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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 April 2025
While prior research has suggested that justice matters for multinational enterprises (MNEs), whether distributive justice affects a subsidiary's tendency to show initiative remains unclear. In this study, we postulate that the extent to which a subsidiary manager regards the sharing of profit and rewards from the headquarters as fair has a curvilinear relationship with the subsidiary's inclination to take initiative. Specifically, although a low to moderate level of distributive justice can motivate subsidiaries to show initiative, this stimulating effect will diminish when distributive justice goes beyond a certain threshold. We furthermore contend that this non-monotonic effect will differ between low internally embedded subsidiaries and high embedded subsidiaries. Results based on a sample of subsidiaries owned by MNEs in Taiwan support our arguments. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
虽然过去的研究表明公正性对于多国企业的管理很重要,但是结果公正对于子公司表现主动行为的影响尚不明确。本研究假设,子公司的管理者对于公司总部在利润分享和奖励分发上是否公平与他们是否会出现工作主动性之间存在非线性关系。具体而言,结果公平从低转向中等程度时,子公司的主动行为会逐渐增加,但在超过一定临界值以后,起作用就会逐步减弱。进一步,这种倒U型关系的强弱受到子公司的嵌入程度影响。台湾跨国企业子公司样本的实证研究支持了上述假设。
The two authors contributed equally to this project.