. 170–4. It must be emphasized that the points made below imply only a partial challenge to Professor Ingram's arguments in this section. On two points there can be no dispute: that it would be difficult to imagine a set of circumstances where the Government would be required to use the full resources of the paper currency reserve to safeguard the note issue; and that by devoting such a high proportion of its resources to reserve funds the Government was inevitably forced to curb expenditure of a developmental character.Google Scholar

73Ian, Brown G., ‘Paper Currency: The Government Note Issues in the Reign of King Chulalongkorn’, Journal of the Siam Society, Vol. 60, Pt 2 (07 1972), pp. 23–44.Google Scholar

74In defence of this rather rash proposition it may be noted that the National Archives materials yield up a detailed account of a minor disagreement between Prince Mahit and Rivett-Carnac over the comparatively trivial matter of whether, in his speech opening the Paper Currency Department, the King should make reference to the fact that all government departments had been instructed to receive the new notes in payment for taxes and duties. Ibid., pp. 30–1.

75 It is not clear whether Phrayā Suriyā or Williamson first proposed this amendment, but it is clear that both supported it. Phrayā Suriyā to King, 17 July 1906, N.A.r.5. Kh. 26/13. Memorandum: Shortage of ticals in the Treasury. Williamson, 18 October 1906, N.A.r.5. Kh. 26/15. F.F.A. 23/2.

76 Monthly Report of the Paper Currency Department, N.A.r.5. Kh. 11/4.

77 Brown, Ph.D. thesis, Ch. 6. Indeed, Siam's abandonment of the silver standard in 1902 could well have been taken as another issue where a priori reasoning would perhaps suggest that the financial adviser exerted considerable influence. In fact, though Rivett-Carnac argued strongly in favour of the measure almost from his arrival in Bangkok in 1899, and indeed was intimately involved with the execution of the measure in 1902, the documents indicate that the actual decision to break with silver was taken by the Siamese ministers alone.

78 Report on the meeting of the Council of Ministers, 18 May 1908, N.A.r.5. Kh. 26/16.

79 Note on the creation of the Gold Standard Reserve Fund. Williamson, 27 February 1911, F.F.A. 23/14. Memorandum on the Currency History of Siam, 1902–1923. Williamson, June 1923, F.F.A. 30/22.

80However, this does not deal with Professor Ingram's point (p. 171) that the exchange stabilization fund ‘represented an addition to the currency reserve’. Yet there may have been good administrative reasons for maintaining separate paper currency and exchange reserve funds. If the Government's reserves had been held in a single, general, fund there could be no guarantee that the foreign exchange reserves would not be used for such items as the purchase of imported capital goods or the upkeep of Siamese missions abroad. Perhaps the only effective way to ensure that the Government constantly maintained sufficient reserves of foreign currency to support the baht was to establish a distinct exchange fund for that purpose, although even with a separate, specific fund, withdrawalsfor unauthorized purposes were not uncommon. Memorandum: Gold Standard Fund. Williamson, 19 December 1910, F.F.A. 23/14.Google Scholar

81Brown, , Ph.D. thesis, pp. 237–41.Google Scholar

82On this point the views of another British adviser to the Siamese Government, J. G. D. Campbell (the adviser to the Education Department, 1899–1901), are of interest: ‘In Siam…an adviser is an adviser, and nothing else. He may have a certain amount of executive and constructive work to do, but any new scheme or proposal he suggests has to be approved at any rate by his Minister, and if it is a matter of importance, may even require the sanction of the Cabinet Council or of his Majesty himself.’Google ScholarCampbell, J. G. D., Siam in the Twentieth Century: Being the Experiences and Impressions of a British Official (London, 1902), p. 169.Google Scholar

83At one point (Economic Change in Thailand, 1850–1970, p. 170) Professor Ingram acknowledges that the Siamese Government's policy of maintaining high reserve levels was determined principally by the very real fear of foreign intervention, but he fails to give this consideration sufficient weight in his overall analysis. If in retrospect it can be argued that the Government was too cautious—devoted too high a proportion of its resources to reserves—then undoubtedly the Government would have argued that it had erred on the right side.Google Scholar

84Lim, Chong-Yah, Economic Development of Modern Malaya (Kuala Lumpur, 1967), pp. 222–24/30.Google ScholarIn fact, a commission reporting in the 1930s recommended a 115% reserve ratio (p. 224, fn. 1).Google Scholar

85 It was not until 1938 that the Malay States actually participated in the Currency Board scheme; however, since the Straits Settlements currency also circulated in the Peninsula, the Malay States clearly benefited from the stability of exchange achieved by the system in this earlier period. Ibid., p. 224.

86 These were certainly features of Indian financial administration in the period following the abolition of the East India Company in 1858. See Bhattacharyya, S., Financial Foundations of the British Raj (Simla, 1971), esp. Ch. 3;Google Scholar and Moore, R. J., Sir Charles Wood's Indian Policy, 1853–66 (Manchester, 1966), esp. Chs 7 and 11.Google Scholar

87 Support for this assertion comes from the fact that the first financial adviser, Mitchell-Innes, so displeased his Siamese employers (and particularly the Minister of Finance, Prince Mahit) that they adamantly refused to renew his initial contract when it expired in early 1899. The rift between the adviser and the Government arose not from a disagreement over policy, but rather from Mitchell-Innes' persistent habit of making condescending criticisms of the Siamese financial administration (whilst rarely offering constructive, practical proposals for reform) and ultimately from his penchant for outspoken criticism of senior Siamese members of the administration. See Brown, Ph.D. thesis pp. 105–12.

88This debate was initiated by John, Gallagher and Ronald, Robinson, in their seminal article, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Reveiw, 2nd series, Vol. VI, No. 1 (1953), pp. 1–15.Google Scholar The literature on just the ‘informal empire’ aspect of their hypothesis is now immense. For a recent guide see Roger, Wm Louis, (ed.), Imperialsim: The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (New York and London, 1976).Google Scholar

89Brown, Ph.D. thesis, Ch. 6. For a general discussion of the factors which forced virtually all states to attempt to adopt the gold standard in the late nineteenth and early twentiety centuries (and the success of failure of those attempts) see Marcello, de Cecco, Money and Empire. The Internaional Gold Standard, 1890–1914 (Oxford, 1974), Ch.3.Google Scholar

90See Katharine, West, ‘Theorizing about “Imperialism’: A Methodological Note’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Vol. I (1972/1973), pp. 147–54.Google Scholar

91Ronald, Robinson's ‘Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration’, in Roger, Owen and Bob, Sutclifee (eds), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972) provides a possible basic theoretical frameworkd for such an examination.Google Scholar