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A note on the feasibility of generalised universal composability†

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2009

ANDREW C. C. YAO ,
FRANCES F. YAO  and
YUNLEI ZHAO
ANDREW C. C. YAO
Affiliation:
Institute for Theoretical Computer Science (ITCS), Tsinghua University, Beijing, China Email: [email protected]
FRANCES F. YAO
Affiliation:
Department of Computer Science, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China Email: [email protected]
YUNLEI ZHAO*
Affiliation:
Software School, Fudan University, Shanghai, China Email: [email protected]
*
Corresponding author. The work by this author was done in part while visiting Tsinghua university and City University of Hong Kong.
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Abstract

In this paper we study (interpret) the precise composability guarantee of the generalised universal composability (GUC) feasibility with global setups that was proposed in the recent paper Canetti et al. (2007) from the point of view of full universal composability (FUC), that is, composability with arbitrary protocols, which was the original security goal and motivation for UC. By observing a counter-intuitive phenomenon, we note that the GUC feasibility implicitly assumes that the adversary has limited access to arbitrary external protocols. We then clarify a general principle for achieving FUC security, and propose some approaches for fixing the GUC feasibility under the general principle. Finally, we discuss the relationship between GUC and FUC from both technical and philosophical points of view. This should be helpful in gaining a precise understanding of the GUC feasibility, and for preventing potential misinterpretations and/or misuses in practice.

Type
Paper
Information
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science , Volume 19 , Special Issue 1: Theory and Applications of Models of Computation (TAMC) , February 2009 , pp. 193 - 205
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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Footnotes

†

The work described in this paper was supported in part by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project Number CityU 122105), by CityU Research Grant (9380039), by the National Basic Research Program of China Grant (973) 2007CB807900, 2007CB807901, by NSFC No. 60703091, by the Pujiang Program of Shanghai and by the Young Faculty Program of MSRA.

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