¹ For two Japanese versions of these events see Chihiro, Hosoya, ‘Sir George Sansom, historian and diplomat’, International Conference on Japanese Studies, Zurich 1976 (forthcoming), and Kiyoko Takeda Cho,‘The Dual Image of the Japanese Tenno:Conflicting Foreign Ideas about the Remoulding of the Tenno-sei at the end of the war’,Google Scholar in Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies, Vol One: 1976, ed. Lowe, Peter (University of Sheffield, 1976).Google Scholar

Hosoya may have exaggerated Sansom's influence on U.S. Policy. Sansom provided British support for a non punitive occupation already advocated by Grew and his group. Sansom was, unfortunately, slow to discover the extent of U.S. wartime planning for postsurrender Japan. He would have preferred a short, inexpensive, indirect occupation relying heavily on the Japanese government, without a vast overseeing U.S. bureaucracy or large numbers of Allied troops. Sansom felt that trade and treaty sanctions would be sufficient to gain the conquerors' will. Cho's paper is valuable for its account of Japanese and Allied feelings on the Emperor, though her British P.R.O. references are sometimes incomplete and difficult to follow up.

² Sansom frequently reminded the Japanese government of this when he visited Japan with the F.E.C. in 1946. Sansom told prime minister Shidehara that British ‘opinion was still very bitter by reason of Japanese atrocities and that the Japanese army had perhaps done more damage to Japan by their cruelties than by losing the war.’ Sansom to F.O. on Shidehara interview, 22 February 1946, F3512/556/23 (FO371/54286).

³ A Gallup poll on 29 June 1945 indicated that 70 per cent of those polled favoured either the hanging or harsh punishment of the Emperor. See Neu, Charles E., ‘The Troubled Encounter: The US and Japan’ (New York 1975), p. 201.Google Scholar

⁴ Foulds, L. H. of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office commented on reports of Butler's speech that the ‘secretariat of the I.P.R. is largely staffed by professional British-baiters and it seems to me that we should consider very carefully whether any useful purpose is served by British participation in these conferences.’ F714/327/23(FO371/46444).Google Scholar

⁵ Instructions to consuls, 1 February 1945, F720/327/23(FO371/46444). The Foreign Office stressed that Butler had been quoted out of context by Pearson.

⁶ F635/327/23(FO371/46444).

⁷ An editorial in Amerasia for 29 December 1944 attacked Grew's argument that the Emperor issue should wait until the Allies reached Tokyo by warning that ‘to use the Emperor as an instrument of social control might well play into the hands of the very groups that are most concerned with preventing the reemergence of a democratic Japan.’ Owen Lattimore reminded readers in The Atlantic Monthly for January 1945 that ‘the Emperor was integral to the expansion of Japan whether the trigger was pulled late or soon’. Both in U.S. press digest from British embassy Washington to F.O. F676/327/23(FO371/46444). For additional comment by Lattimore, see Solution in Asia (London, 1945).Google Scholar Further support for the abolitionists was contained in Johnstone's, William C.The Future of Japan which was written in April and published in May 1945. Johnstone hoped that Japanese reformists would have sufficient courage to remove the Emperor themselves.Google Scholar

⁸ F3620/327/G23(FO371/46447).

⁹ F4975/630/G23 (FO371/46453). Earlier British objections to the Emperor signing the surrender documents can be seen in the F.O. minutes on the I.P.R. conference where a similar proposal had been made by U.S. delegates.

¹⁰ F4974/630/G23(FO371/46453).

¹¹ Dixon, Piers, Double Diploma (London, 1968), p. 180.Google Scholar

¹² The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938–1945 ed. Dilks, David (London, 1971), p. 781. Cadogan noted in his diary for 14 August: ‘considered telegrams from Washington showing that Americans are going ahead on surrender terms &c. without showing much disposition to consult us. We must accept this, and if Dominions complain we can say that we, too, were not consulted.…’Google Scholar

¹³ F4974/630/G23(FO371/46453). Similar opposition by Chiang Kai-shek was reported from Chungking. See F5024/630/G23(FO371/46453). Dr Sun Fo, President of the Legislative Yuan, had written an article ‘The Mikado Must Go’ in Foreign Affairs, October 1944, arguing that ‘Democracy by Imperial Rescript would be nothing less than a continuation of the Japanese game of hoodwinking the world.… There is no short-cut to democracy. Democracy lies in the will of the people to rule themselves. Its source cannot be the will of a Mikado, whether or not he is thought to be a god.’Google Scholar

