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The computational SLR: a logic for reasoning about computational indistinguishability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 October 2010

YU ZHANG
YU ZHANG*
Affiliation:
State Key Laboratory for Computer Science, Institute of Software, Chinese Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 8718, Beijing 100190, China and State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Computational indistinguishability is a notion in complexity-theoretic cryptography and is used to define many security criteria. However, in traditional cryptography, proving computational indistinguishability is usually informal and becomes error-prone when cryptographic constructions are complex. This paper presents a formal proof system based on an extension of Hofmann's SLR language, which can capture probabilistic polynomial-time computations through typing and is sufficient for expressing cryptographic constructions. In particular, we define rules that directly justify the computational indistinguishability between programs, and then prove that these rules are sound with respect to the set-theoretic semantics, and thus the standard definition of security. We also show that it is applicable in cryptography by verifying, in our proof system, Goldreich and Micali's construction of a pseudorandom generator, and the equivalence between next-bit unpredictability and pseudorandomness.

Type
Paper
Information
Mathematical Structures in Computer Science , Volume 20 , Special Issue 5: Theory and Applications of Models of Computation (TAMC 2008–2009) , October 2010 , pp. 951 - 975
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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