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Vox Clamantis in Deserto: Do You Really Mean What You Say in Spring?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2021

Lee J. Dunn Jr.  and
Nancy E. Ator
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Extract

Probably the most vexing result of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's [SJC] opinion in the Spring case is that judges, lawyers, and others faced with similar problems in other jurisdictions are likely to read the opinion and commend the Supreme Judicial Court for its efforts. Yet, once the background of this case is known, or once one reads the opinions of the Court of Appeals or of the Probate Court, or the briefs submitted by the parties and the amici curiae, the inadequacies of the opinion become apparent. In our view, the Spring decision works a disservice on all those both within and without Massachusetts who seek guidance from the courts as they attempt to resolve similar cases.

The Illinois Association of Hospital Attorneys [IAHA], among others, filed a brief amicus curiae in the Spring case for three reasons: First, to ask that the SJC reconsider the position it had taken in Saikewicz, and thereby to alleviate some of the misunderstanding caused by that decision. Second, to ask the court to reconsider whether the tests it enunciated in Saikewicz were truly workable in the contemporary health care delivery system.

Type
Article
Information
Medicolegal News , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , February 1981 , pp. 14 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of Law, Medicine and Ethics 1981

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Footnotes

*

The quotation from the Book of Mark (1,3) literally translated as “the voice of one crying in the wilderness,” reflects the concern of attorneys outside Massachusetts with a somewhat baffling series of appellate opinions culminating in In re Spring. Mr. Dunn, who is General Counsel at Northwestern Memorial Hospital in Chicago, and Ms. Ator, who practices law with the firm of Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller in Chicago, were the principal authors of a brief amicus curiae filed by the Illinois Association of Hospital Attorneys in the Spring case.

References

In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).Google Scholar
In re Spring, 399 N.E.2d 493 (Mass. App. 1979).Google Scholar
In re Spring, No. 49076 (P. Ct., Franklin Co., Mass., May 15, 1979) (temporary guardian, his son, was ordered to refrain from authorizing continued dialysis treatments; on July 2, 1979, a revised order was issued that permitted the ward's wife, son and physician to make any treatment decision.)Google Scholar
In addition to the briefs submitted by the petitioners and the guardian ad litem, briefs amicus curiae were submitted by the American Society of Law & Medicine, the Massachusetts Hospital Association, the Massachusetts Medical Society, and the Mental Health Legal Advisors Committee.Google Scholar
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Saikewicz].Google Scholar
The four enumerated “state interests” were: (1) the preservation of life, (2) the protection of third parties, (3) prevention of suicide, and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession. Id. at 425.Google Scholar
See Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. 1978); In re Dinnerstein, 380 N.E.2d 134 (Mass, App. 1978).Google Scholar
Commissioner of Corrections v. Myers, 399 N.E.2d 452 (Mass. 1979).Google Scholar
Lane v. Candura, supra note 7, at 1233.Google Scholar
A standard of competency similar to that required to execute a will was discussed in Lane v. Candura, supra note 7, but no standard was expressly enunciated or adopted.Google Scholar
In re Spring, supra note 2, at 495–96.Google Scholar
See Boston Globe, January 23, 1980, at 1, 49 (Spring's guardian ad litem responds to affidavits filed by right-to-life advocates and nurses involved in Spring's care by asking for a new hearing).Google Scholar
In re Spring, supra note 1, at 118, n. 1.Google Scholar
See, e.g., In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (Morris Co., Probate Div., N.J. 1978).Google Scholar
In re Spring, No. 80–37 (Mass. SJC, single justice, interlocutory order dated February 4, 1980).Google Scholar
Id. See also Doe v. Doe, 385 N.E.2d 995, 1000 (Mass. 1979) (incompetent ward's preference not to be committed to mental institution is “critical factor” to be considered).Google Scholar
One wonders how a test which requires that the Probate Court determine what the patient would have wanted for himself, could arise from or be applicable to a fact pattern in which the patient, Mr. Saikewicz, had an I.Q. of 10, a mental age of 2 years and 8 months, and was functionally inarticulate.Google Scholar
In re Spring, supra note 1, at 122.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
Id. at 120–21.Google Scholar
Id. at 121.Google Scholar
Id. at 122.Google Scholar
Id.Google Scholar
Id. at 121.Google Scholar
See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 337 N.E.2d 240 (Ill. App. 1975) (intent to cause death not required by statute that defines killing as murder); Ill. Ann. Stat. c. 38,§4.5 (Smith-Hurd).Google Scholar
E.g., In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Ill. 1965), and Holmes v. Silver Cross Hospital, 340 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill. 1972) were cited as authority for the proposition that a patient's right to make treatment decisions is founded upon his right of privacy. In fact, both opinions are based exclusively upon the First Amendment freedom of religious beliefs and do not even discuss a constitutional right of privacy.Google Scholar