¹⁴ Svensson, Eric H. F., ‘The Military Occupation of Japan: The First Years Planning, Policy Formulation and Reform’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Denver, 1966, p. 27.Google Scholar

¹⁵ ‘As former Ambassador to Japan, he [Grew] continued to be interested in the progress being made in SWNCC on the various policy documents. Furthermore, Eugene Dooman, who was Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Far East at that time, had been Counsellor in the Tokyo Embassy under Mr. Grew and continued to have easy access to him.’ Borton, HughAmerican Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan (New York, 1967), pp. 22–3.Google Scholar Grew 's importance and the comparable roles played by other presidential advisors such as Leahy over France, Stimson in the Phillipines & Stettinius at the U.N. is noted in Davis's, Lynn Etheridge work The Cold War Begins (Princeton N.J., 1974). Davis argues that ‘almost by default, responsibility for the day to day formulation of American responses to Soviet actions in Eastern Europe rested with the Dept. of State,’ (p. 379) as neither presidential advisers nor military leaders had any particular concern for what was regarded as a peripheral region.Google Scholar

¹⁶ United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan, in Occupation of Japan, Policy and Progress, Dept. of State Publication 2671, Far Eastern Series 17 (Washington DC, 1946), p. 75.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Ibid., pp. 75–6.

¹⁸ F831/327/23(FO371/46444). There appears to have been little British diplomatic or governmental discussion on the suggestion that the Emperor ought to abdicate in favour of the Crown Prince. British representatives in Tokyo disapproved of the idea that the Emperor should step down to symbolize his war guilt. See report from Foreign Office official MacDermot, 14 December 1945, F3981/2/23(FO371/54088) circulated to Far Eastern (Official) Committee on Bevin's instructions.Google Scholar

¹⁹ 413 H.C. Deb col. 352.

²⁰ Fi 1833/4/23(FO371/46431). The British list of Japanese war criminals was Tojo, Togo, Nakamura, Doihara, Nagano, Oikawa, Shimada, Umezu, Itagaki, Terauchi and Matsuoka. It did not include the Emperor. See F.O. to Halifax, Lord, 31 December 1945, UI0024/211/73(FO371/51052).Google Scholar

²¹ Svensson, , ‘The Military Occupation of Japan’, p. 92.Google Scholar

²² MacArthur's military secretary, Brigadier Gen. Fellers, Bonner F., had reported to MacArthur in October 1945 that the Japanese regarded their Emperor as ‘the living symbol of the race in whom lies the virtues of their ancestors. He is the incarnation of national spirit, incapable of wrong or misdeeds. Loyalty to him is absolute … it would be a sacrilege to entertain the idea that the Emperor is on a level with the people or any governmental official.’ To try the Emperor as a war criminal would result in the collapse of the Japanese government and ‘a general uprising would be inevitable. The people will uncomplainingly stand any other humiliation. Although they are disarmed, there would be chaos and bloodshed… the period of occupation would be prolonged and we would have alienated the Japanese.’ Fellers concluded that ‘American long range interests require friendly relations with the Orient based on mutual respect, faith and understanding. In the long run it is of paramount, national importance that Japan harbour no lasting resentment.’ Record Group 5, Box 21, Military Secretary Official correspondence of Gen. MacArthur, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Va. Indications as to MacArthur's own opinion were given in his statement in September that ‘untold saving in life, time, and money has resulted from retaining the Emperor.’ The Times 22 September 1945.Google Scholar

²³ Sansom despatch from Tokyo on the FEC visit sent 31 January 1946, and seen by Bevin. Fi826/2/23(FO371/54082).Google Scholar

²⁴ Sansom to Sterndale-Bennett, head of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, enclosing letter from Imperial Household minister Matsudaira giving the translation of Emperor's message of 29 January 1946. F3512/556/23(FO371/54286).Google Scholar

²⁵ L. H. Foulds minute, 27 February 1946, ibid. The Emperor on at least two occasions was reported as hoping that Japanese democracy would follow the British model. See questions on Government interpretation of Emperor system in Diet debate, Nippon Times, 12 December 1945.

²⁶ Far Eastern Civil Planning Unit report on ‘Future constitutional machinery for Japan’, 5 September 1945, F6487/630/23(FO371/46458). The Planning Unit and the Foreign Office Research Department were both doubtful whether discussion of the mechanics of political change had much relevance if the understanding of democracy was absent.Google Scholar See Hudson, G. F. (F.O.R.D.), 25 August, F6842/630/23(FO371/46458).Google Scholar

²⁷ Opinion of F.O.'s legal adviser Fitzmaurice, sent to cabinet 4 September 1945, F6712/630/23(FO371/46458).Google Scholar

²⁸ For example, Foulds', L. H. remark that ‘as we have got on tolerably well in this country for the past thousand years without a written constitution of any kind, we are no doubt less impressed than most others with the importance of constitution making’. 4 June 1946, F8016/95/23(FO371/54144).Google Scholar

²⁹ MacDermot, D. ‘Report on Conditions in Japan after Defeat’, 26 September 1945, F9160/4/23(FO371/46430). MacDermot returned to Japan on 1 September 1945 as F.O. representative with the British Pacific Fleet.Google Scholar

³⁰ MacDermot reported after the Konoye press conference that ‘it will be a pity if American political pressure undermines his authority so that he has to go. We might inherit a less obliging or intelligent personality and any sort of regency would tend, in present circumstances, to create confusion.’ MacDermot, D. report on Konoye's press interview, F9678/4/23(FO371/46430).Google Scholar

³¹ MacDermot, D. ‘Attitude and Activities of Prince Konoye’, 18 December 1945 F556/556/23(FO371/54286).Google Scholar

³² Sir Orme Sargent, head of the Foreign Office, commented that ‘whatever the facts, publication of the draft in this way has been most unwise and raises in an acute form the question where responsibility for the control is to be.’ F3620/95/23(FO371/54130).

³³ Morland, O., 21 February 1946, F4591/95/23(FO371/54131).Google Scholar

³⁴ Morland, O., 8 March 1946, F3620/95/23(FO371/54130).Google Scholar

³⁵ The State Department's political adviser to SCAP reported in November that ‘unless some miraculous change is wrought in the minds and hearts of the oligarchy, the draft revision when presented will fall short of providing a practicable frame-work for the development of democracy.… The above estimate of the situation does not reflect that of the Supreme Commander, his main commanders or his staff sections. Their view is very much more optimistic.’ Atcheson to Secretary of State, 15 November 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States 1945, Vol. 6, p. 856.Google Scholar

³⁶ Foulds, L. H., 14 June 1946, F8539/95/23(FO371/54147).Google Scholar

³⁷ F8264/95/23(FO371/54146). The Foreign Office noted it was ‘MacArthur v. the rest’. The FEC Constitution and Legal Reform Committee wanted SCAP to state publically that the draft constitution had not been approved by FEC.

³⁸ MacDermot commenting on members of the Shidehara cabinet, dated 13 October 1945 F9549/4/23(FO371/46430). ‘They are as little fitted for self-government in a modern world as any African tribe, though much more dangerous’. MacDermot, 14 December 1945, F3981/2/23(FO371/54088).Google Scholar

³⁹ United Kingdom Liaison Mission (UKLIM) Japan Periodical Report No. 3, March 1946, F7953/95/23(FO371/54144).Google Scholar For evidence on the formation of new political parties see the letter from Ted de Bary to Keene, Donald in War-Wasted Asia, edited by Cary, Otis (Tokyo, 1975), pp. 102–5.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ MacDermot reports on members of Shidehara cabinet, op. cit. MacDermot described it as largely composed of ‘elderly relics of progressive thought in the preManchurian days’, though he sympathized with the prime minister's point that ‘the occupation authorities tend to expect greater speed and efficiency in the democratizaition of Japan than the cumbersome local machinery can provide.’

⁴¹ Interview with Mrs Aso Kazuko, Tokyo, 9 January 1977. Mrs Aso acted as her father's social secretary. She recalled that General Gairdner, Attlee's personal representative to MacArthur, and Yoshida shared many of the same opinions over SCAP's activities. Morland reported after the formation of Yoshida's ‘food cabinet’ in May 1946 that Yoshida ‘genuinely wished to avoid office and no one else was anxious to take an unenviable job’. UKLIM to FO, 25 May 1946, F9820/95/23(FO371/54144).Google Scholar

⁴² Shidehara papers, Shidehara Peace Library, Tokyo.

⁴³ The F.O. concluded that ‘during the occupation, conditions favourable to reform and re-education can be created through the removal of restraints and the encouragement of existing democratic tendencies, but subsequent progress, and the final emergence of Japan as a useful member of the family of nations, can depend only upon the efforts of the Japanese people.’ In ‘British Foreign Policy in the Far East’, 16 April 1946, F6208/2129/G6(FO371/54052).Google Scholar